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ABSTRACT

The International--Part II section of the Proceedings contains the following 20 papers: "An Economic Imperative: Privatization as Reflected in Business Reporting in the Middle East. Egypt as a Case Study" (Leonard Ray Teel, Hussein Amin, Shirley Biagi, and Carolyn Crimmins); "Broadcasting in South Africa: The Politics of Educational Radio" (Paul R. van der Veur); "Why Beijingers Read Newspapers?" (Tao Sun, Xinshu Zhao, and Guoming Yu); "News about Korea and Japan in American Network Television Evening News: A Content Analysis of Coverage in 1996" (Jowon Park); "Political Parties and Changes in Taiwanese Electronic Media in the 1990s" (Wei-Kuo Lin); "State Control on Television News in Post-War Lebanon" (Marwan M. Kraidy); "American News Coverage of International Crisis Negotiations: Elite Sources of Media Framing and Effects on Public Opinion" (Dhavan V. Shah, Kent D. Kedl, and David P. Fan); "Press Finance and Economic Reform in China" (Huailin Chen and Chin-Chuan Lee); "Putting Okinawa on the Agenda: Applying Three Complementary Theories" (Beverly Horvit); "Western Press Coverage of the United Nations Operation in Somalia: A Comparison of Extra- and Intra-media Data Sources" (Anita Fleming-Rife); "Telling the Truth or Framing a Crisis?: Comparative Analysis of the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Threat as Portrayed in Two American and Two South Korean Newspapers" (Young Soo Shim); "Media, Democracy and Human Rights in Argentina" (Dave Park); "Bahamian TV Programming, 1977-1997: A Case Study of Cultural Proximity" (Juliette Storr); "The Price of Ignorance: How Correspondents' Language Skills Limit Their Work in Japan" (Beverly Horvit); "Michael Fay in 'Lash Land': A Case Study of Social Identity Construction in Foreign News Coverage" (Meredith Li-Vollmer); "Pleasure, Imperialism, and Marxist Political Economy: Exploring a Biological Base" (William Thomas Pritchard); "Media, Markets and Messages: Ghana's Radio Forced To Make Choices" (Janice Windborne); "Journalism under Fire: Reporting the El Mozote Massacre" (Kris Kodrich); "Telecommunications Policy Reform and the Legacy of the Indian Post-Colonial State" (Paula Chakravartty); and "Human Rights in China: A Pawn of a

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Political Agenda? A Content Analysis of 'The New York Times' (1987-1996)"
(Xigen Li and Charles St. Cyr). (RS)

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INTERNATIONAL - Part II

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An Economic Imperative: Privatization
as Reflected in Business Reporting in the Middle East

Egypt as a Case Study

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An Economic Imperative: Privatization as Reflected in Business Reporting in the Middle East

— Egypt as a Case Study—

Abstract

Egypt, a socialist nation from the mid-1950s until the 1990s, is an excellent case study of a national economy experiencing dramatic reforms in privatization and deregulation. Although similar economic initiatives are being undertaken in other Arab countries, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tunisia and Morocco, reforms have been pushed ahead faster in Egypt, especially since 1994, and despite significant obstacles in the form of loyalty to socialist ideas, public cynicism toward capitalism, and general distrust engendered by recent economic fraud in the banking industry .

Whatever the public interest or involvement, the government in 1997 and even more so in 1998 is moving rapidly toward privatization of government-owned industries and enterprises. This paper studies the increasing focus of the Egyptian press upon the process of privatization.

An Economic Imperative: Privatization as Reflected in Business Reporting in the Middle East

— Egypt as a Case Study—

Introduction

Several countries in the Middle East and North Africa during the 1990s launched series of economic reforms intended to make their countries viable participants in the global economy by accelerating private sector development and encouraging foreign investment. Chief among the economic reforms are (1) *privatization* of nationalized industries and (2) *deregulation* and other legal reforms to remove barriers and create incentives. Although such reforms are not uncommon in capitalist or capitalist-leaning societies, they are dramatically new models for nations in the Arab world.

Egypt, a socialist nation from the mid-1950s until the 1990s, is an excellent case study of a national economy experiencing dramatic reforms in privatization and deregulation. Although similar economic initiatives are being undertaken in other Arab countries, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tunisia and Morocco, reforms have been pushed ahead faster in Egypt, especially since 1994, and despite significant obstacles in the form of loyalty to socialist ideas, public cynicism toward capitalism, and general distrust engendered by recent economic fraud in the banking industry .

After the military takeover from the British, led by Gen. Mohammed Naguib in 1952, Egypt went on its own course. Although there were hopes for a democratic state, Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in 1954 and directed Egypt toward socialism. By 1960 Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal and banking and enacted ownership laws, limiting land ownership to 50 to 100 acres. With his economic agenda supported by Cold War aid from the Soviet Union, Nasser developed Egypt into a model for an Arab socialist state. For more than a decade, other African states then achieving independence looked to Egypt for guidance, and Nasser sent military and economic advisers across the Middle East and south of Sahara. Nasser's leadership became the subject of legend and song. The superstar Egyptian singer Abdel Halim Hafez sang praises to Nasser and nationalization. His song, *"Al Sad al Ali"* ("The High Dam") gave homage to Nasser's vision for controlling the floodwaters of the Nile in the Aswan High Dam. And songs such as *"Al Watan al Arabi"* ("The Arab World") denigrated the former imperialist masters and capitalists who had governed from 1882 to 1952.

The turnaround of the Egyptian economy occurred less from inward than from outward impulses. Indeed, Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, continued more or less the same economic policies, as did President Hosni Mubarak until the early 1990s. The increasingly sharp turn away from socialism toward capitalism began at about the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union. After 1989, the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the bankruptcy of communism underscored the fundamental problem of *public* sector industries to compete in an increasingly *private* global economy.

When Mubarak changed direction in the 1990s, he faced the problem of how to convert a socialist economy to private enterprise without rending Egyptian society. For 40 years, about two generations, Egyptians had become accustomed to secure jobs in state-owned businesses and industries and to government-regulated pricing. The president's public stance was to discount fears about rising unemployment and consumer prices. Evidence to the contrary could spark social unrest and riots and aid his political opponents, including Islamic advocates of a theocratic state.

The Egyptian government appeared to agree on a policy of increasing openness in reporting decisions about privatization. Yet there is ample evidence that the bureaucracy has held much in secrecy about the scope and rate of privatization. And there was a significant "clarity gap" between what the government planners reported and what the journalists and their readers understood.

One reason for the reluctance to open public discussion of privatization, finance and the stock market was the public outcry after the Islamic banking fraud exposed in 1992. In the experiment with investment banking from the mid-1980s, Egyptians suffered huge losses in the billions of dollars. Men responsible for fraud were tried and convicted, but the losses engendered long-term bitterness. Furthermore, the government and the press lost credibility — the government for blessing the banking and investment schemes, and the press for publishing stories which later proved to be untrue.

Beginning in 1994, however, government officials began, indirectly and cautiously, to suggest the new direction toward privatization. For this campaign, the government chose the broadcast media, the main source of information and news for the average Egyptian, all of which are owned by the government. In 1994, the government sponsored a televised forum, *"Eksadiat"* (Economy), featuring the vice president of Ain Shams University in Cairo, who simply raised a number of economic questions that might be discussed. Bland as it was, the program was a breakthrough. Other programs followed in more or less the same low-key fashion, not speaking directly about privatization and dealing very carefully with economic issues. Since 1994, the government has sponsored "Al Asbouie al Ekdisa'adi," (The Economic Week), program where a host of economic problems are discussed. In 1996, the government boldly focused directly on privatization. A new Channel One television program also featured a 9 p.m. a two-minute report on the Egyptian Stock Market, which had been launched in 1995.

At the same time, the press, which had lost credibility during the banking scandal, eventually began carrying more economic news as well. Indeed, newspapers appeared to be the best medium for dissemination of the complexities of privatization and capital investment..

As yet, there is no accurate assessment of the diffusion of economic and business news through the mass media. On the one hand, the amount of business and economic news is increasing significantly. On the other hand, some, including government officials, suspect that the diffusion of information is mainly to the *elites*, and that the average Egyptian either ignores or absently pays little attention and hence does not understand privatization and economic liberalization or their consequences.

Whatever the public interest or involvement, the government in 1997 and even more so in 1998 is moving rapidly toward privatization of government-owned industries and enterprises. This paper studies the increasing focus of the Egyptian press upon the process of privatization.

Methodology

This paper is a case study focused on the press in Egypt. Although there may be evident implications for other government-controlled economies in the Arab world, the authors realize that the findings of this study cannot be generalized beyond the country under study. In using this methodology, however, the authors assert with other communication researchers that "there can be knowledge and wisdom in the sample of one case."[1]

The purpose of the research — to study the increasing focus of the Egyptian press upon the process of privatization, an almost taboo subject in socialist Egypt — raised several questions especially of a press which seemed to abet the debacle of the Islamic banking scandal. The following five questions guided our analysis:

1. To what extent does the Egyptian press explain privatization and a market economy?

2. To what extent does the Egyptian press predict or envision the extent of privatization — what publicly owned ventures and industries will be affected.

3. To what extent do the Egyptian newspapers question the "real value" of the public sector now being offered for sale to private investors?

4. To what extent does the press engender a public debate or discussion of the disposition of revenues from sale of publicly owned ventures and government-owned industries?

5. Does the press discuss the impact of privatization upon employment, unemployment, and retraining?

* * ** **

As the government accelerates the trend toward privatization, some sales of government properties are spectacular enough to catch and hold public attention. In November 1997, the press reported that Egypt decided to sell the Cairo Sheraton for LE 500 million (Egyptian pounds), or about US $149 million. At the same time the Cabinet approved the sale of 75 percent of the Al-Ahram Beverage Company (ABC) for LE 231 (about US $68 million). The sales were approved by the Cabinet Privatization Committee, headed by Prime Minister Kamal Ganzory.

The buyers of ABC were identified in *Al-Ahram* only as including six American and European investment groups. In this case, ABC, makers of Stella beer, sold for a price exceeding the evaluation by the Central Accounting Agency by LE 21 million (US $6.2 million).[2]

The sale of a *75 percent majority* of ABC marked a dramatic acceleration of privatization. Earlier, when the sale was advertised for bids in June, the government proposed selling *only 30 percent* of ABC for about LE 90 million — 1.35 million shares at LE 67 per share. This, confirmed the minster of Public Enterprise, Dr. Atef Abeid, was "the first time for an international Group to buy major shares of one of the companies."[3]

The deal seemed sweet. ABC was advertised having no debts "which gives the company the right to get loans if the company wishes to finance new projects." Of course, new projects were envisioned, as *Al-Ahram* reported without attribution to any government officials: "This will allow making incredible development in the future in areas of production and exportation as well as achieve maximum benefits and returns." In November at the sale, Minister Abeid noted that the new owners "must spend LE 221 to develop machinery and equipment."[4]

In selling ABC, the government emphasized its protection of the rights of employees. As previously reported in June, ABC had 3,115 laborers "under the leadership of a group of experienced people in areas such as food industries and projects." In the November news story, the minster of Public Enterprise, Dr. Atef Abeid, stressed that the buyers would "keep all labor force of the workers along with their rights." Employees rights, however, are negotiable as well, planner El Gibali notes. When Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola invested in Egypt, they agreed only to keep all employees for a period of three years, after which the investors have "the right to do what they want." This could of course include employee retraining programs, along the concept of developing resources.[5]

The selling of ABC, which grew from a purported 30 percent minority selloff into a 75 percent majority sale, epitomized the acceleration of privatization in the late 1990s. By contrast, in 1991, in the first year of Egypt's "sweeping reforms," no more than two or three small enterprises were privatized.

The creeping pace could be attributed in part to the Egyptian penchant for "living in the past." This tendency to regard the rear-view mirror is epitomized by the continued popularity of the songs of Abdel Halim Hafez, the troubador of the socialist era. Though he died 17 years ago, his voice is still revered and his songs give homage, both sentimental and historic, to the era of independence and the rise of Arab socialism and its hoped-for triumph over capitalist enemies.

By 1994, the government still kept the brakes on reform. President Mubarak's public stance favored a "gradual pace." The press reported the president's warning that "the Egyptian economy would be badly damaged if the country were to rush its privatisation programme. He called for gradual pace despite the International Monetary Fund (DMF) and other financial institutions urging to speed up the process." Publicly, Mubarak said he would resist pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to devalue the Egyptian pound. "We cannot do like what the former Soviet Union did. It would be a collapse." While "quick measures"would create numerous problems, Mubarak told Egyptian workers that he "does not think that privatization will create large-scale unemployment. He said the private sector would absorb workers displaced from the public sector."[6]

Egypt's own traditional bureaucracy almost assured that the brakes would be kept on. Significant changes there occurred in 1994. An article in the *Financial Times* (London) in 1994 noted a World Bank report that "a host of embedded legal, regulatory, tax, financial, bureaucratic, and judicial constraints are impeding the growth of Egypt's private sector." That same year, *Al-Ahram Weekly* reported that Egypt sponsored a conference to improve the investment environment for Egyptian "business organizations, with their international counterparts, donor agencies, labor organizations, and banks." That very week, the People's Assembly was reported ready to discuss "a series of economic laws aimed at deepening liberalization and encouraging investments." The Assembly would be considering a "unified investment law" to streamline all investment regulations and "encourage investors to launch new, and more serious, ventures."[7]

Egyptian newspapers amplified the economic and political activity, thereby stimulating public discussion. By late November, reporters were covering events that a few years earlier might they may have ignored. One such gathering of academics and economists in Alexandria attracted attention by focusing on privatization and by inviting as their keynote speaker the legendary Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal who had been editor of *Al Ahram* and a confidante of Nasser. After Heikal addressed the "new world order," others of the 450 economic experts discussed the trends in the third year of reform. It had become clear by 1994, said one Egyptian businessman, that most of the companies put on sale were not bought by Egyptians "because most Egyptian businessmen prefer having foreign partners." Al-Habak noted that attitudes had changed since 1991. "Although many Egyptian businessmen were initially enthusiastic about privatization few dared to step forward when companies were actually offered for sale." He said one problem was that "the deals are conducted according to the prices offered by buyers, not according to the real estimation of the company's assets."[8]

Whatever the terms and buyers, streamlining encouraged more deals. Between 1993 and 1997, 76 public enterprises were privatized, most of them since 1996, when the process was accelerated. The amount of sales revenue to Egypt by the end of 1997 totaled LE 5.5 billion (US$1.6 billion). Banks were in a separate category, requiring joint ventures rather than wholesale buyouts. Twenty-one joint venture banks were privatized. "After a change in the Egyptian banking law in 1995, allowing foreigners to own more than 51 percent of the capital of banks," explained economic journalist Yasser Sobhi of *Al Ahram*, "the government has ordered the four big public banks to sell their shares in joint-venture banks. This has almost been accomplished."[9]

The government's 1998 privatization program, including telecommunications, has already impressed Egyptian journalists as "very ambitious" and has been approved, like it or not, by the International Monetary Fund. The 1998 program envisions privatizing 98 public enterprises at a price of $10 billion. This would include, for the first time, one of the four big public banks and a public insurance company. Under a new Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement (BOT), construction of an electric power station will start in March, with the private consortium agreeing to transfer the station to the government in five years. Another first: some *ports and airports* are to be privatized, and the first major highway is to be built and managed by the private sector.[10]

When economic planners write about privatization in the press, they appear to do so with an elite audience in mind. One such expert, Ahmed Galal, executive director of the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, a key economic think tank, has a knack in private conversation for simplifying complexities. On the other hand, when he writes in *Al-Ahram*, he tends to lean on jargon and assume understanding. "Done right," he observed, "privatisation [sic] would increase the efficiency of utilising [sic] existing capital stock. It would stop the flow of resources to unviable enterprises, and signal the withdrawal of government for activities in which the private sector can do a better job. More importantly, privatisation would increase private investment and attract FDI."[11]

Amid this jungle of jargon, some elites question the level of diffusion of economic ideas to the general public. They wonder if the public understands or shares their positive vision for a developing economy, or worries about the rumored downside of privatization — disappearing jobs and higher prices. After a recent meeting of Mubarak's Presidential Council, the Council's spokesman was asked "when the average Egyptian will notice the work of this council." The spokesman couldn't say.

One bright development has been the emergence of a new breed of economic reporters across the Arab world. Until the 1990s, the reporting of business, industry, economics and finance was relegated to only the inside pages. Editors and reporters were not expected to have any special training. As a result, economic reporting, especially on complex issues — open markets, investments, bureaucratic reforms to encourage investors — was often "misinformed and inaccurate." In many countries, the government has contributed to misunderstanding by withholding information or deliberately misleading reporters. "Despite government claims to the contrary and a virtual media blackout on the subject," was the way one reporter began his magazine essay on Egypt's aggressive and somewhat secretive efforts to sell off part of its telecommunications system.[12]

This picture has changed dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union and the abrupt turn from socialism. In almost every country of the Middle East, reporters are focusing more on privatization, trade agreements with the European Union, the prospects for inter-Arab trade as tariff barriers under and Arab League compact are scheduled to be reduced to zero within 10 years.

Last November, senior Arab economic journalists from Yemen to Morocco gathered in Cairo for a workshop organized by *Al-Ahram* and Georgia State University and focused on the promise and problems of privatization. Zhour Gourram, an editor with *Al Katib* in Rabat, published an article airing what she found were serious questions in the debate over privatization. "Some consider it selling Egypt for a low price," she wrote. "They question the source of the fortunes of a new breed of millionaires who they say are the prime beneficiaries of privatization." Another workshop participant, the deputy managing editor for business at *Al Riyadh* in Saudi Arabia, Sulaiman Al-Nasser, focused on tariff walls Saudi investors have faced in trying to invest in Egypt, whose 62 million people represent the largest market in the Middle East. Al-Nasser found that Egypt was lowering its walls. "Egypt has already reduced tariffs three times in one year and implementation of the World Trade Organization rules and regulations may make things easier."[13]

Before the workshop ended, the journalists bonded together in a news exchange, the Economic Information Network (EIN) which will link them by FAX (and email) from Morocco to Yemen. Workshop sponsors recognized that "such a regional Arabic language resource for economic journalists would be a valuable outcome." One of the EIN founders, journalist Mohammed Daraghmeh of *Al Ayyam* in the West Bank, reported to the network that since the November workshop he has focused attention on economic stories he previously ignored — the financial sector, the infrastructure, and the importance to Palestinians of trade on the Israeli market, which now totals about $2.5 billion a year. "I also covered a conference organized by the World Bank about how we can be developing the Palestinian economy despite the difficulties. In this period I can say that I am the only journalist in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who covers the economic issues. *Al-Ayyam* is the first newspaper here that shows concern in economics."[14]

In Jordan, where economic reforms currently lag behind those in Egypt, economic reporting has stimulated a national debate over the nation's reform agenda. In the capital, Amman, the daily newspaper *Al Ra'i* (Opinion) recently created a flurry of press commentary when its business and economics managing editor, Imad Hmoud, wrote that Jordanian businesses were finding better fields for investment in other Arab countries. The article, which reportedly caught the attention of King Hussein, questioned whether Jordan is losing investment by not aggressively addressing its economic reform agenda. Hmoud's sources noted that Jordanians have recently invested anywhere from LE 261 million ($76.7 million) to as much as $1 billion in 140 projects in Egypt. For a case study, Hmoud tracked down a 62-year-old Jordanian investor, Sabri Farraj who has expanded to real estate and commercial properties in Egyptian partnerships. In an interview, Farraj urged his Jordanian government to establish incentives to investors as Egypt does. "Why," Farraj asked, "don't I have the real chance to invest in my homeland and achieve benefits to all?"[15]

New publications have also emerged. Egyptians welcomed a new business-oriented daily, *Alem Al Youm* (The World Today). English and Arabic publications have improved coverage, assigned more reporters to the business beat, encouraged them to specialize. In Cairo, the American Chamber of Commerce revitalized its *Business Monthly*, whose new American managing editor, Drew Dowell, has won praises from Arab elites for imparting comprehension, readability and a previously lacking sense of humor. The American-owned *Business Today* also digests difficult economic issues and knifes through the jargon. An article last July simplified Egypt's "biggest venture" into privatization, the immensely complex partial sale of the national telecommunication organization ARENTO (Arab Republic of Egypt's Telecommunications Organization).[16]

The financial basis for successful privatization depends on foreign investment. While Egypt has attracted investors from Jordan and other Arab countries, the nation is seriously wooding European and U.S. capital. In late January, President Mubarak's high-level Egypt-U.S. Council of business executives agreed to jump-start the process of establishing links with industrial and trading partners. In 1998 they plan a series of conferences and company-to-company meetings. The Council highlighted areas U.S. investors consider important. These include mechanisms for the transfer of managerial know-how, developing human resources, and encouraging further Egyptian government policy reforms conducive to profitable investments. Gamal Mubarak, spokesman for the Egyptian side, cited "positive changes" in the Egyptian economy. "The target now is to establish a mechanism to spread the word...about the business environment in Egypt, and make sure that his is translated into direct foreign investment."[17]

Several agencies are engaged in assisting Egypt to "liberalize" the business environment to lure investment. One prominent organization is the Center for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Its executive director, John D. Sullivan, told Arab leaders meeting in Tunis last year that "liberalizing " the business environment — creating incentives and removing barriers — "is an absolutely essential step in the privatization process." His audience was the eighth seminar of Executive Directors of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture for Arab Countries.[18]

Sullivan shifted the focus to indigenous, small businesses. He said government incentives and reduced barriers are especially vital for stimulating the startup and growth of small and "micro" businesses which create new jobs. "There is no better source of job creation," he said. Other countries have followed this advice to great success, he said. "In fact, the deregulation of the small business sector is credited with being a major part of the economic success stories in countries as diverse as Argentina, Peru and Poland."[19]

One of the most dramatic frontiers for privatization is in telecommunications, a sector not slated for private investment in Egypt until recently. And one of the more interesting aspects of telecommunications privatization, for the press and the public, involves cell-phones. Cairo, with a daytime population of 16 million, is one of the last of the world's great cities to adopt the cellular phone as mobile furniture for the ear. One of the depressants has been the "extremely expensive" service, completely run by the government. "Mobile" bills remain high despite recent reductions in application fees, call rates and monthly fees. Another drawback is the limited service area, constricted by government limitations. Egyptians have demonstrated that the demand is there: the first lines (only 82,000) were "swallowed up so eagerly in fact," wrote one business journalist, "that the government has not had the time nor the funds to expand the service and invest in more lines and transmission towers."[20]

Cellular phone use is expected to multiply in 1998 as a result of recent government decisions. In December, the government announced for the first time its intention to privatize telecommunications. The first to be sold will be the cellular phone service, to become a *majority* privately owned company with shares offered for public subscription as of Feb. 15. Next to be opened for *partial* private ownership will be Egypt Telecom (ARENTO). Privatization of the cellular phone system would "almost certainly and immediately" increase service and decrease prices, wrote economics reporter Hatem Rushdy, "assuming the government builds in the privatization a strongly competitive bias."[21]

Egyptian economic planners, as the press notes, are wary of repeating other countries' mistakes. The experiments with capitalism in the former communist countries, especially in the Soviet Union have sent tremors through the Arab world. No doubt, those awkward economic conversions have slowed down the race toward privatization in Egypt, but only because of the need for caution, not because of political aversion. In the recent move toward privatizing telecommunications, one economic analyst noted that "a watchdog agency must be set up to monitor the privatized entity's market behavior. Without an independent regulatory body, there can be no guarantee that consumers will be protected, promised investments implemented and monopolistic actions avoided."[22]

The Russian experience shocked many Arab elites concerned about misdirection of the new economic forces. The Arab press has published stories about economic — and social — dislocations in the wake of the sudden adoption of capitalism after 70 years under communism and central planning. "Russia's small businesses suffer more under 'people's capitalism,'" read one headline in the *Riyadh Daily* in Saudi Arabia. The newspaper was reprinting a *Washington Post* story documenting how the promises of capitalism were betrayed by government willingness to bend to the wishes of business. While reformers "promised to create equal rules for all, encourage the middle class and let small businesses flourish," the result has been the opposite. "The country is turning toward oligarchic capitalism, characterized by the domination of giant conglomerates and a handful of wealthy tycoons who enjoy special privileges and a cozy relationship with the state."[23]

Given the Russian, model, social concerns if anything have gained greater importance on the agenda of Egyptian economic planners. "All this must be achieved without compromising financial stability and social equity," asserted Ahmed Galal. In an essay in *Al Ahram Weekly,* he recognized the role of privatization in generating "the employment opportunities necessary to raise the standard of living for the population at large." He cautioned that Egypt must be concerned during the transition with the question of "displaced workers."[24]

The fate of Egyptian workers in the transition from socialism to capitalism is possibly the public's greatest concern, if they understand the complex rules at all. Indeed, the head of the Economic Studies Unit at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Abdel-Fattah El Gibali, believes everyone, including the press, should do a better job of explaining the intricacies of privatization. "The whole process — what does it mean — a market economy?" he asked during an interview. Privatization plans currently identify 317 operations at the national level, but about 2,000 more at the municipal level. Additionally, there are industrial and military operations.[25]

In the great sale of government companies, how much should they be sold for? Who sets the prices and how? Is the guideline book value? Real market value? Or potential? Arab traders are renowned for haggling, and this is no different in the marketplace of privatization. In Jordan, accountants, economists and politicians have been negotiating for about six years to evaluate the assets of Jordanian Royal Airlines. Outside help was sought from the U.S. accounting firm of Arthur Anderson, but there are many intangibles and variables. There are some interesting precedents. In West Africa, when the government of Cote d'Ivoire negotiated to sell its national airline to the Dutch, the most important assets were not the airplanes. Air Cote d'Ivoire reportedly had four aircraft, none of which the Dutch buyers planned wanted to use. The greater value of the airlines lay in its assigned *routes.*[26]

Another issue still being debated mainly among elites is the disposition of revenues from the sales. "What will the government do with the revenues?" asks El Gibali. "Will they reduce the internal debt?" Another possibility is to channel money into underfunded social programs which could be considered "investments in human resources" — health and education. In *Al-Ahram*, Galal insisted that Egypt had no choice. "In all cases, revenue from privatisation should be used to retire public debt." Otherwise the government would continue to be burdened by servicing enormous debt.[27]

Conclusion

The public debate over these and other issues will continue as Egypt — and other countries in the Arab world — proceed with economic reforms. While journalists have made great strides in specialization and understanding, they still face major obstacles in reporting the news or privatization and reform.

Press coverage of economic news in Egypt was greatly hampered in 1995 with the passage of a punitive press law. A sweeping provision of the 1995 law protected "the national economy" and threatened journalists with *at least* five years in prison. Journalists argued that such a ubiquitous target might involve anything, including a story about tourism, or one which alluded correctly to the pall of air pollution in Cairo. Certainly the press reported the decline in tourism following the Islamic campaign to terrorize tourists. In lawsuits, the government presumably needed to prove *intent* to harm the economy. Article 188 declared that a journalist who published news "with the intention of causing harm to the national economy" would be penalized by imprisonment for not less than five years and a fine of not less than LE 10,000 ($2,900) and not more than L.E. 20,000.[28]

This economic protection gave the government another tool with which to fight its Islamic opposition, some critics observed. "This effectively puts a blackout on conflicts between Islamists and the government," noted political scientist Mamoun Fandy, "since such reports portray the country as unstable and consequently harm the economy." He argued that the Mubarak regime was unreasonably haunted by the Islamists:

> The ghost of the 1991 Algerian elections, in which Islamists won the elections on an anti-corruption platform, seems to haunt the Egyptian government. But government fear of an Islamist election victory seems unjustified. Egyptian Islamists seem incapable of winning more than 30 percent of the vote. The Algerian scenario (collapse into civil war) is likely only if the government deprives large segments of Egyptian society of a political voice.[29]

Fandy also linked the suppression to potentially sinister political ramifications. Curiously, Mubarak edged closer to the feared Algerian-style abyss, Fandy argued, each time the president alienates moderate voices who articulate the middle ground between Islamists and other radicals against the system. "Mubarak has already antagonized other powerful groups who had been content to work for change within the system," Fandy noted, citing the government campaign against the "moderate, middle-class Islamic Brotherhood," accused "of being the political wing of the Radical Islamic Group, an organization of primarily disaffected southern peasants." If continued, the government strategy could limit its base of support to mainly "those who benefit from the patronage system of the ruling National Democratic Party -- old feudal families and military and ex-military officials."[30]

In 1996, after a year of protest from the Syndicate of Journalists and, at last, Mubarak's intervention, a new press law was passed. The new law did not eradicate all of the penalties, and in fact increased some fines and imprisonment. But the new law enshrined a Code of Ethics and place the Syndicate as the arbiter in disputes.

The original questions posed by the authors have yet to be answered substantially, although preliminary evidence suggests the following conclusions:

1. Egyptian journalists, trained in an era of socialism and unaccustomed to the less predicable complexities of market-economy capitalism, are behind the curve in understanding and explaining privatization?

2. Because until very recently a discussion of the economic turnaround from socialism to capitalism was suppressed in the media, most journalists are currently trying to "catch up" to the basic moves of the government and have yet to gain enough control of the facts to predict or envision the extent of privatization.

3. Egyptian newspapers are being to question the "real value" of public sector industries now being offered for sale to private investors, but are handicapped in not having access to government budgets and documents. In addition, few journalists have access to financial expertise necessary to interpret data.

4. Increasing news coverage of privatization has engendered some public discussion of the disposition of revenues, but there is a lack of evidence, as noted in No. 3 above.

5. The impact of privatization upon employment, unemployment, and retraining is one of the most discussed aspects of the economic turnaround.

Journalists in Egypt and elsewhere who seek to report economic news accurately face numerous obstacles. At the recent workshop for senior Arab journalists in Cairo, instructors identified five principal barriers to open reporting about economic affairs:

(1) **Accuracy.** It is difficult for reporters to obtain and sustain accurate information because their governments often issue economic reports based on public relations strategies rather

than with the idea of building a true economic reporting base of good, current data. Even World Bank data are often more than a year old when released. Also, each government differs in its view of the role of economic data.

(2) **Regional information.** Reporters seeking to regionalize their stories, to establish trends developing across the Arab world, have few mechanisms or traditions that allow and encourage them to reach across borders and access information in a timely manner.

(3) **Technology.** Political barriers to expanded telecommunications, as well as the high cost, pose daily obstacles to journalists. Only a few of the senior Arab journalists at the workshop had access to email, and this is just the beginning of online services available elsewhere in the world. In the Middle East and North Africa, on-line services, where available, can cost as much as $500 a month.

(4) **News management**. The newsmakers whom the reporters cover are so accustomed to managing the news — controlling the economic messages they want to have reported — that they will have a very difficult time adjusting to the demands of privatization, especially as the trend brings *public* companies into the mainstream economy. Privatization presumably should bring with it a more open system of reporting, carrying the responsibility for accurate, public reporting on the successes *and* failures of these companies. This will be difficult for the executives of these companies to digest, and may result in a backlash against reporters before the privatized companies adjust to the new journalistic environment.

(5) **Journalistic culture**. The emerging generation of journalists in the Middle East and North Africa are devoted to truthtelling. This generation — many of whom came into the profession through schools of journalism and as apprentices of Western news agencies — is

familiar with the requirements of professionalism. This makes their lives as reporters difficult, but they understand the responsibility and the costs. This makes ethical decision-making difficult s well, but their concerns seem the same as other journalists. The questions in this respect will be: "Truthtelling — at what cost?" and "How much of the truth will they be allowed to tell?"

* * *

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Broadcasting in South Africa:
The Politics of Educational Radio

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Broadcasting in South Africa: The Politics of Educational Radio

This paper explores efforts by successive British and Afrikaner led governments to use the educational potentials of broadcasting in molding the development of the African population. The study traces the transition of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) into a vehicle for the extension of Afrikaner nationalism and subsequently into an institution in the vanguard of the movement toward a multicultural democracy.

Broadcasting in South Africa: The Politics of Educational Radio

Introduction

Radio has been described as "the people's medium", offering a channel for the general development and upliftment of the African continent. However, the democratic ideal imbedded in this term has rarely been realized. Since the inception of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the Corporation has been used as an ideological and political force. This paper, based on archival research in the British Public Record Office, the South African National Archives and the Botswana National Archives, explores efforts by successive British and Afrikaner led governments to use the educational potentials of broadcasting in molding the development of the African population. The study traces the transition of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) into a vehicle for the extension of Afrikaner nationalism and subsequently into an institution in the vanguard of the movement toward a multicultural democracy. The paper concludes with an analysis of the current state of broadcasting and attempts to place recent developments in their socio-political context.

The Development of Radio

Setting the trend which would prevail throughout the British Empire, radio in South Africa was developed by and for the English speaking settler community.[1] Experimental broadcasts by Western Electric Company followed shortly thereafter, and on the first of July 1920 regular broadcasts of music began from Johannesburg.[2] By the end of 1924 radio was also a reality in the port cities of Cape Town and Durban.[3] In 1927, under government legislation, the various stations operating in the country were consolidated into a commercial radio station, the African Broadcasting Corporation.[4] Then, in 1936, the government of General Hertzog, in consultation with the director-general of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), nationalized the failing commercial network and created the SABC. At no time during this period was consideration given to the potential of broadcasting to the African majority.

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However, radio was integrated into the 'white' educational system at an early stage. Experiments conducted in Cape Town during 1930 led to the implementation of regular schools broadcasts by 1934.[5] By 1937, the SABC reported that students at more than four hundred schools were listening to the daily English language broadcasts from Cape Town.[6] The Cape Education Department also began supporting the transmissions to schools with a weekly illustrated publication *Jongspan*, distributed to all registered schools. Within a year, the number of participating schools had risen to six hundred.[7]

By 1939, each of the provinces had established schools broadcasting programs.[8] Despite a decline in the number of schools participating in the program during the early 1940s, the South African Broadcasting Corporation reported high levels of enthusiasm and interest through the first decade of broadcasting to schools.[9] A 1949 Unesco report indicated that two hundred European Schools and one hundred Coloured Schools were using the service—Native Schools were not allowed to participate.[10] Indeed, one of the main obstacles seen to the continued success of the English and Afrikaans language programs was the "presence of backward races especially the natives."[11]

Despite heavy reliance on the BBC in the development of radio, the SABC soon began to take on a distinctively South African flavor. In an early policy statement, the SABC suggested:

> Political news shall be deemed to be prima facie controversial, and shall not be broadcast ... All news reports, whatever their nature, shall conform to the S.A.B.C.'s interpretation of good taste. This shall apply particularly to physical handicaps, deformities, racial or colour questions, medical details or references to parts of the human body, sordid details of drunkenness or drug addiction, lotteries and gambling. Details of tortures, the execution of death sentences and of human or animal suffering shall not be broadcast.[12]

While news of a political nature was, as a matter of policy, not broadcast, the SABC was political—it reflected positions favored by the regime in power.[13] This policy resulted in a total lack of coverage of any issues related to race, leading one editor to comment:

> A look through the newspaper files of the prewar years and indeed, through the 40's, is a revealing exercise. A visitor from another planet, going through these pages, day after day, year after year, would get the impression that South Africa was a country populated almost exclusively by 3,000,000 whites. There is almost no reference at all to black

people—except occasionally in the odd crime report, or some general allusion to 'the Native Problem'.[14]

Complaints of discrimination were, however not limited to Black South Africans. Since the formation of the Union, Afrikaners had become an increasingly powerful constituency. Issues surrounding language became central to perceived discrimination among the Afrikaner Volk. In October of 1937, the SABC attempted to address these inequities through the introduction of Afrikaans language broadcasts.[15]

The Afrikaner nationalism during World War II was radicalized further by rising poverty within white communities. This militant nationalism found mass expression in the formation of the *Ossenwabrandwag*.[16] Nazi Germany made good use of these sentiments in propaganda broadcasts over *Radio Zeesen*. Afrikaans language broadcasts encouraged members of the *Ossenwabrandwag* to sabotage the Union war effort.[17] The Union government retaliated by establishing a radio monitoring station[18] and jailing Nazi collaborators.[19] Throughout the conflict the SABC supported the Allied war efforts.[20] At the height of hostilities, the SABC was broadcasting twelve hours of BBC programming per week. However, support was not limited to retransmissions of BBC news and information. Reports from SABC correspondents were a vital link in the BBC war coverage, especially with regard to events in North Africa.[21]

War was also the impetus for the introduction of broadcasting to the Native population. In July 1940, the Department of Native Affairs began transmitting news from the central studios of the SABC to mine compounds.[22] Loudspeakers were installed as a method of reaching this essential sector of the workforce at a minimal cost or inconvenience to European radio listeners.[23] The first broadcasts, made in an effort to reach the remainder of the mainly rural Native population, were on September 29, 1942. Languages included Zulu, Sotho and Xhosa. In the initial broadcast, the SABC explained that these broadcasts were being conducted:

> by kindheartedness the owners of our country's Wireless System, namely the South African Broadcasting Corporation, a boon is being granted to the Abantu of our land....It will be thus. It will happen that, beginning today, for half-an-hour each Tuesday and Thursday and Saturday...the Wireless will be heard sounding for Abantu.[24]

This initial program followed an appeal by the Department of Native Affairs for the owners of radios to "allow their Natives to listen to these broadcasts—so far as this may be convenient. Let it be known that where listening-in is allowed, it is allowed as a privilege."[25] In June 1943, the war news was extended to provide general news and educational programming on agricultural issues such as soil management and general horticulture.[26] In addition, the government saw fit to develop campaigns regarding road safety and the policy of food rationing (which urged listeners not to waste bread).[27]

As it made these appeals, the SABC sought to target its messages more effectively by employing African idioms and modes of address. In a letter to the Controller of Programmes, the Head of the SABC Bantu Services explained that "As a gem is an ornament among Europeans, so praises are among Abantu—and have been from time immemorial."[28] As an example, it was suggested that Field Marshal Smuts could be referred to in a fashion befitting his stature:

> Field Marshal Smuts, the Hero of our country,
> Thunder that thundered from the Union of South Africa to Kenya,
> thence to Abyssinia, on to Eritrea,
> yea onward still, to distant Libya,
> and was even heard by birds beyond—
> heard reverberating over the sea named Mediterranean.[29]

Through a masterly use of paeans (praise songs), the broadcaster could relate events with a faithfulness to the language used, strengthening their appeal. The warning was extended however, that such praises must be used with the utmost care, and only where they fit into material provided by the Department of Native Affairs.

These broadcasts to Africans were not without their critics. In 1943, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) declared its belief that the "present vernacular broadcasts could be greatly improved. Unless this is done they will achieve nothing."[30] The SAIRR recommended that propaganda included in the transmissions should be incidental and indirect and that educational aspects of the programming should be stressed.[31] The SABC responded that further technical development of the Native Broadcasts was not possible due to shortages caused by the war. However, they declared their desire to see the development of separate facilities for Africans and the provision of cheap receiving sets.[32]

The Department of Native Affairs concurred, but expressed reservations about the advisability of addressing the Native population via radio. The Secretary for Native Affairs noted in 1943 that the idea of providing radio receivers the Africans had been rejected early in the war both on the basis of the cost and out of a fear that "we might have the enemy propaganda from Portuguese territory making use of the wireless sets we install in getting their ideas across to the Natives."[33] The secretary concluded that in his opinion "the natives are sufficiently catered for in the matter of news and I do not think there is any need at the moment to be unduly perturbed."[34]The end of the war saw continued efforts on the part of the SABC to support the government of the day.

The war years had been good for the South African economy, but the business community emerged even more dependent on African labor. As a result, government was more amenable to the relaxation of the segregationist policies of the prewar era.[35] Five themes emerge in SABC broadcasts between 1946 and 1947 which put forward the government's new position: (a) that Britain and South Africa had a long history of mutual cooperation; (b) that the grievances of the Afrikaner community were being put right; (c) that the "Native Problem" was being effectively addressed; (d) that South Africa should take up its legitimate position as regional leader; and, (e) that the racial policies of South Africa were misunderstood by the world.

The SABC was employed to mitigate Afrikaner suspicions of British policy toward South Africa through an active campaign which included broadcasts by respected British and South African historians and politicians.[36] The SABC made a special attempt to show the steps that it was taking to redress concerns of discrimination by introducing Afrikaans language programming, insisting:

> With the powerful medium of radio and the written form that appears in Radio-Week, the SABC will be a strong factor in the development of an understanding of the Afrikaans language, and this alone can lead to cooperation and good neighborliness among listeners and students.[37]

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In making such appeals, the corporation was eager, not only to reduce distrust between English and Afrikaans speakers, but to be seen amending its own practices. In 1941 the SABC had been admonished by a commission of inquiry which found:

> the admitted inadequacy of the service given to listeners whose language is Afrikaans must affect very closely the efficiency of the aid given by the Corporation in promoting the Union's present policy...Propaganda addressed only to the faithful is largely superfluous. For this reason we think that the Corporation should have been at pains to improve and extend the provision for broadcasting the 'B' programme even at the cost of depriving English-speaking listeners of some of the facilities afforded to them.[38]

As the SABC attempted to placate the Afrikaans speaking community, it also violated its own policies of good taste and objectivity as it began to air more programs dealing with race. Programs tended to reinforce existing notions of racial superiority,[39] while informing White South Africans of the economic necessity of educating Africans.[40] In response to requests by the SABC, the Department of Native Affairs drew up a list of "the more important and picturesque tribes" for use in a series to educate Whites about Africans—they included Zulu, Mpondo, Southern Sotho, Tswana, Northern Sotho, Tsongo, and Venda.[41]

Despite the changes being made by government in addressing the Native Problem, South Africa was receiving increasingly strong condemnation within the United Nations and the international community for its racial policies. Here the SABC again worked to support the popular opinion that South Africa was misunderstood, bemoaning that "[O]ur faults and failures are advertised abroad, often in a very exaggerated and inaccurate form, and we are censured by our fellow-sinners among the Nations."[42] Once contact was established with this common conception, listeners were warned that their future economic livelihood was "bound up with the right handling of our non-European peoples and the building up of good relations with them."[43]

White South Africans should, according to SABC programming, remember that they not only had "their own Africans" to deal with, but a whole continent. In a series of talks about Good Neighbours, the SABC sought both to educate the population about neighboring countries and to structure perceptions of these countries. The SABC suggested that the sub-region be viewed in terms of an economic sphere of influence.[44] Here again, listeners were reminded that the rest of the continent was "much more of a native country than South Africa."[45] Development of the market potential of the region was also seen to be depended on the work of both Black and White, though:

> co-operation is hardly a feasible proposition between one race which is well fed, well clothed, healthy and properly educated, and another consisting largely of poor illiterate peasants, not too well nourished, primitively housed and scourged with things like hookworm, bilharzia and malaria.[46]

According to the SABC, South Africa, should take a leadership role and use its influence to create an "economic unity based on mutual trade and mutual trust."[47] Within this economic union, the SABC would be a voice promoting "mutual understanding and harmony between races and continents as well as between nations, on which ... the happiness and welfare of mankind will depend."[48]

During this period, broadcasting to Africans remained a contentious issue. SAIRR questioned the relevance of SABC programming and the efforts of the Department of Native Affairs. The Institute maintained that while music and folklore might appeal to the masses, the inclusion of political issues and world events was needed to "extend tribal culture" rather than repeating it.[49] In particular, the report recommended talks focusing on the relevance of the Atlantic Charter for Africa.[50] The Director of Information's response to these recommendations was direct:

> I think we should be careful. It might have dangerous repercussions to start talking to Africans over the radio about the Atlantic Charter and politics. It would seem that the writers are anxious to claim a task which at present is the delicate privilege of the Department and the Government.[51]

The continuing debate led, in 1946, to the creation of a commission of inquiry charged with the task of considering the potentials of broadcasting to Africans.[52]

In testimony presented to the commission, SAIRR identified three areas which it considered crucial to the success of such broadcasts. They should improve the leisure-time amenities of the non-European, address the desires of the non-European for information and knowledge and generally work to combat the "unattractive conditions in which he lives."[53] The provision of such services would, in the opinion of SAIRR, counteract the root causes of crime and lawlessness emanating from the Native Areas.[54] Despite SAIRR's testimony that the provision of broadcasting services for Africans had great potential benefits for the country as a whole, development of such services would have to wait. Dramatic shifts were taking place in the fortunes of the government—shifts which would reduce British influence in the region, bring the National Party to power and usher in the Apartheid Era.

The SABC had been broadcasting short news programs in African languages for over nine years before serious consideration was given to extending these services. Eventually, it was law and order concerns which finally propelled the government into action. "Unrest in Zululand" prompted the SABC to add a *Zulu News* program to the already existing Bantu News service.[55] This weekly program carried news about the Zulu King, rainfall in the area, and the condition of cattle. However, any plans for the provision of full service radio broadcasts were shelved in favor of a wired-wireless redistribution system to the homes of Africans in the urban areas.[56]

The wired rediffusion service was extended gradually after its experimental introduction into the Urban Native Location of Orlando (outside Johannesburg) in June 1952. The Service was well received, with subscription rates far exceeding expectations. By 1959 the SABC claimed sixty-five thousand subscribers to programming in "Xosa, Southern Sesoto, Zulu, Northern Sesuto, Shangaan and Sechuana."[57] While commending these initial efforts, the National Council of Women of South Africa (NCWSA) soon pointed out that a "very effective instrument for raising the cultural level of the people" was being wasted by programming which focused on "music, music, music, all the time."[58] The National Council would have preferred to see the service include programs on nutrition, gardening, hygiene and "beauty culture". Noting the work of Unesco in Central Africa, NCWSA threw its support behind efforts to use the radio in addressing the problem of mass education, warning: "there have been undesirable forces at work amongst our mass of illiterate and backward Native races, who have in the past been left at the mercy of propagandists."[59] SABC maintained that the educational elements of its programs were of primary concern, but that they tried to be as unobtrusive as possible in their delivery.[60]

However, both the government nor the SABC were concerned about the exposure of the population to external propaganda which by this time had taken on a decidedly anti-apartheid tone. By 1957, government was seriously considering the introduction of a Bantu radio service and was expanding its experiments into the use of VHF radio transmissions.[61] By June 1960, *Radio Bantu* was broadcasting six hours a day in four languages.[62] With the implementation of a nationwide FM system in 1962, the programming of *Radio Bantu* was regionalized to cater for specific ethnic groups.[63] Divided by the limited range of the FM transmitters and by language differences, groups within the African population were cut off from each other along the lines of government created homelands.[64] The nationwide system of 123 stations and 485 transmitters, with services in Afrikaans, English , Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho, Setswana, Tsonga, Venda and Zulu, was in place by 1967.[65] By making low cost single band receivers available and by providing strong signals in local languages, the SABC was able to win listeners away from international broadcasters-- effectively muzzling the BBC, the Voice of Africa, and other external services.[66]

In 1964 the government added a schools broadcasting service, which broadcast both formal and non-formal educational programs, provided twenty-minute lessons in English and Afrikaans.[67] Educational programming was designed to reinforce, enhance and even create a strong sense of ethnic identity—encouraging Africans to think of themselves first in terms of ethnicity.[68] During 1966, the part played by the SABC's Bantu Programming was:

> to instruct and to entertain by means of a wide variety of programmes, important matters such as good human relationships...the necessity of self-development [was] constantly emphasized in the many educational and informative broadcasts.[69]

Lines of communication between the SABC and the Department of Bantu Education were strengthened during this period. Though initially supporting these broadcasts with booklets and posters, Bantu education became entwined with Bantu radio when administration of the SABC was moved from the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs to the Ministry of Education in 1970.[70] While South Africa could boast that it served the entertainment and educational needs of its population through one of the most sophisticated FM networks in the world, this service was developed under a policy which worked toward the continuing subjugation of the majority of the population.[71]

When the National Party came to power in 1948 it did so, in large part, through the efforts of the secret White male society, the Broederbond.[72] As the new government maneuvered to consolidate power, members of the Broederbond were channeled into key positions within the SABC. However, since the Corporation was a public utility controlled by a board of nine governors and it was some time before the Nationalists could claim complete control. Despite only limited authority at the SABC, the National Party was able to stop retransmission of BBC news, developing instead its own information gathering network. The National Party also pushed successfully for the implementation of a national FM radio system.[73] Likewise, the government's decision to create a national radio network was an outgrowth of radio's demonstrated ability to mobilize large segments of the population.[74] Other immediate results of the change in power can be seen in the development of Bantu Radio, the implementation a regional news service and the development of international broadcasting.

The Broederbond did not come to dominate the SABC completely until the election of Peit Meyer in 1960. From the moment that Meyer was elected chair of both the Broederbond and the SABC, the Corporation was pushed to the forefront of the Afrikaner Republican movement.[75] The appropriation of radio by the National Party and the Broederbond did not go unnoticed either by SABC personnel or by the more liberal elements of South African society. In 1961, the longtime General-Director of the Corporation resigned in protest.[76] The Black Sash movement also launched a petition drive to object to the SABC being used as a propaganda vehicle.[77] The national president of the Black Sash remarked:

> The public of South Africa is becoming more and more disturbed at the policy now being adopted by Radio South Africa ... The S.A.B.C. was established as a public utility to serve all sections of the community ... Today, the news broadcasts, topical talks and commentaries are being used as a propaganda weapon to convey views and beliefs which are peculiar to the Nationalist Party ... it is morally wrong to use so powerful a weapon as broadcasting to propagate one point of view.[78]

The leadership of the government was unimpressed. In 1962 the Corporation's Annual Report made clear that the role of the SABC was to:

> promote the survival and heritage of the White people of South Africa while at the same time encouraging the development and self-realization of the Non-White population groups in their own spheres'.[79]

This fundamental ideology remained in place throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Speaking to the General Council of the SABC, the Chairman reiterated that it was the duty of broadcasting and all the media to play a leading role in gathering up "the Afrikaners' national-political energy in the struggle for survival in the future."[80]

Despite these events, South Africa was not seen by the international community as having any formal system of censorship.[81] The government relied, to a large extent on self-censorship by journalists. When this failed however, the government could fall back on an elaborate system of laws which worked to suppress freedom of speech. These included the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act,[82] the 1964 General Laws Amendment Act,[83] and the 1971 Publications and Entertainments Act.[84] By 1979, the SABC had evolved into a system which, while broadcasting a total of 2,260 hours in seventeen languages over sixteen radio services and three television channels.[85]

In an effort consolidate its hegemony at home and throughout the southern African region, the Nationalist government amended the Broadcasting Act to allow the SABC to broadcast outside its territories as soon as it came to power.[86] By the end of 1949, short-wave broadcasts in English and Afrikaans were being transmitted to South West Africa and, after June of 1950, to the Africa north of the Limpopo River.[87]

With the implementation of the apartheid policies of the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa became more and more isolated internationally. The government suggested that the United States and Britain were waging an attack on "traditional values and culture" of the nation.[88] The Afrikaner-led government was also confronted with communist and nationalist propaganda emanating from a variety of sources. Radio stations from Accra and Cairo provided air time to dissident South Africans while *Peking Radio* broadcast a beam so powerful that it drowned out local stations.[89] The communist threat provided the impetus for a massive expansion of South Africa's external services in the early 1960s.[90]

While the SABC had already established an Africa Service with extensive regional capacities by 1958,[91] the South African government made development of an effective external information department a priority following its withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in 1961.[92] By 1964, the SABC had established a separate external radio service capable of spreading its version of reality to the rest of the African continent.[93] Expenditures of roughly £70,000 [$196.078] in 1965 enabled the SABC to expand this system to allow global broadcasting in eight languages.[94] This service quickly became known throughout the region as *Radio Sjambok*—South Africa's verbal whip.[95]

South Africa's international reach enabled Pretoria to define the terms through which neighboring states were understood. Radio South Africa portrayed Black Africa as existing in a constant state of political, economic and social upheaval.[96] Thus, military conflicts in the region were highlighted while giving no indication of overt support by the Republic of South Africa for guerrilla forces. Zambia, Mozambique and later Zimbabwe received significant attention while Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland received little coverage at all.[97] The pretext of objectivity conveyed in Radio South Africa broadcasts often led to an acceptance of these reports by other services throughout the world.[98]

The independence of many Black African states during the 1960s and 1970s led to the increased isolation of South Africa. This isolation made it essential that South Africa take steps to improve relations with its neighbors and to deflect hostility in other states. As a result, the 1970s saw a further intensification of the battle for airwaves. *Freedom Radio* from Lusaka and ANC broadcasts from Maputo were listened to throughout South Africa.[99] Tanzania also entered the fray, with short-wave broadcasts in English, Shona, Ngazija, French, Ndebele, Chowe, Umbundu, Zulu, Sotho, Makonde, Nganja, Chuaba, Herero, Afrikaans and Portuguese.[100]

However, South Africa proved adept at putting its message before the African people. The South African Broadcasting Corporation produced a vast amount of material and transmitted throughout the region on a continuous basis.[101] A survey conducted in Zambia in 1971 established South Africa as "the most influential foreign radio station" in the country.[102] While an earlier survey had shown that many people preferred to listen to *Lourenço Marques*,[103] the SABC appeared to have effectively eliminated that competitor by taking over operations at the station in 1972.[104]

The SABC shut down *Lourenço Marques* three years later when Mozambicans gained their independence.[105] The service was replaced with *Radio 5*.[106] The elimination of the station as an international competitor and its replacement with *Radio 5* also benefited the government in its internal publicity campaign. Commercial enterprises now had two effective stations on which to advertise. These commercial facilities were further expanded by the creation of the "independent Homelands" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda and the addition of *Radio Transkei*, *Radio Bophuthatswana* and *Radio Venda* in 1976.[107]

Homelands also provided a secure site for the controlled development of independent commercial radio ventures. The first of these, *Radio 702*, began broadcasting from Bophuthatswana in July of 1980. Established as an "English multinational Radio Station," *Radio 702* was designed to deliver the most dominant medium wave signal available to listeners in the Pretoria and Witwatersrand area.[108] The station also took note of "the potential growth in earnings of Urban Blacks" adding that the station would be programmed to appeal to this group "when White listeners are not available."[109] The format schedule for *Radio 702* gives insight into the meticulous manner with which issues of race were treated in South Africa. In selecting songs, race played an central role:

> The artist Anita Ward is black but the music appeals to all race groups. Joan Armatrading is a black artist who generally speaking would not appeal to the white population group in our country. Therefore *Ring my Bell* would be programmed for all times of the day, whereas Joan Armatradings [sic] numbers would be restricted to those programmes which are basically aimed at the black listener.[110]

Equal consideration was given to race in the selection of DJs and the allocation of listening times.

The examples used in outlining the station's policy of song selections is of particular interest in light of the South African government stance on the preservation of cultural values. In particular, the apartheid government was concerned that all segments of society be insulated from external influences as much as possible. South Africa was, under various minority governments, vocal in its opposition to the Westernization of African cultures and to the Americanization of other cultures. In the run-up to multicultural elections, the government also expressed the view that minority groups in particular needed special dispensation. Radio and television were seen as occupying a particularly important position with regard to catering to the needs of these groups.[111]

Transitions

By the early 1980s, 89 percent of the population of South Africa had access to FM radio.[112] At the same time, mass actions, sponsored by the ANC and others, were making the governance of the country increasingly difficult. The Nationalist government responded with increasingly repressive action against what was seen as a 'Total Onslaught' against Afrikanerdom.[113] Since the interests of the interests of the SABC were closely aligned with those of government,[114] the Corporation took an aggressive stance in its attempts to influence the African population. In January 1984 informal educational programming was integrated, on a limited scale, into radio and television services.[115] In 1985 the SABC added a third television channel to help disseminate its educational and public service messages to the general population.[116]

Schools broadcasting, originally transmitted for three hours per week was quickly extended to almost four hours per week during the same period.[117] These programs, in addition to providing basic education courses, offered up instruction in the two official languages of the state, 'the mother tongue', and religious instruction. Vocational guidance courses were also offered to help students choose areas of appropriate study. By 1993, the SABC clamed to be screening educational programs to 260,000 secondary school students daily.[118] In addition to schools broadcasts, the SABC offered special instruction aimed at African preschool children.[119] Parent guidance programs were devoted to "the parent and his role in the school readiness of his child." Adult education courses offered such subjects as 'manpower utilization', 'industrial development', and 'social literacy and community education'.

As tensions within the country continued to rise, and successive States of Emergency failed to stem the tide of social unrest, the position of the SABC in supporting the government's policy of 'Total Strategy' became increasingly important. The failure of the Group Chief Executive (GCE) of the SABC to strongly support the national security interests of the government led to his replacement in 1987.[120] Under the leadership of the new GCE, the corporation made explicit its support of the Nationalist position. Initiatives taken during this period included the continued expansion of the FM system to the extent that, by 1990, services were available in Afrikaans, English and nine African languages.[121] Despite reforms in the broadcast sector, inequities in education persisted. Throughout the 1980s, the government continued to spent more than five times as much on the education of each white student as it did on the education of black students.[122] As a result, by the end of the decade literacy rates for the country's white population stood at close to 99 percent. Literacy rates in African communities were closer to 50 percent.[123]

By the time F.W. de Klerk replaced P.W. Botha at the helm of the government and the National Party in 1989, there was a growing realization that the country could no longer continue on its current path. As Macdonald notes:

> Political uncertainty and crisis were contributing to chronic weakness in the economy; international sanctions, setbacks, and boycotts were intensifying pressure on the regime; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were reducing the perceived danger of the 'Communist threat' while undercutting the geopolitical significance of the apartheid regime to the liberal capitalist countries; South Africa's strategic defences were corroding by virtue of the defeat of colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia; domestic investment in the economy was declining steadily; and Afrikaner middle and upper classes were outgrowing their reliance on direct political control in order to sustain their class positions.[124]

While setting into motion a process of social reform, de Klerk hoped to control the scope and pace of change. In the broadcasting sphere, the government sought to manage the agenda by appointing a special task force to study the future of broadcasting and by implementing a series of structural changes which established financially independent commercial 'Business Units' within the SABC.[125]

Proponents of change recognized that reform of the nation's media systems was essential to the long term success of broader social reforms. Within six months, the Film and Allied Workers Organisation (FAWO) and the Campaign for Open Media (COM) responded by presented memoranda demanding:

> The appointment of an independent board to ensure the SABC's impartiality in the (political) transition period; the resignation of the government-appointed broadcasting task force; a commitment from the SABC on freedom of association with respect to political and union affiliation; the lifting of the SABC's unofficial ban on films and videos produced by South Africans of different political persuasions; [and] a public and open debate on how to prevent the government, the private sector or mirginalized political groups from dominating broadcasting in a future South Africa.[126]

In addition, the COM recommended that the restructuring of the SABC be suspended pending the outcome of political reforms.

Calls for the resignation of the government's task group on broadcasting went unheeded, and in 1991 the group published its findings. With regard to educational broadcasting, the report found that radio and television should "play a significant role in education" and that while quality educational programming was available abroad, there was a special need for education "designed specifically for local curricular, language and other needs."[127] The task group also recommended:

> 1. A public utility company should be created to give practical and systematic effect to the necessary collaboration between departments of education, the electronic media (public and private) and producers of programmes.
> 2. A systematic catalogue of audiovisual requirements to resolve educational problems should be developed, and the necessary support programmes should be created and made available widely. The managers of education, in co-operation with the public broadcaster in particular, should address these needs.
> 3. Commercial broadcasters should develop a code of conduct in consultation with the independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and become involved in addressing educational requirements that are feasible for them.

> 4. The electronic media should be involved in development and positioning of community learning centres form the start.
> 5. Electronic media support in education should be placed on a sound footing by specific, adequate, non-discretionary and recurring budget allocation of funds for this purpose.
> 6. Existing broadcasting facilities should be contacted to produce programmes to suit the needs of educational authorities.
> 7. All pre-service training, and in-service training where suitable, should include use of the electronic media in teaching and learning.

The task force also recommended the protection of cultural heritage in South Africa while building bridges between all its various communities. In noting that "[i]n a country that has many diverse cultures it would be insensitive to allow excessive 'Westernisation' of African cultures and 'Americanisation' of other cultures," the task force suggested special efforts needed to be made to protect the interests of 'minority groups' within the country.[128]

While major social changes began to take place during the early 1990s, little change was evident in the country's media. As recently as March 1993 the SABC continued to enjoy a virtual monopoly on broadcasting.[129] The Board of Directors, which oversees the operations of the SABC was still appointed by the government. The chairman of the SABC Chairman still reported to the Minister of the Interior and the board. In addition, of the sixty-three top executives at the corporation, all but ten were white Afrikaans-speaking men. Most of the remaining executives were conservative English-speaking black men. There were no women executives.[130]

Most of those who sought to influence the development of media policy during the transition period were concerned with the issues of ownership, accessibility, freedom, and language.[131] Scant reference was made to the educational potentials of the broadcast media.[132] Organizations of the Independent Broadcasting and Film Industry suggested that film and video could be effective means for people to make sense of the dramatic changes taking place in the country, especially given the high rate of illiteracy among disadvantaged communities.[133]

Participants at the Jabulani Freedom of the Airwaves Conference, held in the Netherlands in August 1991, also made specific recommendations regarding the potential of educational broadcasting.[134] Conference participants recommended that SABC explore how the Corporation might best "fulfill its mandate to be an educational broadcaster."[135] In addition, the conference expressed its belief that community media should play a central role in the educational process. All broadcasting should, participants stressed, support formal and non-formal educational efforts, covering primary, secondary and tertiary curricula, as well as adult basic and continuing education, literacy training, and worker education.

In May 1993 sweeping changes were finally implemented, including the appointment of a new SABC Board and the establishment of an Independent Broadcasting Authority. The findings of the Viljoen Report, while tempered by the input of the Campaign Open Media and others, formed the foundation of the new media system.[136] One of the main tasks of the new governing bodies was to transform the SABC into a credible source of news. Coverage of the first multiracial elections in the country would test the effectiveness of the new administration. By November 1993 the Board was set to ratify a new Editorial Code which would govern the operations of the newsroom. A major obstacle to the adoption of the Code centered on the question of where authority for editorial direction lay.[137] Some Board members suggested that the management structures within the SABC remained unchanged and that in its current state, management was incapable of making sound editorial judgments.[138]

The Board itself was not above recriminations however, from its inception, the Board was seen as having strong ANC ties; the new Chair in particular made no secret of her affiliation with the ANC.[139] Appointments to the upper echelons of power within the SABC were also criticized for their apparent political nature. Particularly controversial were the February 1994 appointments of Zwelakhe Sisulu, Govin Reddy, and Solly Mokoetle. While the credentials of these individuals was not brought into question, the choice of Sisulu in particular was seen as evidence of ANC bias.[140]

Despite such criticisms, the Corporation moved ahead with plans for coverage of the 1994 elections. As more than 1,500 reporters from around the world converged on South Africa in the run-up to the elections[141], the SABC prepared to cover the event with only 130 reporters and crew.[142] In covering the election, the Corporation made a conscious decision to provide coverage in each of the eleven official languages of the new nation. In addition, SABC required each of its journalists to prepare reports on significant issues in the campaign. This educational effort was a break from past coverage which tended to focus on the personalities of candidates. In covering the election, the Corporation was faced with ethical quandaries such as the appropriate coverage of the of 'execution' of three members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging or the March 28 Johannesburg massacre in which thirty people died and 261 were injured.[143]

Following the elections, the new administration moved quickly to consolidate control over the SABC and further the process of transformation. In December 1994 the Corporation announced the adoption of an affirmative action policy to redress past inequities.[144] The plan called for the prioritization of blacks (i.e. Africans, Coloured and Asians), women and other marginalized groups. In announcing its new policy, SABC committed itself to 50 percent black representation in all ranks and an increased presence of women at senior levels. Six months later, the Corporation announced that "the majority of executives are black."[145] In the same announcement, the SABC indicated that it had not yet fulfilled its commitment to gender diversity.

Restructuring within the Corporation was not limited to personnel issues. A major restructuring of SABC assets has led to the sale of several commercially based radio stations and the reformatting of all remaining radio and television stations in an effort to reflect the ethnic and cultural diversity of the country. While it is still early in the transformation process, significant shifts in demographics have been noted on many channels.[146] In restructuring, the SABC made a commitment to the use of English as an "Anchor Language" across all three television channels. Channel I, the station with the widest coverage, is dedicated to serving the Nguni-speaking population during prime time. Channel II serves Sotho-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking groups; while channel III is broadcast in English during prime time.[147]

Satellite broadcasting was also effected. In 1996, the SABC began transmitting six pay channels dedicated to movies, sports, news, and entertainment.[148] In rationalizing the provision of pay satellite service, the SABC contended that coverage of both "free" and pay TV could be increased and that profits from the pay channels could be used to cross-subsidize free channels. In addition, satellite technology was central to the development of the most extensive distance education channel in South Africa. The Africa Growth Network (AGN), broadcasting out of the SABC's old broadcasting house, was launched in October 1994. The station, developed out of an internal training facility of the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa, is capable of providing up to 24 hours of service per day with programming extending from basic literacy to the provision of an MBA.[149]

Within the SABC, recent educational endeavors have included the development of small scale projects targeting specific population groups. In 1995, the SABC launched an "edutainmant" program promoting basic education concepts. Issues addressed in the program include literacy, housing, employment, health, and education.[150] At the other end of the financial spectrum is a project involving the SABC and the national Department of Education to jointly develop educational programming covering everything from early childhood education to science and technology.[151] Under the new plan more than R100,000 will be spent on research and development, with R50,000 earmarked for the development of television programming and R25,000 for radio.[152]

Barriers to the effective implementation of any of these new programmes include both technical and social issues. Since a substantial portion of South Africa's population lives without electricity and many schools and community centres do not have access to receiving equipment, reaching the target audience (ostensibly the poorest of the poor) may prove to be a significant hurdle. Language barriers may also present problems given that the interim schedule calls for the use of English in most of the television productions.[153] A third, and perhaps more fundamental issue concerns the nature of programming. On the one hand, broadcasters are being asked to provide programming directed at traditionally disadvantaged groups in order to restore cultural identity to a black population "whose history, music and dance have been marginalised over centuries of white dominance:"[154] while on the other hand, radio in particular is being asked to "enhance the nation through creating a common culture in South Africa."[155] How broadcasters overcome these barriers will determine in large part their effectiveness in attaining the educational goals and in defining the future of South Africa.

Conclusions

Broadcasting in South Africa was developed by and for English speaking settlers. Efforts to incorporate radio into English language schools broadcasts began at an early stage in the Cape Province of South Africa. As the political power of the Afrikaner community grew, these programs were extended to include the Afrikaans language. Radio was found to be an effective means of breaking down feelings of cultural isolation and strengthening social bonds among Whites living in the region.

As in Britain, White South Africa's desire to inform the indigenous population about World War II was the primary motivating factor in the introduction of broadcasts to African communities. These broadcasts relied on the good will of the settler community to provide Africans with access to the radio. Despite the fact that broadcasts were made in the interests of the British expatriate community, Africans were told that access to broadcasts was a privilege that could be taken away.

Many groups in South Africa, both liberal and conservative, saw the effective use of radio as a tool in combating the root causes of "unrest" in the African community. It was the provision of law and order which motivated the development of entertainment and educational programming in the post-war period. Drawing heavily on the British experience, South Africa relied on a continuous barrage of culturally rich programming to influence its target audiences.

However, South Africa's racial policies made it a target for international broadcasters interested in influencing the political development of the country. Attacks on the moral and social underpinnings of the apartheid regime provided the impetus for South Africa to provide its own external programming. The need to make its views heard in an increasingly hostile international community spurred the extension of these services, first to serve the African continent, and eventually to cover the globe. Dissatisfaction with the views expressed over external short-wave broadcasts was also the primary motivation for the development of a sophisticated system of FM transmitters. With the introduction of this array, South Africa found that it could limit exposure to unwanted external messages while reinforcing its notions of separate political, social and economic development.

The SABC took as its mandate the promotion of Afrikaner cultural values, and made the realization of apartheid ideology the cornerstone of all its programming. In fulfilling its mandate, the corporation developed a sophisticated means of dividing opposition groups on the basis of language and geographical space. Educational programming by the SABC was designed to divide the African population along ethnic lines by reinforcing or creating linguistic and cultural distinctions. Once these services were implemented, government sought strict controls on the type of education that Africans received. Thus, broadcasting supported the government's policy of promoting the cultural heritage of White South Africans while ostensibly serving the needs of other groups.

Under the direction of the apartheid government, the distinction between propaganda and education ceased to have any real meaning. The goal of the SABC during this period was to imbed White supremacist messages deeply in the text , making them as unobtrusive as possible. The settler community was no less a target of government sponsored educational programming, produced with the goal of framing the ways in which Africans were viewed.

During the 1980s the provision of educational broadcasting was extended in order to counter the 'Total Onslaught' against Afrikanerdom. The provision of schools broadcasts over the airwaves during this period was especially significant given success of school boycotts within

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the townships. Educational broadcasts also targeted Africans from cradle to grave with training in areas ranging from citizenship to literacy and from parenting to work ethics.

By the close of the decade of the eighties, the social and economic costs of maintaining apartheid had risen to such levels that the government was forced into a recognition of defeat and negotiated transfer of power. During this period, the National Party sought to insulate the SABC from any radical shifts control or program content. During the transition, issues related to the educational potentials of broadcasting were silenced in deference to broader issues of ownership, accessibility, press freedom, and broadcast language. It is only in the last two years that broad discussions are again beginning to take place on the role of the media in the processes of education and development. It is thus too early to know if the educational potentials of the media will again be harnessed in the service of 'national security' as defined by government or business, or as deemed appropriate by the general population.

Notes

[1] The first radio transmissions in the Union came as the result of experiments conducted by the (British controlled) South African Railways. See South Africa. Republic Government, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting in South and Southern Africa. Presented to the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of South Africa* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1991), 1. [hereafter, *The Viljoen Report*.].

[2] Eric Rosenthal, *You Have Been Listening...: The Early History of Radio in South Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell & Sons, 1974), 1.

[3] All three of the stations ran into financial difficulties due to problems associated with the collection of listener license fees. The Johannesburg station was forced to close in 1927. See Graham Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology in the Growth of South African Broadcasting, 1924-1971." In *Broadcasting in South Africa* ed. Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli, and Johan Muller, 23-83 (London: Currey, 1989), 26.

[4] William A. Hachten and C. Anthony Giffard, *The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 202.

[5] UNESCO, *Broadcasting To Schools: Reports on the Organization of School Broadcasting Services in Various Countries*, Vol. 661. (Paris: UNESCO, 1949), 135.

[6] South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1937* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1937), 28.

[7] South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1938* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1938), 10.

[8] This was in response to the recommendations of a committee established to review the potentials for extending the Cape Town program throughout the Union. See E.G. Malherbe, "Report of the Sub-committee Appointed to Consider the Advisability of Establishing a Film

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Institute in South Africa: and to Consider the Educational Possibilities of the Radio," 11 November, 1935. South African Government Archives-Pretoria (hereafter TAB) BNS.525/16/2/85.

[9] Lower levels of participation were attributed to the shortage of batteries in the country. See South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1943* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1943), 6. See also, South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1941* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1941), 11.

[10] UNESCO, *Broadcasting To Schools*, 138. Even before the introduction of Apartheid, Britain and South Africa practiced a policy of racial segregation under which people were classified as being "European" (of European decent), "Native" (of African decent), "Coloured" (of mixed lineage), and "Indian" (of Indian or South East Asian decent).

[11] Ibid., 139.

[12] South African Broadcasting Corporation, "General Policy and Code of Ethics," (n.d.) TAB NTS.9728/839/400(1).

[13] This issue will be addressed more fully in the pages which follow.

[14] Quoted in William A. Hachten, *The Growth of Media in the Third World: African Failures, Asian Successes* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1993), 11.

[15] *The Viljoen Report*, 1. The African Broadcasting Corporation had introduced a half-hour Afrikaans language program in 1931. However, this was still seen as discriminatory by the Afrikaner community. See Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology," 29.

[16] (Osssenwabrandwag: literally Ox-wagon-fire-brigade) See Christoph Marx, "The Ossenwabrandwag as a Mass Movement 1939-1941," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20 (2 1994): 195-219.

[17] Hachten and Giffard, *The Press and Apartheid*, 47.

[18] *The Viljoen Report*, 1.

[19] These collaborators included Erik Holman, an announcer for *Radio Zeesen*. Although found guilty of treason and sentenced to ten years in prison for his part in the Nazi propaganda effort, Holm was released immediately when the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948 and was given a job in the Ministry of Education. See David Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective* Second South African ed. (Pretoria: Macmillan South Africa, 1987), 126.

[20] Harrison notes that Ossenwabrandwag sympathizers, such as the SABC Afrikaans program organizer Kowie Marais, were at one point ready to take over the broadcasting facilities by force if asked to do so. Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa*, 123. Marais was interned during the war. He rejoined the Corporation after 1948. Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology," 38.

[21] Asa Briggs, *The War of Words* Vol. III. The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 327. Briggs notes that these reporters were used extensively in covering the Battle of Mahda Pass and the return to power of Haile Selassie in May of 1941.

[22] Transmissions were also extended to Urban Native Locations (UNL) in Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Grahamstown, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, and Pretoria, South Africa. See Union Government, Department of Native Affairs, "Broadcasts to Natives," 1942. TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1). See also: South Africa. Union Government. "Broadcasting to Natives (War News)," 1942. TAB NTS.9653/520/400(9).

[23] Officials noted that Africans, forced to listen to the broadcasts, were bored by the programming. See Native Commissioner, King William's Town, "Letter to the Magistrate and Native Commissioner, Sterkspruit," 1943. KAB CCK-16-N1/5/5

This initial rediffusion service was discontinued in 1945. South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 1.

While the effectiveness of these listening posts was questionable, many communities relied heavily on them as a means of informing the Native inhabitants on the progress of the war. One community which dropped the use of communal listening posts was King William's Town. See "Telephone Broadcasting to Natives in King William's Town." 1940. South African National Archives--Cape Town (hereafter KAB) 3/KWT-4/1/243-ZE2/82

[24] South African Broadcasting Corporation. "Transcript of a National Broadcast for Natives: 9:30 a.m.," 29 September, 1942. TAB NTS.9655/520/400(13).

[25] South African Broadcasting Corporation. "Script for a National Broadcast from Johannesburg, 9.30 a.m. - 9.45 a.m.: National Broadcasts for Natives," Tuesday, 29 September, 1942. TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1).

[26] Rudolf Erasmus. "Draft Letter from the Director of Information to the Secretary for Native Affairs Mr. Smit Regarding a Report on Native Broadcasts." 23 September. 1943. See also: Rudolf Erasmus. "Letter from the Director of Information to the Secretary for Native Affairs Mr. Smit Secretary for Native Affairs Regarding Broadcasting for Natives." 9 June. 1943. TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1): South Africa. Union Government. Department of Native Affairs. "Script of a Talk for Broadcast to Natives: Maintenance of Soil Fertility in the Locations." 1943; South Africa. Union Government. Department of Native Affairs. "Script of a Talk for Broadcast to Natives for Monday 8 February 1943." 2 February. 1943. TAB NTS.9655/520/40014.

[27] South Africa. Union Government. "Broadcasting to Natives (Food Rationing/Road Safety)." 1946. TAB NTS.9728/839/400(2).

[28] C.D. Fuchs. "Letter from the Head of SABC Bantu Services to Miss Dickson. SABC Controller of Programmes." 2 December. 1942. TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1).

[29] Ibid.

[30] South African Institute of Race Relations. "Suggestions Arising from the Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal." 5 March. 1943. Documents Collection of the University of the Witwatersrand--Johannesburg (hereafter WITS) AD.843/B61.3.

[31] Education during this period was defined by the national Commission of Enquiry into Adult Education of 1946 (page 3) as: "the process by which a person undergoes development in one or more respects by means of his endeavour to acquire knowledge or skill by placing himself under circumstances and influences which make him different from what he was. The process is put into operation consciously because it is calculated to make a person happier or more useful." Quoted in John Gasson. *Further Education in Southern Rhodesia with Special Reference to Bulawayo and Matabeleland* (Bulawayo. Southern Rhodesia: Council for Further Education. 1963). 29.

[32] South African Institute of Race Relations. "Minutes of a Meeting (Informal and Confidential) Held at the S.A. Broadcasting Corporation." 15 March. 1943. WITS AD.843/B61.3.

[33] Broadcasting from outside the Union borders helped spur the growth of broadcasting in South Africa. A major annoyance for the SABC was competition from the commercially based station in Lourenço Marques (Maputo). Mozambique. This popular station had a strong transmitter which allowed good reception throughout the region. See: D.L. Smit. "Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to Director of Information Rudolf Erasmus Responding to a Letter of 8 March." 24 March. 1943. TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1).

By 1941. the South African government was in a position to attempt to influence foreign broadcasting. The Bureau of Information began by purchasing air time on the popular Portuguese radio station. Note that this transcription service was carried out as a function of the Bureau of Information. and that the SABC's role was presumably limited to that of a paid consultant. South Africa. Union Government. Bureau of Information. Director of Information. "Letter to the Minister of the Interior." 9 September. 1943. TAB TES.716/F4/118.

These external services included a nightly broadcast of South African news in Portuguese as well as English and Afrikaans language advertisements for Union Loan Certificates. South Africa. Union Government. Bureau of Information. "Letter to the Secretary for Finance." 16 November. 1946. TAB TES.716/F4/118.

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By 1943, The Bureau was also providing a half-hour program to the Nairobi Broadcasting Station. When funding for the transcription service was curtailed in 1946, the Ministry of the Interior was financing programs in Portuguese, French, Flemish, Afrikaans, and English. Regular coverage was provided to Angola, Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique. Intermittent services were also transmitted to Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone, and were heard as far afield as Uruguay and Argentina. South Africa. Union Government. Bureau of Information. Director of Information. "Letter to the Minister of the Interior," 9 September, 1943. TAB TES.716/F4/118.

When informing the finance office that these programs were to be terminated, the Director of Information noted that they were "a purely wartime expenditure designed to counteract enemy propaganda ... now that this Bureau is being reorganised on a peacetime basis ... other arrangements having been made to circulate South African news in that territory." See South Africa. Union Government. Bureau of Information. "Letter to the Secretary for Finance," 16 November, 1946. TAB TES.716/F4/118.

[34] South Africa. Union Government. Bureau of Information. Director of Information. "Letter to the Minister of the Interior," 9 September, 1943. TAB TES.716/F4/118.

[35] Basil Davidson. "South Africa and the Second World War," In *Africa and the Second World War* ed. UNESCO. 107-122. (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 109.

[36] See for example: Reginald Coupland. "In a Recent National Talk the Eminent Oxford Historian Sir Reginald Coupland Gave his Views on South Africa's Place in the World," *Radio-Week* (15 March 1946): 8-9; Lord Hailey. "Description of British Colonial Policy in Africa—Condensed from a Broadcast Talk from Cape Town," *Radio-Week* (30 August 1946): 10-11.

[37] Translation from the Afrikaans: 'Met die kragtige middel van die radio en die skriftelike vorm was in Radio-Week verskyn, sal die S.A.U.K. 'n sterk faktor in die opbow van taal wees, maar dit kan alleen geskied in samewerking en met die goedgesindheid van luisteraars en lesers.' "Taalproblems," *Radio-Week* (29 August 1946): 1.

[38] This finding resulted from testimony put forward by Afrikaans Programme Organizer, J.K. Marais (see footnote 25). South Africa. Union Government. *Report of Commission of Enquiry into the Operations of the South African Broadcasting Corporation* (Pretoria, S.A.: Government Printer, 1941).

[39] See for example: Stella Pines. "The Human Blood Hounds of Australia—From Durban," *Radio-Week* (12 December 1947): 10.

[40] One such program indicated the potential role of radio in addressing "the pressing problem of African education in this country." R.R. Byrne. "U.N.E.S.C.O.'s Second General Conference Takes Place in Mexico City," *Radio-Week* (3 October 1947): 8-9.

[41] South Africa. Republic Government. Secretary for Native Affairs. "Letter from Rodseth for the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Director General of the SABC," 1951. TAB NTS.9728/839/400(II).

[42] Senator Edgar Brookes. "'The Sounding Board of Nations' South Africa—and the other Races," *Radio-Week* (12 April 1946): 24-25.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Davidson notes that, in the post-war era, South Africa had developed its capitalist system to an extent to which it could instigate its own imperialist policies within the realm of the sub-continent. See Davidson. "South Africa and the Second World War," 109.

[45] F.H. Lowe. "Good Neighours—Condensed from a National Broadcast on Northern Rhodesia," *Radio-Week* (26 July 1946): 6-7.

[46] Ibid., 7. A further example of this attitude can be found in SABC broadcast regarding Uganda, which relates the story of how, when 'the white man' discovered the country, he found "a lack of fundamental knowledge, an out-of-date system of agriculture, a low native capacity for physical and mental work and an apathy for social and economic advancement. These, and other things, he resolved into a vicious circle of lack of education, malnutrition, inefficient work and

low production ..." See A.W. Steward. "East African Problems." *Radio-Week* (27 June 1947): 6-7.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Coupland, "In a Recent National Talk," 9.

[49] Hilda Kuper, B.W. Vilakazi, and E. Westphal, *Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal* (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1943). TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1).

[50] The Atlantic Charter was a document signed by the Allied Powers during WWII in an effort to secure the support of indigenous peoples around the world. While the document promised self-determination to all people, both Britain and South Africa resisted application of this principal to the African continent.

[51] Rudolf Erasmus, "Draft Letter from the Director of Information to the Secretary for Native Affairs Mr. Smit Regarding a Report on Native Broadcasts," 23 September, 1943. TAB NTS.9655/520/400/13(1).

[52] The Schoch Commission considered all aspects of broadcasting in South Africa. For a critical reading of the findings consult Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology," 41-46.

[53] Hilda Kuper, S.M. Mofokeng, E. Westphal, B. Valakazi, and Quintin Whyte, "South African Institute of Race Relations Memorandum of Evidence Submitted to the Commission of Inquiry into Broadcasting Services," 28 November, 1946, 1. WITS AD.1715/36.3ii.

[54] It seems that the SABC was paying attention to this debate. In 1952, its Annual Report suggested that the service was providing sixteen hours per day of entertainment and educational programming in the hopes of reducing the crime rate. See Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology," 51.

[55] P.J. Botha, "Letter from the SABC Studio Manager in Natal to the Chief Native Commissioner of the Department of Native Affairs (Pietermaritzburg)," 23 March, 1950. TAB NTS.9728/839/400(1).

[56] Wired wireless used a system of cables to distribute signals into homes. In heavily populated areas, this system proved to be less expensive than broadcasting for both the producer and the audience. Governments identified an additional benefit of reducing public access to international transmissions available to owners of short-wave wireless receivers. This wired service provided advice on crops and cattle, a weather report and information about seasonal work. General news was also broadcast several times a day. Programming was carried in Zulu, Xhosa, Southern Sotho, English and Afrikaans. See P.J. Botha, "Letter from the SABC Studio Manager."

[57] Gideon Roos, "Letter from the Director-General SABC to the Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations Quintin Whyte Regarding SABC's Bantu Programmes," 2 December, 1958. WITS AD.1947/11.1. This, despite the loss of almost two thousand subscribers in 1957 due to the forced removals of Africans from 'temporary shelters in Orlando. Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology," 52.

[58] W. Russell Perkins, "Letter from the National Council of Women of South Africa ISC Member 'Broadcasting' to the Director South African Institute of Race Relations," 28 May, 1953. WITS AD.1947/11.1.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] British Broadcasting Corporation, "VHF Prospects in the Commonwealth: Summary of Replies," ed. External Broadcasting Senior Superintendent Engineer P.E.F.A. West, 24 June, 1957. British Public Records Office--London (Kew Gardens) (hereafter PRO) CO.1027/233. Hayman and Tomaselli suggest that a plausible explanation for this move toward a more expensive system of broadcast services lay in the perception that the provision of wired services

to informal urban African communities legitimized what were, as far as the government was concerned, temporary dwellings. See Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology," 52.

[62] South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 2.

[63] See Unesco, *World Communications: A 200-Country Survey of Press, Radio, Television and Film* (New York: Unesco, 1975), 111. While South Africa had attempted to regionalize programming as early as 1952, the ability to format news for regional consumption was greatly enhanced by the advent of FM services. See A.M. van Schoor, "Letter from the Head of News Services (Johannesburg) to the Mayor of Cradock" 1952. KAB 3/CDK.4/1/137.

[64] Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology in the Growth of South African Broadcasting, 1924-1971," 66.

[65] South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 2.

[66] Unesco, *World Communications: Press, Radio, Television, Film.* See also Hachten and Giffard, *The Press and Apartheid*, 203.

[67] South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 2. See also: Unesco, *World Communications: Press, Radio, Television, Film.* The report notes that "[O]wing to a very full curriculum, broadcasts are transmitted in the afternoon after school hours and are discussed in classrooms the following morning."

[68] See Tomaselli and Tomaselli, "Between Policy and Practice in the SABC, 1970-1981," 95.

[69] South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1966* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1966), 12.

[70] Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology in the Growth of South African Broadcasting, 1924-1971," 63. This close affiliation has enabled the SABC to "contribute" to the development of African languages. The SABC reported that by 1984, it had contributed more than one hundred thousand words to various African languages. See Tomaselli and Tomaselli, "Between Policy and Practice in the SABC, 1970-1981," 101.

[70] Ibid., 97.

[71] This subjugation is most easily recognizable in the disparities which existed in the funding of African and European education. See Appendix D.

[72] The Broederbond was established to promote the welfare of the "Afrikaner Volk" in the face of perceived threats from British and African influences. For a history of the Broederbond consult: Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, *The Super-Afrikaners* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1978); JHP Serfontein, *Brotherhood of Power* (London: Rex Collings, 1979). See also Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa.*

[73] While experimentation with FM was initially seen a means of solving problems with interference, he decision to implement the system was driven by ideological rather than technical concerns.

[74] The 1938 reenactment of the Great Trek is seen by Hayman and Tomaselli as having demonstrated to the Afrikaner community, the power of radio in stimulating cultural unity. See Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology in the Growth of South African Broadcasting, 1924-1971," 34.

[75] Hayman and Tomaselli, "Ideology and Technology in the Growth of South African Broadcasting, 1924-1971."

[76] Ibid. Hayman and Tomaselli note that while an ardent supporter of the Afrikaner movement, SABC General-Director Gideon Roos also believed in the maintenance of an 'objective' style which characterized the BBC.

[77] Black Sash is a group of politically active middle class white women formed in 1961 to oppose to the imposition of Apartheid. The group was particularly active in combating the government's policy of forced removals of people from their homes following the imposition of the Group Areas Act.

[78] Jean Sinclair, "Letter from the National President of the Black Sash to the President of the South African Institute of Race Relations," 30 November, 1961. WITS AD.1947/11.1.

[79] "South Africa: The Press," *Africa Digest*. 1962. 26.

[80] Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa*. 207.

[81] See J. F. Maitland-Jones, *Politics in Africa* Comparative Modern Governments, ed. Max Beloff (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1973), 106.

[82] Under this act, virtually anything which worked toward the abolition of Apartheid could be (and often was) declared communism.

[83] With this act, the detention without trial of political activists for up to ninety days was legalized. Government was under no obligation to release the names of such detainees.

[84] This act allowed police to enter private homes on suspicion, and seize any publications found. See Maitland-Jones, *Politics in Africa*.

[85] See Hachten, *The Growth of Media in the Third World*. 46.

[86] The SABC had been broadcasting throughout the region as early as 1939 but tended to regard this as 'spill over'. The Broadcasting Act was amended in 1949. See South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*. 1.

[87] Ibid., 2.

[88] See William A. Hachten, "Policies and Performance in South African Television," *Journal of Communication* 29 (3 (Summer) 1979): 62-72.

[89] Joyce M. Worsley, "Letter to the Director of Information," 10 November, 1958. PRO DO.35/9545. See also Ainslie, *The Press in Africa*, 157.

[90] The threat of communism was used as a unifying call to South Africans throughout the life of the Nationalist government. In March of 1962 the South African Minister of Defense suggested that the country was in real danger from communist African states and that South Africa could not count on the support of the international community in the event of war. See "South Africa: Danger from African States," *Africa Digest*. 1962. 155.

[91] Ainslie, *The Press in Africa*, 157.

[92] See Hachten and Giffard, *The Press and Apartheid*, 221.

[93] South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 2.

[94] Ainslie, *The Press in Africa*, 157.

[95] South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1966* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1966), 32. The Sjambok is a whip widely used by police and others intent on maintaining order within Apartheid South Africa.

[96] Donald Browne, "Something New Out of Africa? South African International Radio's Presentation of Africa to Listeners in North America," *Journal of African Studies* 14 (1 1987): 17.

[97] In his study of South Africa's short-wave broadcasts, Wasburn identifies six recurrent broadcast themes: that South Africa is an unusually complex, modern society with a pro-Western government with rich cultural ties to Western Europe; that South Africa is wantonly and hypocritically singled out as a nation which oppresses its people; that South Africa has undertaken major programs to improve black-white relations; that South Africa maintains a policy of peaceful co-existence and helpfulness toward other African nations; that efforts by foreign states to influence South Africa's domestic policies through the imposition of economic sanctions are both futile and counterproductive; and that political and economic instabilities across Southern Africa are the result of tribalism, incompetence, crime, corruption and foreign interference. See Philo C. Wasburn, "The Counter-Propaganda of Radio RSA: The Voice of South Africa," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 33 (2 1989): 117-138.

[98] Ibid., 24.

[99] Francis Wilson, "Southern Africa," In *The Cambridge History of Africa: From 1940*-1975, ed. Michael Crowder. 251-330. 8. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 271.

[100] Hadji Konde, *Press Freedom in Tanzania* (Arusha, Tanzania: Eastern Africa Publications, 1984), 234.

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[101] See Ake Magnusson, *Research Report No. 35: The Voice of South Africa* (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976).

[102] Graham Mytton, *National Mass Media Audience Survey: The Major Towns* (Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, 1971). Zambia Broadcasting Services Research Project: Research Reports and Papers No. 2.

[103] A.M. Kittermaster, "Central African Broadcasting Station (Lusaka) Listener Research 1951," 7 January, 1952. WITS AD.1947/11.3.

[104] The SABC bought *Lourenço Marques* in 1972. South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1972* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1972), 12.

[105] The SABC indicated that it maintained satisfactory relations with the new government during the initial transition period despite the transmitter being the center of a counter-revolutionary movement. These cordial relations were short lived. See South African Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report: 1974* (Cape Town, S.A.: Government Printer, 1974), 13.

[106] See South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 2.

[107] Ibid. These stations, set up the 'independent homelands' of South Africa, were the first FM stations outside the direct control of the SABC.

[108] Marketing analysis had shown that 50% of the total national disposable income was spent in this area. See Bophuthatswana Commercial Radio (Pty) Ltd., "Management Report on Developments to Date," 14 November, 1979. WITS AD.2202.

[109] Ibid. It was assumed that the White listeners would start tuning in to television in the evening.

[110] Bophuthatswana Commercial Radio (Pty) Ltd. "Channel 702—Format," 1 May, 1980. WITS AD.2202.

[111] South Africa, *Report of the Task Group on Broadcasting*, 50.

[112] Christopher Paterson, "Broadcasting for National Development in the New South Africa," *Paper Presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, 4-7 December in Boston, Massachusetts*, 1993, 4-5.

[113] See Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," *Media, Culture & Society* 17 (1995): 577-601.

[114] Teer-Tomaselli notes that it is most productive to view the relationship between the SABC and the government as a consensual partnership in which both worked in the 'national interest'. See Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," 577.

[115] HSRC Education Research Programme Main Committee. *The Use of Radio and Television in Education and Training*. Pretoria, South Africa: HSRC, 1985, 125.

[116] Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," 579.

[117] Main Committee. *The Use of Radio and Television in Education and Training*, 125.

[118] Paterson, "Broadcasting for National Development in the New South Africa," 7.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," 578.

[121] Paterson, "Broadcasting for National Development in the New South Africa," 4.

[122] The percentage spent on African education increased from 8 percent in 1980 to 14.5 percent in 1988. See Elaine Unterhalter, "Changing Aspects of Feformism in Bantu Education, 1953-89," In *Apartheid Education and Popular Struggles* (ed. Elaine Unterhalter, Harold Wolpe, Thozamile Botha, Saleem Badat, Thulisile Dlamini, and Benito Khotsend, 35-72. London: Zed Books, 1991), 52.

[123] Paterson, "Broadcasting for National Development in the New South Africa," 9.

[124] Michael Macdonald. "Power Politics in the New South Africa." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22 (2 (June) 1996): 221-233. 224.

[125] The task force was criticized for representing only the interests of the Afrikaner community. for listening to only select evidence. and for recommending tighter government control of broadcasting than currently existed. Likewise. while the creation of 'business units' was ostensibly an economic decision. many saw the move as a way for these units to be parceled out into the private sector should any future government mover to nationalize the airwaves. See Mersham. "The Emergence of Community Ratio in South Africa." 2-3. See also. Teer-Tomaselli. "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election." 578.

[126] Mersham. "The Emergence of Community Ratio in South Africa." 2(fn.).

[127] *The Viljoen Report*. 51.

[128] Ibid.. 50.

[129] "CBA Conference Roundup: South African Transition." *Combroad* (105 (December) 1994): 16-17.

[130] Allister Sparks. "For the Media. the Opportunities of 'Pretoriastroika'." *Media Studies Journal* 7 (4 1993): 103-109. 108.

[131] The PAC in particular noted that "only 20 percent of the African people are conversant with either English or Afrikaans languages. We are aware that some 12 million of our people are regular listeners of the vernacular language radio stations." Pan African Congress of Azania. "Pan African Congress of Azania (PAC) Statement on Media Policy. March 1992: 'Free Media for Azania'." In *South African Media Policy: Debates of the 1990s*. ed. P. Eric Louw. 352-354. Bellville. South Africa: Anthroppos. 1993. 354.

[132] Conferences held to discuss media related issues which failed to address the issue of education include the 1990 Rhodes University Media Policy Workshop. the 1991 seminar hosted by the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies. and the 1992 'Free. Fair and Open: South African Media in the Transition to Democracy' Conference. convened by the Campaign for Open Media and the Centre for Development Studies at the University of the Western Cape. Policy statements by the Democratic Party. the National Party. the Pan African Congress of Azania. and the National Association of Broadcasters all failed to address the issue of educational media. In their 1991 Draft Media Charter. the ANC notes simple that "As part of civic education programmes. the state and media institutions shall strive to inform citizens about their media rights and those of media-workers." African National Congress. "Resolutions Adopted at the ANC DIP National Media Seminar. 23-24 November 1991: Towards a Media Charter." In *South African Media Policy: Debates of the 1990s*. ed. P. Eric Louw. 329-340. Bellville. South Africa: Anthroppos. 1993. 332. For an overview of issues relevant to this period see P. Eric Louw. ed. *South African Media Policy: Debates of the 1990s*. Studies on the South African Media. Bellville. South Africa: Anthroppos. 1993.

[133] Industry representatives also suggested the development of an interim Independent Film Commission charged with the task of. among other things. investigating and developing "educational facilities with a particular emphasis on disadvantaged groups." "Joint Submission to CODESA Working Group 1 and CODESA Working Group 3 by Organizations Which Form Part of the Independent Broadcasting and Film Industry." In *South African Media Policy: Debates of the 1990s*, ed. P. Eric Louw. 294-305. Bellville. South Africa: Anthroppos. 1993. 303.

[134] See "Jabulani Freedom of the Airwaves Conference Recommendations Towards the Future of Broadcasting." In *South African Media Policy: Debates of the 1990s*. ed. P. Eric Louw. 306-315. Bellville. South Africa: Anthroppos. 1993. especially 310-311.

[135] Ibid.. 311.

[136] See Mersham. "The Emergence of Community Ratio in South Africa."

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[137] The Board eventually ratified the Editorial Code which ensured the independence of the newsroom. Teer-Tomaselli notes that this "was central to the transformation of the news services of the SABC, for both radio and television, since it represented a final symbolic and practical break with the tradition of taking direction from outside the ranks of journalists themselves, whether from the government of the hierarchy of the Corporation." For am overview of the SABC's coverage of the election, see Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election."

[138] The predicament facing the Board was the same as that facing the ANC in implementing changes within the civil service, namely that, while despising the ideological stance of many within the service, the new administration needed the expertise they offered. For an interesting reading of the ANC position in this regard, see Macdonald, "Power Politics in the New South Africa."

[139] See Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," 579.

[140] As a Neiman fellow of Harvard University, founding member of the Writers Association of South Africa, founding member of the Media Workers Association of South Africa, media officer for Nelson Mandela and Board member of the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism, Sisulu's journalistic credentials were beyond reproach. However, as the son of then ANC Deputy President Walter Sisulu, the appointment was seen as being inappropriate. See Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," 579. See also, "Sisulu Takes Office," *Combroad* (105 (December) 1994): 5. Sisulu was initially appointed 'special executive' to the Group Chief Executive. His appointment as Group Chief Executive came six months later, only one month after the ANC election victory. Govan Reddy was Deputy Chair of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, while Solly Mokoetle worked for the ANC's Radio Freedom. See "South Africa: SABC and the ANC Factor," *MISA Newsletter*, March 1994.

[141] "How the Corporation met the Needs of 1,500 International Broadcasters: SABC as Host Broadcaster," *Combroad* (103 (June) 1994): 6.

[142] See Teer-Tomaselli, "Moving Toward Democracy: The South African Broadcasting Corporation and the 1994 Election," 585. The SABC had assistance from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC, as well as help from the US based ABC, CBS, and NPR. See "The SABC's Role in South Africa's Moment of History: The Election," *Combroad* (10 (June) 1994): 4-5.

[143] See "The SABC's Role in South Africa's Moment of History: Covering the Violence," *Combroad* (103 (June) 1994): 5.

[144] "SABC Confronts Racial Imbalance," *Combroad* (105 (December) 1994): 4.

[145] "Upheavals Ahead for SABC: More Black Managers at SABC," *Combroad* (107 (June) 1995): 8

[146] The shift in demographic appeal is especially evident with the 'flagship' of the SABC, Radio South Africa, now SAfm. While many of the changes appear to be unpopular with traditional audiences, the SABC reports an increase in listeners across racial lines. See "Radio in the New South Africa: Extracts from Speeches to the Radio Academy Festival, Birmingham, June 1995: Govin Reddy, Chief Executive Radio, SABC," *Combroad* (108 (September) 1995): 14.

[147] "Relaunch of SABC TV," *Combroad* (110 (March-May) 1996): 10.

[148] Gert Claassen, "SABC Whoosh! Into Satellite," *Combroad* (112 (September-November) 1996): 5.

[149] "South Africa: Educational Satellite TV Channel Launched," *Combroad* (105 (December) 1994): 25.

[150] David Harding, "New Voices in South Africa," *Combroad* (107 (June) 1995): 9-10, 25.

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[151] Barbara Ludman. "New Education 'Soapies' for TV Viewing," Weekly Mail & Guardian, March 22, 1996.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Harding. "New Voices in South Africa," 9.

[155] "Radio in the New South Africa: Extracts from Speeches to the Radio Academy Festival, Birmingham, June 1995: S.B. Katz, CEO: Primedia Broadcasting (Pty) Ltd.," *Combroad* (108 (September) 1995): 14.

Why Beijingers Read Newspapers?

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ABSTRACT

Unlike the previous studies that focuse on why and how the Chinese government and Communist Party used the mass media, this study asks what Chinese audience look for while reading newspapers. From the perspective of uses-and-gratification theories, two dimentions were proposed: the societal-level information, and the individual-level information. Those two dimentions differ from the dimentions found in uses-and-gratifications studies conducted in the United States. Using an audience survey of 749 Beijing residents in November 1996, we conducted three independent rounds of factor analyses based on three different groups of variables. Each round of analysis produced the same two dimensions that we proposed.

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Why Beijingers Read Newspapers?

It is well documented that, in China, the top leaders of the government and the Party used to have total control of the media personnel, media contents, and media agenda (Chu, 1978; Lee, 1980; Warren, 1988; Yu, 1990; Li, 1991; Hong, 1993; Lee, 1993; Yu, 1993). Things changed rapidly as market reforms swept into the media industry in the post-Mao era -- the Chinese media can no longer afford to ignore the voices of their audiences. It is imperative for them to learn what their audiences want from their media experiences. While previous research has focused on the media changes initiated by the Party and government in China, this study looks at the other end of the communication process -- the audience, specifically newspaper readers. From the perspective of uses-and-gratification, we ask what readers in Beijing seek from newspapers. We propose two dimensions of uses and gratification sought by the Beijing readers: the societal-level information and individual-level needs. Those two dimensions are tested against factor analyses of three different sets of variables from a survey of 749 Beijing residents in November 1996.

The Roles and Functions of Chinese Media

Early studies of Chinese media focused on the propagandistic and persuasive aspects of mass communication (Chang, Chen & Zhang, 1993). Since the mid-1880s, various social factions have used newspapers mainly as tools in their political struggles. While the propaganda role and news coverage role of the media are often in conflict with each other, information dissemination was rarely seen by many Chinese journalists as their major task. After the communist take over in 1949, the role of media as information provider and propagandist has remained (Li, 1994). Mass media as part of the superstructure in China became class ideologues, defining and reproducing the central knowledge determined by the Party and state's political and ideological deliberations (Wang & Chang, 1996). The Chinese communists have always recognized the value of mass media (Robinson, 1981). For example, the government has emphasized the use of the mass media for China's social, political, and economic development (Yu & Sears, 1996). As a powerful tool of opinion and perceptions, news media are supposed to unite the people, to elevate their consciousness and spirit. To serve this function, news media are not allowed to publish materials that the government think would create political division or ideological differences among the masses (Gan, 1994). With specific regard to the press, Hood suggested that the Chinese press not only serve mainly as the "throat and tongue" of the Party, but also play multiple roles, such as in information gathering, fictional struggle, maintaining social order, national integration and mass indoctrination (Hood, 1994).The media also serve as a frame of reference for people to interpret the problems in society. From the perspective of the Party elite, the masses do not have the ability to tell truth from falsehood, and the media have the noble responsibility to help them understand the daily events (Zhu et al., 1997). Since the Party is assumed to represent the people, media are thus assumed to be serving the people (Chu, 1994). In this sense, the assumed media role and functions of the media collapse into one entity.

Although these studies have examined the specific roles and general functions of Chinese mass media, several questions remain relatively unexplored: How have the media role and functions changed, and if so, how, over the reforming years? And in particular, how do audiences conceive of the media role and functions today? The present reform has had the unintended effect of liberalizing China's media system (Chu, 1994). The structure of the party-state has been deeply shaken by the dynamics and impact of the open-door policy, commercialization, decentralization, cultural pluralism, and de-ideologization in the Post-Mao era (Huang, 1994). Chu (1994) posits that a "self-generating dynamism" catalyzed planned market reforms into spontaneous reform in media operations and the ideological values found in media products. These interacting pressures limit the range of possible responses available to the government. Though the government sticks to the philosophy that the media's primary role is to serve the party (Li, 1991), the role of media to provide information and entertainment have been formally recognized and proclaimed by the Party and government 1986 (Chu, 1989). While these studies have provided useful information in describing the specific roles and general functions of Chinese media, few of them have been devoted to how people use the media, that is, their use of and gratification from mass media. Though the theory of uses and gratification has been extensively explored in the United States, it has been seldom applied to the study of media receivers in China.

Uses and Gratification

Uses and gratification research has focused on audience motivation and consumption. It has been guided by research questions that shifted scholars' focus from what the media do to people to what people do with the media (Klapper, 1963). That is, what are the purposes or functions the media serve for a body of active receivers (Fisher, 1978). The uses and gratification approach began with the study of the functions of radio programming. Herzog (1944) used the term "gratification" when she described the specific types of satisfaction reported by audience members for daytime radio programs. This research on radio serials provided insight into why audiences intentionally seek out some kinds of media content and completely ignore others. This kind of goal-oriented behavior indicates that audiences do not simply wait passively to receive whatever the media provide them (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995). In other words, media receivers want to use the information in some way or to obtain satisfactions that they anticipate (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995).

Following a number of studies on audience uses and gratification of various media (Berelson, 1949; Kimball, 1959, etc), early 1970s scholars in this area turned to audience motivations, developing typologies of the uses people made of the media to gratify social and psychological needs (Katz et al. 1973). Such typologies included such needs as strengthening understanding of self, friends, others, or society; strengthening the status of self or society; and strengthening contact with family, friends, society, or culture (Lowery

& DeFleur, 1995).

In recent years, the uses and gratification approach has been grounded in five assumptions: a) communication behavior, including media selection and use, is goal-directed, purposive, and motivated; b) people take the initiative in selecting and using communication vehicles to satisfy felt needs or desires; c) a host of social and psychological factors mediate people's communication behavior, predisposition, interaction, and environment to mold expectations about the media; d) media compete with other forms of communication for selection, attention, and use to gratify our needs or wants; e) people are typically more influential than the media in the relationship, but not always (For a review, see Lowery & DeFleur, 1995).

The uses and gratification theory originated in the United States. Few research has been done on how this theory might apply to the media uses in other countries, especially those nations with different media systems from the US libertarian press system? This paper will take the case study of China, a country which a mixed model of Socialist and Authoritarian press system. Copying its Communist press system from the former Soviet Union in the 1950s (Schell, 1995), the ruling Communist Party of China exert tight control over the media both economically and politically. However, as the market influence gradually increased in the past two decades, the Party and the state control over the media gradually decreased. Although the Party still officially controls the media, metaphorically speaking, the press in today's China is like a fish -- a fish allowed to swim in the economic pond but only inside the political jar (Xu, 1994). The Chinese media system tends to be moving from a Communist media system toward an authoritarian press system, in which the government controls the media to a much lesser extent. What are the uses and gratification of Chinese media receivers, particularly newspaper readers, in this transitional period? Do the uses and gratification theory developed in a libertarian press system apply to a communist press system, or authoritarian press system, or a combination of both? These are the questions we are exploring in our survey data.

It's likely, as has been found in the uses-and-gratification research from the West, that an individual uses the media for different purposes at different times under different circumstances; and different people may seek different gratifications from the media. A question for researchers is how to meaningfully and effectively categorize (typologize) those different needs and objectives. For our study, we looked for such a typology in the literature. While there are many of such typologies developed on the basis of studying the audience in the Western countries, we were unable to find one that was readily applicable for our Chinese audience. This should not be surprising, given China's cultural history and political/economic/social system that are now almost unique in the world.

So we formulated a typology of our own, a typology that is based on two observations about Chinese society and audience. First, the conflict between the interest of the nation (society) and individual has been a constant and central theme both in Confucius teaching and the Chinese-brand Communist ideology. In fact, it is one of the very few areas where the ancient emperors and modern revolutionaries agree: individuals are called to sacrifice their own needs and desire for the good of all (represented by either the emperors or the Communist Party). Secondly, this conflict continued to play a key role in the post-Mao China, with an important twist. The popular culture and commercial culture in China, helped by the influence from the West, now emphasize the needs of individuals, while the small number of Party officials who vowed to stop the trend appeared powerless. While each individual Chinese may have different views on whether he or she should live to serve the society or live to seek his/her own happiness, the difference and the conflict between the two should be a most important influence on the thinking and behaviors of many.

Among the most affected should be the reporters, editors, and the managers of the media. It was not long ago that Chinese media's sole task was to serve the Party and to motivate the masses to serve the Party. The journalists were trained as propagandists and worked as propagandists. As a result of the changes in the economy and the media industry, however, most of the Chinese media organizations today have to make the ends meet on their own. To survive economically in an increasingly competitive market, they realized that they had to serve the needs of the individual audience (and advertisers). While some journalists relished in the memory of the good old days when the entire nation followed every printed word with action, some other journalists embraced the new opportunities and enriched their individual pockets.

We therefore suspect that Chinese audience's needs and objectives in using the media could be summarized into two dimensions: first, to seek societal-level information and secondly, to serve the individual needs. Further, when audience evaluate a particular newspaper or television program, the criteria that they use could also be categorized into those two dimensions, that is, whether the newspaper or program provides societal-level information and whether it serves his or her individual needs. Factor analysis appears to be an appropriate tool that we can use to test our speculations about the two dimensions.

METHODS

The data for this study were from a survey conducted in November 1996 by the Public Opinion Research Institute at Chinese People's University, one of the oldest and most respected polling organizations in China (Rosen, 1989; Zhao et al, 1994; Zhao and Shen, 1995). Based on a stratified random sample of adult residents of the urban districts of Beijing, 1440 people were visited door-to-door, of whom 749 (52%) completed the questionnaire interview. The sampling error was within three percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.

As the Capitol City and cultural center of the country, Beijing is by no means a representative locale of entire China. Beijing has become a most popular place for survey-based communication studies conducted by some Western-trained researchers, in part because of Beijing's importance, and in part because of better availability of the data (e.g.. Zhao et al., 1994; Zhao and Shen, 1995)

Data Analysis

Three sets of the questions in the survey may provide relevant information with regard to our research question. Because each sets of the questions gauge a different aspect of the readers' needs, we performed three independent factor analyses, one for each set of the questions.

Reasons for Reading Newspapers. One set of questions asked the respondents to identify which of the ten goals they had in mind while reading a newspaper. The question wordings and the results of the factor analysis appear in Table 1.

[Table 1 about Here]

We used varimax rotation methods to extract two underlying factors. Factor 1 was composed of: learning policies, learning social views, learning international and domestic events, learning about society and people, learning about trade news. Factor 2 was composed of: relaxing and taking a spiritual rest, killing time, learning practical knowledge and information in life, and learning about social trends. Roughly speaking, we locate two dimensions here. Variables underlying Factor 1 concern events on the society or group level, while items within Factor 2 are about learning information for the individual's sake. . For example, learning practical knowledge and social trends involve information on the individual level. World and domestic news are obvious societal information. Learning about social trends belongs to the second dimension. However, its low loading (.45) reveals its uncertain identity.

Types of Information Sought by Newspaper Readers. Having examined why Beijing readers read newspapers, we may ask a related but somewhat different question: what types of information the readers seek while they read? Another set of survey questions asked respondents to identify the information they wanted most from reading newspapers. Respondents were provided with 30 choices. The wordings of the questions are shown in Table 2.

[Table 2 about Here]

Because of the large number (30) of the original items, a two-stage factor analysis was performed. The conventional Eigen-value-one criterion produced 8 factors after the first-stage analysis. Those 8 factors were entered into the second stage of analysis, again using the Eigen-value-one criterion. Two factors emerged, which were shown in Table 2.

Factor 1 was composed of soft news, hard news, knowledge, literature and miscellaneous stuff. Factor 2 was composed of entertainment, lifestyle, and life story. Once again, the societal vs. individual dimensions emerged. Roughly speaking, Factor 1 can be seen as a category of societal information (what seems to contradict this categorization is that we have "knowledge on hobbies" in this category), and Factor 2 the things that serve the needs of individuals.

How Readers Evaluated the Newspapers. In addition to the reasons they read and information they seek from newspapers, another related question is how readers evaluated newspapers. The survey also asked readers to select and rank 3 (out of 32) newspapers that are the best in terms of meeting each of ten standards. The question wording and additional technical details of the factor analysis can be found in Table 3.

[Table 3 about Here]

In order to determine how each newspaper scored on each criterion, we recoded each criterion with the unit of analysis being newspapers, not individual respondents. We calculated the comprehensive score of each newspaper on a particular criterion by the following formula: N1*3+N2*2+N3*1 (where N1 stands for the number of respondents who ranked a newspaper in the first place, N2 stands for the number of respondents who put the newspaper in second place, and N3 stands for the frequencies of respondents who put the newspaper in third place).

For example, with regard to the criterion of readability of contents, 182 people ranked *Beijing Evening News* in first place, 73 put it second, and 64 put it third. We get the comprehensive readability score of Beijing Evening News based on the following formula: 182*3+72*2+64*1=754. For readability, no respondents put *China Consumer News* in the first or second place, and only 2 respondents put it in the third place. We get the comprehensive readability score of this newspapers as follows: 0*3+0*2+2*1=2. Based on this formula, we calculated each newspaper's comprehensive score for the ten rating criteria. Then we did a varimax rotated factor analysis of these ten criteria and extracted two underlying factors. Factor 1 was composed of unbiasedness, objectivity, keeping abreast of the most significant issue(s), social influence, and openness style. Factor 2 was composed of relaxation and enjoyment, ad usage, heeding people's practical needs, editorial design and readability. Again, we can roughly put reader's uses and gratification in the societal vs. individual dimension. Items in Factor 1 emphasized more on newspaper's societal role (e.g., social influence, objectivity), while variables in Factor 2 concern what newspapers mean to individual readers (e.g., ad usage, readability).

WHICH DIMENSIONS READERS EMPHASIZED MOST

After we found two dimensions of uses and gratification among Chinese newspaper readers and replicated the US studies, we went on to explore which dimensions readers emphasizes most in their answers. The results will be meaningful for the development of the theory of uses and gratification, as most studies just stopped where several dimensions had been located.

As we have shown above, in the question asking about the goals of newspaper readings (on a 5-point scale, with 1 being never, and 5 being almost always), we factor-analyzed and got two factors, with Factor 1 being societal, and Factor 2 being individual. The overall mean of the 6 variables in Factor 1 is 2.48, while the overall mean for the 4 variables in Factor 2 is 2.34. This indicated that societal information outweighed learning about individual side of the information.

In another question which asked what information readers wanted most from newspapers, we did a two-stage factor analysis among the 30 choices readers were supposed to select from. Again, as we have shown, we got two underlying factors. Then we calculated the average frequency of each factor. On average 24% of respondents would like to get societal dimension of information, 22% of respondents want individual dimension of information. Again, this demonstrates that readers demanded a little bit more societal dimension of information than individual dimension of information, though there was not much difference between them.

We can conclude that newspapers in China seek information from two dimensions, to nearly equal extent. Some difference might exist among people with different interests and backgrounds. However, generally speaking, on the one hand people read newspaper to seek information on a macro-level, on the other hand, they turn to newspaper for individual entertainment and information. One cannot be without the other. The most popular newspaper, *Beijing Evening News*, was ranked first by the criteria spanning both dimensions, such as unbiasedness and objectivity on one hand, and readability and editorial design on the other hand.

MAPPING NEWSPAPERS BY DIMENSIONS

As mentioned above (see Table 3), we changed unit analysis from individual respondents to unit of newspapers. Then we did a varimax rotated factor analysis of these ten criteria and extracted two underlying factors. We calculated the factor scores for the two factors and mapped the scatter plot.

[Figure 1 about Here]

As shown in the graph, the two dimensions can divide the 32 newspapers into four categories. Most of the newspapers fell under the lower left side of the quadrant, which is lower on both dimensions. In the upper right side of the quadrant, we have three newspaper, *Beijing Evening News, Beijing Youth Daily and China TV Guide. Beijing Evening News* scored the highest on both dimensions in this category. The lower right side of the quadrant features high societal dimension and low individual dimension. It includes *People's Daily, Beijing Daily, Reference News and China Youth Daily. People's Daily* got the highest score in societal dimension and lowest score in individual dimension. On the contrary, the category in the upper left side of the quadrant is high in individual dimension and low in societal dimension. It includes *Shopping Shopping Guide to Quality Products, Beijing TV Guide and Soccer News. Shopping Shopping Guide to Quality Products* is the highest in individual dimension and lowest in societal dimension. When we looked at Table 4, we found that those newspapers that scattered around in the quadrant were actually the most popular newspapers in different aspects. This indicated that in order to be competitive in the market, a newspaper has to appeal to both dimensions, such as *Beijing Evening News*, or at least one of them, such as *Shopping Shopping Guide to Quality Products, Reference News.*

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Through factor analyses of different sets of questions from the original questionnaire -- we discovered the same dimension of uses and gratification among urban Beijing newspaper readers: seeking societal-level information and serving individual-level needs. This finding may be compared with Rubin's two-dimensional findings from the TV viewing study, where Rubin (1984) found that media use can be primarily ritualized (diversionary) or instrumental (utilitarian) in nature. In Rubin's two dimensions, the former is less active or goal-directed in terms of utility than the latter. Previous studies of uses and gratification indicated that such psychological factors as individual structures of interests, attitudes, and values may help shape selections from the media (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995). Different dimensions of uses and gratification between our China study and Rubin's US study might be due to different media being studied, or it might also be due to cultural (or value) differences, or a combination of both. Culturally speaking, China is a traditional Confucius society, which emphasizes community values over individual rights. The Communist rule in China since 1949 reinforced this cultural ideology, as Communism also happens to stress the commonwealth of society. Thus Confucianism and Communist combine to create a cultural tradition which might influence individual's nature or pattern of media uses. Since China was forced open to the outside world in the 1840 Opium War and especially since Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in the late 1970s, China has witnessed vast Western influences, including the Western cultural value of individualism. This influence can be reflected in the conflict between societal dimension and individual dimension of media uses among today's Chinese newspaper readers, though the former still outweighs the latter a little bit. By comparison, individualism is widely accepted as the dominant cultural value in the United States. Rubin's two dimensions thus cover something different from this paper's dimensions, that is, utility of media is emphasized, along goal-directed vs. less goal-directed dimension.

From the perspectives of the Communist Party and the Chinese government, the media's primary function was news transmission, and entertainment was considered secondary. Past communication research in China focused on evaluating how well the media publicized Party policies, and how well the media transmitted news "to serve the masses" (Rogers, 1985). This study departed from this perspective by looking at how people use the media for their own purpose and gratification. The results indicate that the newspaper readers in China are not passive receivers of media content provided by the Party and state. They also actively seek the newspapers for their individual needs and desires. This active use by the readers might affect subsequent changes in media contents, as most of the Chinese media have to serve their audiences in order to survive in the market. As previous studies, people are typically more influential than the media in the relationship, though not always (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995). It will be interesting to further observe how the "economic man" will change the media structure and contents in China.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study of uses and gratification was based on a close-ended questionnaire data, rather than open-ended interviews and panel studies. Due to the limitation of specific questions, this study has no way to find out other possible uses and gratification of newspaper readers, such as social prestige, social contact, security and ritual, etc. (Kimball, 1959). Due to the nature of close-ended question, we will be less confident to conclude that readers actively seek the two dimensions of information from newspapers. In answering the questions, readers might also have tended to answer in a politically correct or socially acceptable way. In addition, this study only covered the newspaper readers of urban Beijing residents. The sample was not representative of all the Beijing newspaper readers, let alone the newspaper readers in China. Future research might combining quantitative and qualitative methods in studying the uses and gratification among media receivers, and a much larger and more representative sample is warranted.

CONCLUSION

The focus of this paper is on the uses and gratification, that is, the functions of newspapers for Beijing readers. In focusing on audience motives for using newspapers, this study factor-analyzed the reasons the Beijingers read newspapers, the information they seek from the newspapers, and the standards they use to evaluate the newspapers. Two dimensions emerged from each of the three independent round of analyses: the societal-level information and individual-level needs. It was found through sets of factor analyses that Beijing readers are not passive entities being acted upon by newspapers. While the Party and government use the newspaper to suit their goals and needs, the readers also use newspapers to gratify their own needs. We also found that the readers sought societal-level information as often as they looked to satisfy their individual-level needs, although the former still appeared to enjoy a small -- very small -- advantage. The two dimensions we unearthed here pointed a direction toward which the Chinese media are progressing. They also serve as an important guide for understanding the structure of Chinese newspapers, and possibly newspapers in the other Confucius societies, such as Singapore and Korea.

According to Mao Zedong, newspapers should propagandize. Mao never mentioned the press functions of conveying information, cultivating knowledge, or providing entertainment (Li, 1994). In today's post-Mao era, media's roles and functions have changed dramatically to fit China's ongoing market reforms. By the same token, the nature and behavior of media uses by the audiences have also changed dramatically, from passive receivers of state propaganda in the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, to active readers of different information that suits their own needs. We need to discard the monolithic view about doing research on the Chinese media, and look at the development of Chinese media in a more dynamic way. That is, we should not only look at the Party and government side of the media uses and function, but also look at the receivers' side of the story. Our findings indicate that readers not only seek information of societal dimension, but also seek individual dimension of information. The latter seems to be at odd with traditional Party goals of mass communication. This paper thus provides a new perspective on the changing behavior of Chinese newspaper readers. However, the two dimensions we located from the media uses among Chinese readers are different from Rubin's dimensions in his US study of TV viewers. Cultural differences might contribute to different dimensions in the two societies.

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Table 1: Reasons for Reading Newspapers

Question 12: People read newspaper for different reasons. How often do you read newspapers for the following reasons? (1= never, 2= seldom, 3= sometimes, 4= often, 5=almost always)

Results of Factor Analysis:

	Factor 1: Societal	*Factor 2: Individual*
B.* Learn policies	.82**	
C. Learn social views	.78	
A. Learn world and domestic events	.77	
F. Enrich knowledge and broaden outlooks	.69	
G. Learn about society and people	.66	
E. Learn about trade news	.64	
I. Relax and take a spiritual rest		.81
J. Kill time		.77
H. Learn practical knowledge for life		.50
D. Learn about social trends		.45

* The items were reordered according to the factor loadings. The letters indicate the original order in questionnaire.

** Cell numbers are factor loadings based on principal component analysis, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Factor extraction criterion: Eigen value equal or larger than 1.

Table 2: Types of Information Sought by Newspaper Readers

Question 23: According to your current situation and needs, what information do you want most when reading newspaper? (Please select as many as you think as appropriate)

	Factor 1: Societal	*Factor 2: Individual*
Softnews [1]	.79	
Hardnews [2]	.72	
Knowledge [3]	.64	
Miscellaneous [4]	.52	
Literature [5]	.50	
Entertainment [6]		.76
Lifestyle [7]		.64
Lifestory [8]		.63

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

1. Variables underlying the factor of softnews are: hot issues (.65), news analysis (.65), perspectives on economic and social phenomena (.60), investigative reportage (.37), military information (.33).
2. Hardnews: domestic news (.73), world news (.61), local news (.58), Party and government policies (.57).
3. Knowledge: hot majors (.68), scientific development (.57), knowledge on hobbies (.52), and sports (.40).
4. Miscellaneous: photograph and cartoons (.62), social investigation (.50), and international experience (.65).
5. Literature: books and newspaper digest (.69), essays (.63), social sciences (.52).
6. Lifestory: ordinary life stories (.74), historical anecdotes (.36).
7. Lifestyle: market guide (.62), health information (.57), daily knack (.56), travel and food information (.51), social trends (.49).
8. Entertainment: celebrity news (.69), entertainment news (.67), excerpts of plays or novels (.55), humors (.48).

Table 3: How Readers Evaluate Newspapers

Question 10: The following are (ten) various features that newspapers may or may not have. For each feature, please name three newspapers that are the best in terms of having the feature. For each feature, please list the three newspapers that you select in the order of the best, the second best, and the third best in terms of having that feature.

Note: For our analysis, a "best" vote is worth 3 points; a "second best" vote is worth 2 points; a "third best" vote is worth 1 point; and a "no mentioning" vote is worth 0 point. Therefore, each newspaper receives 10 scores (1 score for each of the 10 features) from each respondent. These scores were summed across the respondents. This procedure is identical to the one used by media organizations who rank college sports teams by aggregating reporters' votes. For factor analysis, the unit of analysis is newspapers (N=32). The 10 features become 10 variables, and the respondents served as evaluators who evaluate the newspapers on each of the 10 features.

Results of Factor Analysis

	Factor 1: Societal	*Factor2: Invidual*
G.* Unbiasedness	.94**	
F. Objectivity	.90	
I. Keeping abreast of the most significant issue(s)	.90	
D. Openness of style	.88	
E. Social influence	.72	
J. Relaxation and enjoyment		.95
B. Ads usage		.92
H. Heeding people's practical needs		.80
C. Editorial design		.76
A. Readability		.70

* The items were reordered according to the factor loadings. The letters indicate the original order in questionnaire.

** Cell numbers are factor loadings based on principal component analysis, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Factor extraction criterion: Eigen value equal or larger than 1.

Table 4: Newspaper Ranking in the Beijing Market

Ranking	Newspapers People Read Most	Newspapers People Like Most	Newspapers People Subscribed to or Bought Most
1	Beijing Evening News (68%)	Beijing Evening News (53%)	Beijing Evening News (58%)
2	Beijing Youth Daily (40%)	Beijing Youth Daily (36%)	Beijing TV Guide (27%)
3	Beijing Daily (33%)	Reference News (24%)	Beijing Youth Daily (25%)
4	Reference News (31%)	Shopping Shopping Guide to Quality Products (22%)	Shopping Shopping Guide to Quality Products (20%)
5	Beijing TV Guide (28%)	Soccer News (19%)	Soccer News (17%)
6	Shopping Shopping Guide to Quality Products (22%)	Southern Weekend (17%)	China TV Guide (16%)
7	People's Daily (22%)	Beijing TV Guide (17%)	Reference News (11%)
8	Soccer News (19%)	Beijing Daily (14%)	Southern Weekend (10%)
9	China TV Guide (19%)	Legal Daily (13%)	Writers Digest (9%)
10	Legal Daily (16%)	Writers' Digest (12%)	Beijing Daily (8%)

Figure 1


Individual Dimension
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Societal Dimension
4
12
11
2 6
1
9
8
10
7
1 China TV Guide
2 Beijing TV Guide
3 Health News
4 Guide to Quality Products
5 Writers' Digest
6 Soccer News
7 People's Daily
8 Beijing Daily
9 China Youth Daily
10 Reference News
11 Beijing Youth Daily
12 Beijing Evening News

News about Korea and Japan in American Network Television Evening News: A Content Analysis of Coverage in 1996

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Television news abstracts about Korea and Japan in three networks' evening news programs were analyzed. Importance, thematic content, and orientation of news were examined. The findings showed that the news about Korea was treated less importantly than the news about Japan. While Japanese stories showed diversity in thematic contents, Korean stories showed lack of diversity. The news about Korea had a strong orientation toward crisis, while Japanese stories were balanced between crisis and noncrisis orientation.

Introduction

Most people in the United States get their information about foreign countries from mass media. Mass media are "a major source of definitions and images" (McQuail, 1994) of foreign countries. Mass media are sometimes referred to as the "window to the world" because people see the world through the window that mass media offer. However, the window does not show the whole world. People only see the world in the frame of the window. If the frame of the window is too small, people will see a small part of the world. If the window is on the west side wall, people will only see the west side. In other words, media may show a small part of the world from a one-sided point of view.

Among various mass media, television can give the news about the countries on the opposite side of the earth promptly with vivid pictures. Television can greatly influence people's perception about foreign countries. People's attitudes toward a country may vary according to the depiction on television.

Concerning international news, the agenda-setting function of mass media is very effective because mass media are major sources of information about foreign countries. One study shows that the coverage of international conflicts or terrorism involving the United States, crime and drugs, and military issues demonstrated strong agenda setting influence (Wanta & Hu, 1993). This means that mass media may have a powerful effect on the cognition of audiences about foreign countries. Another study found that international news exposures and images of foreign nations are associated positively (McNelly &

Izcaray, 1986). Research also reveals that television is more important than newspapers for influencing public opinion about foreign countries (Semetko et al., 1992).

As noted earlier, people see foreign countries through the frames that mass media offer. According to Graber (1994), television journalists have developed frames of highly stereotyped descriptions of specific situations. While "selecting and emphasizing" certain aspects of reality, mass media establish the media frame (Entman, 1993). When dealing with issues in which the public has little first-hand knowledge, such as international issues, the potential for television to establish the frames for the public is considerable. Consistent portrayal of certain topics may help people in America develop the images of foreign countries.

However, it is often argued that the coverage of foreign countries is not fair. In particular, the Third World countries claim that they are underrepresented and the reports are inaccurate and biased (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980).

Literature Review

The imbalance of news flow between developed and underdeveloped nations has been a major issue in international communication. The Third World protests against the dominant flow of news from the industrialized countries were often construed as an attack on the free flow of information (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980). Not only the quantity, but the quality also has been a major problem in international news in developed countries. The Third World countries assert that the stories covered by the media in the developed countries reflect an inaccurate picture of their countries. Many studies show the unbalanced coverage about foreign countries.

According to Gans (1979) most foreign news in America has been about England, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, Egypt, the Soviet Union, and mainland China. Other countries typically make the news only when they are the site of unusually dramatic happenings, such as wars, coup d'etat, or major disasters.

In fact scholars and researchers have claimed that foreign news in American media is often crisis-oriented (Lent, 1977). The categories of accidents, disasters, war, violence, crime, and vice are more likely to be covered than other categories in American newspapers (Hurrat, 1989). Therefore, the American mass media can give the people a violent and conflict-laden portrait of the world, especially when the Third World is involved (Wilhoit & Weaver, 1983). In addition, the Third World coverage lags behind developed countries and is more crisis-oriented and negative (Giffard, 1984; Larson, 1979).

These studies reveal that the international news frames emphasize the negative aspects of foreign countries.

Some studies that examine the foreign news coverage of American media show that Japan is covered more frequently than the Republic of Korea (i.e. South Korea, hereafter the the ROK) by American media (Giffard, 1984; Ismail, 1988; Larson, 1984). However, no research that compared the news coverage about both countries was found. Therefore, this study will examine how American television news stories delineate and deal with the ROK and Japan. Both Far Eastern countries have had close relationships with the United States in economics, politics, foreign affairs, and military affairs.

Although the two countries are in the same region, they are very different. Japan, an economic superpower, is the only First World country in Asia. The ROK is a rapidly developing Third World country that is under military confrontation with North Korea. Thus, based on previous research, it is assumed that the news coverage about both countries may be unbalanced either in terms of amount or content of the news.

Based on this assumption, the following hypotheses will be examined in this study.

Hypothesis 1: Television news about Japan will be treated as more important than news about the ROK as evidenced by a greater number of and the average length of news stories about Japan compared with the ROK.

Hypothesis 2: Television news stories about Japan will be more diversified than news stories about the ROK in terms of themes or subjects. While the news stories about the ROK will be dominated by political matters, such as politics, military affairs, and foreign affairs, the news stories about Japan will show higher portion of non-politics related stories, such as economics, culture, and society than those about the ROK.

Hypothesis 3: Television news about the ROK will show crisis orientation compared to coverage of Japan.

Method

Collecting Data

This study analyzed all news stories about the ROK and Japan in the evening television news of the three major networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC in 1996 (This study does not include CNN news stories). The analysis was based on the abstracts of the news stories from the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive. The Vanderbilt University Television News Archive has gathered television network news since August 5, 1968. The abstracts are available on the World Wide Web at <http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu>.

A search of the archive, using the key words "Korea" and "Japan" yielded abstracts for 117 stories, 40 about the ROK, and 77 about Japan.

At the outset it should be noted that the analysis was based on the abstracts of television news stories, not an analysis of the videotapes themselves. Thus, the study could not investigate the full aspects of television news and may have limitations.

Categories for Analysis

The sampled stories were coded for statistical analysis. The following categories were used.

A. Countries

1. The ROK

2. Japan

B. Networks:

1. ABC

2. CBS

3. NBC

C. Length of News (How long is the news?):

_____ Seconds.

D. Themes or Subjects (What is the news about?):

1. Politics—Government, Election, Congress, etc.

2. Economics—Company, Trade, Employment, etc.

3. Foreign Affairs—Summit Talk, Treaty, Agreement, Territorial Dispute, etc.

4. Military Affairs—Military Conflict, Military Maneuver, Military Operation, etc.

5. Unrest—Protest, Demonstration, etc.

6. Terrorism

7. Crime

8. Disaster—Earthquake, Flood, Disease, Accident, etc.

9. Culture—Art, Sports, Tour, etc.

10. Science and Technology

11. Society—Fashion, People, Living, etc.

12. Human Interest—Anecdote, Adventure, Unusualness, etc.

E. Political/Non-political Themes

1. Political Themes—Politics, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Political Unrest or Terrorism, etc.

2. Non-political Themes—Economics, Society, Human Interest, Science-Technology, Culture, Non-political Unrest or Terrorism, Crime, etc.

F. Orientation:

1. Crisis—Unrest, Military Conflict, Crime, Disasters, Terror, Dispute, etc.

2. Noncrisis—Democracy, Culture, Science, Technology, Economic Development, Peace, etc.

The categories of theme and orientation were modified from Larson's categories[1] (1984). Larson used nine thematic categories that could be grouped into two orientation categories at the same time. However, using the two categories at the same time may undermine "mutual exclusiveness." According to Larson's categories, the news stories about politics, military, and economic are noncrisis oriented stories. Some of them, however, can be crisis oriented stories. For example, military conflict and economic instability, such as unemployment and inflation, are crisis oriented. For this reason, the present study further categorizes stories into two orientations: crisis and noncrisis.

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[1] Larson's nine categories

Crisis Themes: 1. Unrest and Dissent, 2. War, Terrorism, Crime 3. Coups and Assassinations, 4. Disasters

Noncrisis Themes: 5. Political-Military, 6. Economics, 7. Environment, 8. Technology-Science, 9. Human Interest

3. Coder Reliability

Thirty randomly chosen stories were coded by the author and a Korean graduate student in advertising at the University of Tennessee. The Holsti Formula[2] was used to check the intercoder reliability. Reliability for such simple choices as country, network, and length were 100 percent. The coding for thematic and orientation categories showed high degrees of agreement. The agreement percentage on thematic, political/nonpolitical theme, and orientation categories were 83, 87, and 93 percent respectively.

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[2] The Holsti Formula:
Reliability = $2M/(N1 + N2)$
Where M=coding decisions for which coders were in agreement
N1 + N2 = the total number of coding dicisions (Singletary, 1994, p. 295).

Findings

1. Importance of News Stories

The three networks broadcast more news stories about Japan than about the ROK. Among 117 news stories, 77 stories were about Japan and 40 stories were about the ROK. The ratio of Japanese stories to the ROK stories is about two to one.

Among the three networks, ABC reported the ROK and Japan most frequently. ABC broadcast 55 (47.01 %) stories, and CBS and NBC broadcast 39 (33.33 %) and 23 (19.66 %) stories respectively. For the ROK, ABC, CBS, and NBC aired 23, 10 and 7 stories respectively. For Japan, ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcast 32, 29, and 16 stories (Table 1).

Table 1. Number of News Stories

Network\Country	the ROK (Column Pct)	Japan (Column Pct)	Total (Column Pct)
ABC	23 (57.50)	32 (41.56)	55 (47.01)
CBS	10 (25.00)	29 (37.66)	39 (33.33)
NBC	7 (17.50)	16 (27.78)	23 (19.66)
Total	40 (100.00)	77 (100.00)	117 (100.00)

The average length of Japanese news exceeded the ROK news. While the ROK news aired for 51.25 seconds in average, Japanese news was broadcast for 91.43 seconds. The t-test shows that the difference of average length of news between the two countries is statistically significant (Table 2). In total, 7040 seconds (one hour and 57 minutes) were devoted for Japanese news stories during 1996 and 2050 seconds (34 minutes) were devoted for the ROK news stories. The total time for Japanese news stories was almost 3.5 times that of the ROK.

Table 2. Average Length of News Stories (Seconds)

Country	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.	Minimum	Maximum
the ROK	40	51.25	46.14	7.30	10.00	150.00
Japan	77	91.43	77.37	8.82	10.00	330.00

t=3.0140, df=115.0, p=0.0032

The results of the statistical analysis indicate that Japanese news is treated as being more important than the ROK news. There were almost twice as many stories about Japan as about the ROK, and Japanese stories were 3.5 times longer than the ROK stories. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.

2. Contents of News Stories

Table 3 shows the thematic contents of the news stories. For Japan, disaster was the most frequently broadcast issue in the American television networks. There were 22 (28.57 %) news stories about disaster in Japan. For the ROK, military affairs were broadcast most frequently. Half of the ROK news stories were about military affairs, reflecting the military confrontation between the ROK and North Korea.

Other themes that were most frequently covered for Japan were foreign affairs (12, 12.58 %), crime (8, 10.39 %), politics (8, 10.39 %), and economics (6, 7.79 %). For the ROK, besides military affairs, unrest (8, 20.00 %) and foreign affairs (6, 15.00 %) were covered most frequently.

Table 3. Thematic Contents of News Stories

Theme\Country	the ROK (Column Pct)	Japan (Column Pct)
Politics	1 (2.50)	8 (10.39)
Economics	0 (0.00)	6 (7.79)
Foreign Affairs	6 (15.00)	12 (15.58)
Military Affairs	20 (50.00)	3 (3.90)
Unrest	8 (20.00)	1 (1.30)
Terrorism	0 (0.00)	4 (5.19)
Crime	0 (0.00)	8 (10.39)
Disaster	1 (2.50)	22 (28.57)
Culture	0 (0.00)	4 (5.19)
Science-Technology	0 (0.00)	2 (2.60)
Society	0 (0.00)	4 (5.19)
Human Interest	4 (10.00)	3 (3.90)
Total	40 (100.00)	77 (100.00)

As the table shows, while all the twelve themes were covered for Japan, only six themes were covered for the ROK. There were no stories about economics, terrorism, crime, culture, science-technology, and society for the ROK. This shows the lack of diversity in themes or subjects for the ROK news stories. This further connotes that American television network news emphasizes certain aspects of the ROK rather than showing all aspects of the ROK. Among 40 stories about the ROK, 34 (85.00 %) stories fell into three categories, military affairs, unrest, and foreign affairs. Emphasizing these certain aspects of the ROK is evidenced by the following analysis.

Table 4 shows that the unbalanced numbers between politics related themes and non-politics related themes for the ROK news stories. Thirty (75.00 %) stories out of 40 dealt with political matters. While more news stories about the ROK were related to political matters, such as politics, military affairs, and foreign affairs, the news stories about Japan were more about non-political matters. Less than one-third (24, 31.17 %) was about political matters and more than two-third (53, 68.83 %) dealt with non-political matters. This means that the news stories about Japan show various aspects besides political aspects. On the contrary, the news stories about the ROK mainly show political aspects, while other aspects of the society were not viewed by American people. The Chi-Square test shows the difference is statistically significant. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was supported by the findings.

Table 4. Political and Non-political Themes

Theme\Country	the ROK (Column Pct)	Japan (Column Pct)
Political Themes	30 (75.00)	24 (31.17)
Non-political Themes	10 (25.00)	53 (68.83)
Total	40 (100.00)	77 (100.00)

Chi-Square=20.350, df=1, p=0.001

3. Orientation of News Stories

The news stories about the ROK showed a strong orientation toward crisis. Among 40 stories about the ROK, 33 (82.50 %) stories were crisis oriented. Only 7 (17.50 %) stories were noncrisis oriented. On the other hand, the stories about Japan were almost evenly divided. Among 77 stories, 39 (50.65 %) stories were noncrisis oriented and 38 (49.35 %) stories were crisis oriented (Table 4).

Table 5. Orientation of News Stories

Orientation\Country	the ROK (Column Pct)	Japan (Column Pct)
Crisis	33 (82.50)	38 (49.35)
Noncrisis	7 (17.50)	39 (50.65)
Total	40 (100.00)	77 (100.00)

Chi-Square=12.125, df=1, p=0.001

This finding illustrates that the news about the Third World countries is often crisis oriented. The Chi-Square test shows that the differences in orientation are statistically significant. The finding supported hypothesis 3.

Conclusions

The abstracts for 117 network television news stories about the ROK and Japan were analyzed. The importance, thematic contents, and orientation were analyzed in the present study.

The findings supported the three hypotheses. The news about Japan was treated as more important than the news about the ROK. Japanese news stories showed more diversity in contents compared to the ROK. In addition, the news stories about the ROK showed strong orientation toward crisis while the Japanese news stories were balanced between crisis and noncrisis orientation.

The results of this study can be summarized as Table 6. The summary shows how the television news stories about the ROK and Japan are framed.

Table 6. Summary of the Results

	the ROK	Japan
Importance	Treated relatively unimportant compared to Japan.	Treated relatively important compared to the ROK.
Thematic contents	Political themes such as military affairs and foreign affairs dominated contents. Less diversified news contents.	More diversified news contents compared to the ROK.
Orientation	Strong crisis orientation. Unbalanced orientation.	Even division of crisis and noncrisis orientation. Balanced orientation.

The findings supported the general assumptions about international news coverage that the Third World countries are treated as less important than the First World countries, and the news about the Third World countries is often crisis oriented. Therefore, more balanced news about the Third World countries is recommended.

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Political Parties and Changes in Taiwanese Electronic Media in the 1990s

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Abstract

The study is to present an overall picture of changes in relationships between Taiwanese media and political parties during a pursuit of democracy in the 1990s. Three research questions regarding the long-term effects of the media on an emerging democracy at a macroscopic level have been answered. It applies a methodological combination of historical analysis, theoretical criticism, and in-depth interviewing. This study not only provides exploratory findings on the role of mass media interacting with democratic development, but also, more importantly, bridges these findings to essential theories which enable future researchers to follow.

Importance of The Study and Literature Review

From the perspective of communication and national development, what is the mass media's role in the struggle for political reform and democracy in a developing country? Does the mass media always play a positive role in assisting civilians in their pursuit of democracy? Regarding the mass media versus the state, what are the norms for the mass media's role when interacting with political power?

To understand these questions, I adopted a case study approach to examine the related issues in Taiwan, which functioned as a prominent example of developing countries and as an avenue for my research. The issues examined concern Taiwanese mass media's roles, the general population, and major political parties in the setting of a burgeoning democracy.

The importance of present study is that it provides exploratory findings with the respect to the crucial role of mass media interacting with democratic development in a prominent developing country and, meanwhile, bridges its findings to essential theories which enable future researchers to follow. The present study also attempts to explore the long-term effects and changes of the mass media in an emerging democracy by applying a methodological combination of historical analysis, theoretical criticism, and in-depth interviewing.

In addition, the present study holds important values which are concerned from international and Taiwanese domestic perspectives. From an international perspective, following its well-known economic miracle, Taiwan intended to start a dramatic political miracle through a series of reforms in its political system. Obviously, development of the mass media was one of the most important vehicles for shaping political reforms. In this regard, the present study uses Taiwan as a case study for examining the mass media and politics in developing countries, especially countries with similar political systems that are moving from authoritarianism to democracy. On the other hand, from a Taiwanese domestic perspective, the author's concern is about the new media's effect on the pursuit of democracy in Taiwan's national development. From the perspective of communication and national development theory which discusses how the functions of mass communication assist national development in developing countries, one questions if these new media have become the ferment for democracy, or, rather, a tool for political struggle decorated with attractive slogans such as "media reform" and "breaking the media monopoly"? Will the new media become a poison for Taiwan's emerging democracy because they are utilized as political tools? Will the new media become part of the resources for a political party's development, rather than as democratic speaker for the public interests? Will Taiwan become a media oligarchy in which several large political parties control different media, or will it become a one-party media monopoly in which only one party monopolizes the mass media?

In examining the relationship between mass media and political parties, Seymour-Ure (1974) considered many sources of variation (as in the feature of party systems and values endorsed by political cultures) in press-party parallelism, or the degree to which individual newspapers are identified with specific political parties. Hadenius, Hoyer, and Weibull (1979) examined the evolution of similar relationships over time and identified some correlates and consequences of trends away from press-party affiliation and identification. Most research has focused on relationships of press/political party organizations in the setting of a democratic country. In a democratic setting, the impetus for the press and a political party to form such a union is mainly based on mutual interests in each other. These findings are not applicable to countries where the mass media exist in an authoritarian regime.

Taiwanese media research has examined KMT's state capitalism and its control of the media in the process of national development. Wang (1993) observed that KMT's authority relied on "domination", representedly in KMT's political, economic, and ideological controls. The mass media served as a major tool for KMT's ideological domination. Chiang (1994) noted that the KMT monopolized the media to achieve commercial and ideological control goals. This research, however, failed to examine the effects of evolving Taiwanese media reform whereby opposition parties seized part of the new media and utilized them as a propaganda mechanism.

Researchers Luo (1993), Tsai (1991), and Chang (1994) focused on Taiwanese media laws, such as The Broadcasting and Television Law, The Public Television Law, and The Cable Television Law. Luo (1993), for instance, stated that the KMT government attempted to get involved in the operation of Taiwanese cable television through the manipulation of The Cable Television Law in Congress. Although Luo's research mentioned the new development concerning the opposition parties' involvement in cable television, it was difficult to get an overview of how the parties' political struggles were reflected in Taiwanese cable television operations, and its subsequent effects on Taiwanese society.

To continue research on the topic and to examine more recent changes among Taiwanese political parties and mass media, I framed the present study on the relationship between Taiwanese mass media (especially new media, such as cable television and low-powered radio) and political parties (both the ruling and opposition parties) in the setting of an emerging democracy. Through this examination, I obtained findings concerning the effects of interactions between new media and political parties on Taiwanese democracy.

A Historical Analysis of the Relationship Between the Mass Media and its Political Controls in Taiwan

Authoritarian regime and the mass media

Having lost a civil war and been exiled in 1949, the Kuomintang Party, or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), established its ruling position in the Republic of China in Taiwan. During the two eras of President Chiang Kai-Shek (1949-1975) and his son, President Chiang Chin-Kuo (1975-1988), Taiwan's political system was considered an authoritarian regime among developing countries. At the time, broadcast television, newspaper, and radio were the three major mass media in this country.

Taiwan's mass media were strongly controlled by the KMT during the period of early authoritarianism. From a historical perspective, the KMT government took over all industry and business under the Japanese colonial economic system in Taiwan at the end of World War II. In 1949, 91% of business was government-owned, and 9% was private. This represented a phenomenon of State Capitalism (Chen et al., 1991). The mass media, a crucial mechanism for propaganda, was reorganized and managed by the KMT, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the military.

The mass media was controlled by the ruling party through various strategies. The representations of the KMT's media control are described as follows.

1. Regulations that forced the media to obey the government's will: through the first strategy, for example, the print media were limited through government licensing. The Regulation of Restrictions on Newspaper's Registration and Pages was enacted to ban new licenses of Taiwanese newspapers for thirty-eight years (1949-1987). The regulation not only banned new registrations of newspapers but also influenced existing newspapers' opinions toward the government. By the regulation, existing large newspapers did not criticize government opinions, for fear of losing their licenses.
2. Governmental ownership, directly controlling the media: through the second strategy, the largest radio station, "Broadcasting Corporation of China" (BCC) was completely owned by the KMT. Consequently, it became a political party-

owned station. As of December 1992, there were 33 radio broadcasting companies with 188 stations and 435 transmitters in Taiwan. Six radio companies were run by the military, six by the KMT government agencies, one (BCC) directly by the party of KMT, and 20 were private (Wang, 1993). Although there were 20 private radio broadcasting companies, all of these companies were only broadcasting locally and were comparatively small in their company size and broadcasting capability (see Table 1).

3. Through cooperation with trusted private enterprises: by a third strategy, the three major television networks were formed in cooperation with trusted private enterprises. To ensure its control over these media, the KMT employed three tactics: (a) holding majority stock in the media companies; (b) control of the board of directors and managing of the media through majority stock; and (c) establishing party factions within these media through managerial control, in order to organize party-member media workers and observe other workers' political attitudes.

In 1951, the Executive Yuan (the highest administrative level of government) decided the government's policy concerning Taiwanese television business. The policy stated: television stations and facilities are established by the government, but operations are managed by business companies (Chi et al., 1993). For example, the first television station, Taiwan Television Enterprise, Ltd. (TTV), was formed in 1962. According to the above control strategies and Executive Yuan's basic principle, the Provincial Government of Taiwan held the majority of TTV stock, the remainder belonging to enterprises considered "trustworthy partners" of the ruling party. Table 2 in appendixes provides detailed information that reveals the stock of the three major television networks shared by the KMT party and its ruling government.

Because of the holding of company's majority stock, the KMT had legal decision-making power over the media's management and board. By controlling members of the board of trustees of a major television network, it was easy to understand the KMT's influence on this medium. In the China Television Company (CTV), the president and two vice presidents were KMT members. On the board of directors were nine trustees, five of whom were KMT members (Chiang, 1994). Since the KMT seized the media's leadership, it was able to influence important decisions and choose loyal staff.

Administrative control was the other KMT media strategy. The Broadcasting and Television Law was not enacted until 1976. That meant the first television station had broadcast without regulation for over fourteen years. During this period, the KMT controlled electronic media by issuing administrative orders and changing high-ranked managers. In 1965, the KMT's News Faction was established under the command of the Central Committee, the highest power in the party, the News Faction had branches within television stations, radio stations, newspapers, and magazines. The goal of the party's News Faction was to organize all KMT-member media workers and insure their loyalty.

The emergence of pirate cable television

Cable television emerged illegally in Taiwan. Beginning in 1960s, cable television was to provide a channel for broadcasting pirate video tapes and programs from the three major television networks to audiences living in mountainous areas where signals could not be received clearly. For two decades, cable television had limited growth. Although the KMT sought to make this medium illegal, the government did not harshly suppress cable television.

During the 1980s, however, Taiwan's cable television experienced dramatic growth. There were several factors influencing this development. First, many of the cable television stations provided foreign programs which could not be seen on the major television networks, and these were attractive to viewers. Also, video cassette recorders (VCR) were being imported into Taiwan. Although many people could not afford a VCR, they were quite interested in this new entertainment technology. Second, the three major networks had had a monopoly over television for over twenty years. This monopoly caused many problems, such as the stagnant quality of programming. The three major networks' poor programming quality led the audience to seek a fourth choice. Third, high quality programs flooded into Taiwan from Japan and Hong Kong in the 1980s. These exotic programs upgraded Taiwanese audience's taste and catalyzed their dissatisfaction with the existing three networks. With the stimuli described above, cable television developed dramatically, especially around metropolitan areas. Because cable television provided multiple channels in addition to the three major networks, the Taiwanese gave it a nickname, "the fourth channel."

The New Settings for Electronic Media in the 1990s

The end of forty years of Martial Law in 1987 was a breakthrough which freed Taiwan's mass media. With encouragement from emerging political parties and many civic libertarian groups, reform occurred in Taiwan's mass media. Under pressure from the general population, the KMT started to consider opening parts of the mass media market by issuing more licenses and releasing more frequencies. Since 1990, some changes included:

1. Cooperation between opposition parties and anti-KMT-media-monopoly groups: the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was established in 1986 and recognized by the government as a legal party in 1987. The DPP was eager to cooperate with civic anti-KMT groups to strengthen its political and societal influence. This opposition party also understood KMT's power as partly originating from its influential media monopoly. Therefore, one of DPP's strategies was to cooperate with anti-KMT groups to break down KMT's media monopoly. Through criticism regarding the legitimacy of KMT's media monopoly, the DPP was able to gradually gain support from the public and many anti-media monopoly groups. For instance the Taipei Society, a scholarly society, organized well-known college professors and regularly published articles criticizing the KMT's media monopoly. Among the members of the Taipei Society was Dr. Rei-Chen Dran, director of the Journalism

Department at National Chen-Chi University, who published many critical articles on *The China Times* and *Ten-Hsa Magazine*, the largest newspaper and magazine in Taiwan, holding criticisms toward the political party's control over the media.

2. The influence of liberated print media: after the end of Martial Law in 1987, a decades-old ban on the registration of new newspapers in Taiwan and the restrictions on the number of pages per issue were relaxed, while the electronic media were still under the KMT's control. In 1987, there were only 30 newspapers in Taiwan. As of May 1991, the number of Taiwanese newspapers had increased to 216. These papers, furthermore, were all in the capital city of Taipei, except for three tabloids based in the eastern area and offshore islands. The newspaper subscription rate in 1991 was 61.7 papers per 100 households--an average of 16.1 newspapers per 100 persons (*The ROC Year Book*, 1991-92).

The openness of the print media resulted in a virtual information explosion, increasing Taiwanese demands for the right to information. The new print media helped to educate the general population about democracy. Following the relaxation of print media controls, a strong urge to open the electronic media soon emerged within Taiwanese society.

3. Operation of cable television and pirate radio by the opposition parties: The opposition parties and anti-KMT groups not only criticized KMT's media control, but also acted to break down the monopoly. They tried to establish their own mass media to compete with the KMT-controlled media system. Once restrictions on the print media were relaxed after the end of Martial Law,

opposition political groups focused on cable television and radio-- media still banned by license and frequency restrictions.

Many DPP members, especially the elected lawmakers (congressmen), invested in local cable television stations established around the island. These stations called themselves "Democratic Cable Television" (Wong, 1993). The first Democratic Cable Television station was established in Taipei County, February 1990. By October 15, 1990, there were 24 DPP cable television stations that belonged to the National Association of Taiwan's Democratic Cable Television. The DPP chairman was elected honorary president of this Association. By the end of 1993, the number of Democratic Cable Television stations had increased to 71, serving approximately 280,000 households (Wong, 1993).

In the Association's constitution, it was specified that non-DPP members could not be stock holders of any Democratic Cable Television station. In this manner, the DPP attempted to maintain control of these cable television stations. A major characteristic of Democratic Cable Television's programming was to produce alternative political news shows which differed from that of the KMT controlled television networks.

Learning from the DPP's strategies, the second largest opposition party, New Party (NP), established in 1993, also wanted to control its own cable television stations. Through the success of the DPP's Democratic Cable Television stations, the NP understood the electronic media's potential for transmitting a political party's ideological propaganda and in increasing its political resources. Because it was newly established, the NP was eager to form a cable television organization to earn civic support for the party, for instance, lawmakers Chen Cho and Shen-Fen Lee were key persons in building relationships with cable television and some associations of cable television were organized under their influences.

Radio used to be considered a marginal medium in Taiwan because of its limited audience. According to an official report, the daily radio listening rate was 37.85%, comparatively lower than that of television's viewing at 78.49% (*Republic of China, The National Report of Cultural Supply-side Statistics*, 1993, p. 71-72). Since the KMT controlled radio, radio stations were either ideological propagandists or soft entertainers.

Nevertheless, with the anti-KMT movement among opposition parties and some civic groups, a former DPP member, Ron-Chi Hsi, made radio attractive to opposition politicians. In November 3, 1993, Hsi established a pirate radio station called the Voice of Taiwan as a political mechanism to criticize the corruption and problems of the KMT government. Surprisingly, this small pirate radio station attracted nationwide attention. The government saw the Voice of Taiwan as a danger to its ruling position, especially during election campaigns, and tried to suppress the station's broadcast by reason of its illegal status. Scholars reflecting public opinion, however, argued that the act of suppression was indeed a political struggle, not an act of enforcing legitimacy (*The China Times*, July 31, 1994, p. 3).

In addition, from the experiences of many political and social movements, opposition politicians learned that, through the radio station's live reports and call-in programming which can drew thousands of people to protests, pirate radio was an incredibly efficient way to organize their supporters. Afterwards, it became a trend that opposition parties and politicians invested in the establishment of pirate radio stations in the 1990s. Pirate radio was used to criticize the politics of the KMT, to attract massive audiences, and to propagandize their ideologies. Pirate radio became a crucial tool for the organizational and developmental activities of opposition parties. Through ownership, a pirate radio station became part of the resources that a politician utilize to promote his or her political platform.

Types of pirate radio ownership

Because the Voice of Taiwan earned support from many Taiwanese, similar pirate radio stations emerged during 1994-1995. Opposition politicians got involved in the ownership of political opposition radio stations. In late 1993, there were only three pirate radio stations: the Voice of Taiwan, the Whole People's Radio, and The Voice of Southern Taiwan (Lin, 1994). By November 1994, the number of Taiwanese pirate radio stations had increased to more than thirty stations. Of these thirty stations there are three types of ownership: Type A - directly owned by members of opposition parties; Type B - owned by civic anti-KMT groups or groups cooperating with opposition politicians; and Type C - owned by people who have no evident political affiliations but are against the monopoly of electronic media, and thus offer an alternative radio station (See Table 3 in appendixes).

In Table 3, half of the pirate radio stations (50 %) were directly owned by members of the two major opposition parties, the DPP and the NP. The second largest group of stations (40%) were owned by civic anti-KMT groups. The remainder (10%) were supported by people with no evident political interests. The ownership statistics provide a significant picture of the pirate radio stations' existing political connections. In general, Taiwanese pirate radio stations were mostly owned by opposition parties and anti-KMT groups which numbered 90% (combined type A and B). Besides ownership, station programming was the way in which political attitudes were conveyed.

Research Questions and Methods

The present study focuses on examining the relationship between Taiwanese cable television/pirate radio and political parties within the setting of an emerging democracy in the 1990s. Its theoretical framework applies the approach of **institutional analysis**. Mass communication system theorists suggest four research approaches for political communication studies: effects research, exposure behavior, audience roles, and institutional analysis. Gurevith & Blumler (1979) stated that:

> Institutional analysis is especially conducive to a systems approach, since it suggests that variations in the closeness of relationship between media institutions and certain political institutions may have

> consequences at other levels, including media content... and ultimately the degree of consensus or dissensus prevalent in a given society (P. 273).

Using the above approach, the study focuses on the institutional relationship between new media and political parties, concluding with an analysis of Taiwanese media's role in the process of pursuing democracy. Specifically, three questions are answered in the present research: **(1). Why and how did the opposition parties and their civic leagues form various cable television associations and pirate radio stations to oppose the KMT's monopoly on electronic media? (2). How did the ruling party face the challenges from its political rivals and the public? (3). How were conflicts among the KMT, opposition parties, and the civic anti-KMT groups reflected in Taiwanese election campaigns and mass media policies?** To better understand their relevance, the logical relationships between these three questions and corresponding findings are represented in Figure 1 in appendixes.

Using the institutional analysis perspective, examination of a political communication system includes studying the communication components of political institutions and the political elements of media institutions. Therefore, the present study attempts to determine, in the first question, how and why opposition parties (opposition political institutions) formed various cable television associations and pirate radio stations (opposition media institutions) in opposition to KMT's media monopoly. The second question examines how the KMT (ruling political institution) faced the opposition challenge (including KMT responses to changes in its control of media institutions). The third question focuses on conflicts among the KMT and opposition parties, represented in Taiwanese media policies and election campaigns. The final question tries to identify the consequences resulting from changes in these political and media institutions, and the in influence on Taiwan's democracy. The later two questions concern the influences and outcomes of political and media institutions.

Methods

The goal of this study is to present an overall picture of the long-term changes within Taiwanese electronic media and its political controls by a combination of different methods, rather than to focus on only a few independent variables with short-term effects. The methodological combination of the present study includes historical analysis, in-depth interviewing, and theoretical criticism. John Pauly (1990, p. 1) notes that qualitative method is trustworthy for serving the goal of presenting an overall picture of long-term phenomena because "research questions are developed in relation to perceived wholes, not independent and subject variables." In light of the study's objectives, therefore, a qualitative method is considered comparatively more suitable here than a quantitative method. Primarily using a qualitative research approach, the present study was guided by the fundamental ideas of Pauly's description of the qualitative approach involved the following:

> Research questions are developed in relation to perceived wholes, not independent and subject variables; evidence is open-ended, rather than preselected by particular techniques; analytic procedures are interpretive,

> not statistical; findings are consciously narrativized, not neutrally "reported"; and knowledge is always assumed to be partial and eliminative, rather than complete and cumulative (1990, p. 1).

With a qualitative research approach, the study utilized historical analysis and theoretical criticism as the key elements of the study examinations and personal in-depth interviews as the supplemental component. The present study did not waive, however, results from quantitative research as supporting materials in this study. For instance, research data collected through the method of content analysis, "*How the Three Major Television Networks Report the News of the 2nd Taiwan Congress Election*" (Shu-Hui Sun, 1994), was highly consistent with the present study's findings and therefore used to strengthen the observations regarding KMT's media control.

Discussions of the three research questions were mainly "interpretive" involving criticisms based on relative theories. Three theories from the fields of mass communication and political science were applied in this study. First, Talcott Parsons's ideas of state vs. civil society was used to explain why there was an emerging opposition to KMT's media monopoly. Second, using Antonio Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony, the struggle for ideological control through the mass media was found in the process of Taiwan's electronic media reform in the time of 1990s. Third, Graham Murdoch and Peter Golding's political economy theory was used to examine how complicated bridges connecting political parties with media institutions were built.

As for the level of analysis, this research involved a macroscopic approach. It explains a wide range of interactions among political parties and media institutions that generated a reform of electronic media in the 1990s. In addition to a variety of data gathered for historical analysis and theoretical criticism, in-depth interviews with representatives from related fields were used to collect further information for the study. In the summer of 1995, the author traveled to Taiwan and interviewed elaborately selected individuals representative of various professions related to the research subject. Each interview took more than two hours or longer. The list of interviewees and a guideline (Table 4 in appendixes) used for selecting interviewees are included in appendixes.

Discussions

A. Why and how did the opposition parties and their civic organizations form various cable television associations and pirate radio stations to oppose KMT's monopoly of the electronic media?

State capitalism: the philosophy of KMT's monopoly of the media

Scholars agree that KMT's media monopoly represented state capitalism in Taiwan's political-economic system. KMT's state capitalism had four characteristics: (a) it used the concept of a free economy as cover, but the government actually interfered in many economic activities; (b) it used a capitalist approach to attract foreign investment, caring little for the interests of the working class; (c) it used Nationalism to build KMT's party and state business; and (d) KMT's political-economic system was Authoritarianism (Lee, 1993 & Chen et al., 1991).

KMT's mass media control was based on three interwoven elements: the KMT party, the government, and the military. The KMT was the central controller. Indeed, KMT management of this triad is said to have imitated that of the Leninist Communist Party (Lee, 1993). Taiwan authoritarian regime founder, President Chiang Kai-Shek, stated his ideas of the journalist's role in national development as follows: "Propaganda is education... therefore, journalists should be the mouth of the state's will" (Chiang, 1940).

Through its media monopoly, the KMT received both ideological and commercial benefits in Taiwanese society. By controlling the media, the KMT established a party/state-owned media empire. The KMT saw the mass media as an important mechanism for political propaganda and maintenance of ruling power. The party, furthermore, benefited though its control of media institutions. For example, in operating the only three television networks in Taiwan, the KMT's average rate of financial return per 100 NT dollars invested was 28.89%. This figure is significantly higher than the interest rates of 17.89% for banks in 1980 (Wu, *The China Times*, Jun. 25, 1994, p. 39).

Opposition to the media monopoly from the "State vs. Civil Society" perspective

Talcott Parsons (1971) derived his concepts about "civil society" from Hegel. Parsons used "societal community" to distinguish differences in factors of social integration between a "state" and a "civil society." For Parsons, a social community distinguished from the economy, the polity, and the cultural sphere represented a synthesis of the liberal concept of civil society differentiated from the state, stressing social integration and solidarity. A modern civil society is structured by the normative framework of plurality (associations) and legality (Cohen & Arato, 1992).

Although under an authoritarian regime, the Taiwanese people never hesitated to struggle for media plurality or question the legality of KMT's media control. The emergence of Taiwanese civil society was observed in the process of opposition to KMT's State Capitalism in the mass media. The following observations were made:

1. Demands for media plurality existed in Taiwanese history: in Taiwan's history, the Taiwanese had tried to form different "illegal media," in contradiction to state laws, which worked to break the KMT's media monopoly. Before the end of Martial Law, anti-KMT people used illegal magazines, mainly critical political magazines, against the controlled public opinions of KMT-owned mass media. Among these, "Free China Magazine" (1960s), "Literature Star Magazine" and "University Magazine" (early 1970s), and "Formosa Magazine" (the late 1970s) were important examples. These illegal magazines fought with KMT's strict administrative suppressions and punishments. Civic opposition to KMT's media control was an important influence in ending forty-years of Martial Law (Lee, 1993).

2. New newspapers increased demands for democracy and media plurality: after the end of Martial Law, the print media was liberated catalyzing an information explosion which increased Taiwanese demands for the right to know. New newspapers soon became civic educators in pursuing democracy and media freedom, while new electronic media were still under government control.

3. Civic opposition to KMT's media control was one part of the development of Taiwan's burgeoning civil society: Taiwanese societal energy also was released by the end of Martial Law. Various civic groups were formed and encouraged people's demands for plurality in political and social spheres. Thus, the ideas of civil society were introduced during the early 1990s. Scholars argued that the KMT sought people as its "subjects," not "citizens," under state hegemonic power. They thought the energized Taiwanese released society a burgeoning civil society. The energy of Taiwanese civil society never disappeared, but had been suppressed by KMT's authoritarian government. Once suppression was removed, as with the end of Martial Law, the development of Taiwanese civil society occurred rapidly. Scholars observed two facts that reflected the development of Taiwanese civil society: the increased establishment of civic associations for various interests, and the use of alternative media and movements by these civic associations to raise the general population's sense of citizenship (Chen, 1992).

The author's interviews with a mass communication scholar and a media lawyer also identified an emerging impetus for Taiwanese society to stand up to KMT's forty-year authoritarian media control. Scholar Lee stated that factors generating fast development of cable television and pirate radio came from an emerging sense of Taiwanese civil society. He explained:

> Fast growth of cable television and the emergence of pirate radio represented a part of Taiwanese people's emancipation from KMT's state control after the end of Martial Law. Specifically, we should pay attention to the original factor that made these new media develop-- the factor came from people's demands. What news could not be seen on the KMT-controlled three television networks, it was broadcasted in the programming of cable television and pirate radio. People demanded it. That's why cable television and pirate radio existed. It came from a developing sense of civil society in the Taiwanese released society (Tien-Dou Lee).

From a legislative perspective, Lawyer Tsai stated that corrections in mass media-related laws during 1991-1994 were requested due to the pressure of Taiwanese societal power. Tsai explained:

> With print media freedom and computer proliferation, increased needs for information made the laws of KMT's media control outdated with Taiwanese contemporary demands. More and more Taiwanese society asked for modification of outdated mass media laws or to consider enacting new laws. For example the demand for correction of the "Broadcasting and Television Law" and for legislation of the "Cable Television Law"... I think the people demands and their power of the ballot were the real factors that pushed the government to make changes in Taiwanese state-controlled oriented mass media laws... So, I concluded that these changes in mass media laws originated from Taiwanese society itself (Dei-Yan Tsai).

From the above examinations and interview opinions, we can see an emerging sense of civil society among the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese realized that the KMT ruled Taiwanese society as a "political society," described as a dictatorship and coercive apparatus, for the purpose of assimilating the popular masses to a model of production and economy of a given society (Femia, 1987). In this sense, the KMT did not possess legitimacy in its ruling status through citizens' "consent." The representation of Taiwanese "political society" in KMT's media control is in fact KMT's State Capitalism in media monopoly. Therefore, people started asking about their rights of citizenship of which access to mass media is one.

In addition, under KMT's authoritarianism, the Taiwanese gradually understood that they had to organize civic power through "associations," such as various cable television associations, to oppose state controls. Power conflicts between the emerging civil society and the controlling state gave birth to alternative media with concerns about the demands of the general population. This Taiwanese case was considered a result of a ruling state apparatus versus a burgeoning power of civil society.

How opposition to KMT's media control was formed and its problems

It is important to examine how opposition to KMT's media control developed. Although the emerging sense of civil society generated various cable television and pirate radio stations, this new media soon faced challenges from other political powers, namely, opposition parties.

Opposition parties and civic anti-KMT groups were unified in their aims to oppose KMT's media control. Since the opposition parties tried to establish their own media associations, however, civic anti-KMT groups faced dilemmas of cooperation with opposition parties. Civic groups were concerned that they might lose their independence with this type of cooperation. With cooperation between the civic anti-KMT groups and the opposition parties, the above concern became a real problem. This problem was considered partly caused by the "immaturity" of Taiwanese civil society (Chen, 1992).

Chi-Nan Chen (1992) argued that although essential components of Taiwanese civil society had developed drastically, it was still in a period of "Pre-Civil Society." This meant that Taiwanese society lacked sufficient sense of autonomy for integrating a "societal community." Therefore, emerging civic groups were still massive and easily utilized by opposition parties.

The first opposition party, the DPP, was eager to cooperate with civic anti-KMT groups in the establishment of new media that would strengthen its political and societal influence. As mentioned earlier, the DPP organized its own cable television association, "National Association of Taiwan's Democratic Cable Television," which lured many civic anti-KMT groups' members to join.

In addition to pirate radio, the DPP Lawmakers also established radio stations through their investments. Due to a lack of funds, civic anti-KMT group members sometimes had to "rent" time on the DPP's stations. For example, the host of the most famous pirate radio program, Ron-Chi Shi, was an activist in anti-KMT groups. Prior to becoming so well-known, Shi paid NT$ 60,000/per hour to a DPP's pirate radio station "The Voice of Whole People" to get a hour program in 1992 (*The Independent Daily*, April 24, 1994, p. 3). Under this arrangement, civic anti-KMT groups oftentimes had to concede on political attitudes to DPP radio owners. At least that civic group would not criticize the DPP.

To conclude Question One discussion, the original reasons for the existence of Taiwanese cable television/pirate radio and the development of their operations was that the fast growth of cable television and pirate radio were influenced by the emerging power of Taiwanese civil society. However, opposition parties tried to organize the resources of the massive and immature anti-KMT groups. As a result, the new media soon became part of the resources for the development of Taiwanese opposition parties.

B. How did the ruling party face the challenges from its political rivals and the public?

Under public pressure from the emerging Taiwanese civil society, the ruling party, the KMT, had to change its electronic media monopoly in order to maintain its state legitimacy. According to the following research and evidence, the KMT's responses to its opposition challenges were passive, yet, strategic.

The KMT's "passive" policies

The dean of the College of Communication at National Chen-Chi University, Dr. Rei-Chen Dran, identified the KMT's responses to the public for electronic media freedom as "the policy of squeezing toothpaste" (Dran, 1995). This meant that the KMT would not release radio frequencies and cable television licenses until the government was pressured hard enough. This demonstrates KMT's "passive" behavior in its mass communication policies.

When Martial Law was enacted, the KMT regularly suppressed cable television. After Martial Law, the KMT still restricted cable television through licenses, although the political climate had changed. To break down the ruling party's cable television restrictions, the DPP formed the "National Association of Taiwanese Democratic Cable Television" to operate the nationwide opposition party-owned cable television system. The number of association members was 71 by the end of 1993.

The NP also devoted itself to freeing Taiwanese cable television. NP Lawmaker, Ms. Chen Cho, made efforts to negotiate with the KMT majority in Congress on the issue of cable television legislation. Cho was supported by 180 local cable television stations of the National Association for Cable Communication Development, which formed a major civic "pressure group" to focus on freeing cable television.

Faced with these pressures from both the opposition parties and the public, the KMT started to concede on restrictions of cable television. In 1993, after a long ban, the Taiwanese Cable Television Law finally was enacted.

KMT's "strategic" responses

After attempting suppression, the KMT modified its strategies to face opposition challenges. The KMT responded to the challenges in two "strategic" ways: (a) to open-up spaces for the new media, such as cable television and low-powered radio, but still maintain control of the old electronic media, such as the three major television networks and the larger (especially national broadcasting) radio stations; (b) in the process of opening-up the new media, the principle was-- among the KMT opposition, those whose "noises" were louder, the KMT would give them larger "candies" (Dran, 1995).

As to the first principle, the KMT's continued control of the old electronic media, some interviewees held similar opinions. Press Journalist Lee stated:

> From many cases on how the three television networks selected their political news, I observed that the KMT's ideological and administrative controls on the networks' workers were still there. These controls appeared to be not influenced by the revolutionary development of cable television (Yen-Fu Lee).

Former CTS Journalist Pon agreed and noted:

> In my opinion, the political attitudes of the three major television networks were consistently supporting the KMT, especially during elections... I would say that it was due to opening-up cable television and pirate radio. Why? Because: while the new media were still banned, people paid attention to the break-down of KMT's restrictions. Once the restrictions were removed, people thought they had done a good job, and many of the opposition's human resources went to cable television and new radio... During this process, public attention and efforts were transferred to the new media. The old KMT-controlled electronic media, therefore, were able to maintain their status-quo (Dei-Shen Pon).

Concerning the second principle, the KMT viewed the openness of the new media as a strategy to share political parties' resources. To avoid yielding its existing controlled media resources, the KMT tactically gave the new media, cable television and low-powered radio, to its political rivals, the DPP and the NP. In fact, this strategy made the reform of Taiwanese electronic media "a game of sharing political booty." Through this strategy, anti-KMT's pressure was lessened due to opposition parties' acceptance of the "political booty" (Dran, 1995).

C. How conflict among the KMT, the opposition parties, and anti-KMT groups were reflected in media policies and election campaigns?

How Conflicts influenced mass media policies

Today Taiwan's fundamental electronic media law is The Broadcasting and Television Law, enacted in 1976. The law outlines four main principles: first, the goals and missions of electronic media are clearly stated by this government's law. For example, the first priority of the electronic media's missions are to "explain national policies" and "propagate government orders" (in the law's first article, the first chapter); second, the regulating institution for interpreting media law and deciding punishment is the government's administrative Government Information Office, not the comparatively objective judiciary system. Therefore, by law, the KMT administration possesses the right to judge and punish electronic media; third, most program content has to be examined by the government prior to broadcast. Fourth, the military is deeply involved in the operation of electronic media and even participates in examining program content (Chiang, 1994). In addition, according to the 1976 Broadcasting and Television Law, the business of cable television and new radio stations are restricted.

Since the 1990s, however, the emerging Taiwanese civil society impetus to question the legitimacy of The Broadcasting and Television Law pressed the

KMT government to consider correcting the law. As mentioned in discussions for Question One, a massive anti-KMT power had been organized by opposition parties under the slogan of "oppose the KMT's media monopoly." Thus, pressure from the DPP and the NP represented the core of the opposition to KMT's state capitalism in electronic media.

By forming a national cable television association, the DPP owned its political platform via the mass media. The NP possessed many pirate radio stations that promoted its political arguments. The realities of the new media's establishment by opposition parties directly challenged the KMT's Broadcasting and Television Law. The operation of cable television and pirate radio stations by opposition parties was beyond the regulations of The Broadcasting and Television Law. The challenge of opposition parties to KMT's legitimacy to its media monopoly received public support. From an event (in July, 1994) in which about 30 pirate radio stations were suppressed nationwide, pirate radio stations drew national attention and support from the general population. It also made the KMT understand that its suppression was worthless, and that it only enhanced the reputation of the pirate radio.

With challenges from the opposition parties supported by the public, a new Cable Television Law was enacted in 1992, ending a long-term ban on the operations of Taiwanese pirate cable television. The KMT government also yielded freedom to low-powered radio stations through "The Regulation of Low-

Powered Radio" in 1994. In addition, the KMT considered modifying The Broadcasting and Television Law in 1994.

Conflicts were reflected in election campaigns

Aside from its commercial benefit, the most important impact of the KMT's State Capitalism media control was on election campaigns. Research of *How the Three Major Television Networks Report Election of the 2nd Taiwanese Congress* (Sun, 1994) examined the three KMT networks' strategies of offering channels for political propaganda and assistance during elections. This research examined five election-related subjects from the networks' news by the method of content analysis and achieved the following conclusions: (1) conflicts during election campaigns: strong bias against the opposition parties existed in the news of the three television networks. In reporting conflicts during election campaigns, opposition candidates were portrayed as the initiators; (2) analysis of election news: the KMT's candidates had more opportunities to be interviewed by network journalists. The party headquarters of the KMT was the major office to provide updated analysis of the elections in network news. On the other hand, opposition party candidates and their headquarters were rarely interviewed; (3) candidate's political views: although some civic group research on candidates' political views were reported, the three networks added the opinions of KMT officials to conclude the research findings. This kind of strategic reporting provided the KMT more chances to argue their political views; (4) news of KMT's attempts to buy votes: the vote buying news harmed the on candidates' political views were reported, the three networks added the opinions of KMT officials to conclude the research findings. This kind of strategic reporting provided the KMT more chances to argue their political views; (4) news of KMT's attempts to buy votes: the vote buying news harmed the reputation of the KMT during the election. When voters heard about it from the media, the three television networks tried to minimize damage to the KMT by giving candidates who were considered responsible for the vote - buying many opportunities to explain their innocence in order to balance the critical news coverage of other media, and did their best to make the vote - buying news appear to be a rumor; (5) party commercials: slogans from KMT commercials became part of the three networks' election news content. It strengthened the audience's impressions of KMT's commercials.

This research demonstrated how KMT-controlled television networks served as party tools during election campaigns. The cable television and pirate radio stations owned by the opposition parties, however, also became crucial tools for political propaganda. Thus, the parties' political struggles expanded to conflicts between the ruling party-owned and opposition party-owned media. From the interviews, we find that the political struggles were reflected in the operations of Taiwanese media. For example, Local Cable Assistant Manager Lee stated:

> Local politicians own local cable television stations. For example, the DPP lawmaker elected from Chan-Wha County owns the largest cable television station in that area... More and more local cable television stations were eager to establish a 'local news network'. One of the reasons for forming this network was to develop a station's relationship

> with local politicians by giving them more broadcast opportunities, especially during elections. This was very important for both owners of local cable television stations and politicians (Min Lee).

NP Radio Station Owner Chi expressed his reasons for investing in a radio station as:

> I am a member of the NP. So, of course, I support the ideology of the NP... I wanted to establish a radio station to help the NP's candidate for Taiwan's Province Government. In addition, the NP needed a radio station to organize its supporters.
>
> The major functions of most pirate radio stations occur in the period of elections. They are important fighters for different political parties... After elections, my radio station is devoted to voter education in changing Taiwanese election culture.
>
> This was successful in achieving the expected goals of my radio station... I am going to establish one more station, The Voice of the President, to assist the NP's presidential campaign in Koushung City (Wei-Nan Chi).

In conclusion, conflicts between KMT's media control and the opposition groups were reflected in the examples of media policies and election campaigns. First, Taiwanese media policies were modified due to pressure from opposition parties. Second, both the ruling party and opposition parties possess their own media and viewed them as tools for party development. Therefore, during election campaigns, political struggles were expanded to conflicts between KMT-owned and opposition party-owned media.

Research Findings and Recommendations for Future Research

The findings were concerning the political and ideological struggle among Taiwanese parties represented in the operations of their electronic media. This research also examined the effects of the struggles among Taiwanese political parties and new media on the future of national development in a burgeoning democracy. More importantly, these findings also recommend some potential theoretical perspectives for future studies in concerning political communication and democratic development in Taiwan or other developing countries with similar contexts. The main findings were as follows.

A. The "media monopoly" of Taiwanese electronic media was broken, but transferred to a "media oligarchy"

Examinations of the data of Question Two found that the KMT's one-party monopoly was transformed into an oligarchy of three parties, that is, media oligarchy. During its authoritarian regime, the KMT was the only party and controlled Taiwan's media. Through the framework of state capitalism, the KMT government controlled the major mass media, including press and electronic media. At the end of Martial Law, demands from the emerging Taiwanese civil society pressured the KMT to open-up the mass media. With the dramatic growth of opposition parties in the early 1990s, two major parties made efforts to organize massive anti-KMT groups by cooperating in establishing new media. Two major opposition parties, the DPP and the NP, formed loyal media groups of cable television and pirate radio stations. The new electronic media became part of the opposition parties' resources for ideological propaganda and mobilization of popular support.

In regard to the breaking of the KMT media monopoly, changes in Taiwanese electronic media undermined the KMT's forty-year old control. In the market of cable television and low-powered radio stations, the KMT was not able to "compete" with the two opposition parties. Yet, the KMT successfully maintained its political-economic controls on the "old" electronic media, such as the three television networks and national radio stations. Therefore, changes and interactions between electronic media and political parties caused a transformation of the Taiwanese " media monopoly" to an "media oligarchy." Control of Taiwanese electronic media was then held by the ruling party, the KMT, and the two major opposition parties, the DPP and the NP. The KMT maintained control on the old electronic media, namely, the three television networks and national radio stations. The DPP and NP seized ownership of the new electronic media, including cable television and low-powered local radio stations.

B. Regarding goals, Taiwanese political parties' media struggles represented pursuits for "cultural hegemony"

Through discussions of Question Three, the present study observed that the KMT's monopoly of the TV networks and national radio stations and the opposition parties' control of the cable TV and low-frequency radio stations gave them on opportunity to utilize media institutions as mechanisms for propaganda and organizing. The goals of both parties were similar in that they strove to achieve success in political and ideological struggles. The reasons for this can be explained through the theoretical application of "cultural hegemony," as offered by Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, the concept of "culture" was treated as having two elements: (a) values, ideas, meanings, and beliefs; and (b) the way, or the social order in which, values, ideas, meanings, and beliefs are exchanged (McQuail & Siune, 1986). In addition, "culture" is a form of "human knowledge," which is materialized in human production, embodied in social organizations, and advanced through the development of practical as well as theoretical techniques. In a modern society, culture exchange is mainly accomplished through "a communication order or network" (Hall, 1979).

According to Gramsci, the meaning of "hegemony" included concepts of both "leadership" and "domination." Therefore, "cultural hegemony" was a notion of "ideological predominance," or intellectual domination and leadership in a given human society. Social control, therefore, takes two basic forms: externally influenced behavior and choice initiated through rewards and punishment, and internally influenced behavior caused by the molding of personal convictions into a replica of prevailing norms. Such "internal control" was based on cultural hegemony in a society (Femia, 1987). Through cultural hegemony, Gramsci stated that hegemonic institutions or groups often "initiated" public opinion and actions based on what they want because these entities controlled the mass media and other ideological instruments in a given society. Or, if the hegemonic institutions or groups did not have direct ties with media institutions, they were able to "mobilize" the support of the mass media and other ideological instruments because the various elites, political or otherwise, shared similar world-views and life-styles. Having understood the operation of cultural hegemony, one questions what are the major hegemonic institutions in a society? Gramsci observed that one hegemonic institution of civil society was the political party (Fontana, 1993).

Taiwanese political parties have displayed intentions for cultural hegemony through their control of the mass media. The KMT was the "old" hegemonic institution with a media monopoly. By breaking the media monopoly, the opposition parties, the DPP and NP, intended to "compete" with the KMT through ownership of the new electronic media. They became "new" hegemonic institutions through competition in controlling the mass media, and, consequently, important ideological instruments in Taiwanese society. Through the ownership of the mass media by political parties in Taiwan we can understand that the goals of the ruling and opposition parties' competition for media control were to achieve a "cultural hegemonic position" in Taiwanese society. In attaining these goals, the parties achieved ideological domination and leadership which assisted their development and success in the political arena. Moreover, ownership of media institutions by Taiwanese political parties showed that the methods to control the mass media were economic through direct ownership. These methods, as Gramsci identified, demonstrated that operations of cultural hegemony were not only based on ideological superiority, but also had solid "economic roots": if hegemonic is ethico-poltical, it must also be economic, it must also have its foundation in the decisive function that the leading groups exercises in the decisive nucleus economic activities (Femia, 1987). Since Taiwanese political parties exercised decisive economic activities through their ownership of the media, the economic controls were thus associated with the parties' media operations strategies.

C. Control strategies: the media operations of Taiwanese parties as examples of "political economy" in media institutions

Question One's discussions, the KMT's forty year philosophy and exercise of state capitalism over Taiwanese mass media was identified. After dramatic changes in Taiwan's electronic media in the 1990s, however, ideas of state capitalism were unable to sufficiently explain the increased media ownership by political parties. To deal with these changes, the present study suggested the applications of political economy theory. Political economy theory utilizes a socially critical approach that primarily focuses on the relationship between economic structure and the dynamics of media institutions and then ideological content. The theory pays attention to structures of ownership and control of the media. From the political economic perspective, media institutions are to be considered part of the economic system with close links to the political system (McQuail, 1994). Derived from Marxism, political economists believed that those who "owned the means of production" also controlled the distribution of economic resources and the uses of the resulting surplus. Therefore, those who control media ownership also occupy core executive and managerial positions giving them significant control over the formulation of the media institutions' general allocation policies. Through ownership, owners were able to have a operational control over the media institutions (Murdoch & Golding, 1979).

Today, Taiwan's political party ownership of the media goes beyond the KMT. Through the organization of massive anti-KMT groups and politicians' investment in ownership, opposition parties were able to compete with KMT's media control. Opposition parties used the new electronic media, cable television and pirate radio stations, to oppose KMT's old electronic media, the three television networks and major radio stations. Therefore, political control of Taiwanese media not only included "the state" (the KMT government), but also other hegemonic institutions (the opposition parties). From the changes in Taiwanese electronic media in the 1990s, it was evident that both the KMT and opposition parties utilized the same strategies for media control -- ownership of the media. These strategies were informed by political economy theory.

As described earlier in the part of historical analysis, the KMT's media control strategies included: (a) majority stock in media companies; (b) through majority stock, the KMT was able to control high-level media leaders and management of the media; and (c) with managerial control, the KMT was able to establish party factions within the media, to organize party-member media workers, and observe other workers' political attitudes. The above strategies represent what Murdoch & Golding (1979, p. 30) have observed about political economic control over media institutions: "[owners] also occupy key executive and managerial positions which give them a significant degree of control over the formulation of the companies' general allocation policies, together with a degree of operational control over their day-to-day implementation".

D. The changes in the media's role in political relationships appears to be a detriment to Taiwan's process of political development and pursuit of democracy

A major concern of this study was the media's role in Taiwan's political development and pursuit of democracy. The present study evaluated the roles of Taiwan's media in the political development process from three aspects: first, the achievement in breaking KMT's media monopoly; second, emancipating versus repressive use of the media; and third, the consequence of operation of new media institutions by opposition parties as seen in the examples of cable television and pirate radio.

1. "Semi-success" in breaking a media monopoly: in the 1990s, the Taiwanese successfully broke-up the KMT media monopoly through changes in the electronic media after forty-years of state capitalism and strict media control. With this achievement, alternative media emerged allowing expression of different political opinions and ideologies. Through cable television and pirate radio stations, people supporting various parties were able to publicly broadcast their arguments. Moreover, media workers were permitted to have more freedom in criticizing government policies. These situations were impossible under the KMT's authoritarianism. Although the KMT's monopoly was broken, a media oligarchy still existed in Taiwan. In fact, the KMT's one-party media

monopoly was transformed into a three-party media oligarchy by the addition of the DPP and NP political parties. Taiwan's emerging political parties were eager to share the advantages which the KMT party had by means of its control over the media for ideological purposes. Thus, the present study concludes that the Taiwanese achievement in breaking the media monopoly was "semi-successful." In some ways, attempts to abolish the media monopoly were incomplete. Taiwanese electronic media still have a long way to go to be an active and trustworthy assistant to the pursuit of democracy.

2. Repressive use of the media still occurring in Taiwan: H. M. Enzensberger (1986) compared emancipatory and repressive uses of the media. Emancipatory media use was represented in the following situations: (a) interactive participant behaviors; (b) a broad and free political learning process; (c) messages originating from the public; and (d) self-organization and self-social control in society. On the other hand, repressive media use was represented in the following situations: (a) passive audience behaviors; (b) media's politicization (domination through the mass media); (c) messages from oligarchic senders; and (d) politician or capitalist control of the media.

From Enzensberger's perspective, Taiwanese electronic media's use was still repressive. In Taiwan, audiences were mobilized and organized to support different political parties. Electronic media was highly politicized in order to serve as a party's hegemonic institution. Messages were initiated directly from the media owners or indirectly through managerial control of media institutions. These situations were due to political control of Taiwan's electronic media.

In conclusion, although the KMT's media authoritarianism has ended, Taiwan's media roles still appear to be detrimental to pursuit of democracy. With the development of a "media oligarchy," the general population still has difficulties in accessing the electronic media. Political media controls still exist although they are more diffused. Opposition parties have now joined the media control game. In the long term, control of the media by political parties should be examined as to its influences on the future development of Taiwanese democracy.

3. The consequence of operation of cable television and pirate radio by opposition parties: as previously mentioned, many factors resulted from the break of the KMT media monopoly. One of the major factors was the association of opposition parties with civic anti-media monopoly groups. As discussed in the part of historical analysis, the strategy of opposition parties to break down the KMT media monopoly was "to establish new media of their own side." The process of breaking the media monopoly soon became the process of "media competition" among the three political parties: the KMT, DPP, and NP. This result disappointed civic anti-media monopoly groups and the general public. Dr. Rei-Chen Dran, dean of the College of Communication at National Chen-Chi University, argued that the opposition parties "betrayed" their partners. During the process of breaking the KMT media monopoly the political parties worked to

establish their own media power rather than to establish a "political control free" media environment in Taiwan. The KMT figured out the intention of the opposition parties and tried to appease them by "throwing out some candies." The facts show that the KMT and the opposition parties were playing a political game during the process of Taiwanese media reform (Dran, 1995).

Meanwhile, by playing this political game, the opposition parties distorted the goals and wasted the efforts of civic anti-KMT media monopoly groups. In 1987, forty years of Martial Law ended. The Taiwanese people were looking for greater openness in the issue of new newspaper licenses. There was an enthusiasm among the public which led to the formation of anti-media monopoly groups. Through association with the opposition political parties, anti-KMT media monopoly groups helped end one-party monopoly yet, they helped to create a new form of media monopoly, control by an oligarchy of political parties, including the opposition parties. Many civic groups were disappointed and gave up their efforts toward further media reform. This negative development has set back public hopes for a media environment free of political influence after the end of forty years of Martial Law. From the viewpoint of a free press, we might say that the KMT media monopoly was the primary detriment to the freedom of Taiwanese media. The negative consequence of a new media oligarchy is a possible second detriment. Because the opposition parties distorted their goals as well as wasted the efforts of civic anti-KMT media monopoly groups in a strategic way, these obstacles are likely to deter Taiwanese media reform in the pursuit of democracy in the future.

With the respect to research focuses, recommendations for future studies are as follows. First, a focus on the "political culture" might be plausible. Chinese politics have unique characteristics that differ from Western politics. By focusing on the political culture, researchers may find other factors that have influenced thoughts and behaviors of Taiwanese politicians in their struggle for political and media control. In fact, political culture may explain why Taiwanese opposition parties have used strategies similar to those of the KMT for media ownership and control. Thus, influenced by the same political culture, opposition parties will adopt "an eye for an eye" policy utilizing similar political strategies as in a reaction response. Since political culture was not a component of this study, I recommend this area for further research.

Second, it is equally important to keep an eye on the consequences of media control by the opposition parties. Some people have argued that Taiwan's electronic media roles will be changed as a result of a fast growing democracy. They hold the view that media control of opposition parties are "necessary" as strategies for breaking KMT's media monopoly. After the first "revolutionary" stage, opposition parties will emancipate their controlled media to the public since they cannot oppose media democratization. In response to these arguments, I would say that it is an idealist's prediction. I suggest that the mass media are always an important factor in influencing the development of democracy in a country. The mass media should "participate" in the pursuit of democracy in speaking for public interests. In other words, the mass media should be a "participant" in the process of pursuing democracy and should not wait for a well-developed democracy to reform them. On the other hand, opposition parties in Taiwan have already seized their own media resources. Will they easily release these resources after struggling to gain them? If the general population does not challenge the opposition parties' media control as they did the KMT's media control, will these parties automatically forfeit their media ownership? For the future, therefore, the present study suggests that more study is needed on the consequences of the media control by opposition parties and the resulting media oligarchy on Taiwan's democracy and political development.

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[Appendixes]

Table 1. 1992 Taiwanese Radio's Ownership Type and Broadcasting Capabilities*

Type of ownership	Station number	Transmitters (rate)	Electric capability
Private radio	20	64 (14.7%)	1.8%
Military radio	6	176 (40.4%)	51.3%
Governmental radio	6	56 (12.9%)	3.7%
KMT-owned (BCC)	1	139 (32%)	43.2%
Total	33	435 (100%)	100%

* As found in Wang (1993 p.109).

Table 2. Taiwanese Television Stock Shared by the KMT Party and its Ruling Government*

TV	Years	Share by the KMT	Share by the Government	Share by trusted enterprises
T	1970s		48.96%	51.04%
T	1980s		48.95%	51.05%
V	1992		48.95%	51.05%
C	1970s	50.00%		50.00%
T	1980s	60.27%		39.73%
V	1992	68.23%		31.77%
C	1970s		49.00%	51.00%
T	1980s		82.32%	17.68%
S	1992		86.45%	13.55%

* This table is revised from Wang (1993, p.89, 94, and 98).

* The category of television stock share is based on the research of Wang (1993).

Table 3. The Ownership of Pirate Radio Stations and its Political Relationship

Name of Station	Ownership	Political Relationship	Frequency	Geographic Location
The Voice of Taiwan	A	~owner is a former DPP member; ~programming designed by staff of the DPP's local branches	FM 88.3	**Northern Taiwan**
Taiwan New Tone (TNT)	A	~owners are DPP Lawmakers	FM 95.1	~ (same)
The Voice of New Party	A	~owned by the New Party	--	
Nation of Taiwan	A	~owners are staff of the DPP's local branches	FM 90.9	~
The Voice of Basic People	A	~owner is a former leader of the DPP's party faction	FM 91.9	~
Broadcasting for Independence	A	~owner is a former DPP Lawmaker	FM 93.5	~
The Voice of the Public	A	~owner is a DPP member	FM 92.7	~
The Whole People's Radio	A	~owner is a former secretary-general of the DPP	FM 98.1	~
The Green Peace	B	~owner formerly belonged to a DPP-owned station; ~programming designed by anti-KMT groups	FM 90.3	~
The Voice of Freedom	B	~owners are anti-KMT groups	FM 95.5	~
The Voice of Peace	B	~owners are anti-KMT groups	FM 88.3	~
New Thoughts	B	~owners are NP supporting civic groups	--	~
The Voice of Dynasty	C		FM 89.9	~
The Voice of the Ethnic of HaKKa	C		FM 91.5	~
The Voice of Central Taiwan	A	~owners are DPP Lawmakers	FM 88.7	**Central Taiwan**
The Voice of Formosa Justice	B	~owners are DPP supporting civic groups	FM 92.1	~ (same)
The Voice of Yams (in Hsin-Ju)	B	~owners are anti-KMT groups and staff of DPP local branches	FM 89.7	~
The Voice of Southern Taiwan	A	~owner is a DPP Lawmaker	FM 88.3	**Southern Taiwan**
The Voice of President	B	~owner belongs to NP supporting groups	FM 95.2	~ (same)
The Voice of Yams (in Koashung)	B	~owner belongs to anti-KMT groups	FM 89.9	~

Total Number: Type A- 10; Type B- 8; Type C- 2. There are 20 stations in this table; 14 stations are located in Northern Taiwan; 3 in Central ; 3 in Southern. * This Table is combined information from Chen (1994, p. 225) and Lin (1994, p. 73).

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Table 4. **Guidelines for Selecting Interviewees**

People from Related Fields	**People from Opposition parties-owned media**	**People from KMT-Owned Media**
Mass Communication Scholars	Owner of a NP-owned Radio	Assistant Director at TTV
Media Lawyer	Programmer of a DPP-Owned Radio	Official from KMT's Close Cable TV Partner, a Large MSO Company
Telecommunication News Journalist from the Print Media		Former Journalist at CTS

The List of Interviewee Backgrounds and Interview Time

1. Dr. Tien-Dou Lee (Scholar Lee), Director of the Department of Communication Arts at Fu-Jen Catholic University, Taipei County. **Interviewed Time:** August 9, 1995.

2. Dr. Hsiu-Huei Sun (Scholar Sun), Professor of the Mass Communication College at the National Chen Chi University, Taipei City. August 13, 1995.

3. Mr. Dei-Yan Tsai (Lawyer Tsai), lawyer of the second largest law office in Taiwan located in Taipei City. Mr. Tsai's focus is mass media law. August 4, 1995.

4. Mr. Yen-Fu Lee (Press Journalist Lee), telecommunication news journalist in one of the largest Taiwanese newspapers, *The United Daily*, Taipei City. August 1, 1995.

5. Mr. Wei-Nan Chi (The NP Owner Chi), owner of a NP pirate radio, "The Voice of President", Koushung City. Aug. 25 & August 26, 1995.

6. Mr. Wei Chen (The DPP Radio Programmer Chen), programmer of the program, "The Challenge to Media" on the DPP pirate radio "The Voice of People," Taipei County. July 27, 1995.

7. Ms. Wen-Yao Chen (Cable MSO Official Chen), Official of the largest national cable MSO, "The Ho-Shin Communication Corporation," Taipei City. August 19, 1995.

8. Ms. Min Lee (Local Cable Assistant Manager Lee), Assistant Manager of the Department of Programming in "The North First Cable TV", the largest local cable television station in Tao Yuan City. August 14, 1995.

9. Ms. Dei-Shen Pon (Former CTS Journalist Pon), former journalist of the CTS, one of the three KMT-controlled television networks, Taipei City. She is now working for a public relations company. July 26, 1995.

10. Ms. Shin-Shin Wang (The TTV Assistant Director Wang), Assistant Director of the TTV News, one of the three KMT-controlled television networks, Taipei City. August 20, 1995.

Figure 1.

The Logical Relationships of Research Questions and Findings


Civic Anti-KMT Groups
Large Enterprises
Q1
Q2
Opposition Parties
DPP
NP
use
A. Cable TV
B. Pirate Radio
oppose
Conflicts
response
KMT
Electronic Media
Monopoly
reflected on
Q3
a. Election Campaigns
b. Media Policies
Outcomes
(The Influences on Democratization)
Research Findings

Chronology of Key Events in Politics and Media in Taiwan

<Year>	***Key events**
<1949>	--The Kuomintang Party (KMT) has lost the civil war and is exiled from mainland China to Taiwan. Since then, the KMT has established its ruling position in the Republic of China (Taiwan).
	--The Martial Law was enacted at the same time.
	--10 radio stations followed the KMT to Taiwan, mostly state-owned or party-owned, including the largest radio station, Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC). Among those radio stations, there was only one private station.
<1950s>	24 radio stations were established.
<1961>	5 radio stations were established.
<1962>	The first network television station, Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), was formed by the Province Government of Taiwan with some private companies.
<1968>	--The second network television station, China Television Company (CTV), was formed by the KMT and some private companies.
	--The first cable television station emerged in central Taiwan. Cable television was illegal at this time. The purpose of this cable station was to provide a channel for broadcasting pirate videotapes and programs from the network television to audiences living in mountainous areas where signals could not be received clearly.

<1971> The third network television station, Chinese Television System (CTS), was formed by Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Education, and some private companies.

<1975> President Chiang Kai-Shek died.

<1976> The Broadcasting and Television Law was enacted. This was the law for radio (radio was conventionally called "broadcasting" in Taiwan) and network television.

<1980s> Cable television was rapidly developed (reasons devoted to this on p.18- 19). However, cable television was still illegal at this time.

<1982> The amendment of Broadcasting and Television Law was enacted.

<1986> The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed under an illegal status.

<1987> --The government ended the Martial Law.

--The DPP was recognized as a legal party.

<1988> The ban on registration of new newspapers was relaxed.

<1989> Satellite dishes were first used by most cable television stations to receive American and Japanese news and programs.

<1990> The first Democratic Cable Television station was established in Taipei County by a congressman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). By October 15, 24 Democratic Cable TV stations formed the National Association of Taiwan's Democratic Cable Television.

<1992> The first pirate radio station, The Whole People's Radio, was established by a incumbent DPP congressman for the purpose of propaganda transmission during a congressional campaign.
<1993> --The Cable Television Law was enacted. Cable television was finally legalized. The government examined applications and licensed a total of 260 cable television stations.
-- The most influential pirate radio station, The Voice of Taiwan, was established in November.
<1994> --The Legislative Yuan (Taiwan Congress) started discussing the second amendment of the Broadcasting and Television Law.
-- The event of "730 nationwide pirate radio suppression", causing fierce public protest versus government suppression (730 meant the date, July 30, the suppression started).
-- The government proposed to open low-frequency (500-1000 watts) radio stations for local broadcasting.
-- By November, there were 26 pirate radio stations around the country. Some of them applied for licenses within the newer opened low-frequency space, but some decided not to apply, maintaining their pirate status.

State Control on Television News in Post-War Lebanon

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ABSTRACT

State Control On Television News in Post-War Lebanon

Whereas pre-war news media in Lebanon enjoyed a relatively high level of editorial independence, post-war Lebanon witnessed numerous conflicts between the Lebanese state and private broadcast media, caused by state attempts to control or ban television news and political programs. This paper traces attempts by the Lebanese state to control television news and analyzes internal and external factors influencing these attempts. Direct and indirect forms of control are discussed and conclusions are drawn.

As the financial and publishing center of the Arab Middle East, pre-war Lebanon was scene to a thriving, diverse and independent press and numerous publishing houses. The Lebanese press somewhat maintained its independence during the 1974-1990 war, and wartime Lebanon witnessed a proliferation of unlicensed broadcast media: in 1994, more than 100 radio stations and an excess of 50 television stations operated in the country, privately owned and unregulated. These stations were initially designed to be political mouthpieces for their owners, but many of them became viable commercial enterprises because of their popularity among the Lebanese audience who perceived them to be more reliable that state run services. The 1990 Taef Agreement officially ended the war and called for the reorganization of electronic media within a modern regulatory framework. The 1990-1998 period witnessed numerous conflicts between the Lebanese state and private media, mainly because of state attempts to control or ban news and political information programs on television, fiercely resisted by the media.

This paper traces state attempts to control news and political programs on television in post-war Lebanon. It is based on research conducted in Lebanon by the author between 1992 and 1998, using three methods: (1) in depth interviews with professionals in the Lebanese print and broadcast media, advertising industry and academe, (2) review of the Arabic, French and English language Lebanese print media to determine how they cover and react to government attempts at controlling them, (3) a monitoring and recording of newscasts and political information programs during 8 research periods in Lebanon, ranging from 3 weeks to 3 months each, and (4) review of the research on Lebanese media and society, published in the United States and Lebanon. After tracing the development of Lebanese news media from their inception in the 17th century into the 1974-1990 Lebanese war, the impact of the war on news media is examined, and government efforts to control news and political information programs are described. Factors influencing government control are discussed and conclusions are drawn.

Mass Media, History and Politics in Lebanon

Lebanon lies in Western Asia on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. It is bordered by Syria to the North and East, Israel to the South and the Mediterranean to the West. The country's 4,015 square miles, roughly half the size of the state of Delaware, make it one of the world's smallest nation-states. Lebanon was a province of the Ottoman empire for four centuries, enjoying a relatively high degree of autonomy, until the Ottoman defeat in the first world war brought on the French mandate. The Lebanese constitution was promulgated in 1926, under a French mandate sanctioned by the League of Nations, but Lebanon did not gain independence until 1943. The country's population can only be estimated, since the last official census was conducted in 1932, at which time it was found that the population was almost evenly divided, with Christians slightly outnumbering Muslims. A July 1996 estimate put the population at 3,776,317 (Lebanon, 1997) and a total of eighteen religious groups are now officially recognized by the state, while it is believed that Muslims slightly outnumber Christians.

Modern Lebanon's civil upheavals began in 1958, when Arab nationalists, advocating Lebanese union with Egypt and Syria, fought a Lebanese nationalist administration, which prompted president Camille Chamoun to request, and obtain, the help of the U.S. Six Fleet to restore his authority over the country. The 1958 events brought to the surface Lebanon's fundamental identity dilemma: is Lebanon a unique country with Phoenician ascendance, Western affinities, distinct from its Arab environment, as Lebanese nationalists argued? Or is Lebanon an integral part of the Arab world, inseparable part of a whole, sharing the history, cultural values and national identity of its neighbors? This question ensnared Lebanon in a permanent identity crisis, which lead to occasional flare-ups culminating with the 1974-1990 war. In 1943, leaders of the various Lebanese religious groups reached an oral consensus, the National Pact, by which they agreed to share power as follows: the President of the Republic would always be a Maronite Christian, Maronites being the largest group then, the President of the Chamber of Deputies would always be a Shiite Muslim, and the Prime Minister always a Sunni Muslim. The National Pact also dictated that the Lebanese parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, will be representative of Lebanon 's demographics by having 6 Christian deputies for every 5 Muslim deputies. The 1990 Taef accord redressed the ratio to 6-6 to reflect demographic changes in the country, and put more political clout in the hand of Lebanese Muslims by shifting executive power from the President to the Prime Minister (Harik, 1994)

The Lebanese constitution, promulgated on May 23, 1926 clearly anchored Lebanese government as a democracy, with legislative, executive and judicial branches whose roles were sanctioned by law and whose prerogatives were clearly stipulated. The constitution defined the three branches of government: legislative power lied within a unicameral assembly, the Chamber of Deputies. Executive power was held by the President of the Republic, elected by the Chamber of Deputies and not by universal suffrage. Judicial power is exercised by independent judges in courts of different orders. The constitution also stipulated that any citizen aged 21, male or female, is entitled to vote, and set a non-renewable 6 year term for the President of the Republic (Bustros, 1973).

Perhaps more importantly, the Lebanese constitution guaranteed the rule of law, civil liberties and religious freedom. Whereas Article 8 stated that "individual liberty is guaranteed and protected," Article 9 of the constitution stipulated that "liberty of conscience is absolute ... the state respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise." Perhaps most significant was Article 13: "[F]reedom of expression by word or pen, freedom of thought, freedom of holding meetings and freedom of association are equally guaranteed within the framework of the law" (Bustros, 1973, p. 2). Besides establishing democratic principles and procedures, the constitution laid strong foundations for civil society, in that it guaranteed the rights of journalists to express their opinions and those of labor unions to form and demonstrate, protected private property and recognized the right of Lebanon's plural civil constituencies. The judicial system is an obvious testimony to the strength of civil society in Lebanon, since only criminal cases are treated by state courts, while civil cases are the province of religious courts established by the different religious groups (Saadeh, 1993).

Historically, the press in Lebanon has enjoyed relatively high levels of freedom and autonomy. The first movable type printing press was introduced to the country by Christian Maronite monks in 1610, and Hadikat Al Akhbar [The News Garden], published in 1858, was the first newspaper in Lebanon (Mouradian, 1981). In 1861, England, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey signed a protocol giving Lebanon special press freedom not seen in other parts of the Arab world. Since then, newspapers became organs for different religious groups, propagating their views. The pluralistic character of Lebanese demographics, culture and politics was directly reflected in the press. In the second half of the 19th century, Lebanon witnessed the birth in 1870 of the first political, literary and scientific magazine in the Arab world, in 1871 of the first children magazine in the Arab world, and in 1896 the first women's magazine in the same region (Mouradian, 1981). A change in Ottoman rule brought severe oppression of the press at the dawn of the twentieth century, culminating in 1916 with the public hanging in Beirut of 16 authors, intellectuals and press people, among them 8 Lebanese journalists (Dajani, 1992). Before independence was achieved in 1943, the Lebanese Union of the Press, born in 1919, split into the Union of Editors and the Union of Journalists (Mouradian, 1981). In post-independence Lebanon, press restrictions were progressively eased and dozens of newspapers and magazines mushroomed to the point of slashing advertising and sales revenues to a level not viable to publishers. This prompted authorities to limit the number of publication licenses to 25 political dailies and 20 weeklies. The laws of September 14, 1962 anchored press freedom and set its limits, prohibiting the publication of news that endangered national security or attacked heads of states (Abu Laban, 1966). Lebanon has a literacy rate of over 80 % and studies have indicated that more than 75 % of the population reads the daily press on regular basis (Abu Laban, 1966; Rugh, 1987). During the 1974-

1990 war the press went through several crises, sometimes financial, other times political, when some journalists and publishers were harassed or even assassinated. With the weak implementation of the law limiting the number of publication licenses, 53 dailies, 48 weeklies and 4 monthly magazines, all licensed, were counted in Lebanon in the early 1990s, in addition to more than 300 non-political publications (Dajani, 1992).

The broadcasting scene in Lebanon was relatively limited until the mid- to late seventies. The first radio station was operated by the French starting in 1937 as a propaganda tool against Arabic-language programs aired by the Germans and Italians (UNESCO, 1949). The Lebanese government took over radio facilities in 1946 and the radio station was renamed the *Lebanese Broadcasting Station* (Dajani, 1979). The radio spectrum remained limited until the seventies when dozens of unlicensed radio stations began broadcasting in the country. The first television venture began in 1956 after a group of businessmen signed an agreement with the Lebanese government. The company was named *La Compagnie Libanaise de Télévision*. and in 1959 operated two channels, one in Arabic and the other in French and English (Boulos, 1996). That agreement set privately owned Lebanese television apart from Arab services, all state-run. A second commercial television, the *Télévision du Liban et du Proche-Orient*, better known as *Télé-Orient*, started in 1962, partially financed by the *American Broadcasting Corporation* and later by British Thomson (Boyd, 1993a). In 1977, the two stations merged to become *Télé-Liban*, a shareholding company, half private and half state owned (Boulos, 1996).

Until the mid-eighties, there were no fully private television stations (*Télé-Liban* was half owned by the state and half by shareholders) and few unlicensed radio stations belonging to political parties and operating on the AM band. During the mid-eighties, broadcasting activities suddenly boomed with an unprecedented impetus. That rapid growth is possibly a unique phenomenon in modern history (Boyd, 1991; Boulos, 1996), and is symptomatic of a larger phenomenon in war-torn Lebanon: the emergence of a powerful civil society that not only complemented state services, but completely superseded and replaced them. Whereas taxes levied by militias in the areas under their control provided the finances for private broadcasting activities, the unreliability of state-sponsored media made them desirable. At the beginning designed to be direct instruments of political propaganda, these broadcasting outlets soon became self-sustaining commercial corporations fueled by a booming advertising market.

State Attempts to Control the News Before and During the War in Lebanon

The flourishing of private broadcasting in Lebanon exposed the weaknesses of pre-war official media in Lebanon. Since the 1960s, scholars have pointed out that radio and television programs were always sanitized by Lebanese authorities to preserve the country's stability and national unity (Abu Laban, 1966; Browne, 1975). Since its inception, Lebanese television has come under close scrutiny from the Ministries of the Interior and of Information to guarantee that no program undermining "national security" was broadcast (Boulos, 1996). Browne (1975) reported that in the early days of the 1974-1990 war several television officials were told by the Ministry of Information to make sure "the Lebanese ... not sense (experience) the war" (p. 695). Often, this meant keeping citizens uninformed of key events: the 1974 shooting of a bus full of Palestinians in a Beirut suburb by Christian Lebanese nationalists, *the* pivotal event that started the war, was not announced on the evening news of the half-private, half-government owned television, nor on state owned radio. The immediate result of this misinformation was the slaying of a Christian student who unaware of the event, drove through a Palestinian camp where he was captured and murdered (Boulos, 1996). Similar events drove the Lebanese to distrust and abandon official government media and seek information from the emerging private radios established by political parties and militias. A great number of Lebanese also turned to *Radio Monte-Carlo*, the *BBC* and to a lesser extent the *Voice of America* where they believed they could obtain more, and more reliable information (Boulos, 1996), in accordance with a clear pattern in the Arab world where "more people listen to foreign radio broadcasts than in any other part of the globe" (Boyd, 1993b, p. 134). Clearly, the unreliability of official media who often concealed images of dissent or instability to artificially depict a harmoniously pluralistic nation, was a major factor in the emergence of private broadcasting during the 1974-1990 war in Lebanon.

Internal and External Factors Affecting State Control of News and Political Programs in Post-War Lebanon

Before the war, government attempts to control news and political programs remained restricted both in scope and in frequency, and were severely impaired at various stages of the war as militias carved the country into self-ruled enclaves. After the war, broadcasting regulation was a priority for successive Lebanese governments, and became an issue publicly and actively debated in the news media themselves. It is at this historical juncture that state attempts to control news and political programs became public, systematic and even authoritarian. Internal and external factors affected continuous attempts by the state to control the news media.

Internal Factors

Internal factors consisted of the necessity to regulate the broadcasting chaos in the country, with the resulting increase in control over content, including news, of the government clear attempts to control political opposition, and of internal political struggles, including those between the executive and legislative government branches. Finally, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law was meant to provide a regulatory framework for broadcasting in the country.

Regulating Chaos

According to the government, numerous private broadcast media disseminating a plethora of viewpoints and conflicting political agendas could lead to further social and political disintegration of the country. Wartime unlicensed broadcasting was also a visible reminder of the state of anarchy that prevailed in war-torn Lebanon when the government completely lost control of the country. Other economic and technical factors prompted broadcasting regulation. The proliferation of media slashed down advertising revenues for stations (Azzi, 1994) and caused interference and gridlock on the airwaves, causing transmission and reception problems and posing a threat to aviation and navigation ("Lebanon's tower," 1987; "Interviews avec," 1993).

Controlling Dissent

However, a series of events that occurred between 1994 and 1998 suggest that political factors motivated regulation, which appears to have been considered by the government as a way to control private news media and muzzle dissenting voices. This series of events were unleashed by the actions of the Lebanese Council of Ministers, headed by Rafik al Hariri . After temporarily suspending several newspapers from across the ideological divide for allegedly criticizing government officials, which authorities sanctioned under the "national security" concern in the 1962 law of the press, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on March 23, 1994, prohibiting privately owned radio and television stations from broadcasting news and political programs. Protests by opposition politicians, intellectuals and journalists were ignored and the resolution became effective immediately (Kraidy, 1995). During that same meeting, the Council of Ministers outlawed the "Lebanese Forces," the predominantly Maronite Christian political party. The Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia which had been reconverted into a political party, was the political body behind the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation*, the country's first and most popular private television station. The Lebanese Forces also were regarded as a pro-Israel, anti-Syria entity. This embarrassed the Lebanese government in its "special" relationship with Syria and put pressure on Lebanese authorities to muzzle the Lebanese Forces. Syria, with 30,000 troops in Lebanon, was the main power-broker in the country, enjoying "a transparent hegemony over Lebanese affairs" (Harik, 1994, p. 53).

The *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* began broadcasting in August 1985 and was the first privately owned television station to broadcast nationally during the 1974-1990 war. Since then, *LBC* successfully remained at the top of all ratings, ahead of competitors. It attracted the best technicians, artists and journalists in Lebanon and offered a diverse programming schedule. Shortly after the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* began broadcasting, it surpassed the public/private television station, *Télé-Liban* in terms of audience, advertising budget, quality and reputation. Its main claim to fame was its news department, one of the largest in the Middle-East. Besides, because the Lebanese Forces were in the opposition, *LBC*'s newscasts regularly included diatribes accusing the government of corruption, authoritarianism, and of being manipulated by Syria.

The dissolution of the Lebanese Forces occurred a month after the bombing of a Maronite church in a town north of Beirut on February 27. The Lebanese government, through a declaration by Prime Minister Hariri, accused Israel of the bombing and of planning to shatter national unity in Lebanon. Immediately, the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* started airing special video clips accusing the Lebanese government of a conspiracy to control and marginalize Lebanese Christians in general, and in particular the Lebanese Forces. The leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, held a press conference, largely attended by the foreign press, in which he denounced the alleged "large set-up" mounted against his party. *L'Orient-Le Jour* , Lebanon's respected Francophone daily, revealed that a source "close to the Lebanese Forces" had disclosed that the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* had been ordered by the Cabinet not to broadcast Geagea's press conference. The source added that the *LBC* was threatened with a shut down if it did not comply, and was requested to broadcast a statement expressing its support of "all decisions taken by the Council of Ministers to reinforce peace and security in the country" ("No more newscasts," 1994, p. 1) The *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* complied and issued a "communiqué" affirming its obedience to government decisions and its appreciation of the role played by Syria in Lebanon ("Communiqué by," 1994).

According to government officials, the investigation into the church bombing revealed that the Lebanese Forces were involved in the planning and execution of the operation. The Council of Ministers decided to dissolve and ban the Lebanese Forces because of their criminal involvement in the bombing. In fact, in late March, security forces arrested the leader of the Lebanese Forces and a number of his aides under charges of breaching national security and undermining national reconciliation. These charges were vehemently denied by the Lebanese Forces, who accused the government of making them scapegoats, shutting political opposition and muzzling Lebanon's top private television station. On one hand, the implication of the Lebanese Forces in the bombing provided legal basis for the Council of Ministers to dissolve them without triggering objections and unrest among Christians, since the persons behind the church bombing were being publicly prosecuted. This was an occasion for Hariri and his Council of Ministers to reiterate their commitment to equity and stability in the country. Besides, the ideologically charged video clips aired by the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* after the church-bombing incident justified government intervention because they endangered national unity and security. Although government intervention was justified, mixing the two highly sensitive issues of the church bombing and the regulation of private broadcasting was not politically wise. Geagea and his aides were later found innocent from the church bombing charges, but the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation* needed to redress its policy in order to survive a possible slashing of television stations within the framework of a new broadcasting law.

The Political Struggle over Broadcasting Regulation

On July 15, 1994, the Lebanese press was in a festive mood. On July 14, the Lebanese House of Deputies had unanimously voted against the March 23, 1994 Council of Ministers resolution banning news and political programs on privately owned broadcast media. Headlines assumed various shades of a celebratory tone. A headline in *Nidaa Al Watan* [Call of the Nation], a Christian Lebanese nationalist daily, succinctly summarized the feelings of the press and media community: "House avenges broadcasting" ("House avenges," 1994). The issue of broadcasting regulation took precedence over all other matters and was followed closely by the Arab press. As *Asharq Al-Awsat* [The Middle East], a pan-Arab daily owned by Saudi interests put it, "[T]he Lebanese [were] treating broadcasting regulation as a national priority." The editorial concluded: "And they are right to do so!" (Atallah, 1994, p. 2).

Obviously, the press celebrated what appeared to be a reshuffling of priorities by Lebanese authorities, who seemed to consider that media freedom was more important than a national cohesion artificially maintained by muzzling private media and the political voices they carried. Besides, it appeared that the press, along several other constituencies of Lebanese civil society, was relieved to see the influential and powerful Prime Minister Hariri challenged, because until then he was regarded as the most powerful personality in Lebanese politics. The general impression among politicians and journalists was that Hariri was trying to bring all broadcasting activities in the country under his control (Dennis, 1994). The overall atmosphere of uneasiness and hostility toward Hariri suddenly exploded in a public scandal on December 15, 1994, when the Council of Ministers he headed gave Hariri's own television station *Future Television,* the exclusive right to start pan-Arab satellite broadcasting via the ARABSAT (Arab Satellite Communication Organization) satellite. This decree was so strongly opposed and vehemently criticized that President Elias Hrawi vetoed it on December 17, 1994. On December 19, Hrawi and Hariri met and had a "frank" discussion about the issue. Hrawi reportedly voiced the concerns of media owners and other politicians, who were hostile to Hariri's growing control over a large number of cultural, economic, financial and political institutions ("Lebanon Chronology," 1994). On December 20, 1994, Hariri held a press conference in which he defended himself against such accusations. He also announced that *Future Television* would suspend its test broadcasting on ARABSAT on midnight of that day. Finally, the controversial decree on satellite broadcasting was amended on December 23. The amendment stipulated that *Télé-Liban*, the public/private *Télé-Liban* station, was the only broadcasting corporation allowed to use Arabsat until a new law on broadcasting was passed ("Lebanon Chronology," 1994).

These events centered around the personality of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. A wealthy Fortune 500 billionaire, Hariri was appointed Prime Minister in October 1992, and his financial power and regional and international political connections made him the most powerful Lebanese politician. He was accused of abusing his influential political position in order to gain control over Lebanese institutions, specially media ventures. In the first six months of his term, Hariri built a private media empire: first, he acquired fifty percent of *Télé-Liban* 's shares, which constitute the entirety of the company's private shares, while as Prime Minster, he controlled the remaining state owned fifty percent. Second, he appointed a Board of Administration at *Télé-Liban*, entirely composed of people who either worked for one of his companies or were completely loyal to him. Finally, he founded his own television station, ***Future Television***. These actions, in addition to a radio station and shares in several Lebanese private media, made Hariri Lebanon's most powerful media mogul. The fact that he had enormous stakes in the broadcasting industry and at the same time was decisively influential in relation to the regulation of broadcasting caused mounting anger among his opponents, particularly media owners and opposition politicians. Their argument was that it was not acceptable for anyone to be a player *and* a referee in any given game (Dennis, 1994; Kraidy, 1995). This growing hostility gave popular and civil support to the Chamber of Deputies, led by Speaker Nabih Berri, to vote against the March 1994 Council of Ministers ban on news and political programs.

The Audio-Visual Law

Discussions continued until a broadcasting law, the so-called "audio-visual law," was passed on October 19, 1994. The law, the first of its kind in Lebanon, gave an urgently needed regulatory framework for broadcasting in the country. It legalized private broadcasting, revoked *Télé-Liban* 's monopoly on television in Lebanon, and declared that "audio-visual information" was free within the framework of the constitution. It required Lebanese stations to produce more local programs. The law also affirmed that channels, waves and frequencies were the exclusive property of the state and could only be leased, with appropriate fees charged. Broadcasting licenses were to be issued by the Council of Ministers and private broadcasters were given two months to apply for licenses, in which they had to meet certain financial requirements. Finally, the law established the National Council of Audio-Visual Media (NCOAVM) and assigned that council the task of laying down technical conditions and of monitoring broadcasting and recommending the suspension and closure of media violating the law ("An Audio-Visual," 1994).

The law provided a regulatory framework for broadcasting in Lebanon. Technical standards would eliminate interference and financial requirements would reduce the number of stations and consolidate the advertising industry. The affirmation of freedom of information and the requirements for more locally produced programs were also positive steps. The law divided television and radio stations into four categories, restricting news and political programs to First Category stations. It also stipulated sanctions for the violation of its provisions and of other Lebanese laws, including the 1962 Press Law. The Audio-Visual Law provided other positive requirements such as the one mandating news bulletins to be objective, balanced and inclusive.

Nevertheless, it was widely criticized by journalists and politicians for failing to address key concerns and for ambiguous wording of some key provisions. The imperative requirement that news and political programs could not disturb "public order, national defense requirements and the public interest" ("An Audio-Visual," 1994, p. 38) was ambiguously worded. One of its most worrisome provisions was Article 47, which stipulated that "by request from the Ministry of Information, the National Council of Audiovisual Media practices censorship over television and radio stations" (An Audio-Visual, 1994, p. 38). In fact, Boulos (1996) revealed that a first draft of the law was "... full of contradictions ..." (p. 311) that were not rectified in the final text.

The law was also criticized for considerably enhancing the power of the Minister of Information by giving the Minister full discretion in monitoring and sanctioning broadcasters. The law gave the right to the Minister of Information to audit the records of both advertising and television stations to verify that advertising charges corresponded and to check the financial soundness of private media. The law prohibited any television station to operate at a financial deficit for a protracted period. According to observers, only two of Lebanon's televisions could meet that condition ("An Audio-Visual," 1994, p. 37). This put the Minister of Information in a position to sanction television stations that are not "government-friendly" while turning a blind eye to friendlier stations, even if they do not meet the law's financial criteria. The power of the Minister of Information is also enhanced by the fact that the prerogatives of the National Council On Audio Visual Media (NCOAVM) were purely consultative and reduced to policy recommendation (Boulos, 1996). The extent of the power of the Minister of Information raised fears that broadcasting regulation would be greatly influenced by the personality of the sitting Minister.

Broadcasters had to struggle for survival with the passing of the law with financial requirements and technical specifications that many feared could not be met. Rumors amplified of a government plan to slash television stations down to three or four ("Lebanon's top," 1995). It appeared that executives at the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation*, aware of the station's past political record, felt they had to take fast and decisive action to survive. On September 6, 1995, the *LBC*, renamed the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International* (*LBCI*), announced a U.S. $ 34 million capital increase. Pierre Daher, *LBCI*'s Chief Executive Officer and principal shareholder, announced that the money injected by new shareholders raised *LBCI*'s share capital to modernize the infrastructure, upgrade equipment and expand coverage. *LBCI* had been vying for survival since March 1994 when it was subjected to a severe government harassment campaign. Daher said that the strengthening of the station made it a key contender to the few government licenses to be awarded to private broadcasting stations. New shareholders included several members of the Hariri Council of Ministers, several members of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies and other prominent Christian and Muslim politicians. The inclusion of high ranking government officials among its shareholders revealed *LBCI*'s strong desire to survive ("Lebanon's top," 1995). Mergers and acquisitions consolidated the broadcasting industry, awaiting the decision of the Council of Ministers on licenses.

On February 2, 1996, the Lebanese Council of Ministers decided to slash private television and radio stations upon the recommendation of the NCOAVM. Only four private televisions were given licenses ("Lebanon to slash," 1996). Although rumors had anticipated it, the Council's decision was met with strong objections culminating in a general uproar in which members of the Chamber of Deputies joined journalists, religious leaders, students and labor unions. More important than the reduction of the number of broadcasting outlets (from 60 to 4 in the case of television, and from 150 to 10 in the case of radio stations) was the fact that all but one of the stations granted licenses were owned by people holding government positions. The television stations that were allowed to remain in operation were ***Future Television***, owned by Prime Minister Hariri, *MTV* (*Murr Television*), owned by the family of deputy prime minister Michel El Murr, the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International* (*LBCI*), saved by its size, popularity and the presence of government officials among its shareholders, and finally *NBN*, a station that did yet exist and whose name was not known beyond its acronym, owned by Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Berri. The *National Broadcasting Network* (*NBN*) began broadcasting in August 1997.

The Council of Minster's decision was a decisive factor, along with economic woes, in precipitating Lebanon into one of its worst post-war socio-economic crises. On February 29, 1996, the entire country went on strike upon the request of the General Labor Confederation, Lebanon's main labor union. The Council of Ministers reacted rapidly by imposing a curfew accompanied by an army crackdown on protesters and demonstrators whose two main demands were (1) an end to the curtailment of freedom of speech and of the press and (2) an amelioration of the condition of the working class. Immediately after the incident government officials frequently took action against the press. Most noticed was

Al Diyar [The Homes], a leftist daily that charged by Lebanon's prosecutor general 5 times in 10 days in March 1996, for allegedly criticizing President Hrawi, Speaker Berri and Prime Minister Hariri, who were dubbed by the press "the ruling troika" ("*Ad-Diyar* charged," 1996). As observers and people directly concerned by the slashing of broadcast media speculated about difficult days to come, the issue of broadcasting regulation and governmental attacks on press freedom appeared to fade away from public scrutiny.

Curiously, the Council of Ministers' decision to slash down private broadcasting to 4 television and 11 radio stations was not implemented; all television and radio stations in Lebanon remained in operation. One of the reasons was probably the fact that the Council of Ministers could not go back on its decision for fear of losing credibility, and at the same time could not implement a measure that attracted such a strong and widespread opposition. Also, the "media and information dossier," which had become the designation referring to the heavy-handed methods of the government in regulating media and information, was temporarily eclipsed by more important events on the local scene. The most prominent of those events were "Grapes of Wrath," the Israeli military operation in southern Lebanon in which more than 100 civilians were killed, and Lebanon's legislative elections, the country's second such elections in the postwar era.

On September 17, 1996, the Council of Ministers announced that 4 television stations and 11 radio stations would be granted licenses, but that other stations would be allowed to "clarify their qualifications" before November 30, 1996, at which time all non--licensed stations shall cease broadcasting ("Media," 1996). All non-licensed stations were ordered to stop broadcasting news and political programs starting from the evening of September 18. The Council granted an exceptional status to *Al-Manar* [The Lighthouse] television, owned and operated by the radical Islamic guerrilla party Hezbollah, which was allowed to broadcast news of anti-Israeli resistance in Southern Lebanon until Israel withdrew from Lebanese land it occupied ("Media," 1996). Government officials seemed to have decided that the time had come where they were in a position to implement the

February 2, 1996 decision of the Council of Ministers, since the Israeli invasion in the South had subsided and the legislative elections in Lebanon were completed.

On November 12, 1996, 10 members of the Chamber of Deputies introduced a motion calling for the extension of the deadline by which non-licensed stations had to shut down from November 30 1996 to the end of April 1997. Despite legislative backing, the motion was completely ignored by the Chamber of Deputies with Speaker Berri making a public "wish" that the Council of Ministers leaves the status quo intact, while Prime Minister Hariri adamantly refused to discuss the issue during Council meetings ("Committee," 1996). In the meantime, private broadcasters tried to gain time and to consolidate their operations to survive the eventually inevitable enforcement of the 1994 broadcasting law.

External Factors

In addition to internal factors, external factors also influenced state attempts to control news and political programs on television. The first external factor was the influence that Lebanon's media have traditionally had in the Arab world. The second such factor was the advent of transnational satellite broadcasting in the Arab world and the ensuing loss of control over broadcasting by Arab governments.

Lebanon's Media Regional Historical Legacy

The uniquenes of Lebanon's media and their strategic position in the Arab world was underscored by several researchers (Abu Laban, 1966, Rugh, 1987; Mackey, 1989; Boyd, 1991; Harik, 1994, Boulos, 1996). Abu Laban (1966) recounted a rumor that Egyptian and Pan-Arab leader Nasser always read the Lebanese press before reading Egyptian newspapers, in order to gain insights into regional affairs on any given day (p. 511). The reputation of Lebanese dailies made them widely read throughout the Arab-speaking world. William Rugh (1987) wrote that more than twenty Lebanese dailies are read in the Arab world country, and that "seven or eight [newspapers] have for years distributed more outside than inside Lebanon" (p. 91).

The regional popularity of Lebanese newspapers was feared by Arab leaders who often read in their pages critiques of and attacks on their policies. Even though the 1962 Lebanese press law banned attacks on foreign leaders, many Arab leaders were directly attacked in Lebanese newspapers, especially during the civil war when official control of the press was non-existent. Lebanese newspapers were banned in certain Arab countries experiencing political unrest (Abu Laban, 1966), and Arab governments frequently pressured Lebanese authorities to muzzle a press that regularly embarrassed them. Beirut was a safe haven for Arab dissidents who freely attacked Arab governments in its cafés, its newspapers and books. As Mackey (1987) put it, it was in Beirut that "most of the books the Arab world read were published under the protection of the only Arab government that allowed freedom of the press" (p. 9).

Broadcasts from Lebanon 's private television stations spilled over the borders of neighboring countries such as Jordan, Israel, Syria and Cyprus (Badran, 1991). Like the press, newscasts on Lebanese televisions often criticized Arab regimes and their leaders. Most notable were the diatribes against the Syrian regime broadcast by the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International*. Lebanese authorities, aware of the regional reach of Lebanon's media, decided it was necessary to control news and political programs that might have a negative impact on Lebanon. Politically, the Lebanese government officials could not tolerate that private owned media embarrass them by criticizing the Syrian role in Lebanon. Economically, dissenting opinions critical of the government performance could have a negative impact on Arab investment in Lebanon's reconstruction drive. Concerns about the impact of Lebanese media outside of the country dramatically increased with technological change, as transnational satellite television broadcasting became a reality in the Arab world.

Technological Change and Transnational Broadcasting:

Observers have recently described the rapid growth of the satellite industry in the Arab world and Middle East (Hift, 1993; Barkey, 1996; Millichip, 1996; Tagliabue, 1996).

Historically, more people in the region have listened to foreign radio broadcasts than in any other part of the world (Boyd, 1993b) as a result of the perceived unreliability of government operated services. The wide success of the *Cable News Network (CNN)* during the Gulf War was rapidly emulated by Arab governments and entrepreneurs. Initially, regional economic or cultural heavyweights such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt appeared to have a quasi-monopoly on satellite activities. However they were soon joined by the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Lebanon.

Competing governments and business interests are rushing into a race with potentially gigantic political and economic implications. At stake is the control of the distribution and content of information and entertainment beamed to more than 300 million Arabic speakers across the Arab Middle East (Tagliabue, 1996). Initial satellite broadcasts by the *Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC)* and the Egyptian government satellite channel (*ESC*) in 1991 were followed by a variety of contenders: In 1993, *Arab Radio and Television (ART)* began broadcasting in Arabic and English. It was soon followed by *Orbit Satellite Television and Radio Network* who in 1994 transmitted on 19 television channels (Russell, 1994). By 1996, Arab and Middle Eastern skies were invaded by a plethora of satellite programs (Barkey, 1996).

Satellite Broadcasting From Lebanon. The 1994 "Audio-Visual Law" provided for television stations that "transmit via satellite and whose coverage exceeds the Lebanese territory" ("An audio-visual," 1994, p. 39). On December 12, 1996, the Council of Ministers allowed *Future Television* and the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International* to broadcast via satellite, and permitted them to broadcast news and political programs on the condition they were cleared by official censors ("Council of," 1996).

The two politically well-connected stations gained transponder space on the ARABSAT-2A satellite and quickly became popular from the Gulf states to Egypt. A Pan Arab Research Center-Gallup International (PARC-Gallup) study conducted in Saudi Arabia during the holy month of Ramadan (falling between December 20, 1996 and

January 10, 1997, in that particular year) found that *LBCI* had 6 of the 10 most popular programs there ("Television-February," 1997). A 1997 consumer study found that the three most popular satellite stations in the Arab Middle East were *MBC* (first), *Future Television* (second) and *LBCI* (third). The three stations ranked ahead of competitors such as *Dubai TV*, *Orbit*, *Arab Radio and Television (ART)* and Egypt's *ESC* , and non-Arab services such as *CNN* and the *BBC* ranked respectively ninth and tenth ("Interwood marketing," 1997). These studies are somewhat contradictory; nonetheless, they indicate that Lebanon's two satellite stations and London-based *MBC* were the top three pan-Arab satellite services.

Lebanon's two satellite stations had divergent editorial policies. Whereas *Future*, owned by the Lebanese Prime Minister, de facto opted for an editorial policy in allegiance to Lebanese political authorities, *LBCI* remained critical of the regime (Rizk, 1997). *Future*'s current affairs and news programs focused on the perceived successes of the regime in its efforts to rebuild Lebanon's infrastructure, strengthen its economy and bring the country back to its pre-war financial, cultural and intellectual regional preeminence. Newscasts favorable to the Lebanese regime and optimistic social and economic prognostications painted a picture of a country briskly rising for the ashes of the war. The clip that signaled the beginning of programs every morning, "El Balad Mashi wel Shoghel Mashi" [The country's fine, and business is good] became associated with people's perspective on the regime, which was perceived as pretending the country was in the best possible shape while it was not.

LBCI adopted a more critical stance on government affairs. Its newscasts and programs highlighted Lebanon's socio-economic problems and criticized the regime's authoritarian dealing with the media and labor unions. On March 27, 1997, *LBCI* broadcast an interview with an eminent Lebanese jurist during its national newscast, in which he severely criticized government censorship of news and political programs broadcast via satellite, and repressive information policies in the Arab world. Immediately, *LBCI* was contacted by government officials who requested the interview not to be broadcast via satellite, since it could harm relations with neighboring countries. *LBCI* executives replied they would comply with government instructions, but found out that government forces had stormed the Jouret Al Ballout earth station and disconnected them from ARABSAT 2A ("Et maintenant," 1997). On March 28, 1997, *LBCI* filed an official complaint with the Shura Council, Lebanon's equivalent of the Supreme Court. The complaint claimed the illegality of the government actions and listed damages the station could suffer such as "loss of professional credibility" and "impossibility of bringing news scoops" ("Censure: La," 1997). As of August 1997, *LBCI*'s complaint remained unanswered (personal communication, August 8, 1997), although the station resumed its satellite broadcasts.

Another crisis occurred between *LBCI* and the Lebanese government when the station aired a live interview with Roger Tamraz, a Lebanese financier wanted in Lebanon for embezzlement and for contacting Israeli businessmen. Tamraz, now a U.S. citizen and an international oil entrepreneur, became famous in the U.S. when Senate investigations in 1997 linked him with the White House campaign finance scandal. After the interview, *LBCI*'s general manager and the host of the program in which the interview appeared were summoned for questioning by Lebanese judiciary authorities (Saadé, 1997). The judge in charge of the matter later declared that *LBCI* had not violated any laws because the interview was featured as a media scoop and not to promote a Lebanese fugitive who collaborated with Israel (Darrous, 1997, November 18). According to observers, the regime's main concern was that *LBCI*'s satellite programs were "harming Lebanon's image abroad(personal communication, August 8, 1997). Statements by members of the regime indicated that they wanted *LBCI* to comply with the government's "unified political discourse" (read pro-Syria and anti-Israel) ("Sabeh: Compliance," 1997), preserving a "balance between depicting Lebanon's democratic nature and not harming its relations with neighboring nations" ("Sabeh: No," 1997, p. 4). Other Lebanese officials attacked *LBCI* for not wholeheartedly supporting Hizbollah's resistance against Israel in Southern Lebanon ("Confrontation escalates," 1997).

A series of state attempts to control television news and political programs ignited some of post-war Lebanon's biggest controversies. A December 1997 Information Ministry attempt to ban *Murr-Television* from airing a live interview with opposition leader in exile Michel Aoun lead to several days of civil unrest, massive student demonstrations and political struggles. After the Information Minister justified his actions by concerns for "civil peace, Lebanon's economic interests, Lebanon's relations with brotherly Arab countries" ("Le Gouvernement," 1997), and concerns for "public order and national safety" (Darrous, 1997, December 12), political and social pressure led him moderate his position. Other attempts to ban live interviews with opposition politicians were carried into 1998 when the Lebanese government banned news and political programs broadcast via satellite, while lifting all restrictions on news and political programs broadcast in Lebanon ("L'interdiction des," 1998). Therefore, the government had to allow news to carry opposition voices domestically, in order to prevent it from reaching outside of Lebanon's borders.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the 1990-1998 post-war period, the Lebanese state has repeatedly attempted to control television news and political programs, with various levels of success. Several justifications were offered, ranging from the need for broadcasting regulation, to concerns about national security and stability to the preservation of Lebanon's friendly ties with other Arab countries. However, events occurring between 1990 and 1998 suggest that the Lebanese state has crossed the boundary between regulation and authoritarianism.

Broadcasting regulation was necessary in post-war Lebanon. Private broadcasting was a result of the anarchy that prevailed during the war and had to be regulated if the state is to effectively reassume legal control over the country. Besides, interference on the airwaves caused visible dangers for civil aviation and maritime navigation, and resulted in jamming and bad reception of broadcasting signals. Furthermore, a chaotic broadcasting scene risked suffocating the Lebanese advertising market, which is the lifeblood of Lebanese media, thus posing a threat to the entire media industry in the country. Finally, concerns about national unity after seventeen years of war are legitimate. Therefore, legislation that provided a legal framework for media operation in Lebanon was fully justified.

However, a closer look at post-war political and media event suggests that the Lebanese state crossed the boundaries of legitimate regulation and law enforcement and instead has become an authoritarian regime violating democratic principles and institutions protected by the Lebanese constitution. Internal and external attempts by the state to control news and political programs in post-war Lebanon have been direct and indirect.

Direct attempts included Council of Ministers decisions to ban news and political programs from private television and radio stations, such as the March 1994 decision. These decisions were often followed by campaigns of harassment against the news media who did not comply with government instructions. Another form of direct control included direct intervention from the Information Minister. A case in point is the ban of Aoun's interview on *Murr Television* in December 1997. The Lebanese government also resorted to direct technical intervention to block television stations from airing newscasts and political programs critical of the regime. The most flagrant example of this direct intervention is when government agents disconnected the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International* earth station link, physically interrupting the station's satellite broadcasts. Direct attempts to control news and political programs thus ranged from authoritarian intimidation and threat to state supported from of vandalism.

Indirect forms of control of news and political programs are perhaps more threatening to democratic life and public opinion in the country, since they are often not visible to the public. These include a political monopoly over the media by members of the regime and various levels of economic controls and ambiguous legislation.

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The political monopoly over Lebanese media is clear. Three of the four licensed private television stations are owned by prominent members of the regime. Prime Minister Hariri owns *Future Television*, the family of Vice Prime Minister Murr owns *Murr Television*, and Speaker of the House of Deputies Nabih Berri owns the *National Broadcasting Network*.

Future Television newscasts look like press conferences given by representatives of the Prime Minister. Political programs aired by the station are harnessed to publicize, defend and legitimize the Prime Minister's political and economic agendas. Satellite broadcasts are a systematic public relations campaign to persuade Arab business people and members of the large Lebanese diaspora to invest in Lebanon's ambitious recovery and reconstruction plan. News bulletins and political programs on Murr Television and the *National Broadcasting Network* are not as subservient to the regime as Future's, but they usually avoid direct criticism unless their interests are immediately threatened, such as when the Information Ministry banned *Murr Television* from broadcasting Aoun's interview. News and political programs on all three stations are thus indirectly controlled by government interests.

After its September 1996 expansion, the *Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International* is indirectly controlled by a variety of interests, including members of the current regime. Most probably, the reason *LBCI* has repeatedly challenged state attempts to control its newscasts and political programs because of the financial threat such controls constitute. In fact, in its complaint to Lebanon's highest court against the state, *LBCI* did not invoke any political, ideological or social grievances, such as appeals to media freedom or political attacks on the state. Rather, the station's complaint cited professional credibility and its inability to realize scoops as its main grievances. Therefore, unlike the other three private stations, *LBCI*'s editorial policy is affected primarily by economic factors, with political factors coming in second place.

Government attempts to control television news and political programs in post-war Lebanon have been relatively successful. Although the volatile and diverse nature of Lebanese media, politics and civil society have occasionally been able to challenge the state's authoritarian tendencies, these successes have been reversed at later times, or were achieved at a high cost for the media. Unfortunately, it appears that the Lebanese state has bypassed democratic processes and institutions, even violating the constitution and a Shura Council (supreme court) decision, in order to control news and political programs opposed to its policies. At a time where democracy is making inroads elsewhere in the world, it appears that the Arab world's leading democracy is taking the opposite direction.

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American News Coverage of International Crisis Negotations: Elite Sources of Media Framing and Effects on Public Opinion

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American News Coverage of International Crisis Negotiations: The Elite Sources of Media Framing and Effects on Public Opinion

Abstract

The manner in which media present elites' interpretations of international crises has important implications for strategic public diplomacy -- the process of signaling intentions to adversaries *and* shaping public opinion concerning conflict resolution efforts. This study considers two recent international crises: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990 - 1991) and the military coup d'état of Haiti (1993 - 1994). Framing -- the act of highlighting certain aspect of a topic while excluding others -- provides a basis for an analysis which examines (a) the *problem definitions* and *treatment recommendations* attributed to U.S. elites in key newspapers, and (b) the effects of these negotiations frames on public opinion. Findings suggest political elites frame the crisis in ways that reflect their foreign policy roles *and* that these media frames influence public opinion concerning U.S. involvement.

American News Coverage of International Crisis Negotiations: Elite Sources of Media Framing and Effects on Public Opinion

Within the context of international negotiations and conflict resolution, the news media are not simply conduits of information to an interested citizenry; they have become a means of understanding the intentions of governments. Some scholars contend that political actors embrace this function of media and strategically use news outlets to accomplish foreign policy ends (Davison, 1974; Lee, 1968; Merritt, 1980). Consequently, foreign governments gauge the positions of political elites by monitoring the media institutions of international powers (Cohen, 1986; Manheim, 1994). Others argue that the role of the press in negotiations and foreign policy is best understood in relation to its influence on domestic public opinion (Arno, 1984; Hughes, 1978; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985, Nincic, 1992), since a focus on winning the support of constituencies may limit the range of available options and, in turn, may affect negotiators' ability to reach agreement (Douglas, 1992; Turner, 1992).

While scholars hold differing conceptions of the role of media during periods of international crisis resolution, they generally agree that the manner in which the press present and discuss a conflict has important implications for its outcome. Unfortunately, little academic research systematically examines media content during periods of international crisis with an understanding of conflict resolution (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In response, this study explores the differing *problem definitions* and *treatment recommendations* discussed in media and attributed to U.S. elites during two international crises: (1) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the anticipated attack on Saudi Arabia, which ultimately lead to the Persian Gulf War; and (2) the refusal of the Haitian military to relinquish governmental control to the island nation's democratically elected leadership, which was resolved with in a negotiated settlement on the eve of a planned invasion. *Framing* -- the act of emphasizing some aspect of an issue in communication to direct individuals towards a particular interpretation -- provides the basis for analyzing media content about these international conflicts (Drake & Donohue, 1996; Entman, 1993; Putman & Holmer, 1992; Shah, Domke & Wackman, 1996).

This research addresses a number of important questions: How do media define the underlying problem of the crises (i.e., in terms of material and strategic interests *and/or* in terms of democratic and humanitarian principles)? What treatment recommendations are offered as foreign policy options (i.e., military action, economic sanctions, negotiated settlement, *and/or* avoiding the use of force)? Who are the elite sources of these frames, and do particular elites favor certain frames over others? And finally, do the treatment recommendations presented in the media shape public preferences about possible action plans? In answering the last of these questions, we test a theoretical model of media effects that attempts to predict public support for sending troops into the crisis situation *based solely upon media coverage*. Therefore, this research has two primary goals: first, to examine the negotiations frames in media content -- the definitions of the crisis and the recommended treatment options -- and the elites sources of these frames; and second, to investigate whether news media coverage, *alone*, can predict U.S. mass opinion about using military force. We draw upon two sets of data to explore these issues: (1) newspaper stories from four elite media outlets (*Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Time Magazine, and Washington Post*), and (2) a time series of public opinion polls gauging attitudes towards military involvement.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Strategic Public Diplomacy

Scholars have long recognized that elites frequently and effectively use informal channels of communication, such as the news media, to communicate with foreign governments (Jervis, 1970; Thomas, 1962; Young, 1968). Ways of communicating via media include articles by officials and ministers, news conferences, press, radio and television interviews, letters to the editor, press releases, as well as leaks to journalists (Manheim, 1994; Sigal, 1973). For U.S. leaders, the "one-way" flow of communications empowers American news coverage with strategic influence beyond its boarders (Hamelink, 1994; Nordenstreng & Schiller, 1993). While media may be used as a primary conduit of information between two countries when no formal diplomatic channel exists, more often, media complement formal channels and are used to communicate impressions, interests or potential threats. Adversaries often look for consistency between what they see in media and what diplomats say at the negotiating table (Cohen, 1986).

This view is consistent with the assertion that governments pay particular attention to *news management* during periods of international conflict resolution. Herman (1993, p. 23) concludes that news management "is most evident in foreign affairs reporting in which strong domestic constituencies contesting government propaganda campaigns are rare, and in which the government can employ ideological weapons." Herman and Chomsky (1986) point to structural evidence that media do tend to follow the state agenda in reporting foreign policy news and are used strategically by those elites to pursue particular ends, domestically and internationally. Other scholars, who take a less deterministic view of the relationship between the government and the press, also acknowledge the ability of elites to orchestrate "media events" for the purpose of "strategic public diplomacy" (Dayan & Katz, 1992; Manheim, 1994). Political communicators create, distribute, and use information as a resource directed at foreign governments, interest groups, and/or the general public. These elites understand how news organizations make decisions regarding media content and adjust their tactics accordingly; they present stories to the press in ways that maximize their coverage and convey the desired issue framing (Manheim, 1991).

This is not to say that all elites are heard equally in media coverage. While American journalists traditionally operate under a norm of objectivity, their desire to get a balanced perspective based on a variety of sources does not mean that all political actors warrant equal press coverage. Rather, in foreign policy reporting, reporters and editors over-sample those who hold the most power to influence the situation. Previous research suggests that in such contexts, journalists rely most heavily on foreign policy decision-makers: the President and other White House officials, followed by diplomatic sources, and then military sources. Congressional sources are attended to least during these periods, due to their limited role in international policy making (Chang, 1993).[1]

Zaller (1994, p. 250) argues that "at least in the domain of foreign affairs, the media normally take cues from government officials, 'indexing' coverage to the range of opinions that exist within the government." That is, the viewpoints available in the mass media reflect the opinions expressed in political debate and official communication (Althaus, Edy, & Entman, 1996, Bennett, 1990; Ghanem, 1997). These viewpoints are thought to play an important role in shaping public opinion (Fan, 1988; Zaller, 1992). In explaining how people acquire and convert political information into political preferences, many scholars maintain that elites establish the range of discourse in the mass media, and that this *framing* powerfully influences the dynamics of mass opinion by providing the public with cues for understanding the issue (Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, & Waring, 1990; Jasperson, Shah, Watts, Faber, & Fan, forthcoming).

Framing

Framing, as conceived by scholars in communications, sociology, psychology, political science, and negotiations, concerns the process of news construction reflected in the language choices of communicators *and* the dynamics of audience consumption shaped by cognitive processes (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Much of the sociological literature on framing focuses on the active construction of reality out of bits of information, and concentrates the communicator and the text as the key units of analysis (Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978). These scholars assert that frames go beyond simply presenting the news; they create news events by signifying what is important. A media frame orders or organizes the perception of the receiver by including and excluding certain messages, structuring journalistic and audience understanding of the issue (Tuchman, 1978). As Gamson (1985, p. 617) contends,

> News frames are almost entirely implicit and taken for granted. They do not appear to either journalists or audiences as social constructions but as primary attributes of events that reporters are merely reflecting.

Accordingly, theorists argue that framing, by removing other ways of thinking, can create the acceptable range of meaning of an issue (see Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990; Ball-Rokeach & Rokeach, 1987; Bennett, 1993; Edelman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

Entman (1993, p. 52) explains that making some aspects of a perceived reality more salient in communication can "promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." Thus, frames are not merely features of a message, but a mediating device between the social realm and everyday understanding (Friedland & Menbai, 1996). In linking these levels, framing can be understood as "the manner in which the construction of communication texts influences individual cognitions by selectively focusing on particular parts of reality while ignoring or downplaying other aspects" (Shah et al., 1993, p. 510 - 511, see also Gamson, 1992; Entman & Rojecki, 1993).

From a psychological perspective, then, framing provides a means of describing the ability of communications to shape individuals' cognitive processes, leading them toward prescribed interpretations. Several empirical examples testify to the insights framing can provide regarding media effects on opinion (Iyengar, 1991; Zaller, 1992). These works assert that media frames influence the way people perceive a problem or issue and its consequences, possibly altering their final evaluation of the topic. For example, research suggests that framing economic and foreign policy questions in terms of gains vs. losses (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988) or framing affirmative action in terms of unfair advantage vs. just compensation (Kinder & Sanders, 1989) can change the basis of political judgment. Similarly, shifting the news frame of health care reform from a focus on economic interests to ethical principles alters how voters interpret the issue and use it in electoral decision making (Shah et al., 1996; see also Shah, Domke & Wackman, 1997).

Not surprisingly, the concept of framing receives extensive attention in negotiations and conflict resolution literature (Drake & Donohue, 1996; Putnam, 1990). In particular, the issue development approach to framing embraces a communicative perspective on conflict resolution, focusing on how alteration of the message frame can shift the way problems are conceived (Felstiner, Abel & Surat, 1980-81; Putnam, 1985). In this approach, the frame refers to the "definition, meaning and conceptualization of an issue" (Putnam & Holmer, 1992, p. 138). The confrontation, argumentation and debate of issues serves as the basis for framing and reframing, as negotiators focus on "stock issues" that recur during conflict resolution efforts.

Thus, frames are *constructed* by bargainers as they define problems and the appropriate courses of action in attempts to modify, shape and transform the issues over time (Putnam, Wilson & Turner, 1990). Drawing these literatures together for our present purpose, we argue that the framing of an international crisis can occur at multiple levels within media coverage, with elites not only offering ways to define the dilemma but also providing avenues for remedying the situation. Further, these negotiations frames, in addition to signaling diplomatic intentions to foreign governments, may shape domestic public opinion about the international crisis.

Messages in Negotiations

The literature on negotiations offers a variety of perspectives on the dynamics of conflict resolution. The structural analysis of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Schelling (1960), and Rapoport (1960); the game theories of Young (1975) and Axelrod (1984); and the micro-level psychological approaches of Deutsch (1973), Rubin and Brown (1975), and Pruitt and Carnevale (1993): all offer different observations on the negotiations process. Structural analyses provide insights into issues of power and available resources; game theories contribute to an understanding of the roles of threats, rewards, and personal interests within the interactive and often oppositional dynamic of bargaining; micro-level psychological approaches provide useful views into the influence of various social, cultural, and individual factors on the cognitions, judgments, and behaviors of negotiators within conflict resolution situations. Our understanding of relevant communications frame categories in negotiations draws upon each of these approaches.

In particular, theorists assert that bargaining characterized by a focus on interests rather than positions has a greater likelihood of succeeding (Fisher & Ury, 1981). This perspective depends on both parties' willingness to communicate about the particular aspects of the conflict that concern them. Instead of viewing the negotiations as a contest in which one side must win at the expense of the other -- a zero-sum game -- bargainers must choose to be inventive and cooperative enough to devise an agreement that yields gains to each party's tangible concerns (Bercovitch, 1989; Lax & Sebenius, 1984; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). In American foreign policy, invested raw materials, regional stability, and strategic concerns represent key national interests (Krasner, 1978). Parties generally focus on interests when they are at parity in terms of structural power, or when the weaker party controls some valued quantity. However, many conflict resolution situations are not characterized by these factors (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Thus, this approach has been criticized for viewing negotiations as static rather than process-based and for failing to provide a direct analysis of the role of power (McCarthy, 1986; Habeeb, 1988).

Negotiators are often inclined to use power in the pursuit of diplomatic interests. The use of threats are common in international relations, especially when power dynamics are asymmetric. During international crises, this usually takes two very distinct forms -- military action or economic sanctions (Jervis, 1976; Krasner, 1978). As Deutsch (1976, p. 155) advocates, the use of threats against the relatively defenseless does make sense:

> A severe threat against an adversary who cannot inflict the same level of damage in retaliation threatens great costs at small cost to the threatener. The more intense the threat, the more successful it is supposed to be, according to the theory, against a weaker but still rational opponent.

Threats also can be used strategically to create "ripeness" in the crisis negotiation situation, forcing the other side to the bargaining table. Threats may succeed in creating a situation "in the conflict in which all parties are ready to take the conflict seriously ... to do whatever is necessary to bring the conflict to a close" (Rubin, 1991, p. 10). Therefore, threats are often used when one party holds economic or military power over an opponent. However, there are serious problems associated with using coercive means to "ripen" a conflict (Waelchli & Shah, 1994). This may encourage conflict escalation, as each side attempts to motivate the other side by increasing the stakes, especially when they hold comparable structural power (Habeeb, 1988; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; Rubin, 1991). The strategic choice to use contentious behavior to persuade the other party through pressure tactics, commitments to unalterable positions, and threats has often "proven an inefficient and unwise negotiations course" (Pruitt, 1991, p. 29).

Coercive commitments are sometimes associated with unyielding positions grounded in the "principles" of the threatening party. The application of "righteous and moral (criteria) tend to encourage rigidity with respect to one's demands, and hostility if the other party rejects these demands" (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p. 124-125). However, often what is deemed *fair* or *right* tends to differ based on the perspective of the participant in the negotiations (see Hamner & Baird, 1978). Negotiations characterized by opposing principles and contending moral evaluations tend to be especially hard to resolve (Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1988; Bercovitch, 1989; Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, & Syna, 1992). Scholars have detailed numerous principles that create tensions in international affairs, including human rights, freedom, unbridled aggression and totalitarianism (Morgenthau, 1994; Murray, 1994; Thompson, 1994; Weber, 1994).

It seems clear, then, that interests, principles, compromises and threats are all important communications domains within the arena of international conflict resolution. Some of these categories also may have important implications for the public's understanding of the crisis. By considering each of these elements as possible frames, this research attempts to understand the content of media during negotiations and its impact on public opinion. In doing so, this study offers a richer conception of communication during negotiation than previous scholarship which has sometimes focused on only one of these types of messages (i.e., coercive communications), and has often failed to consider the influence of mass media on mass opinion.

HYPOTHESES

This paper attempts to combine several streams of research heretofore left separate -- strategic public diplomacy, framing, and negotiation theory -- in an effort to explore the nature and range of mediated communication during periods of international crises, the elite sources of these messages, and the relationship between press coverage and public opinion. These issues will be examined through analysis of press coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis (1990 - 1991) and the Haiti crisis (1993 - 1994). Notably, for reasons both structural and individual, these two crises ended quite differently, with one leading to war and the other being resolved peacefully. As a result, little research has explored media coverage and public opinion about the crisis in Haiti, while a number of studies have considered these dynamics of the Gulf crisis (e.g., Hybel, 1993; Mueller, 1994), though most focus on the military conflict that followed.[2] While work on the Gulf crisis has provided insights into elite-media-public interactions, important questions have remained unanswered. In particular, when frames have been identified in news content, they are seen as coming from "elites" in general (see Iyengar & Simon, 1994; Zaller, 1994). This ignores the wide variety of potential sources and the differences that may exist among them. Elite framing may not be unified; the President may concentrate one aspect of the conflict, while state department officials focus on another aspect (Chang, 1993). This research considers a variety of elite sources of frames and examines whether their presentations of the conflict are different from one another.

Specifically, two types of crisis negotiations frames emanate from governmental sources: definitions of the problem and recommendations for action. First, an international crisis can be circumscribed through (a) statements of material and strategic interest or (b) declarations of principles and moral imperatives (Krasner, 1978; Morganthau, 1994; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). The justification for American involvement must be related to tangible economic or security concerns, normative or ethical convictions, or both. Second, international crises may be discussed in terms of particular treatment recommendations available in the execution of foreign policy. In the case of international disputes, a variety of response frames are available: compromise, respond with economic penalties, take military actions, or avoid hostile action (Deutsch, 1976; Lax & Sebenius, 1984; Neale and Bazerman, 1991).

Considering the status of Iraq's armed forces prior to the war (fifth largest in the world) and the fact that the crisis centered on the "oil rich" middle east, we expect that news coverage of the crisis focused on interests (Krasner, 1978; Mueller, 1993; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). While interests may have provided the major basis for defining the Gulf crisis, we also expect principles figured prominently as a justification for U.S. involvement in the situation, given American concern about "unbridled aggression" and "restoring the rightful government." In contrast, Haiti, though it represents a strategic American concern, does not contain the vital resources of the Gulf region. Thus, while we expect that certain national interests were stressed in news coverage (i.e., maintaining regional stability and stopping the flow of Haitian refugees), concerns about human rights and democratic principles likely provided the main criteria for justifying U.S. foreign policy (Beardslee, 1996; Gore, 1995; Mendelbaum, 1996). Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:

H1a: Due to the vital economic and strategic value of the Gulf region, interests will be the most favored problem definition frame of the Gulf crisis, followed by principle frames.

H1b: Due to the democratic and humanitarian issues at stake, principles will be the most favored problem definition frame of the Haiti crisis, followed by interest frames.

Further, due to the questionable application of historical analogies to the Gulf crisis by President Bush and Brent Scowcroft, threats seemed to play a larger role than a strictly rational approach might have predicted. "Since Saddam Hussein was another Adolf Hitler, the only choice left to the United States was to act aggressively" (Hybel, 1993, p. 9). Further, since the analogy to 1938 Munich was paired with the Vietnam debacle, the implication was that the use of military threats, and force if necessary, would be overwhelming, as well as swift (Hybel, 1993). Thus, we predict that news media mainly framed U.S. reaction to the situation in terms of military threats, and that economic threats or compromise frames were less prominent treatment recommendations.

The Haiti crisis, on the other hand, saw substantial diplomatic progress in the months proceeding the scheduled U.S. invasion, which itself faced strong opposition. This may have lead government officials to stress treatment options other than military action. Given the fact that Haiti, a small island nation, had limited material resources and little military power, economic threats and compromise frames likely played a more prominent role in media discourse (Clement, 1997; Talbott, 1996). However, since threats against the relatively defenseless do tend to be successful, we also expect that elites, through the media, focused heavily on military threats (Deutsch, 1976). Accordingly, we offer the following hypotheses:

H2a: Due to the coercive focus of administration policy, military threats will be the dominant treatment recommendation frame of the Gulf crisis, followed by economic threat and compromise frames.

H2b: Due to progress on diplomatic fronts and the power asymmetry between the U.S. and Haiti, economic threat and compromise frames will play a more prominent role in the Haiti crisis, though military threat frames will still be a favored content category.

This is not to say that all elites have equal access to news outlets through which to voice these frames. As argued above, elites operate in concentric circles of power around an issue (Chang, 1993). In the international realm, U.S. journalists 'index' the range of opinion among foreign policy decision, since they hold the power to affect the dynamics of the crisis (Bennett, 1990; Zaller, 1994). If visibility in the press is related to one's role in determining U.S. foreign policy, one would expect that primary sources during these periods are the President and other White House officials, followed by diplomatic sources, and then military sources. Members of Congress, who play a limited role in directing American foreign policy, likely serve as sources to a much lesser degree than these other governmental elites. Lastly, United Nations officials, who provide an international perspective, likely receive little attention in domestic coverage. These news criteria should be true during both crises; accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:

> H3: The President and other administration officials will be the most prominent sources in news coverage, followed by diplomatic officials, military officials, and, finally, congressional members and UN officials.

Elites may not only be used differentially as sources, they may choose to stress different interpretations of the crisis. While the President may respond with "moral indignation" at the actions of Saddam Hussein or the Haitian military, he also may stress specific tangible interests, feeling a need to present a balanced portrait to justify U.S. involvement in the conflict. Diplomatic officials, who are trained in conflict resolution, seem more likely to emphasize compromise frames, while military official seem more likely to focus on coercive threats. Congressional members, with their reluctance to send American troops in harms way, seem likely to frame the conflict in terms of avoiding the use of force. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:

> H4: Elites will stress problem definition and treatment recommendation frames that reflect their roles in American foreign policy and represent their interests in shaping an understanding of the crisis.

Some scholars also contend that media coverage of international conflicts shapes domestic public opinion during negotiations (Arno, 1984; Hughes, 1978; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985, Nincic, 1992). Consequently, we posit that treatment recommendation frames of the crisis have persuasive influence on public preferences concerning military involvement. To explain public support for hostile action, the treatment recommendation frames of military threats, opposition to economic sanctions, and unwillingness to compromise are assumed to persuade those previously opposed to the use of military force to support sending American troops, while the treatment recommendation frames of compromise, economic threats, and avoiding force are thought to have the opposite effect (see Fan, 1988; Jasperson et al., forthcoming). These countervailing forces should explain change in public opinion *based solely on media content.* Thus, our final hypothesis is:

> H5: Treatment recommendation frames in media coverage, *alone*, can be used to predict change in pubic support for sending American troops.

METHODOLOGY

Data Retrieval and Content Analysis

To study media presentation of the Persian Gulf and Haiti crises, news stories were randomly sampled from four major American print news outlets available through the NEXIS electronic database. Specifically, news content from *Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Time Magazine, and Washington Post* was analyzed. These key news organizations rely on staff reporters rather than wire services, and often set the agenda for other news media. Therefore, we assume that the content of these media reflect the broader discourse surrounding these crises.

For the Gulf crisis, NEXIS was searched for stories from August 3, 1990 (one day before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) to January 16, 1991 (the day after the beginning of the Desert Storm offensive). Stories were sought that contained any reference to the Gulf region, (e.g. "Saddam," "Iraq," "Baghdad," or "Kuwait"). The original search identified 10,782 stories. A random number generator was then used to retrieve 5,000 stories as a sample from the original search.

For the Haiti crisis, NEXIS was searched for stories from January 20, 1993 (the day Bill Clinton was sworn is as President) to October 8, 1994 (the day after U.S. delegates achieved an end to the military coup). Stories were sought that contained any reference to Haiti or its leadership region, (e.g. "Cedras," "Aristide," or "Haiti"). The original search identified 3,662 stories, all of which were selected for content analysis. For both Gulf and Haiti coverage, text was retrieved within a 50 word window surrounding the tagged content.

A computer method was used to analyze stories (see Fan, 1988, 1994).[3] The coding unit for this study was the paragraph. Conventions of newspaper journalism dictate that the paragraph has the smallest unit of meaning. The sentence typically relies on the context of the paragraph for its meaning. The paragraph may contain several ideas; each would be coded individually.

Coding of Frames and Sources

The content analysis was divided into three steps wherein various filters were applied to the text. The first filter refined the original NEXIS downloads for both crises by eliminating irrelevant coverage. These rules removed content that originated from sources other than U.S. government elites, as well as coverage that did not focus on the crisis. By eliminating paragraphs in which political elites from other countries made statements concerning the Gulf crisis (i.e., Iraq, Kuwait and international allies) or the Haiti crisis (i.e., Haitian military, as well as European and Latin American nations), the remaining text concerned the US perspective on the crisis.

Of the original 5,000 stories, 4,058 were found to contain relevant Gulf crisis coverage, a total of 24,620 paragraphs. For the Haiti crisis, 2,925 of the original 3,658 stories were found to contain relevant content, a total of 20,716 paragraphs. The next filter was applied to the remaining text; it separated paragraphs into eight distinct media frames: two problem definition frames -- interests and principles -- and six treatment recommendation frames -- military threats, economic threats, compromise, avoiding force, lifting the embargo, and opposing a compromise. While adjustments were made in response to differences in context, the computer coding rules for the Gulf and Haiti shared many similarities.

"Interest" frames are conceptualized as news content that defines the crisis in terms of the tangible economic, political, or national security concerns of the U.S. For the Persian Gulf crisis, rules were created to capture words and phrases such as "oil," "American jobs," and "regional stability." For the Haiti crisis, rules were created to capture content such as "Haiti's economy," "immigration," and "regional security." "Principle" frames are conceptualized as news content that defines the crisis in terms of ethical concerns of the U.S. and moral evaluations of the adversary. Words and phrases such as "Saddam is evil/Hitler/brutal," "naked aggression," "human rights," "restore rightful government," and "moral duty" were used to capture relevant content for the Gulf crisis. The corresponding rules for the Haiti crisis used words such as "atrocities," "democracy," "starving," and "freedom," as well as many of the words used to code the Gulf data.

"Military Threat" frames are conceptualized as news content that recommends actual or potential military action in response to the crisis. Operationally, such frames were defined by military phrases and word combinations including "ground forces," "warship," "American troops," "invasion," and "deadline." "Economic Threat" frames are conceptualized as news content that recommends actual or potential economic action in response to the crisis. Words and phrases such as "economic sanction," "embargo," "blockade," or "interdiction" operationalized this frame category. "Compromise" frames are conceptualized as news content that recommends diplomacy to resolve the crisis. They were defined by phrases and word combinations that indicate the potential for a negotiated conclusion to the crisis, such as "concession," "mediation," "talks between," or "settlement." The computer rules were nearly identical for the two crises.

Three other categories were created by accounting for negation created by words such as "not," "oppose," and "against." By using this rule in combination with the three treatment recommendation categories detailed above, we coded media content that suggested we should (1) avoid using military force, (2) lift economic sanctions, or (3) not settle for a compromise. These categories reflect the fact that media content can oppose a particular framing of an issue without developing a discussion that moves beyond that framing.

Application of these computer rules to code the various problem definition and treatment recommendation frames yielded a total of 20,334 paragraphs -- frame mentions -- in the Gulf crisis data, and 17, 568 paragraphs in the Haiti crisis data. Since one paragraph could have been coded as containing multiple ideas reflecting multiple frames, the total number of coded ideas was slightly greater than the total number of paragraphs coded. A hand-scored, random sample of 200 paragraphs was drawn from each content domain to test the accuracy of the computer rules. For the Gulf data, we achieved an intercoder reliability of 86.0% between the human coder and the computer. In the corresponding reliability assessment for the Haiti data, we achieved an intercoder reliability of 81.5% between the human coder and the computer.

The final filter, used to determine source attributions, was applied to any text registered as containing relevant content identified by the first filter. Computer instructions were written in order to determine the exact source of the idea. Seven categories of sources were identified: The President, other Administration officials (spokespeople, "White House" sources, Vice President, etc.); Military sources (Secretary of Defense, Pentagon officials, Generals, etc.); Diplomatic sources (Secretary of State, State Department, etc.); Congressional sources (Speaker, Senators, Representatives, etc.); United Nations officials (Secretary General, UN officials, Security Council, etc.); and unnamed officials. Coding rules for both crises relied on many of the same titles (i.e., Assistant Secretary of State) to identify sources; of course, adjustments in proper names (i.e., Bush to Clinton) were made to account for changes in official positions between administrations. For the Haiti crisis, we included Aristide as a source, since U.S. media often sought out the deposed leader, who was residing in the United States. Rules were written to identify the source words within 60 characters of over 40 journalistic synonyms of "said."

For the Gulf crisis, this filter was able to attribute 11,066 paragraphs to sources; intercoder reliability between human and computer coders for 200 randomly-selected paragraphs was 91.5%. For the Haiti crisis, this filter was able to attribute 10,578 paragraphs to sources; intercoder reliability between human and computer coders for 200 randomly-selected paragraphs was 85.0%.

Modeling Public Opinion

We posit that treatment recommendation frames for international crises contain persuasive information that is either favorable or unfavorable to U.S. military involvement. In our formal *ideodynamic model*, persuasive information is treated as time-dependent persuasive force functions: $F(\text{ProMilitary},t)$ and $F(\text{ConMilitary},t)$. These persuasive force functions indicate the amount of information available at time *t* to influence the public to favor a particular idea. Each function F for time t is the sum of the number of paragraphs in news media coverage of the appropriate valence, each one given its maximal value on the story date followed by an exponential decay with an one-day half-life. Previous research indicates that the one-day decay rate for the loss in ability to persuade provides a good fit for the relationship between media coverage and public opinion polls (see Fan, 1988; Fan and Tims, 1989; Fan 1996).

The model is based on the premise that certain treatment recommendation frames (military threats, opposition to economic sanctions, and unwillingness to compromise) should persuade those who disapprove of military involvement to approve of the U.S. decision to send troops, while other treatment recommendation frames (compromise, economic threats, and avoiding the use of force) should have the opposite effect. Formally, the level of approval for sending U.S. troops into the crisis at any time as measured in public opinion polls should be the result of the existing level of approval modified by the recruitment of new supporters due to $F_{(\text{ProMilitary},t)}$ media coverage and the loss of previous supporters due to $F_{(\text{ConMilitary},t)}$ media coverage.

In mathematical terms, the model is

$$\begin{aligned}&\text{OpinSendTroop}_t = \text{OpinSendTroop}_{(t-1)}\\&+ [k_{\text{ProMilitary}}\, F_{(\text{ProMilitary},t)}]\ \text{OpinNoSendTroop}_{(t-1)}\\&- [k_{\text{ConMilitary}}\, F_{(\text{ConMilitary},t)}]\ \text{OpinSendTroop}_{(t-1)}\end{aligned}$$

where OpinSendTroop and OpinNoSendTroop represent opinion approving the US decision to send American troops and opinion disapproving the US decision to send American troops, respectively, and the *k* parameters are the persuasibility constants describing the percentage of the population recruited by the corresponding paragraphs translated into persuasive force functions. OpinSendTroop_t and OpinNoSendTroop_t add to 100% since all undecideds are excluded and the numbers renormalized.

The dependent variable in the ideodynamic model is the proportion of poll respondents who approve of sending troops into the crisis out of the total respondents who approve or disapprove of sending troops. Data were developed from polls available from the Roper Center's POLL database; polls were pulled for the span of time paralleling the collection dates for news media coverage. Unfortunately, a time series of opinion polls sufficient for modeling public opinion was not available for the Haiti crisis. For the Gulf crisis, however, nineteen poll points were found concerning approval or disapproval of sending troops to Saudi Arabia. The basic question for the

POLL database polls was, "Do you approve or disapprove of the US decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia as a defense against Iraq?" The first poll was conducted August 9 - 12, 1990; the final poll was conducted January 11-13, 1991. During this period, approval for sending troops declined 13 points from 78% to 65%, while disapproval increase 12 points from 17% to 29%.

RESULTS

The study's design allowed us to examine (1) the major problem definition and treatment recommendation frames of the crises, (2) the elite sources of these frames, and (3) the ability of differing treatment recommendation frames to predict public support for military involvement.

Media Framing

The first set of hypotheses predicted that the Gulf and Haiti crises would differ substantially in which problem definition frames were featured in media content; these predictions received some support from the content analysis. The relative presence of problem definition frames concerning the Gulf and Haiti crises is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

For the Gulf crisis, a total of 4,430 paragraphs contained one or more problem definition frames. As predicted, interest frames comprised the bulk of content the with 3,111 paragraphs or 70.2 percent of the analyzed coverage. Principle frames accounted for only 29.8 percent of analyzed coverage. For the Haiti crisis, a total of 5,828 paragraphs contained one or more problem definition frames. In contrast to the Gulf crisis, coverage was split evenly between the interests (2,933 paragraphs) and principles (2,828 paragraphs), with each accounting for roughly 50 percent of the problem definition frames. While the Haiti crisis was framed in terms of principles substantially more than the Gulf crisis, the prediction that principle frames would be the most favored frame of the Haiti crisis was not supported.

The second set of hypotheses predicted that the Gulf and Haiti crises would differ in which treatment recommendation frames were featured in media content; these predictions received strong support from the content analysis data. The relative presence of treatment recommendation frames concerning the Gulf and Haiti crises is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

A total of 15,904 paragraphs contained one or more treatment recommendation frames about the Gulf crisis. As predicted, military threat frames comprised the bulk of content with 10,988 paragraphs or 69.1 percent of the analyzed coverage. Economic threat frames and compromise frames were the next most prominent, with 10.4 percent and 11.0 percent of analyzed coverage, respectively. They were followed closely by framing the crisis in terms of avoiding the use of force, which accounted for 7.2 percent of the analyzed content. Frames that discussed the crisis in terms of lifting the embargo and not compromising were substantially less prominent. For the Haiti crisis, a total of 11,170 paragraphs contained one or more treatment recommendation frames. While military threat frames comprised the majority of content with 5,661 paragraphs or 50.7 percent of the analyzed coverage. Economic threat frames and compromise frames were nearly twice as prominent compared to the Gulf crisis, accounting for 19.4 percent and 20.3 percent of analyzed coverage, respectively. Media frames that advocated avoiding the use of force accounted for 6.0 percent of analyzed content. Lifting the embargo and not compromising were substantially less prominent

Elite Sources of Framing

The third hypothesis predicted that the visibility of U.S. elites in news coverage of foreign policy matters would differ substantially, with those most able to influence the situation receiving the most coverage. This hypothesis received strong support from the content analysis of the Haiti and Gulf crises. The results of analysis are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

During both crises, the President and members of his staff were identified as sources most often, with 3,037 paragraphs or 27.4 percent of content attributed to U.S. elites during the Gulf crises, and 3,173 paragraphs or 30.0 percent of content attributed to U.S. elites during the Haiti crises. Among traditional named sources, diplomatic officials ranked second, accounting for 20.2 percent of attributed coverage during the Gulf crisis and 13.3 percent of attributed coverage during the Haiti crisis. They were followed by military sources, who were named as sources in 13.7 percent and 12.3 percent of coverage during the Gulf and Haiti crises, respectively. Congressional sources were the least used governmental elite source, with 10.3 percent of attributions during the Gulf crisis and 7.5 percent of attributions during the Haiti crisis. UN officials were sources for approximately six percent of coverage during both crises. Notably, statements attributed to unnamed sources accounted for 22.3 percent the Gulf coverage and 15.6 percent of Haiti coverage. Coverage of the Haitian situation also often included the perspective of President Aristide and his supporters; it comprised 15.6 percent of content attributed to elite sources.

The fourth hypothesis predicted that U.S. elites would stress problem definition and treatment recommendation frames that reflect their roles in American foreign policy. This hypothesis is supported by content analysis of both crises. The crosstab between the elite sources and problem definition frames of the Gulf and Haiti crises offers a number of important insights into how political leaders differed in their definitions of the conflict (see Table 4 and 5).[4]

TABLE 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE

Overall, elite sources during the Gulf crisis favored the interest frame (65.8% of all attributions) over the principle frame (34.2%). In contrast, during the Haiti crisis, elite sources favored the principle frame (52.9% of all attributions) over interest frames (47.1%). These attributed frames closely parallel the total analyzed content for both crises (see Table 1), suggesting that media do construct their coverage by "indexing" elite opinions.

However, this is not to say that elites were unified in their presentation of these frames during the two conflicts. Interest frames were mainly issued by the President, his administration, and diplomatic officials. Together, they accounted for over 70% of sources using this frame during the Gulf crisis and nearly 65% of sources using this frame during the Haiti crisis. Further, administration officials and military officials were above average in their use of interest frames relative to other elites during both crises; they achieved indices of 109 and 111, respectively, for the Gulf crisis, and indices of 127 and 120, respectively, for the Haiti crisis. These elites did not stress principles to the same degree as other elites on average. Administration officials only achieved indices of 83 for the Gulf crisis and 76 for the Haiti crisis. Similarly, military sources achieved index values of 78 for the Gulf crisis and 82 for the Haiti crisis. These figures indicate that administration officials and military sources were approximately 20% less likely to define the conflict in terms of principles than the average across other elites.

This is in stark contrast with the framing of the conflict by members of Congress and UN officials. These sources heavily favored principles as problem definition frames. While these political elites did not account for a great deal of coverage, when they were heard in the media, they mainly discussed the crises in terms of principles. For the Gulf crisis, they achieved indices of 118 and 157, respectively. These same two sources both generated index values of 119 for the Haiti crisis. Aristide, who was included in the Haiti analysis, also favored principles over interests, yielding an index value of 128 for his use of principle frames during the crisis.

Notably, the President and diplomatic officials were fairly balanced in their discussions of the Haiti crisis; about half of media content attributed to these sources discussed the problem in terms of U.S. interest, while the other half discussed it in terms of basic principles. Both sources used principle and interest frames in nearly equal amount and garnered index values near 100 for both problem definition frames. During the Gulf crisis, these same sources were not so balanced in their overall discussion of the issues, heavily favoring interest over principles, as was typical for that conflict. However, when their framing of the crises is compared to that of other elites, it becomes apparent that they were not particularly skewed towards a particular framing. That is, their index values for interests and principles were both near 100.

TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE

The results of the crosstab between the treatment recommendation frames and elite sources are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Beginning with the totals, elite sources favored the military threat frame over all the other treatment recommendations (66.8% of all attributable frames during the Gulf crisis and 50.0% of all attributable frames during the Haiti crisis). For the Haiti crisis, economic threat frames (23.0% of attributions) and compromise frames (21.9% of attributions) also were quite popular among elites. For the Gulf crisis, compromise frames were a distant second (13.6%), followed closely by economic threats (12.8%) and avoiding force frames (6.8%). Avoiding force frames only accounted for a small amount of attributed frames (5.1%) during the Haiti crisis. Again, the content that is directly attributable to elites closely parallels the total analyzed content (see Table 2), further supporting the contention that news media construct their coverage by "indexing" elite opinions within the domain of foreign affairs. However, particular groups of elites differed substantially in terms of which frames were attributed to them in news reports.

The roles of different elites during international crisis negotiations become quite clear when considering which treatment recommendation frames they stress in news coverage. Not surprisingly, the most frequently quoted sources of military threat frames are military officials (25.3% during the Gulf crisis and 20.5% during the Haiti crisis). When a military spokesperson was quoted in reference to the Gulf crisis, 80% of the time a military threat was being invoked, yielding an index value of 118. Only 54.7% of attributions to United Nations officials were military threat frames, resulting in an index of 80 (20% below average). Similarly, when comments were attributed to a military spokesperson during the Haiti crisis, 61% of the time a military threat was used, yielding an index value of 125. About 40% of the frames attributed to diplomats, UN officials, and Aristide were military threats, generating indices that were well below average compared to other elites -- 83, 76, and 80, respectively.

A contrasting pattern exists for economic threat frames. During both crises, this frame is stressed heavily by UN officials, yielding an index of 220 for the period of the Gulf crisis and 183 for the Haiti crisis. During the Gulf crisis, UN officials were the largest sources of economic threat frames -- 21.8% of their attributions. Military spokespersons were the opposite, with only 11.8% of their attributions taking the form of economic threat frames, indexing at 55. Diplomats were 20% below average (index = 80) in their use of an economic threat frame, while Bush administration officials are nearly 20% above average (index = 119). For Haiti, economic threats were also stressed by Administration officials (index = 111), but, in contrast to the Gulf crisis, even more so by diplomats (index = 135). In comparison, this frame was not used widely by military officials (12.9% of their attributed coverage; index = 61) and members of Congress (9.1% of their attributed coverage; index = 43).

Compromise and negotiation is the job of diplomats -- the data reflects this. For the Gulf crisis, the compromise frame was most prominent among State Department officials, who accounted for 33.5% of all compromise frame attributions and generated an index of 163. Military officials and members of Congress were substantially less like to be attributed a compromise frame than other elites; the indexes indicate that they were 64% below average and 35% below average, respectively. Only those speaking on behalf of the United Nations approached diplomats in voicing compromise frames; UN sources indexed at 127. During the Haiti crisis, diplomats were the most frequent American elites source of the compromise frame, accounting for 17.0% of all attributed talk of compromise and achieving an index value of 112. However, Aristide, who was quite prominent in media coverage, dominated this category. He accounted for 27.0% of the total attributed compromise frames; when he was quoted in reference to the Haiti crisis, nearly 40% of the time a compromise frame was being invoked, yielding an index value of 167. In contrast, military spokespersons, administration officials, and members of congress were attributed this frame in less than 20% of their coverage, generating below average index values compared to other elites -- 84, 79, and 64, respectively.

Finally, recommending that the use of force be avoided was the favored frame of Congress, reflecting their role as a counterpoint to the executive. Source attributions to Congressional members indexed 27% above average for the Gulf crisis and 107% above average for the Haiti crisis. Contrasted with UN officials and diplomats -- who indexed at 54 and 85 during the Gulf crisis and 49 and 76 during the Haiti crisis, respectively -- the differences are vast. Again, this may be due to the use of military threats as a negotiations tool. Advocating that force should not be used could undermine the strong positions taken to "ripen" the conflict and bring adversaries to the bargaining table. Notably, during both the Haiti and the Gulf crises, the President and his administration, possibly in an attempt to assure the public, were 8% to 16% above average in their use of avoiding force frames when compared to other elites.

Public Opinion Prediction

To this point, our analysis has focused solely on news media coverage. We now turn to the ideodynamic model to gain greater insight into the linkage between media coverage and public support for sending troops to Saudi Arabia to defend against Iraq. As explained above, due the lack of available poll data, the parallel analysis for the Haiti crisis is not possible. Specifically, this analysis investigates whether treatment recommendation frames that support (military threats, opposition to economic sanctions, and unwillingness to compromise) and oppose (compromise, economic threats, and avoiding the use of force) a military solution to the Gulf crisis can be used to predict the public's preference for sending troops. In other words, did media treatment of the crisis contribute significantly to the decline in public support for military involvement from 78% (August 9 - 12, 1990) to 65% (January 11-13, 1991). During this same period, disapproval for sending troops increased 12 points from 17% to 29%.

The two *k* parameters of the estimated model contribute differently to the prediction of public opinion favoring a military solution. The parameter estimates (times 0.000001) for the period of analysis, along with the 95% confidence limits in parentheses, are as follows:

- $k_{\text{ProMilitary}}$ = 0.002 (0, 0.049)
- $k_{\text{ConMilitary}}$ = 0.124 (0.091, 0.159)

The model explained 80.4% of variance in public opinion in favor ~~of~~ sending troops and public opinion opposed to sending troops, with a root mean squared residual of 1.4%. We then plotted the level of public support for sending troops and not sending troops as predicted *solely from news media coverage* and modeled this prediction against actual poll results (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE

The polls indicated a general decline in public support for sending troops and a corresponding rise in opposition to sending troops. The central solid line in Figure 1 shows the prediction of public opinion based on media coverage provided a good fit with the poll data. Indeed, the time trend of public support and opposition to sending troops predicted from media coverage fell within the 95% uncertainty limits for almost all polls for the period of the analysis.

In particular, as indicated by the persuasibility constants, the ideodynamic model finds that media coverage recommending a non-military solution was a statistically significant predictor of public opinion, while media coverage recommending a military solution did not contribute to the model. This modeling suggests that, although their was much more coverage framing the conflict in terms of military action (a total of 11,358 Pro-military paragraphs versus 4,545 Con-military paragraphs), the coverage that opposed this framing had more persuasive impact on opinion.

DISCUSSION

To summarize, our findings indicate, as hypothesized, that during the Gulf crisis interests comprised the bulk of problem definition framing, while military threats dominate the treatment recommendation framing. In contrast, although interests and military threats still comprised a majority of the framing during the Haiti crisis, these perspectives on the conflict did not dominate coverage. Principle frames served as problem definitions nearly 50% of the time, while discussions of economic sanctions and compromise summed to nearly 40% of treatment recommendations. These differences suggests that elites mainly defined the Gulf crisis in terms of material interests and used this primarily to emphasize proposed military actions -- potentially constraining the range of available options in negotiations -- while elites used a wider variety of frames during the Haiti crisis -- possibly allowing more latitude in attempts to resolve the conflict.

Further, our analysis shows, consistent with the hypothesis, that elite framing of the conflict was most often attributed to the President and his administration, followed by diplomatic officials, military officials, congressional members and, lastly, UN officials. In the realm of international crisis coverage, it seems that the media rely of those at the center of foreign policy decision-making as their sources, working in concentric circles outward from the White House, to the State Department, to the Pentagon, and then finally to Capital Hill. During the Haiti crisis, Aristide also figured prominently as a source, suggesting that American media do not only rely on elites who are able to influence the situation, but also include elites who offer an unique perspective.

The research also addressed the question of whether particular elites emphasized or favored one frame over another. At the most basic level, the results indicate that media framing of the conflict closely parallels how elites, in the aggregate, choose to frame the conflict. This supports the contentions of other researchers (i.e., Bennett, 1990; Zaller, 1994) that news media construct their coverage by 'indexing' elite opinions within the domain of foreign policy. However, there are notable difference in which frames as emphasized in media coverage attributed to particular elites. During both crises, administration officials and military spokespersons focused on interests when defining the problem, while members of Congress and UN officials stressed principles. The problem definition frames attributed to the President and diplomats did not seem to stress a particular frame when compared with the average across all elites. These findings suggest that the specific role a political actor plays in the formation of foreign policy influences how they define the international crises to justify U.S. involvement.

This is further reflected in the treatment recommendation suggested by elites during these two crises. Military sources emphasized military threat frames, accounting for more of them than any other set of actors. Similarly, UN officials concentrated on economic threats, diplomatic officials emphasized compromise frames, and members of Congress stressed avoiding the use of force. The pattern that emerges suggests that political actors accent frames that fit their roles in the crisis negotiations process: the military threatens, the UN endorses sanctions, diplomats negotiate, and Congress checks and balances the President. These findings support our contention that elites use media to forward strategic conceptions of the conflict.

Further, our attempt to model poll data about approval and disapproval for sending U.S. troops to the Gulf suggests that the treatment recommendation options presented in media have important influences on domestic public opinion. The model was able to predict the decline in public support for military action in the months leading up to the Gulf War *based solely on media coverage of the crisis.* As the parameter estimates indicate, coverage favoring a non-military solution was a statistically significant predictor of opinion, while coverage favoring a military solution was not. Thus, the trend in opposition to sending troops is best explained by increasing coverage of non-military options, even though this accounted for a minority of coverage.

Overall, these findings suggest that using the frames concept to understand media coverage of international conflict resolution provides valuable insight into the dynamic role of news outlets in periods of negotiations. However, the influence of different negotiations frames on one's adversary remains unclear. Considering that dualistic role of media during negotiations -- diplomacy and publicity -- media framing may have important implications for the how one's adversary understands the conflict. However, without documentation of foreign elites' micro-level reactions to American news coverage, such assessments are not possible here. It is a weakness of this work that future research should attempt to address.

Additionally, the emphasis of this study on *frame sources* offers an avenue for further research. This research found that elites do not share or stress the same frames; therefore, what different elite sources provided as their "reading" of a particular news event may provide important insights into the controversy and struggle over an event's "meaning". Though numerous theorists of media and politics discuss the power elites have over media framing of event and issues, little research has systematically examined the sources of frames and how different elites often forward differing views of an event or issue. Clearly, examination of the elite sources of media framing would provides insight into how leaders use the media to forward particular policy agendas.

Footnotes

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[1]. This perspective also recognizes, however, that as conflicts escalate and legislative approval is required for actions or resources, congressional sources gain a greater voice.

[2]. For example, work by Mueller (1993) on the "rally around the flag effect" and Hybel (1993) on the Bush administrations focus on "power over rationality" addresses questions related to foreign policy during the Gulf War and the implications of elite actions on the decision to go to war. However, relationships between elite policy and media coverage are left without much theoretical structure. Other studies concerning U.S. foreign policy during the Gulf crisis have focused more closely on the linkages between political elites and the media, examining media impact on public approval for the president (e.g., Krosnick and Brannon, 1993), as well as public opinion in support of the war (Brody, 1994; Iyengar and Simon, 1994; Zaller, 1994). In particular, Zaller concludes that, in the aggregate, those who are most aware mirror the character of elite opinion, whether it is unified or polarized. In the case of the Gulf Crisis, he argues, elite opinion was unified and, therefore, there was heavy popular support for the war policy. Iyengar and Simon (1993) compare agenda-setting, priming, and framing as ways of explaining public opinion and find that each contributed to actually legitimizing elite opinion. In both cases, however, while the concept of framing is explored, the *actual media frames* are never detailed. In a notable exception, Fan (1991) shows that as the media framing of Saddam Hussein as evil increased so did public opinion in support of assassinating him.

[3]. Unlike a number of other computer methods, where both the input and analysis techniques are pre-set (and therefore limited) by the software search strategies, the InfoTrend system is actually a high-level programming language in which the researcher enters words, word relationships and phrases to extract meaning from the text. User-defined dictionaries are used to locate words in the text and then the machine implements a series of user-defined decision rules to extract ideas based on word relationships, not simply word counts. Another strength of the InfoTrend system is the ability to "layer" successive filters to select relevant text. Paragraphs identified as containing one set of ideas can be used as the input for a separate set of instructions to extract a second group of ideas. The researcher is able to obtain a level of detail and specificity typically associated with hand-coding, and yet is able to analyze large amounts of data which would otherwise be time or cost prohibitive. The InfoTrend program allows researchers to work through a series of inductive and deductive cycles in on-screen tests to refine the dictionaries of word relationship rules. In this way, the rules are tested paragraph by paragraph by the human coder for accuracy and contextual relevance. This interactive style of developing computer instructions allows for media content to guide the construction of the rules, rather than basing content coding on the researcher's ad hoc assumptions.

[4]. The top row provides a raw count of the number of frames, or ideas, that are attributed to that particular elite source. The second row of figures (% across) indicates what percent of any elites framing of the crisis was one of the four frames, while the third row (% down) indicates what percent of any frame originated with a particular elite. The final row is an index which represents whether the elite source was more (over 100) or less (under 100) likely to use that frame than the average across all elite sources. Totals for frames and source attributions are provided in the marginals.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1
Problem Definition Frames in Media Coverage

Frame	# of Ideas	% of Total
Gulf Crisis		
Interests	3,111	70.2
Principles	1,319	29.8
Total	4,430	100.0
Haiti Crisis		
Interests	2,933	50.3
Principles	2,895	49.7
Total	5,828	100.0

Table 2
Treatment Recommendation Frames in Media Coverage

Frame	# of Ideas	% of Total
Gulf Crisis		
Military Threat	10,988	69.1
Economic Threat	1,647	10.4
Compromise	1,749	11.0
Avoid Force	1,150	7.2
Lift Embargo	115	0.7
No Compromise	255	1.6
Total	15,904	100.0
Haiti Crisis		
Military Threat	5,661	50.7
Economic Threat	2,168	19.4
Compromise	2,273	20.3
Avoid Force	665	6.0
Lift Embargo	229	2.0
No Compromise	174	1.6
Total	11,170	100.0

Table 3
Source Attribution to U.S. Elites in Media Coverage

Source	# of Attributions	% of All Attributions
Gulf Crisis		
President Bush	1,951	17.6
Bush Administration	1,086	9.8
Military Officials	1,519	13.7
Diplomatic Officials	2,231	20.2
Congressional Members	1,137	10.3
United Nations Officials	673	6.1
Generic Officials (Not Named)	2,469	22.3
Total	11,066	100.0
Haiti Crisis		
President Clinton	1,742	16.5
Clinton Administration	1,431	13.5
Military Officials	1,301	12.3
Diplomatic Officials	1,406	13.3
Congressional Members	791	7.5
United Nations Officials	605	5.7
Aristide and supporters	1,650	15.6
Generic Officials (Not Named)	1,652	15.6
Total	10,578	100.0

Table 4
Elite Sources of Problem Definition Frames - Gulf Crisis

	Interests	Principles	Total
President Bush			
# of ideas	270	132	402
% across	67.2%	32.8%	100.0%
% down	30.0%	28.3%	29.4%
Index	102	96	
Administration			
# of ideas	139	55	194
% across	71.6%	28.4%	100.0%
% down	15.4%	11.8%	14.2%
Index	109	83	
Military			
# of ideas	113	41	154
% across	73.4%	26.6%	100.0%
% down	12.6%	8.8%	11.3%
Index	111	78	
Diplomatic			
# of ideas	242	122	364
% across	66.5%	33.5%	100.0%
% down	26.9%	26.1%	26.6%
Index	101	98	
Congressional			
# of ideas	84	57	141
% across	59.6%	40.4%	100.0%
% down	9.3%	12.2%	10.3%
Index	90	118	
United Nations			
# of ideas	52	60	112
% across	46.4%	53.6%	100.0%
% down	5.8%	12.8%	8.2%
Index	71	157	
Total			
# of ideas	900	467	1,367
% across	65.8%	34.2%	100.0%
% down	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5
Elite Sources of Problem Definition Frames - Haiti Crisis

	Interests	Principles	Total
President Clinton			
# of ideas	332	346	678
% across	49.0%	51.0%	100.0%
% down	25.6%	23.7%	24.6%
Index	104	96	
Administration			
# of ideas	313	209	522
% across	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
% down	24.2%	14.3%	19.0%
Index	127	76	
Military			
# of ideas	168	130	298
% across	56.4%	43.6%	100.0%
% down	13.0%	8.9%	10.8%
Index	120	82	
Diplomatic			
# of ideas	182	208	390
% across	46.7%	53.3%	100.0%
% down	14.0%	14.3%	14.2%
Index	99	101	
Congressional			
# of ideas	84	143	227
% across	37.0%	63.0%	100.0%
% down	6.5%	9.8%	8.2%
Index	79	119	
United Nations			
# of ideas	57	98	155
% across	36.8%	63.2%	100.0%
% down	4.4%	6.7%	5.6%
Index	78	119	
Aristide			
# of ideas	160	324	484
% across	33.1%	67.9%	100.0%
% down	12.3%	22.2%	17.6%
Index	70	128	
Total			
# of ideas	1,296	1,458	2,754
% across	47.1%	52.9%	100.0%
% down	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6
Elite Sources of Treatment Recommendation Frames - Gulf Crisis

	Military	Economic	Compromise	Avoid Force	Total
President Bush					
# of ideas	844	149	149	127	1,269
% across	66.5%	11.7%	11.7%	10.0%	100.0%
% down	21.4%	21.2%	23.8%	23.9%	21.8%
Index	98	97	109	110	
Administration					
# of ideas	438	98	82	68	686
% across	63.8%	14.3%	12.0%	9.9%	100.0%
% down	11.1%	14.0%	13.1%	12.8%	11.8%
Index	94	119	111	108	
Military					
# of ideas	998	83	48	118	1,247
% across	80.0%	6.7%	3.8%	9.5%	100.0%
% down	25.3%	11.8%	7.7%	22.2%	21.5
Index	118	55	36	103	
Diplomatic					
# of ideas	781	116	210	93	1,200
% across	65.1%	9.7%	17.5%	7.8%	100.0%
% down	19.8%	16.5%	33.5%	17.5%	20.6%
Index	96	80	163	85	
Congressional					
# of ideas	578	103	59	97	837
% across	69.1%	12.3%	7.0%	11.6%	100.0%
% down	14.6%	14.7%	9.4%	18.3%	14.4%
Index	101	102	65	127	
United Nations					
# of ideas	314	153	79	28	574
% across	54.7%	26.7%	13.8%	4.9%	100.0%
% down	7.9%	21.8%	12.6%	5.3%	9.9%
Index	80	220	127	54	
Total					
# of ideas	3,953	702	627	531	5,813
% across	68.0%	12.1%	10.8%	9.1%	100.00%
% down	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 7
Elite Sources of Treatment Recommendation Frames - Haiti Crisis

	Military	Economic	Compromise	Avoid Force	Total
President Clinton					
# of ideas	519	207	196	85	1,007
% across	51.5%	20.6%	19.5%	8.4%	100.0%
% down	19.6%	18.0%	16.1%	21.0%	18.6%
Index	105	97	87	112	
Administration					
# of ideas	427	200	150	74	851
% across	50.2%	23.5%	17.6%	8.7%	100.0%
% down	16.1%	17.4%	12.3%	18.3%	15.7%
Index	103	111	79	116	
Military					
# of ideas	542	114	167	63	886
% across	61.2%	12.9%	18.8%	7.1%	100.0%
% down	20.5%	9.9%	13.7%	15.6%	16.4%
Index	125	61	84	95	
Diplomatic					
# of ideas	335	236	207	47	825
% across	40.6%	28.6%	25.1%	5.7%	100.0%
% down	12.7%	20.5%	17.0%	11.6%	15.2%
Index	83	135	112	76	
Congressional					
# of ideas	308	46	72	78	504
% across	61.1%	9.1%	14.3%	15.5%	100.0%
% down	11.6%	4.0%	5.9%	19.3%	9.3%
Index	125	43	64	207	
United Nations					
# of ideas	172	179	95	17	463
% across	37.1%	38.7%	20.5%	3.7%	100.0%
% down	6.5%	15.6%	7.8%	4.2%	8.6%
Index	76	183	92	49	
Aristide					
# of ideas	342	168	328	40	878
% across	38.9%	19.1%	37.4%	4.6%	100.0%
% down	12.9%	14.6%	27.0%	9.9%	16.2%
Index	80	90	167	61	
Total					
# of ideas	2,645	1,150	1,215	404	5,414
% across	48.9%	21.2%	22.4%	7.5%	100.00%
% down	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Figure 1
Level of Public Support for Sending Troops to Saudi Arabia
as Predicted from News Media Coverage



Figure 2
Level of Public Opposition for Sending Troops to Saudi Arabia
as Predicted from News Media Coverage



Notes:

Survey data is taken from the Roper Center public opinion poll database for the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the US decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia as a defense against Iraq?"

The boxes in the figure indicate public opinion about sending troops; the width of the boxes corresponds to the beginning and ending dates of the surveys, and the height gives a 95 percent confidence interval.

The central solid line show the prediction of public opinion based on media coverage.

PRESS FINANCE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA

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PRESS FINANCE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA

Abstract

This study provides a detailed account of the changing structure of press finance in China and its impact on various aspects of press operation. It closely scrutinizes the role of marketization in the process of partisan press' decline and the transformation of newspapers' financial management, practitioners' income system, ownership structure, production process, and content. The emerging patterns suggest that the Chinese press is undergoing a liberalizing experience in some areas, which serve to dilute its mouthpiece function.

Press Finance and Economic Reform in China

One of the most central problems facing China's political communication involves what Chin-Chuan Lee calls "imbiguities and contradictions" arising from the relationship between continued state control and economic reform.[1] The media under the old Communist commandist system were first and foremost the transmission belts of the party line, but two decades of economic reform have served to weaken their still strong mouthpiece role.[2] Marketization of political management has progressively depoliticized the state, economics and culture, thus creating considerable room for media liberalization. Formal censorship has been made more predictable through bureaucratization,[3] and the media have undergone a process of increasing secularization.[4] China still maintains an authoritarian, arbitrary, and intrusive state, but it has had to reckon with innumerable manifest or latent functions unleashed by the market forces. The media must try to strike a balance with both sides of the political economy--the state versus the market--in order to manage, if not resolve, their paradoxical relationship. As a result, China's media have been characterized as having "commercialization without independence" or enjoying "bird-caged press freedom."[5]

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[1] Lee, Chin-Chuan, "Ambiguities and Contradictions: Issues in China's Changing Political Communication," in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.), *China's Media, Media's China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 3-22.

[2] Lee, Chin-Chuan, "Mass Media: Of China, About China," in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.), *Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism* (New York: Guilford Press, 1990), pp. 3-29.

[3] Polumbaum, Judy, "Striving for Predictability: The Bureaucratization of Media Management in China," in Lee, *China's Media, Media's China*, pp. 113-128.

[4] Dittmer, Lowell, "The Politics of Publicity in Reform China," in Lee, *China's Media, Media's China*. pp. 89-112.

[5] Chan, Joseph Man, "Commercialization Without Independence: Media Development in China," in Joseph Cheng and Maurice Brosseau (eds.), *China Review, 1993*. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994), pp. 23.1-3.20; Chen, Huailin and Chan, Joseph Man, "Bird-caged Press Freedom in China," in Joseph Cheng (ed.), *China After Deng*. (Hong Kong: City University Press, in press), pp. 23.1-23.19.

There is a growing literature that takes account of this momentous change. Huailin Chen and Yu Huang have analyzed China's "uneven development" of circulation and advertising revenues in the reform era, which favors mass-appeal newspapers in major coastal cities at the expense of party newspapers.[6] Lynn White examines the Shanghai press's organization, staff, content and constituencies in relation to the larger environment of economic reform, while Jinglu Yu explores the changing central-local relationship in China's television system.[7] Guoguang Wu and Xiaoying Liao note that the state's control of political thought is still tight, but there is an increasing level of functional differentiation within China's multilayered bureaucracies, with each segment in search of its own organ and thus comprising "many mouths" that reflect the thought of "one head."[8] Zhongdang Pan and Judy Polumbaum argue that economic reform has impacted the emerging "professional culture" of media organizations and working journalists, who constantly improvise new reporting strategies to surmount official control and attract market success.[9] Zhou He investigates how the effect of economic reform has penetrated media organizations to reshape their internal news routines, power distribution, and content.[10]

This chapter aims to systematically cull diverse economic information from voluminous Chinese publications to examine both macroscopically and microscopically how economic reform has influenced press finance, and with what implications for various aspects of press operation. We are necessarily constrained by the highly sketchy and incomplete nature of the original sources, but hope to portray a relatively coherent picture. First, we must explain some of the criteria and parameters necessary for understanding how the state controls press finance in China. Then we shall examine how the methods of press financing have been changed by marketization, and how these changes have affected the revenues of press organizations and news workers. We shall also analyze China's current trend toward press conglomeration, and finally discuss the impact of changes in press finance on press operation and content.

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[6] Chen, Huailin and Huang, Yu, "Reversal of Fortune: Uneven Development in China's Press Commercialization," in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.), *Money, Power, and Media: Communication Patterns in Cultural China.* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998). (in press)

[7] White, Lynn III, "All the News: Structure and Politics in Shanghai's Reform Media," in Lee, *Voices of China*, pp. 88-110, Yu, Jinglu, "The Structure and Function of Chinese Television, 1979-1989," in Lee, *Voices of China*, pp. 69-87.

[8] Wu, Guoguang and Liao, Xiaoying, "One Head, Many Mouths: Diversifying Press Structures in the Reform China," in Lee, *Money, Power, and Media.*

[9] Pan, Zhongdang, "Improvising for Social Change," in Lee, *Money, Power, and Media*; Polumbaum, Judy, "The Tribulations of China's Journalists After a Decade of Reform," in Lee, *Voices of China*, pp. 33-68.

[10] He, Zhou, "Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug of War: A Political-Economic Analysis of the *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily*," in Lee, *Money, Power, and Media.*

Administrative Rank, Professional Grade, and Press Finance

There are some background parameters that should be understood. In China commandist political and economic system, rank always constitutes a paramount determinant of occupational status and reward, although results of economic reform have somehow diluted this established rule. Media organizations, like any institutions, are absorbed into the national administrative rank system which consists of the central level, the provincial or ministerial level, the district or bureau (*ju*) level, the county (equivalent of *chu*) level, as well as the township (equivalent of *gu*) level. Each newspaper, at the time of inauguration, is assigned a rank, usually one level below its sponsoring or supervising body. Thus, a central-level organ (such as the *People Daily*) commands the ministerial rank, whereas the provincial-level or ministerial-level papers (such as the *Henan Daily* or the *Chinese Petroleum Daily*) are accorded the

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district/bureau rank.

In addition, China divides the nature of state-owned units into three types--state administrative units, non-profit business units (*shiye*), and profitable enterprises (*qiye*)--that stand in different political and economic relationships to the state in terms of privileges and obligations. Mass media do not qualify themselves as part of the established administrative units or government agencies of the state system which receive guaranteed funding. Nor are the media seen as profitable (*qiye*) organizations free to pursue their own interests in the market. They are treated as non-profit units (*shiye*) whose legal and financial status is akin to various cultural, educational, sports, science and health institutions. The media are thus placed in the dilemma of not being legally entitled to receive state subsidies and yet not being autonomous to pursue commercial profits. In view of the media's centrality in China ideological and propaganda system, however, their actual dependence on state subsidies had long been assumed.

With the progress of economic reform, the state found it imperative to shed part of its mammoth financial obligations, urging all media to achieve financial self-reliance and even taking measures to curtail traditional aid to them. As ideologically vital organizations they continue to be subjected to stringent state supervision. In order to lessen the state's financial burden, exceptions have also been made to allow the supposedly non-profit (*shiye*) media organizations to operate as if they were profit-making (*qiye*) organizations.[11] It is hoped that the media will continue to serve the state propaganda aims but ultimately with the money they themselves make. Many media outlets have found it difficult to reach this financial goal.

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[11] Huang, Xinqiang, "Characteristics of the Trial Guideline Governing Non-profit Organizations' Accounting," *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, February 11-12, 1998, (in Chinese).

The state, as the sole owner of the press, reserves the right to decide which newspaper will follow which mode of financial operation: fully subsidized, partially subsidized, or unsubsidized. Until recently, most newspapers in the nation have been fully or partially subsidized by the state. Specifically, most of the internally circulated newspapers that are published by industries, enterprises, colleges and universities do not have separate or stable sources of revenues; their expenses are fully budgeted in the unit's overall plan and any unspent money is returned to state coffers. The majority of the publicly available newspapers belong to the second mode of operation: partial state subsidies. While they derive part of the revenues from circulation and advertising, the amount is insufficient to defray operating expenses and salaries, thus requiring the state budget to cover the deficit. Alternatively, they may pay operating costs and salaries out of state funds and apply self-generating revenues to balance the difference. Third, there are increasing numbers of profitable newspapers permitted to be run entirely on their own revenues without state subsidies, even though their revenue procurement and payment must still observe state regulations.

The Decline of the Party Press

At the first brush, the impact of changes in press finance can be broadly observed in the rise and fall of newspaper circulation from 1986 to 1996, as summarized in Table 1. During the decade, the number of dailies, defined as those publishing at least four times a week, rose faster than their total circulation; this suggests that there are new winners and losers. While the number of dailies gained by two and a half times (from 239 to 621), the total circulation only grew moderately (from 50 million to 56.3 million).[12] One of the most notable consequences of economic reform in China has been a steady erosion of the party press and the corresponding rise in popularity of the mass-appeal press.

Patterned after the old Soviet system, these newspapers are functionally and organizationally classified into five types to form an interwoven web of targeted and overlapping readership, with profound implications for their financial control, social influence, and editorial content.[13] First and foremost is the party organ. The central committee of the Chinese Communist Party controls the *People Daily*, while each of the provincial-level party committees controls an organ usually named after the province (for example, the *Henan Daily*). The party press nearly doubled from 180 to 345 but lost ground in its total circulation. The decline in its actual circulation figures (from 25.7 million to 22.9 million) is, however, not as dramatic as the drop in its share of national newspaper circulation (from 51.3% to 40.6%).

The second group of newspapers, called the "target press," are published by official or semi-official organizations to cater to specialized readers of various occupational backgrounds or socioeconomic interests. For example, the Young Communist League publishes the *Chinese Youth Daily*, the National Federation of Workers owns the *Workers Daily*, and the Physical Education and Sports Commission under the State Council issues its own *Chinese Sports Daily*. From 1986 to 1996, the target press grew slightly in number (from 17 to 41) but declined substantially in circulation (from 12.7 million to 7.9 million). There was also a sharp decrease in its share of national newspaper circulation (from 25.5% to 14%).

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[12] Currencies expressed in this chapter are all in Renminbi (RMB).

[13] Liu, Alan P. L., *Communication and National Integration in Communist China*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975).

The third group is the enterprise/industry press published either by government departments (such as the *Chinese Petroleum Daily*) or by large state enterprises (such as the *Baosan Steel Daily*). This press seems to have scored significant gains both in number (from 10 to 113) and circulation (from .6 million to 84.7 million). It accounted for 15% of national newspaper circulation in 1996, compared with the negligible 1.2% a decade before. But such statistics are misleading, for this internally circulated press exerts little social influence and appears to be published at a loss. In fact, the central government has been seeking to bring this press under control through forced closure of many outlets.[14]

The mass press--comprising the evening press, the municipal press, and the general-content press with more than 50% of private subscription (vis-à-vis state subscription)--has gained in popularity and advertising revenues. In 1996, even though the number of the mass press was small (110), its circulation had risen so sharply as to account for 23.4% of the nation's total newspaper circulation. In the same year, the nation four largest newspaper advertisers were all mass-appeal newspapers; moreover, 39 mass-appeal newspapers produced a billing of $3.3 billion, or 42% of the national total.[15] The mass-appeal papers have distanced themselves financially from the once most prestigious party papers in a glaring way, to the extent that some of the party papers have produced their own mass-appeal imitates.

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[14] Newspaper and Publication Bureau, State Council, *Updated Documents Regarding Work on Newspaper and Publication*. (Beijing: Chinese Society Press, 1997) p. D-3, (in Chinese).

[15] Damen Information Company, *Monitoring Report of the Chinese Newspaper Advertising, 1996*. Guangzhou, 1997, (in Chinese).

The fifth type is a variety of digests, as represented by the *Reference News* that prints selections from the foreign press presumably for internal circulation among cadres and intellectuals. The circulation of the once immensely popular *Reference News* has dropped sharply as China's press has become more informative in the reform decades.

Severance of State Subsidies

Press subsidies, which have been in effect since 1949, started to take a toll on the state treasury in the mid-1980s. Until then, the state had provided almost guaranteed revenues to the press through subscriptions and direct financial assistance. As part of the centrally planned economy, the government annually formulated a detailed budget plan regarding how the newspaper should expend the money it received. The newspaper could use the state money to pay for wages and fringe benefits (such as housing and medical care), to defray any deficit in operating costs (including newsprint, ink, and energy), or to acquire and maintain fixed assets (such as office building and printing facilities). If the state approved the newspaper's request for hiring additional people, the associated cost would be incorporated into the budget. Since individual papers had no authority to appropriate the funds as they saw fit, they did not have any incentive to cultivate their own revenues.

The state set out, in 1978, to grant selected papers a measure of financial autonomy by allowing them to operate on a profit-seeking basis.[16] But at that time this new experiment was too small in scale and China's market still too weak to structurally alter the basic press dependence on state subsidies. As the press was hard hit by a series of huge rises in newsprint costs and wages from 1986 to 1988, the state prohibited the press from raising its price. Forced to help alleviate the press's financial hardship, the state mandated that the central government should subsidize the central-level newspapers, and that the provincial-level newspapers could ask their local governments for compensation, but that the lower-level newspapers had to solve their own problems. Many chief editors of the provincial-level newspapers complained aloud that they had to divide their time to "beg for money" because none of their supervising agencies seemed willing to take responsibility for press survival--including its capital, facilities, management and development.[17] The state was obviously feeling overburdened.

In 1992, the Newspaper and Publication Bureau under the State Council announced a new policy--generally branded as a policy to "stop breast-feeding"--which amounted to a declaration of severing press subsidies.[18] The policy called for all newspapers but a handful of chief organs (such as the *People's Daily*, the *Economic Daily* and the party's leading theoretical magazine, *Qiushi*) to achieve financial self-reliance by 1994. Deputy Minister of Propaganda, Xu Guangcun, even expressed the hope that the *People's Daily* and *Qiushi* would someday stand on their feet financially.[19] Meanwhile, he designated the task of increasing these two publications' circulation as "the most important assignment" and also the task of boosting the circulation of the *Guangming Daily*, the *Economic Daily*, and the *Liberation Army Daily* as an "important

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[16] Tu, Zhongjun, *Newspaper Management*. (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1994), pp. 30-31, (in Chinese).

[17] Department of Propaganda, "Summary of National Conference Attended by Chief Editors of Provincial Papers" (Oct. 22, 1986), in Newspaper and Publication Bureau, State Council, (ed.) *Updated Documents Regarding Work on Newspaper and Publication*. (Beijing: Chinese Book Press, 1988) pp. 52-61, (in Chinese).

[18] Liang, Heng, "On Newspapers Entering into the Market," *Journalist Monthly*, No. 12, 1992, pp. 10-13, (in Chinese).

[19] Xu, Guangcun, "Correctly Recognize and Handle Problems of Newspaper Management," *Chinese Newspapers and Magazines Monthly*, No. 6, 1997, pp. 4-8, (in Chinese).

assignment."[20] By the same token, Hebei's provincial authorities decreed that unless government units subscribe to the *People's Daily*, *Qiushi*, and the *Hebei Daily*, they would not be labeled as "vanguard party units."[21]

Notwithstanding the state's intention, only an estimated one-third of the press in China were financially self-reliant by 1997. Most of the central-level papers and some of the major provincial-level newspapers were said to be self-supporting.[22] The whole picture is, however, by no means clear. In Shanghai, there were 51 financially autonomous newspapers, yet 14 outlets were still partially subsidized and 19 others fully subsidized. In the impoverished interior provinces, the newspapers could generate only a tiny trickle of revenues, and the outside income contributed only 1% to 3% to their total revenues in 1996.[23] Of Anhui's 39 provincial papers, only seven were reportedly self-supporting.[24] The 40 publicly circulated newspapers in Guizhou province--whose circulation (400,000 copies combined) and advertising revenues ($60 million, or almost one-tenth of *Xinmin Evening News*'s $570 million) were very small--would have been bankrupt if there had not been a flow of state funds.[25]

As a way of encouraging papers to cultivate their own revenues, the state has also issued permissions for them to retain a certain proportion of their profits. The money can be used for improving the employee's medical care, upgrading newspaper equipment, and rewarding good performance. The state, however, reserves the final authority to decide on how big a proportion of profits is to be retained and in what ways the money should be spent.[26] In contrast to the declining and greatly disadvantaged party press, a handful of the mass-appeal newspapers, such as the *Xinmin Evening Daily* in Shanghai and the *Yangcheng Evening Daily* in Guangzhou, have amassed huge amounts of resources at their disposal. In exchange for greater financial autonomy, these newspapers have opted to pay higher taxes to the state, assessed at a rate (over 30%) that normally applies to profitable business enterprises.

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[20] See *News and Publication Press*, September 2, 1997. Also mentioned for special attention were the *Fortnight* magazine, the *Outlook* magazine, the *Reference News*, the *Technology Daily*, the *Legal Daily*, the *Chinese Youth Daily*, the *Worker's Daily*, the *Farmer's Daily*, and the *Chinese Women Daily*.

[21] *News and Publication Press*, September 23, 1997.

[22] Song, Jianwu, "On the Theory and Practice of the Operation in Our Country's Press Economic Marketization," *News Front*, No. 7, 1997, pp. 36-38, (in Chinese).

[23] Zhu, Benzhuo (1997), "The Path to Press Economic Development in Central and Western China," *News Front*, No. 6, 1997, pp. 33-34, (in Chinese).

[24] Wang, Zhongyi, "A Survey Report on the Press's Financial Conditions in the Anhui Province", *News and Communication Research*, No. 2, 1996, pp. 25-29, (in Chinese).

[25] Tang, Xujun, "Whither the Chinese Press?" *Modern Advertising*, No. 3, 1997, pp. 65-67, (in Chinese).

Impact on Newspaper Workers' Income

In the 1980s a newspaper worker remuneration consisted of regular wages, fringe benefits, and bonuses. Wages, being most significant, were paid uniformly according to the worker's professional grade, regardless of the paper administrative rank. There exist four professional grades within a newspaper organization: senior reporters/editors (equivalent to full professors), head reporters/editors (equivalent to associate professors), reporters/editors, and assistant reporters/editors. In 1985, the standard wages for a senior reporter/editor ranged from $220 to $350 monthly, and an assistant reporter/editor was paid between $70 and $105, with a gap of roughly three times between them (Table 2, Part I).

Even the distribution of various professional grades within a newspaper organization is centrally planned and strictly controlled through the setting of quotas, with preference given to newspapers of a higher administrative rank (Table 2, Part II). The central-level *People's Daily* is authorized to employ up to 5% of its editorial personnel as senior reporters/editors and 25% as head reporters/editors; the corresponding quotas for the provincial-level *Liberation Daily* decline to 2% and 18%. The district-level newspaper is permitted to have no more than 15% as head reporters/editors (but no senior reporters/editors), whereas the county-level newspaper can only employ junior staffers. In the 1980s, the journalist's professional grade was far more consequential than the paper's administrative rank in deciding the amount of wages, because a reporter of the same grade was paid at a fixed scale whether working for the *People's Daily* or the lower-ranking *Shanghai Youth Daily*. The narrow salary range within the same professional grade was due to the small allowances made for the individual's working years and the location of his residence where the cost of living differed. Shanghai and Qinghai led the nation in the cost of living on a nine-point scale; Sichuan and Henan ranked among the lowest, with Beijing in between.

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[26] Department of Propaganda of The Chinese Communist Party, et al., *Handbook of Journalistic Regulations and Policies*. (Beijing: Learning Press, 1992), pp. 226-229, (in Chinese).

Besides the meager basic wages, the Big State took it upon itself to look after media workers' mundane daily lives through provision of fringe benefits, especially those of housing and medical care. The cost of fringe benefits was borne by the local government where the newspaper was located or by the government department that owned the newspaper. Theoretically, the Shanghai Municipal Government should have paid for the fringe benefits of the *Liberation Daily* staff, and the Shanghai Young Communist League was obliged to look after the *Shanghai Youth Daily* employees. Besides housing and medical care, the government-paid fringe benefits also covered--in the eyes of outsiders--a shockingly detailed and encompassing menu of programs, including anything from cost-of-living adjustments and single-child allowances, to newspaper subscriptions and personal hygiene (for getting a bath and haircut). As forbidding as this general welfare policy might seem, however, the absolute sum of money involved was relatively minor. By the 1985 standard, each person received $2 each month for newspaper subscriptions and another $2 to meet the needs of personal hygiene.

A set of processes was involved in transferring housing benefits from higher-level bureaucracies to the newspaper organization. For example, the Shanghai Municipal Government might first build blocks of apartments and then distribute them to various systems (*xitong*) under its supervision, one of these being the news and propaganda system. Upon receiving its allocated share from the news and propaganda system, the *Liberation Daily* further assigned these apartments to qualified employees based presumably on professional grade and actual need--if not on favoritism, graft, and other extraneous considerations. Since the mid-1980s some profitable newspapers have lessened their state dependence by either building apartments on a piece of government land or contributing toward the construction cost.

Economic reform has substantially eroded, even reversed, the significance of administrative rank as a determinant of the newspaper's resources. The amount of resources that provincial papers could command from state agencies used to be a target of envy by municipal or district papers, but the cessation of state subsidies has turned previous advantages into unexpected disadvantages. Plagued by the diseconomy of their staff size, many provincial newspapers are facing a formidable task of having to fulfill their long-standing obligation in providing adequate housing accommodations to a large army of active workers and retired staff. Municipal or district newspapers are neither as negatively impacted by the drastic reduction in state budget nor as burdened by historical legacy as their higher-ranking provincial counterparts. On the contrary, these lower-ranking outlets have been able to lure talents away from provincial papers with higher pay and better housing conditions.[27]

Bonuses were introduced in the mid-1980s to constitute the third component of the media worker's income. Though originally set up to encourage the supposedly non-profit press outlets to generate their own revenues, bonuses came to be distributed equally within the press organization without reference to the journalist's professional grade or work performance. The bonus averaged less than 10% and was in any case limited to 25% of one's wages. Otherwise, the state could tax the media outlets for any excess amount so exorbitantly as to make dispensing it infeasible--except for such highly lucrative outlets as Shanghai Television.

Entering into the 1990s as the remunerative structure underwent major transformation, a newspaper ability to produce revenues has gradually come to replace the journalist's professional grade as a major determinant of individual income. A junior reporter in a profitable paper often makes more money than a senior reporter in an unprofitable paper. In 1993, the government implemented a nation-wide wages reform, allowing the media to retain a certain amount of profits in direct proportion to their income-producing abilities. As is evident in Table 2 (Part II), the state-guaranteed basic wages stayed virtually unchanged from 1985 to 1994. In 1994, a senior reporter made $165 to $670, only marginally higher than the $70-$350 range in 1985.[28] With inflation averaging 10.5% annually, journalists' real income declined considerably.

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[27] Li, Junchang, "The Causes of Underdevelopment of the Provincial Party Press and its Strategies," *Chinese Journalist*, No. 7, 1997, pp. 21-22, (in Chinese).

Under the new wages structure, the newspaper has continued to provide a fixed amount of "basic wages" to guarantee minimum payment. But the bonus has been regularized as "flexible wages" and distributed on the basis of merit. The amount of flexible wages is tied to both the newspaper's revenue-generating ability and the individual worker's performance. Specifically, fully subsidized papers, such as the internally circulated enterprise/industry and university press, could apply 60% of the allocated money to pay for fixed wages yet reserve 30% as flexible wages. As previously noted, the majority of newspapers in China are still partially dependent on the state to cover deficit differences between operating costs and the revenues they generate. For them, the flexible wages could be raised to 40%.[29] The financially independent newspapers were, of course, given even greater autonomy. This policy has prompted papers to create a wide variety of incentive items as part of their flexible wages—"story fees," "editing fees," "on-duty fees" and "good stories" awards--but the amount of which usually does not exceed the basic wages. In a financially distressed newspaper, flexible wages are likely to be small, only 20% to 30% of the basic wages.

In this complex and untidy wages system which evolved in a patchwork fashion, the newspaper not only pays fixed wages and flexible wages (bonuses of the 1980s) but also creates a new pool of money as cash awards. These newly created cash awards also depend on the newspaper's revenue-producing ability, in favor of the advertising-rich and financially autonomous outlets. Even partially subsidized outlets can negotiate with the state on a case-by-case basis to dispense cash awards as a mechanism to stimulate their revenue-producing efforts. The generously endowed *Xinmin Evening Daily* can confer on its most deserving worker a cash award which is three to five times as big as the total amount of basic wages and flexible wages combined, not to speak of the paper's ability to provide better housing conditions at a cheap rate.

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[28] Newspaper and Publication Bureau, State Council, *Selected Work in Newspaper and Publication.* (Beijing: Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 504-515, (in Chinese).
[29] Ibid.

Different ratios between fixed wages, flexible wages, and cash awards have widened the gaps in income and presumably morale levels among employees within and across various press units. In financially thriving newspapers, basic wages are unimportant relative to flexible wages and cash awards, so one's personal performance has outweighed professional grade as a decisive factor of income. But in financially difficult outlets, flexible wages and cash awards are likely to be small, making the journalist professional grade still a primary consideration of one's main source of income: basic wages. Symbolic of this paradox that would have been seen as heinous in the 1980s is the fact that a *Xinmin Evening Daily* reporter makes about as much money as the *People's Daily's* editor-in-chief. This has led Zhu Xinmin, the *People's Daily* general secretary, to openly decry that only with a strengthened financial position can the party organ retain its requisite talents and prevent further erosion of its traditional status and dignity.[30]

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[30] Zhu, Xinmin, "To Manage the *People's Daily* Better," *News and Publications Press*, April 8, 1997, (in Chinese).

Marketization and the Structure of Press Finance

In 1988, the Newspaper and Publication Bureau authorized newspapers to undertake media-related businesses such as printing, advertising, and photographic services.[31] Under intense pressure to generate outside income amidst gradually relaxed government control, newspapers have one by one ventured into not only media-related businesses but also other activities--real estate, hotels, and restaurants--totally unrelated to media operation. This national craze for striking instant prosperity has, however, produced more losers than winners across the nation.[32] The Chinese press circle is filled with stories that tell of how many and which media outlets have suffered financial debacles due to inexperience, policy errors, mismanagement, or inadequate capital. For example, half of the *Henan Daily*'s ventures have reportedly failed, and many other non-coastal papers have similarly suffered.[33] In contrast, the *Xinmin Evening Daily* boasts of its multifaceted business operations, including a $450 million modern printing center and a variety of information, trading, and advertising companies, in addition to a restaurant and a real estate company.[34] Other profitable papers in the coastal provinces, especially in the cities of Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Beijing, have been closely following suit. Many of them have typically imported sophisticated printing facilities and built expensive office complexes.[35] But on a national scale, the number and proportion of such profitable papers remain rather small.

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[31] Newspaper and Publication Bureau, *Handbook of Journalistic Regulations and Policies*. (Beijing: Chinese Books Press, 1994), pp. 233-234, (in Chinese).

[32] Song, "On the Theory and Practice of the Operation in Our Country's Press Economic Marketization".

[33] Zhu, "The Path to Press Economic Development in Central and Western China".

[34] *Chinese Newspapers and Magazines Monthly*, , 1997, pp. 14-15.

[35] For example, the *Yunnan Daily* invested $100 million to build a 28-storey office complex and another $20 million to import printing facilities from Germany, and the *Dazhong Daily* built a 32-storey office complex and imported high-speed color printers worth $65 million (see *Chinese Journalist*, No. 1, 1998, pp. 8-9). In addition, the *Shenyang Daily* also built a 25-storey office complex at a cost of $150 million (*News and Publication Press*, October 23, 1997).

The most important sources of self-produced income consist of circulation and advertising revenues. But in China, newspaper subscriptions are for the most part approved and paid by government units and thus should be seen as an essential ingredient of state subsidies. As a unique phenomenon probably not to be found elsewhere, China's government units at various levels reserve a sum of special funds exclusively for the purpose of subscribing to a host of primarily party newspapers in their offices. A common cartoon caricatured China's "office culture" as having people sit around and read newspapers all day long while smoking a cigarette and sipping a hot cup of tea on the side. Across China, for every private subscription, there were 19 state subscriptions. Without the state backing, many newspapers would not have survived.

Regarded as vital to the state's ideological functions, most central-level and provincial-level newspapers enjoyed a massive and taken-for-granted dependence on state subsidies in the 1980s, whether in the form of press subscriptions or direct financial assistance. Table 3 shows that in 1985, state subscription accounted for a lion share of revenues (67%, or $78.5 million) for the four central-level newspapers where the data were available. Specifically, state subscription's contribution to the revenue structure ranged from 54% for the intellectual-oriented *Guangming Daily*, 61% for the *Economic Daily*, 70% for the *Worker's Daily*, to 77% for the *Chinese Youth Daily*. For them, state subscription and direct assistance accounted for anywhere between six to almost nine dollars in ten. Meanwhile, revenues accrued from advertising were only beginning to play a weightier role, especially for the *Economic*

Daily (23%) and the *Guangming Daily* (19%).

Next, Table 4 sums up the revenue profile of 8 major provincial-level newspapers in 1986 where the data were available and which were supposedly representative of the general pattern. State subsidies, especially in the form of newspaper subscriptions, remained dominant, accounting for 37% to 71% of individual paper's revenues and 53% of the group revenues. Only Shanghai's *Wenhui Bao* and *Liberation Daily* managed to attract 15% private subscribers; 95% of the subscriptions to the other six papers came from the state. Despite individual variations, this group market dependence on advertising and outside businesses seemed higher than the central-level newspapers. Notably, the *Nanfang Daily* in Guangzhou derived 40% of its revenues from such outside businesses as providing advertising, circulation, printing and information services; it also owns factory plants, real estate properties and eight other different companies.[36]

Similarly, Table 5 shows the revenue profile of 18 selected district- or municipal-level newspapers in 1987 for which the data were available. They are scattered in diverse parts of the country and thus believed to typify the general pattern. Members of this group possessed substantially smaller revenues than those of the central-level or provincial-level counterparts. Private subscription was minimum. Direct state assistance for this group stood at 11%. The role of state subscription in the revenue structure was significant (22%) for this group, but even more dominant for the central-level newspapers (67.7%) and the provincial-level newspapers (50%). Despite internal differences, these district/municipal newspapers accrued much of their income from outside businesses (43%) and advertising (24%). Many are still operating in deficit, but some are competitive with provincial papers.[37]

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[36] Zhao, Cunxiao, "To Welcome the New Era in the Age of Competition," *Chinese Journalist*, No. 1, 1998, pp. 4-5, (in Chinese).

Profiting from vigorous market reform, the Chinese press has been shifting its revenue base. In the early 1980s, newspaper advertising was virtually insignificant as state subscriptions were of utmost importance. Nationally, as Table 6 shows, the rates of growth in both newspaper circulation and advertising revenues from 1986 to 1996 surpassed those of the national gross product (GNP) several times. The annual growth rates--especially from 1992 to 1994--were equally impressive on both counts. In terms of percentage growth, advertising (31 times) was even more spectacular than circulation (10 times) over the decade. In 1986, newspaper advertising revenues totaled $.9 billion, more than three times larger than total advertising revenues ($.25 billion). The gap has been narrowed, and by 1996 total advertising billings ($7.77 billion) were closely behind total circulation revenues ($8.12 billion). It should be noted, however, that given China's continental size, both its total advertising revenues and its newspaper advertising revenues are still very small, only slightly above the levels of Hong Kong but below those of Taiwan, and thus leaving much room for future growth. Dependence on advertising revenues is expected to intensify as the state reduces its subsidies, including newspaper subscriptions. It goes without saying that both advertising and circulation revenues have never been equitably shared, undoubtedly favoring the mass-appeal press.

Unfortunately, there are no corresponding data in the 1990s for these three groups of newspapers to make historical comparisons. Table 7 shows, however, that the decade from 1986 to 1996 saw circulation figures of selected central-level and provincial-level newspapers more than quadrupled. During the same period, their combined advertising revenues grew 19 times, averaging 34% per year. Further scrutiny reveals that the eight provincial papers have surpassed the four central papers in terms of the rate, if not the size, of growth in circulation and advertising. Advertising revenues were only 29% of circulation revenues in 1986 but surged to be as large as 133% of the latter a decade later. The size and rate of growth in advertising for the *Liberation Daily* (with a ratio of 3.16), the *Wenhui Bao* (1.65) and the *Nanfang Daily* (2.13) have been particularly amazing. This trend is continuing in full swing.

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[37] Li, "The Causes of Underdevelopment of the Provincial Party Press and its Strategies".

The media worker's earnings increasingly hinge on the newspaper ability to generate advertising proceeds, which, as previously stated, are directly related to the amount of "flexible wages" and cash awards that the newspaper can afford to provide. This revenue-producing ability is further influenced by the ideological versus business nature of the newspaper and the operating environment it faces. In the absence of more broad-ranging data, Table 8 presents an illuminating case of the medium-sized *Labor Daily* in Shanghai. This paper's advertising revenues rose almost geometrically from $560,000 in 1991 to $22 million in 1996--representing a 39-fold increase over five years, doubling every year.[38] Meanwhile, there was a vast increase in the paper's total assets from $11 million to $50 million. The average worker's monthly income increased 56% per year, climbing from $313 to $2,980 in five years. It is clear that fixed wages became less significant as flexible wages and cash awards became more significant. In 1991, flexible wages and cash awards constituted only 18% of the worker's monthly income, but five years later the figure rose sharply to 67%.

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[38] However impressive, the $22 million figure is still dwarfed by two other Shanghai papers: the *Xinmin Evening Daily* ($570 million) and the *Liberation Daily* ($225 million).

To appreciate the impact of regional differences in the level of economic development, Table 8 compares media workers' annual earnings in 1996 of six selected newspapers located in Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, and Shaanxi Province. Shanghai ranked the highest in earnings, followed by Jiangsu as a far distant second, with Shaanxi at the bottom. In each of these locations, the evening mass papers invariably far outstripped the party papers--despite the latter's political significance--in terms of advertising revenues and income levels. To strengthen its position, the *Shaanxi Daily* invested $20 million to upgrade its working environment and even took a $30 million loan to import printing facilities in 1996,[39] but whether this will be sufficient to create an competitive advantage remains dubious. Furthermore, Table 9 shows that in Shanghai, the *Xinmin Evening Daily* registered a coveted advertising revenue of $570 million in 1996, more than doubling the *Liberation Daily*'s $225 million. Likewise, each of the party organs in Jiangsu and Shaanxi reported dismal advertising revenues that figured less than 5% of the *Xinmin Evening Daily* .[40] An average reporter in the *Xinmin Evening Daily* made $57,000, almost matching the earning power of the *Liberation Daily*'s chief editor ($60,000) and exceeding that of a comparable reporter in the *Xian Evening Daily* ($20,000) and the *Shaanxi Daily* ($12,000) by three to five times.

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[39] *Chinese Journalist*, No. 1, 1998, pp. 7-8.

[40] For a different comparison, 88 newspapers in Henan province only had a combined advertising income of $163 million in 1996 (Zhu, "The Path to Press Economic Development"), or less than one-third of *Xinmin Evening Daily*'s.

When the *People's Daily* founded its East China edition in Shanghai in 1994, according to our informants, the paper attempted to recruit some reporters and editors from the *Xinmin Evening Daily*, but to no avail. The editor-in-chief of the *Xinmin Evening Daily* consented to the party organ's request, but found none of his staff willing to leave. Even though the *People's Daily* carries a badge of prestige and authority in China's ideological hierarchy, *Xinmin Evening Daily*'s higher pay and less austere thought control proved more effective in retaining talents. Meanwhile, financial capacity has enabled the *Xinmin Evening Daily* to set higher sights in staff recruitment. Our informants disclose that only department heads of peer institutions and national award-winning reporters could hope to enter the Shanghai paper as a regular reporter or editor. Horizontal movement between different media organizations has been difficult in China, but the resource-rich outlets are beginning to enjoy an advantage in recruitment and retention.

Impact on Press Ownership

As Ithiel de sola Pool once aptly pointed out, probably no other regimes were more conscious of the central importance of propaganda and thus paid more attention to control of the media than those of China.[41] This remark is largely still valid. China has transformed its economy from a commandist system into a partially market-oriented system that encourages setting up private enterprises and establishing joint ventures with foreign interests. Market reform has brought about considerable expansion in the diversity and abundance of media genres and content in politically less sensitive areas.[42] However, under no circumstances would private interests, domestic or foreign, be allowed to invest in the state ideological apparatuses of the media. The media are strictly state-owned in China.

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[41] Pool, Ithiel de sola, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Ithiel de sola Pool and Wilbur Schramm, (eds.), *Handbook of Communication*. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973).

One of the most intriguing and perplexing developments has been a recent trend toward press conglomeration in Communist China. As it was difficult to secure state approval for adding a new publication in the market, many "official" newspapers began in the mid-1980s to put out editorially soft "companion" publications or supplements disguised in a variety of names, such as "weekend editions," as a way to create extra income. Hardline propaganda officials repeatedly attacked the alleged political and social ill-effects of the fact that many large-sized papers (*da bao*), which had been losing readers, tried to support themselves by publishing small-sized papers (*xiao bao*, or tabloids) which appealed to readers with the dubious content of accidents, gossip, and trivia. In the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the state sternly ordered that all "companion" publications--except a few of those controlled by major party organs--be closed down.

The Communist Party had long been fiercely hostile to press conglomeration in the Western countries, criticizing it as a manifestation of strategically controlling public opinion on behalf of the oppressive capitalist class. Therefore it seemed to symbolize a peculiarly radical reversal of its earlier policy and deep-rooted attitude when the Newspaper and Publication Bureau approved the *Guangzhou Daily* in 1996 to develop itself as China's first press group. To be approved in 1998 are 10 more newspapers, including the *Nanfang Daily*, the *Yangcheng Evening Daily*, and the *Shenzhen Daily*. It should be noted that the formation of press conglomeration in China is strictly engineered by the state, revolving around a group of "core" party organs, which serve as umbrella organizations to incorporate a multitude of auxiliary newspapers and magazines designed for various specialized areas of interest.

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[42] Lee, "Mass Media: Of China, About China;" White, "All the News: Structure and Politics in Shanghai's Reform Media;" He, "Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug of War;" Pan, "Improvising for Social

To illustrate, the *People's Daily* publishes five newspapers (including its domestic and overseas editions, the *Market*, *Global Digest*, and *Caricature and Humor*) and six magazines (*News Front*, *Earth*, *Chinese Economic Express*, *Chinese Product Quality Bulletin*, *People's Forum*, and *Current Thought*). In addition, the *Liberation Daily* owns four newspapers and two magazines; the *Nanfang Daily* has six newspapers and one magazine; and the *Economic Daily* publishes four newspapers and five magazines. Other potential conglomerates include the *Zhejiang Daily* (five newspapers and two magazines), the *Yunnan Daily* (four newspapers and one magazine), the *Dazhong Daily* (four newspapers and two magazines), the *Fujian Daily* (five newspapers and one magazine), and the *Shaanxi Daily* (five newspapers and three magazines). The names of these auxiliary publications are largely revealing of social need and market demand. The subjects they cover range from arts and novels through farming, fashion, birds and flowers, to English learning, public relations, and even information about Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Official rhetoric justifies press conglomeration as a measure to transform the Chinese press from "a large quantity" to "high quality" and from crudeness to a state of

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Change."

sophistication marked by being capital-intensive.[43] The real reasons are, of course, much more complex. The state seeks to reincorporate the core and wealthy outlets into the state system and then shift part of its own financial responsibility by asking them to subsidize publications that are considered socially important but financially unprofitable. It is also hoped that with their rich professional experience and financial strength, these core outlets will crowd out or take over a chaotic array of "small papers" that have repeatedly defied state orders. The "core" newspapers, on the other hand, hope to promote the speed and scope of capital accumulation and, furthermore, to profit themselves from takeover and merger. The *Xinmin Evening Daily* infused a sum of capital into two financially failing publications--a sports paper and a Chinese chess monthly, which it had taken over from the Shanghai Municipal Government's Sports Commission--and quickly turned them into profitable operations. In addition, many ore" papers may follow the example set by the *Guangzhou Daily*, which reportedly took advantage of the opportunity in attaching conditions of conglomeration to bargaining with the state for preferential treatment in taxes.

So far, the Chinese authorities seem to have found in press conglomeration an excessively simplistic and romantic solution to many difficult choices that must be faced sooner or later between the state's maintaining political control and its unloading financial burdens. It is hoped, perhaps wistfully, that led by these press conglomerates, China will, by 2010, have 10% of its newspapers each exceeding $100 million in assets, 80% of which from advertising.[44] Whether this objective is realistic and whether this policy can be sustained remain to be seen. Communist state planners seem conveniently forgetful of the criticisms they used to level at Western capitalists, even though in China the party will remain as the monopolistic owner of press conglomerates in disguise. Press conglomeration does exact social prices, which the Chinese authorities do not seem to have thought through because the policy change was declared by fiat, devoid of transparency, and probably masking a series of behind-the-scene bargaining with the emergent financial forces.

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[43] *Chinese Newspapers and Magazines Monthly*, No. 2, 1996, p. 14.

[44] This was a view expressed at the nation-wide working conference on newspaper and publication affairs

For press conglomeration to work, however, China must confront many vexing legacies of the Leninist system.[45] How will the omnipresent state interfere in the process and operation of press conglomeration? In the course of controlling the pace, size, and process of press conglomeration, will the state have other alternatives than to challenge the traditional Communist mode of organizing the press around political structure, geography, target audience, and ideological functions? What will be the relationship between the core and its subsidiary publications? Should the core take away all or most of the profits from its affiliates? These issues warrant close scrutiny.

Many provincial party papers, having been victimized by the marketized operation, have rushed to accommodate the commercial logic by establishing spinoff evening and mass-appeal papers which wear a less formal ideological straitjacket. By mid-1997, 20 of China's 31 provincial newspapers had founded 22 commercially more popular offsrpings--10 of them in the 1990s--in hopes of drawing bigger advertising

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held in February, 1998.

[45] Wei, Yongzheng , "Press Complexes and Conglomeration," *Journalism and Communication Forum*, No. 1, 1996, pp. 76-81, (in Chinese).

gains to help finance their "parent" publications.[46] Even the central-level *Guangming Daily* founded a more light-hearted *Life Times* in 1996. As Table 10 shows, five of the ten spinoff papers listed have surpassed their "parent" publications in advertising revenues. The *Yangzi Evening Daily* garnered a total advertising revenue of $99.4 million, or four times that of its "parent" *Xinhua Daily*. The spinoff papers of the *Beijing Daily*, the *Yunnan Daily*, and the *Zhejiang Daily* also reaped advertising revenues twice or three times as large as the parent papers. However, their counterparts that have a shorter history or are published in the economically unfavorable locations--such as the *Liaoning Daily*, the *Anhui Daily* and the *Shaanxi Daily*--fared much poorly, with advertising receipts less than one-third those of their parent publications.

Impact on Press Operation

Introducing advertising as a market incentive into newspaper management amounted to a state concession that it was no longer capable of shouldering the full responsibility for press cost. In 1990, the Newspaper and Publication Bureau still defined the newspaper as "an essential part of the Communist-led journalistic enterprises dedicated to the highest principle of social impact."[47] Seven years later, the State Council's Newspaper Management Ordinances mentioned that the dual press goals were to "achieve an optimal integration between social impact and economic impact, with social impact taking precedence."[48] The different language used in the two documents might appear to be a simple matter but, in effect, represents the result of intense struggles between different power factions at the top echelon of the Communist Party. "Social impact" being a euphemism for the media's mouthpiece role under party control, adding "Economic impact" as one of the press goals signaled that the state not only expected the press to toe the political line but also encouraged it to be revenue self-generating. This policy change has produced an array of unanticipated consequences.

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[46] It is cumbersome to list these papers; suffices it to give a few examples, the names of which are revealing: the *Nanfang Daily* in Guangzhou published the *South China Municipal Daily* (1997); the *Jiangxi Daily* published the *Economic Evening Daily* (1993) and the *Jiangnan Municipal Daily* (1997); the *Fujian Daily*'s counterpart is the *Straits Municipal Daily* (started in 1997). This arrangement appears to follow the lead of the *Beijing Daily*, which founded the *Beijing Evening Daily* in 1958. The *Xinhua Daily*, the party organ of Jiangsu Province, published the *Yangzi Evening Daily* and the *Services Guide* in 1985.

[47] Newspaper and Publication Bureau, *Selected Works in Newspaper and Publication*, pp. 1-2.

Economic imperatives and market vibrancy have necessitated a fundamental restructuring of the division of labor--and relative power--between different units and departments within the press organization. Prior to 1990 as the newspaper could count on unfailing state subsidies, the editorial department was unequivocally the dominant force, with the editor-in-chief acting as the "soul" of the paper in charge of its ideological correctness. Heads of business departments took little initiative and assumed an auxiliary role as mid-level managers remote from policy-making centers. Since then, such newspapers as the *Beijing Daily*, the *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily*, and the *Yangcheng Evening Daily* have emulated the foreign press system in which editor-in-chief and general manager are made equal partners under the leadership of the director (*shezhang*). The editor has to shift and share part of the power with the business manager in formulating and implementing newspaper policies.[49]

In the 1990s, the newspaper's size, number of pages published, and frequency of publication were rigidly fixed by the Communist Party's Department of Propaganda with little latitude for maneuver. Any decisions to enlarge newspaper size or to publish more pages more frequently added to the financial burden of the state, which had to channel special funds to cover the increased newsprint cost. As a first sign of policy change, the state announced in 1987 that newspapers themselves would be held responsible for the extra cost if and when they should decide to publish supplemental pages. Starting in 1990, the newspaper could apply to the state for a change of status in the size and frequency of publication. In the 1990s, considerations of cost and benefit became decisive, as rich newspapers found out that they could enrich themselves further by offering extra pages to carry more advertisements. It came as little surprise that the *Guangzhou Daily* sent a deputy chief editor to lobby through the bureaucratic maze in Beijing for the specific purpose of securing government authorization to expand the number of pages it could publish.[50] When Guangdong's party secretary suggested that the *Nanfang Daily* could try to publish extra pages once or twice a week, the paper lost little time in using his off-hand remark as an official justification for producing more pages daily.[51]

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[48] *Chinese Newspapers and Magazines Monthly*, April, 1997, pp. 15-18.

[49] See He, "Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug of War" for example.

Newspaper competition has intensified. In the past, newspapers existing in the same geographical location were compared to different departments of the same government bureaucracy, each minding its own business without bothering to compete with the other. In as much as the state furnished them with requisite funds, competition was largely avoided. Now the newspapers must aggressively vie for the same pool of circulation and advertising revenues; this rivalry is particularly intense in the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Changcun, Harbin, and Chengdu. Market-driven competition between the *Guangzhou Daily* and the *Yangcheng Daily*, each trying to beat the other with comparable circulation and advertising volumes, has come to a head, resulting in hostile shouting matches.

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[50] *International Advertising*, June 1995, pp. 13-17, (in Chinese).

The press delivery system has also changed. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the post office monopolized the press delivery business, charging one-quarter of the newspaper's sale price for the service. The press did not raise much objection because it did not have to bear the real consequences of business profit or loss, and giving money to the post office simply meant transferring state funds between different accounts. This time-honored monopoly became questionable in the mid-1980s when the post office unilaterally raised the already high fee for its deteriorating service, and at a time when the newspaper became increasingly conscious of the market imperative. Initiated by the *Luoyang Daily*, many large-city newspapers began to organize their own delivery systems instead of relying on the postal service. By 1995, while postal delivery still accounted for 60% of the nation's newspapers, 40% of them have developed their own delivery system, thus constituting a two-track system.

Impact on Press Content

Despite the state's intention and effort to maintain tight ideological control, the impact of press finance on broadening press content has been inevitable and enormous. The Chinese press, acting as the state's ideological trumpet, had previously bombarded its readers with a monotonous and repetitive staple of propaganda talks, official documents, and stories of "model" workers. Catering to more popular tastes of a wider readership, many newspapers undertook bold experiments in the mid-1980s to publish a

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[51] *Chinese Journalist*, August 1996, p. 27, (in Chinese).

variety of special editions on weekends, capitalizing on policy loopholes to offer a preponderant amount of soft news, less propagandistic information, and advertisement. The authorities imposed sporadic crackdowns on what they considered as politically or morally objectionable contents, but the deterrence effect was only temporary. Market forces having developed a life of their own too powerful to be totally contained by political decrees, many newspapers took measures to expand the number of pages on a regular basis in the late 1980s. The 1990s have witnessed the appearance of successive mass-appeal newspapers, some even published under the auspices of the party organs.

In the late 1980s the politically boldest was Shanghai's semi-official *World Economic Herald*, which stood at the forefront of advocating various comprehensive programs of political and economic reforms, only to be closed down by the authorities during the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989.[52] Tighter press control briefly returned in its wake. The waves of economic enthusiasm that have swept across China since 1992 have brought about increasing relaxation of restrictions in *non-political* areas, but none of today's newspapers--not even the *Beijing Youth Daily*, whose editorial policy has been repeatedly singled out for blame by the authorities[53] --can match the *political* courage of the *World Economic Herald*. In retrospect, the *World Economic Journal* both benefited tremendously from the more tolerant atmosphere of political reform initiated by Zhao Ziyang and appeared to be used by Zhao's top assistants (many of whom are now in exile) as a forum to advocate their reformist agendas.[54] Instead of challenging state ideology directly in the post-1989 decade, newspapers have learned to invent more innovative and devious approaches in coping with the demands of political requirements and those of economic interests. Faced with the dilemma of having to please "two masters" (the party and the people), in other words, they have had to improvise a variety of seemingly paradoxical strategies able to stimulate readers' interest yet without stepping out of official bounds.[55] As a newspaper official describes it to us with candor, the front page of his paper endorses a planned economy, second to eighth pages support a mixed economy, and ninth to sixteenth pages advocate a market economy. This schizophrenic personality seems most useful in serving the party needs and satisfying the public likes at the same time. Newspaper organizations and their top leaders have little reason or incentive to openly challenge the established order because they stand to gain most if they try to maximize market interests within the approved political confines. In a way, the state is exchanging economic benefits for their political loyalty.

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[52] Hsiao, Ching-chang and Yang, Mei-rong, "'Don't Force Us to Lie:' The Case of the *World Economic Herald*," in Lee, *Voices of China*, pp. 111-121; Goldman, Merle, "The Role of the Press in Post-Mao Political Struggles," in Lee, *China's Media, Media's China*, pp. 23-36.

[53] Rosen, Stanley, "Setting Appropriate Behavior Under a Socialist Market Economy: Debates and Controversies Reported in the *Beijing Youth Daily*," in Lee, *Money, Power, and Media*.

[54] For a first-hand record of the reformist programs, see Wu, Guoguang, *Zhao Ziyang and Political*

In sum, changes in press finance have engendered mixed and incomplete patterns of reform in newspaper operation and content. The omnipotent state still holds unchallenged power to control press ownership, to appoint major leaders to newspaper organizations, and to set the overall ideological policy. The press generally prefers soft news to hard propaganda. Politically sensitive subjects remain off limits to press coverage, even though a larger amount of apolitical and depoliticized content is allowed. However, it is important to note that the press finance reform has forced newspaper organizations--sometimes against their won will--to take a greater share of financial

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Reform. (Hong Kong: Pacific, 1997), (in Chinese); see also Note 52.

autonomy and the responsibility that comes with it. Newspapers have entered into an intensively competitive market, with the mass-appeal papers surpassing the popularity of the party press which has been eroding for a long time. As money replaces ideology as a main obsession, corruption and graft have become rampant in journalistic circles despite official threats to punish offenders. Papers with economic might are privileged to expand the number of pages they publish, to set their own circulation and advertising rates, and to provide their staff with more attractive salary packages. The emergent press conglomeration is an uncertain and potentially risky answer to the enduring tension between the state's political control and its desire to lessen its own financial responsibility. Within newspaper organizations, the status of management departments has been elevated to rival that of the traditionally dominant editorial department. Overall, the Chinese press has been undergoing a process of liberalization in non-politically sensitive areas, so rapid and vast as to indirectly weaken the press's mouthpiece role, but the process of press democratization appears to be very faraway.

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[55] Polumbaum, "The Tribulations of China's Journalists After a Decade of Reform;" Pan, "Improvising for Social Change;" He, "Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug of War."

TABLE 1. Number and Circulation of Newspapers by Type, 1986-1996

		Party paper	(%)	Target paper	(%)	Industry paper	(%)	Mass paper	(%)	Other paper	(%)	Total	Total %
1986	No. of paper	180	75.3	17	7.1	10	4.2	26	10.9	6	2.5	239	(100)
	circ. (million)	25.7	51.3	12.7	25.5	.62	1.2	7.2	14.3	3.8	7.7	50.0	(100)
1987	No. of paper	186	76.9	17	7.0	4	1.7	30	12.4	5	2.1	242	(100)
	circ. (million)	26.6	51.4	12.3	23.7	.31	0.6	8.2	15.8	4.4	8.5	51.8	(100)
1988	No. of paper	184	78.6	16	6.8	6	2.6	29	12.7	4	1.7	234	(100)
	circ. (million)	26.1	50.3	12.7	24.4	1.9	3.7	6.6	12.7	4.7	9.0	52.0	(100)
1989	No. of paper	198	74.7	17	6.1	12	4.5	31	12.5	6	2.7	265	(100)
	circ. (million)	22.9	53.5	8.4	19.7	.65	1.5	6.9	16.1	3.9	9.2	42.7	(100)
1990	No. of paper	196	74.2	16	6.1	12	4.5	33	12.0	7	2.4	264	(100)
	circ. (million)	21.7	52.5	8.4	20.1	1.7	3.2	6.0	15.7	3.6	8.6	41.3	(100)
1991	No. of paper	211	72.5	19	6.5	19	6.5	35	12.0	7	2.7	291	(100)
	circ. (million)	23.1	50.7	9.3	20.5	1.5	3.2	7.1	15.7	4.5	10.0	45.6	(100)
1992	No. of paper	222	72.6	20	6.5	23	7.5	35	11.4	7	2.3	307	(100)
	circ. (million)	25.5	52.1	9.1	18.5	1.8	3.6	8.1	16.5	4.5	9.1	48.9	(100)
1993	No. of paper	260	69.3	22	5.9	36	9.6	48	12.8	9	2.4	375	(100)
	circ. (million)	24.3	48.6	8.9	17.7	3.3	6.5	9.1	18.3	4.4	8.9	50.0	(100)
1994	No. of paper	299	62.0	33	6.8	65	13.5	74	15.4	11	2.3	482	(100)
	circ. (million)	23.6	46.5	7.9	15.6	5.4	10.6	9.9	19.4	4.0	7.9	50.8	(100)
1995	No. of paper	324	56.3	42	7.3	95	16.5	96	16.7	18	3.1	575	(100)
	circ. (million)	30.4	48.6	9.1	14.6	6.7	10.7	11.3	18.0	5.0	8.0	62.6	(100)
1996	No. of paper	345	55.6	41	6.6	113	18.2	110	17.6	12	1.9	621	(100)
	circ. (million)	22.9	40.6	7.9	14.0	8.5	15.0	13.2	23.4	3.9	6.9	56.3	(100)

SOURCES: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Journalism, *Chinese Journalism Yearbook* (Beijing: Journalism Yearbook Press, 1987-1997), various issues, in Chinese.

TABLE 2 Professional Grade, Quota and Salary in the Chinese Press, 1986 and 1994

	Senior Reporter/ Editor	Head Reporter/ Editor	Reporter/ Editor	Assistant Reporter/ Editor
I. Salary (in RMB yuan)				
1986	220-350	130-240	105-130	70-105
1994	390-670	275-555	205-45	165-313
II. Quota for papers of various administrative rank				
Central-level	5%	25%	50%	20%
Provincial-level	2%	18%	50%	30%
District/Municipal-level	0%	15%	45%*	40%*
County-level	0%	0%	40%*	60%*

SOURCES: Newspaper and Publication Bureau, State Council, *Selected Work in Newspaper and Publication* (Beijing: Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 240, p. 513. Original sources were in Chinese.
* Estimated figures.

TABLE 3. Revenue Structures of Selected Central-Level Newspapers, 1986 (in percentage)

	State subscrip	Gov't aid	State Subtotal	Private subscrip	Ad	Outside business	Market subtotal	Total percent	Total revenues (million RMB)
China Youth Daily	77	9	(86)	4	6	4	(14)	(100)	31.0
Worker's Daily	70	7	(77)	4	12	7	(23)	(100)	40.6
Guangming Daily	55	6	(61)	3	19	16	(38)	(99)	17.1
Economic Daily	62	8	(70)	3	23	4	(30)	(100)	27.3
Total	68	7	(75)	4	14	7	(25)	(100)	116.0

SOURCES: Tu Jongjun, *Newspaper Management* (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1994), p. 54, in Chinese.

TABLE 4. Revenue Structures of Selected Provincial-Level Newspapers, 1986 (in percentage)

	State subscrip	Gov't aid	State subtotal	Private subscrip	Ad	Outside business	Market subtotal	Total percent	Total revenues (million RMB)
Beijing Daily	57	0	(57)	3	25	15	(43)	(100)	25.3
Tianjing Daily	47	0	(47)	3	29	21	(53)	(100)	13.9
Liberation Daily	51	2	(53)	9	16	21	(46)	(99)	41.0
Wenhui Daily	50	6	(56)	9	20	16	(45)	(101)	31.5
Jilin Daily	46	7	(53)	2	29	16	(47)	(100)	6.7
Henan Daily	72	0	(72)	4	20	5	(29)	(101)	12.5
Jiangxi Daily	56	8	(64)	3	16	18	(37)	(101)	10.0
Nanfang Daily	34	5	(39)	2	18	40	(60)	(99)	28.1
All	50	3	(53)	5	21	21	(47)	(100)	169.0

SOURCES: See Table 3, p. 54. Percentages may not total to 100% due to rounding.

TABLE 5. Revenue Structures of Selected District-Level Newspapers, 1987 (in percentage)

	State subscrip	Gov't aid	State subtotal	Private subscrip	Ad	Outside business	Market subtotal	Total percent	Total revenues (million RMB)
Zhanjiang Daily	14	3	(17)	1	22	61	(84)	(101)	37.1
Shaoguan Daily	12	58	(70)	1	29	0	(30)	(100)	10.4
Maoming Daily	15	18	(33)	1	16	50	(67)	(100)	25.5
Foshan Daily	12	24	(36)	1	56	7	(64)	(100)	11.6
Liuzhou Daily	22	5	(27)	1	24	48	(73)	(100)	33.0
Hangzhou Daily	42	0	(42)	2	36	20	(58)	(100)	64.5
Nantong Daily	25	11	(36)	1	41	22	(64)	(100)	19.4
Xiangfan Daily	9	0	(9)	0	5	86	(91)	(100)	66.1
Huangshi Daily	31	49	(80)	2	18	0	(20)	(100)	8.1
Dandong Daily	21	5	(26)	1	24	49	(76)	(100)	38.1
Jiangcheng Daily	19	12	(31)	1	18	51	(70)	(101)	50.3
Daqing Daily	17	33	(50)	1	4	44	(49)	(99)	10.6
Baotou Daily	21	54	(75)	1	19	5	(25)	(100)	12.8
Kashi Daily	2	33	(35)	0	2	63	(65)	(100)	28.7
Chengde Journal	49	32	(81)	3	11	6	(20)	(101)	8.8
Economic News	23	0	(23)	1	76	0	(77)	(100)	15.9
Luoyang Daily	55	0	(55)	3	39	3	(45)	(100)	20.6
All	22	11	(33)	1	23	43	(67)	(100)	461.4

SOURCES: See Table 3, p.50. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

TABLE 6. Circulation and Advertising Revenue of the Chinese Press, 1986-1996 (in billion RMB)

Year	Circulation revenue	Rate of increase (%)	Advertising revenue	Rate of increase (%)	Adv./Circulation. ratio
1986	.90		.25		0.28
1987	.94	4.3	.36	38.9	0.38
1988	1.11	18.3	.50	41.0	0.45
1989	2.03	82.4	.63	25.6	0.31
1990	1.93	-4.8	.68	7.6	0.35
1991	2.04	5.3	.96	42.1	0.47
1992	2.57	26.5	1.62	68.2	0.63
1993	3.79	47.3	3.77	133.0	0.99
1994	5.65	49.1	5.05	33.9	0.89
1995	7.20	27.5	6.46	28.0	0.90
1996	8.12	28.0	7.77	20.3	0.95

SOURCES: Circulation figures based on Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *Chinese Journalism Yearbook*, various issues. Advertising figures based on *Chinese Advertising*, 1995, No. 3; 1996, No. 3; 1997, No. 3. Original sources were in Chinese.

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TABLE 7. Circulation and Advertising Revenues for Selected Papers, 1986 and 1996 (in million RMB)

	Circulation revenues			Advertising revenues			Ad /circulation ratio	
	1986	1996	Ratio	1986	1996	Ratio	1986	1996
China Youth Daily	25.1	111.7	(4.45)	1.9	33.1	(17.26)	0.08	0.30
Worker's Daily	30.0	99.1	(3.31)	5.04	38.4	(7.65)	0.17	0.39
Guangming Daily	9.9	29.1	(2.95)	3.3	32.1	(9.83)	0.33	1.10
Economic Daily	17.8	86.8	(4.89)	6.4	97.5	(15.23)	0.36	1.12
Beijing Daily	15.2	57.3	(3.77)	6.4	86.3	(13.45)	0.42	1.51
Tianjing Daily	6.9	42.4	(6.19)	4.1	99.8	(24.50)	0.59	2.35
Liberation Daily	24.8	71.2	(2.87)	6.6	224.9	(33.97)	0.27	3.16
Wenhui Daily	18.5	78.5	(4.23)	6.1	117.8	(19.18)	0.33	1.65
Jilin Daily	3.7	15.8	(4.73)	1.9	30.3	(15.77)	0.59	1.91
Henan Daily	9.4	48.0	(5.10)	2.5	38.0	(15.12)	0.27	0.79
Jiangxi Daily	5.9	26.6	(4.54)	1.6	26.4	(16.80)	0.27	0.99
Nanfang Daily	10.0	79.5	(7.97)	5.8	169.3	(29.17)	0.58	2.13
Total	176.6	746.2	(4.23)	51.7	993.8	(19.24)	0.29	1.33

SOURCES: Circulation revenues based on Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *Chinese Journalism Yearbook*, 1987, 1997; Advertising revenues based on Tu, *Press Managment*, p. 54 and Damen Information Co., *Monitoring Report of the Chinese Newspaper Advertising* (Guangzhou: author, 1996). Original sources were in Chinese.

TABLE 8. Advertising Revenue, Journalists' Income and Fixed Assets in Shanghai's *Labor's Journal* (1991--1996)

	unit	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Ad revenues	million RMB	0.56	1.1	2.8	9.0	16	22
Monthly income	RMB yuan	313	438	755	1,452	2,254*	2,980*
(Salary)	%	(82.1)	(75.3)	(58.7)	(39.9)	(33.5)	(30.4)
(Cash award)	%	(17.9)	(24.7)	(41.3)	(60.1)	(66.5)	(69.6)
Fixed capital	million RMB	1.1	2.2	5.3	11.2	25.0	50.0

SOURCES: Yao Xitang, ed., *Fifteen Years of Press Reform in Shanghai* (Shanghai: Academy of Social Scinces, 1994), p. 51; Shanghai Press Association, et al., *The Conditions and Trend of the Chinese Press* (Shanghai: Baixin Press, 1996) p. 36. Original sources were in Chinese. * Based on interviews.

TABLE 9. Comparison of Journalists' Annual Income between Party and Mass Papers in Shanghai, Jiangsu and Shaanxi (1996)

	Shanghai		Jiangsu		Shaanxi	
	Party	Mass	Party	Mass	Party	Mass
	Liberation Daily	*Xinmin Eve. Daily*	*Xinhua Daily*	*Yangzi Eve. Daily*	*Shaanxi Daily*	*Xian Eve. Daily*
Chief editor	60,000	100,000	40,000	45,000	30,000	35,000
Department head	45,000	70,000	30,000	35,000	25,000	27,000
Reportor/editor	30,000	50,000	25,000	28,000	12,000	20,000
Paper's Ad Rev. (million RMB)	225.0	570.0	24.6	99.4	26.3	75.0

SOURCES: Income data based on interviews. Advertising revenues: Damen Information Co., *Monitoring Report*.

TABLE 10. Comparison of Advertising Revenues between Parent Party Papers and their Affiliate Mass-Appeal Papers (1996)

Province	Parent Paper	Advertising (million RMB)	Affliate Paper	Advertising (million RMB)	Parent:affiliate ratio
Jiangsu	*Xinhua Daily*	24.6	*Yangzi Evening Daily*	99.4	4.05
Beijing	*Beijing Daily*	36.3	*Beijing Evening Daily*	270.1	3.13
Yunnan	*Yunnan Daily*	16.9	*Chuncheng Eve. Daily*	42.1	2.49
Zhejiang	*Zhejiang Daily*	60.1	*Qianjiang Eve. Daily*	135.0	2.25
Shandong	*Dazhong Daily*	58.3	*Qilu Evening Daily*	68.0	1.17
Heilongjiang	*Heilongjiang Daily*	31.8	*Life Journal*	27.0	0.85
Sichuan	*Sichuan Daily*	40.4	*Huaxi Metro Journal*	30.6	0.76
Liaoning	*Liaoning Daily*	31.9	*Liaosheng Eve. Daily*	10.7	0.33
Anhui	*Anhui Daily*	35.2	*Xi'an Evening Daily*	10.1	0.29
Shaanxi	*Shaanxi Daily*	26.3	*Sanqing Metro Journal*	6.1	0.23

SOURCES: Damen Information Co., *Monitoring Report.*

Putting Okinawa on the Agenda: Applying Three Complementary Theories

Abstract: This paper examines why U.S. and Japanese policy-makers decided to make changes in the base structure on Okinawa after a schoolgirl was raped in 1995. Applying three different but complementary theories -- agenda-setting, rational decision-making and bureaucratic politics – provides a fuller understanding of how U.S. foreign policy was made on Okinawa. This interdisciplinary approach can also serve as a heuristic device to improve knowledge about the interplay between media, foreign policy and international relations.

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A paper submitted to the international division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in Baltimore, August 1998.

Putting Okinawa on the Agenda:
Applying Three Complementary Theories

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A paper submitted to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication for its conference in Baltimore, August 1998.

In early 1995, U.S. policy-makers were emphatic: To maintain stability, prosperity and American influence in Asia, the United States needed to maintain a force of 100,000 troops in the region. Of that number, 47,000 would remain in Japan, including about 27,000 troops in Okinawa Prefecture, which had borne that burden for decades. Then, in April 1996, the United States agreed to close some of its bases in Okinawa and to take other steps to reduce the burden placed on Okinawans. The Japanese government also committed itself to spending billions of dollars to build an offshore landing facility for the U.S. military. Why did policy-makers decide to take these steps?

Communication scholars and political science scholars may suggest entirely different answers. To a media researcher, here is a logical hypothesis: The 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by U.S. Marines in Okinawa was a catalyst that served to put Okinawa on the media agenda and, as a result, on policy-makers' agenda. Political scientists might offer different explanations: U.S. policy was the result of a rational decision-making process or bureaucratic politics.

This paper will look at the Okinawa case in terms of agenda-setting, rational decision-making and bureaucratic politics, and then suggest how the theories complement each other. Together, the theories combine to provide a fuller understanding of how U.S. foreign policy may have been made – and is still being made – on Okinawa. Perhaps more important, this interdisciplinary approach can also serve as a heuristic device to improve knowledge about the interplay between domestic media, foreign policy and international relations.

The U.S.-Japanese security relationship

The security ties between the United States and Japan are a legacy of World War II. In the aftermath of the war, the victorious Americans saw an immediate need to help rebuild Japan in the United States' own democratic and free-market-oriented image. As the Cold War began and escalated, Japan was a prized ally of the United States partly because of its strategic location and partly because of its growing production capabilities. Say Friedman and Lebard:

> As long as the Soviet-American competition remained the central fact of the international system, the United States was dependent on Japan. Geographically, Japan was indispensable; not only did its position effectively block the Soviet Far Eastern fleet from access to the Pacific, but Japan also provided the United States with unsinkable bases for air attacks on the Soviet mainland. Additionally, Japan was both a major U.S. supply depot for Korea and a reserve industrial plant for the production of war materials (1991, p. 2).

In return, the United States promised to take care of Japan's security needs. That seemed wholly appropriate at the time, especially considering that the United States had drafted a new constitution for Japan that renounced war and Japan's right to become a military power. The peace and security treaties went into effect in 1952, when Japan officially regained its independence. Over the next three decades, Japan was able to concentrate on its economy while the United States paid the costs of Japan's defense, leaving some to argue that "Japan essentially got a free ride into an economic superpower" (Nester, 1993, p. 8).

After the Cold War ended, however, questions began to surface about why the United States – the world's largest debtor country -- needed to keep American troops in Japan and otherwise contribute to the defense of Japan – now the world's biggest lender. What was the threat? What justified the continuation of the security alliance?

In 1994, U.S. officials "set out purposefully to conduct an intensive security dialogue with Japan. Our mutual goal has been to re-examine and reaffirm the rationale and goals of our alliance in this 50th anniversary year of the end of World War II" (Lord, 1995). The end result was the Pentagon's East Asia strategy report, which announced the United States' commitment to keeping 100,000 troops in the region. The report "resolved doubts in Japan and throughout Asia regarding American intentions and security guarantees" (Giarra, 1997, p. 20).

Okinawans were not satisfied. The site of one of the bloodiest battles of World War II, Okinawa still carries the heaviest burdens left over from the war. During the Battle of Okinawa, more than 14,000 American and 100,000 Japanese troops lost their lives. Another 100,000 civilians on Okinawa were "sacrificed to preserve the 'motherland' that cared little for them" (Baker, April 1, 1995, p. 3.) Then, like the rest of Japan, the American Occupation authorities ruled Okinawa, which had been its own kingdom before Japan annexed it in 1879. For the Japanese mainland, the American Occupation lasted until 1952. In Okinawa, however, the Americans were in control until 1972, when the island reverted back to Japan. The occupation was over, but the U.S. military was not going anywhere. As part of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the United States continues to base about 27,000 troops in Okinawa, and its bases occupy about one-fifth of Okinawa's land. Three-quarters of the U.S. military bases in Japan are in Okinawa, which is Japan's smallest prefecture, making up only 0.6 percent of Japan's total area.

For security reasons, did the United States need all these troops in Okinawa? American and Japanese policy-makers said yes; nine out of 10 Okinawans said no in a 1996 referendum. For nearly 20 years, talks had been in progress about the U.S. military returning some of its land (Baker, May 13, 1995, p. 2), but little changed. Then, in September 1995, two Marines and a Navy seaman kidnapped a 12-year-old Okinawan girl and raped her. The case generated a huge public outcry in Okinawa and Japan, as well as tremendous media coverage in both the United States and Japan. In other words, a communications scholar might suggest, the rape case was the catalyst that put the Okinawa issue on the agenda of the media and policy-makers.

The agenda-setting process

In 1963, Bernard C. Cohen wrote that the press "may not be successful much of time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (p. 13). His idea came to be known as agenda setting, and communication researchers first empirically tested it during the 1968-election season (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Dearing and Rogers define the agenda-setting process as "an ongoing competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of the media professionals, the public and policy elites" with the goal of putting an issue on their agenda -- "a set of issues that are communicated in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time" (1996, p.2). Agenda setting helps explain why policy-makers tackle some issues but not others.

To help organize the vast body of research on agenda setting, Rogers and Dearing divided the process into three components -- media-agenda setting, public agenda-setting and policy-agenda setting -- and they argue that agenda setting is a process of interaction between the three. In their model, the media agenda influences the public agenda, which then influences the policy agenda. The media agenda and policy agenda also can both influence each other, bypassing the public agenda.[1] In addition, the media, public and policy-makers are affected by personal experience and interpersonal communication, as well as "real-world indicators of the importance of an agenda issue or event" (Dearing and Rogers, p. 5). Finally, the model suggests that gatekeepers, influential media and spectacular news events also influence the media agenda. In the Okinawa case, the rape of the 12-year-old girl and ensuing protests were the spectacular news events that triggered U.S. media coverage, and, one might argue, a change in U.S. policy toward Okinawa.

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[1] It seems unlikely that the issue of U.S. troops in Okinawa had much salience for the American public, so the public agenda will not be considered in this paper. Furthermore, research suggests the public's impact on foreign policy is more limited than its impact on domestic policy. See Graber, 1968, Cohen, 1983, and Seaver, 1998, for example. In a more extensive case study, the public's possible impact on policy could not be ignored.

A Lexis/Nexis database search of major newspapers provides a rough indicator of how U.S. media coverage on Okinawa evolved in 1995. In the first seven months of 1995, an average of 70 news items can be found each month. In August, as the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa and other significant World War II events were commemorated, news coverage referring to Okinawa escalated sharply. Many of the stories took a look back at the horrific battle; a few related Okinawa's history to its current plight. On May 15, 1995, a handful of American newspapers gave brief mention (200 words or less) to a protest on Okinawa the day before. More than 13,000 people had formed a human chain around a U.S. military base "to dramatize their demands for the return of land on the southern island" (*Orlando Sentinel Tribune*, 1995, p. A10). The burden the U.S. military placed on Okinawa was salient to Okinawans but not to most of the American media.

That changed in mid-September 1995. The rape occurred Sept. 4, and the first American news coverage of the tragedy surfaced Sept. 14. The topic first came up at a State Department news briefing five days later, when a question about the rape was the last to be asked (State Department daily news briefings, Sept. 19, 1995). By October, Okinawa was a full-fledged story on the U.S. media agenda, with 232 items in the major papers, 310 items published in November.

Ironically, the day after the rape – but before it was public knowledge -- the *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported that U.S. and Japanese officials were preparing to issue a joint statement stressing the importance of bilateral security ties, including "the need for agreement over U.S. bases in Okinawa Prefecture" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Sept. 5, 1995, p. 1). Agreeing to talk about the need for agreement, however, is a far cry from coming to an agreement on what is to be done.

In a direct response to the rape case, American and Japanese policy-makers agreed on changes in their Status of Forces Agreement. After being criticized in Japan for delays in turning over the accused to the Japanese authorities, on Oct. 25, 1995, the United States "agreed to give sympathetic consideration to Japanese requests for transfer of custody of criminal suspects prior to indictment in specific cases of murder or rape" (Lord, 1995). The next month, the Japanese and American governments announced they were forming a Special Action Committee on Okinawa, or SACO, whose members included the Japanese foreign minister and defense minister, as well as the American secretaries of state and defense. In April 1996, on the same week President Clinton was visiting Japan, policy-makers announced the United States planned to give up an airfield. SACO's final report was issued in December 1996, when the United States and Japan agreed the United States would return 21 percent of the Okinawa land used by the U.S. military within five to seven years, as well as take other steps to reduce the intrusiveness of the military (Reid, 1997, p. 46). Although the United States was not significantly reducing the number of its troops on Okinawa, it did agree to close 11 bases, and the Japanese agreed to spend $2 billion or so to build an offshore-landing facility to accommodate the military's needs.

On the surface at least, it appears the rape case was the catalyst that put the Okinawa issue on the agenda of the American media, which in turn helped place the issue on U.S. policy-makers' agenda as well. Of course, it would be naïve to believe the agenda-setting process was that simple. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, the impact of domestic pressures within Japan on the United States should be considered as well. And, key to this paper, is how U.S. foreign policy is made in terms of rational decision-making and bureaucratic politics.

Rational decision-making

According to the rational decision-making model, the national government acts as a unitary actor confronting a strategic problem. It identifies its national security goals and objectives, identifies a spectrum of options for achieving its goals, estimates the costs and benefits of each option and, finally, makes a "value-maximizing" choice (Allison, 1969). The goal is to get the greatest benefit for the least cost.

How might this model of decision-making apply to the Okinawa case? First, let us consider the United States' national security interests in keeping troops in Japan. Although Okinawa's governor, Masahide Ota, and political scientists such as Chalmers Johnson and Michael O'Hanlon challenge the need for U.S. forces in Japan in the post-Cold War world, U.S. and Japanese policy-makers are convinced otherwise. Just months before the rape occurred, policy-makers had finished re-evaluating the security alliance, and in the "U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," the Pentagon called the alliance with Japan "the linchpin of U.S. security policy in Asia" (*The Daily Yomiuri*, Feb. 28, 1995, p. 1).

The alliance was deemed critical for several reasons. In general, a top State Department official said, "The presence of 47,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, combined with the personnel aboard Seventh Fleet ships – home-ported in Japan – allow us to contribute to the maintenance of stability in the region; forestall regional arms competition, including nuclear arms; and exercise influence over the course of events" (Lord, 1995). More specifically, the alliance allows the United States and Japan to counteract the instability of the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's "history of aggression, threats to peace and exports of missile technology," as well as the uncertainty about what China plans to do with its vastly growing military budget (*The Daily Yomiuri*, Feb. 28, 1995). In addition, if U.S. troops were to withdraw from Japan, the Japanese would necessarily have to provide for their own defense. That would not sit well with Japan's neighbors and would likely contribute to the existing arms race in Asia. "While Japan has publicly eschewed any intention of building up a large, offensively oriented military capacity, its neighbors retain such traumatic memories of the Japanese conquest and occupation during World War II that any sign of increased military activity by Japan inevitably generates anxieties throughout the region" (Klare, 1993, p. 136).

Of course, one well-deserved criticism of the rational decision-making model is that it assumes policy-makers have all the relevant information before making a decision. In the real world, however, they must deal with incomplete information and uncertainty (Bendor and Hammond, 1992). In fact, Giarra argues, "current security planners face post-Cold War uncertainties at least as complex, if not as dangerous" as those faced at the beginning of the Cold War (1997, p. 19). No one really knows how the leaders of China and North Korea will proceed, for example, or, for that matter, how committed Japan is to its peace constitution.

To try to deal with the uncertainties as well as possible, the United States is pursuing stability, which policy-makers believe is in the nation's security and economic interests. Peace tends to equal prosperity. "Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, but it is necessary," argues Joseph S. Nye Jr., assistant secretary for defense. "... Security is like oxygen – you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about" (1995, p. 90). The United States wants to maintain stability in Asia to promote its own economic interests. "If all goes well in this chunk of the world, more and more American companies will invest in Asia; more Americans will work for subsidiaries of Asian firms; more American retirement plans will hold stakes in Asian stock markets" (Mallaby, 1996, p. 17). Whose job is it to ensure that all goes well in Asia? Nye argues that because, unlike the case in Europe, "there is no web of multilateral institutions tying countries together in East Asia," that job falls to the United States (p. 90).

How does Okinawa fit into the United States' security goals? Its location is strategic. The first American troops on the scene during the Persian Gulf War were from Okinawa, and when the United States bombed Iraq in September 1996, "aircraft from Okinawa refueled the B-52s on the way to their targets" (Mallaby, p. 17). The largest American air base in East Asia is Kadena on Okinawa. "Kadena's purpose in a military flare-up would be to give the United States air superiority anywhere in the Western Pacific, including front-line South Korea, within 24 hours" (D. Smith, 1995, p. 5F).

In addition to protecting its security interests, however, the United States likely had two related, but secondary goals in the Okinawa case: avoiding negative public opinion in Japan, if not the United States, that could endanger the alliance, and ensuring that tensions did not become so high as to interfere with U.S. military operations in Okinawa. From an idealist perspective, the United States would not want to be seen as an unwelcome, insensitive intruder in another jurisdiction. "I know what it's like for people to feel that they are being oppressed by those over whom they have no influence," Clinton told NHK Television. "And I don't want that to be the feeling of the people of Okinawa" (1995). From a realist perspective, U.S. policy-makers may have feared that the Okinawans' rage would severely limit support in both democracies for the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

On the one hand, then, the U.S. policy-makers see a legitimate national security interest in keeping American troops in Japan, and, on the other hand, they may have been worried about losing public support for doing so. According to the rational decision-making model, policy-makers evaluated the costs and benefits of their options and picked the option with the most benefit for the least cost. Regardless of media coverage, the policy-makers had other benefits and costs to consider.

In addition to the destabilizing effect removing U.S. troops might have, policy-makers also had economic costs to consider. According to U.S. officials, one key advantage to having the troops in Japan is that Japan helps finance the troops' existence. In 1995, the Japanese paid $5 billion -- about 70 percent of the cost – to help finance U.S. troops in Japan. The funding "is more than the amount provided by all other allies combined" (Lord, 1995), and, as a result, the Pentagon says, "it is actually less expensive to the American taxpayer to maintain our forces forward deployed than in the United States" (*Daily Yomiuri*, September 1995, p. 1).

Another drawback to moving the troops in Okinawa was the political cost involved. It is highly unlikely other areas in Japan would be willing to accept the burden of playing host to U.S. troops. "Out of sight, out of mind has been the rule for nearly half a century – unless you are Okinawan" (P. Smith, 1997, p. 5). Giarra suggests the Japanese national government is either unable or unwilling to get the four main islands to accept additional U.S. forces (p. 25). In 1974, for example, Japan and the United States agreed that the United States would return the port facilities in Naha, Okinawa's capital city. However, because an alternative site was not decided upon, the issue remained unresolved for more than 20 years (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Feb. 16, 1995, p. 1). Similarly, the United States likely would have had problems finding another host country in Asia. Sebastian Mallaby, a Washington correspondent for the *Economist*, sees no good alternatives for the United States:

> In 1992, its troops were booted out of Subic Bay by nationalistic Filipinos. It still maintains a force of 36,000 in South Korea, but this is pinned down by the constant threat of attack from the North. There is a 7,000-strong force in Guam, but that island's governor has recently shown signs of copying Okinawa's base-baiting politics. ... (Besides Japan) No other Asian country is willing to play host to large numbers of American troops. Singapore has 150 on its soil; Thailand bravely hosts 100. Australia recently offered to give the Marines a home, but it is miles away. Besides, Australia has no intention of coughing up the vast sums in host-nation support that Japanese taxpayers contribute to America's armed forces (1996, p. 17).

Of course, one option U.S. and Japanese policy-makers likely considered was doing nothing. Why not continue with the status quo? Okinawa has been unfairly burdened by the U.S.

military presence for decades; Okinawa has been considered a second-class citizen of Japan for even longer. Why worry about how many American troops are stationed in Okinawa? Do the benefits of doing nothing outweigh the costs? The more relevant question here is whether the costs outweigh the benefits.

If only the Okinawans were concerned about the troops issue, U.S. and Japanese policy-makers might be able to ignore them. That assumes, of course, that tensions on the island do not become so high that they interfere with the military operations. If there were too many protesters blocking the bases at inopportune times, that might be the case. Another scenario would be the United States deciding that keeping troops in Okinawa was not worth the effort given the constant protests. "Preserving the goodwill of communities in Japan where there are U.S. bases will be especially important because difficult base relations will otherwise corrode the strength of the U.S. commitment" (Giarra, 1997, p. 22). The risks of doing nothing to appease the Okinawans could then be substantial.

A more immediate cost faced by the United States and Japan, however, stemmed from the fact the Okinawans were not the only ones upset about the U.S. military presence. "The resentment was not limited to Okinawa as demonstrations took place across the nation, and public support for the U.S.-Japan security partnership plummeted" (Reid, 1997). And, even in the United States, there was increased debate about the necessity of maintaining U.S. troops abroad. In the post-Cold War world, Giarra argues, public support for the security alliance cannot be taken for granted. The rape and ensuing protests "made policymakers realize that for the U.S.-Japan security relationship to survive into the next century, it needed more attentive management" (Reid, 1997, p. 46). How did policy-makers come to realize the political costs of doing nothing? The most likely answer is that the media told them. Media coverage, to the extent that it is perceived to reflect public opinion, likely then becomes part of the cost-benefit equation.

If the Okinawan situation were allowed to fester, some believed it would have the potential to bring down the whole security alliance. "The cumulative effect of failing to adjust would be to reduce the viability of other U.S. military bases in Japan, and to chip away at the American military doctrine of forward deployment" (Giarra, 1997, p. 24). In other words, doing nothing was not an acceptable option.

In the end, the United States and Japan found a way, they hope, to appease the Okinawans while not changing the basic structure of U.S. forces in Japan. The two countries did not agree to remove the U.S. military from Okinawa. Nor did they agree to significantly reduce the number of U.S. troops in Okinawa. Rather, the United States is consolidating bases, and Japan has opted to build an offshore landing facility. For the United States, this is a workable policy that protects its national security interests, reduces the burden on Okinawans and shows, or at least gives the appearance, that the United States wants to be a good neighbor.

Some argue that the plan to close 11 bases is superficial. "Given that the United States will move facilities only when Tokyo finds new locations for them, this is no more than incompetent management," says journalist Patrick Smith (1997, p. 5). Chalmers Johnson labels the agreement as "only cosmetic" (1996, p. 22). Granted, only time will tell if the United States and Japan follow-through on their commitment. Nevertheless, at least one of the individuals involved in the discussions seems to believe the commitment to change is genuine. "More work has been done in the last year than in the preceding 25 years put together," said Walter Mondale, the U.S. ambassador to Japan when the Okinawa plan was announced (Ishizawa, 1996, p. 4).

Bureaucratic politics and organizational process

That the change in policy toward Okinawa can be viewed as incremental would be no surprise to those who study bureaucratic politics and the organizational process. To some researchers, the government's behavior can be seen "less as deliberate choices of leaders and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior" (Allison, 1969, p. 698). In the Okinawa case, the most relevant characteristics of bureaucracies are their standard operating procedures, tendency to support the status quo and their desire to protect their own turf.

Allison suggested that organizations are able to perform "higher functions" such as attending to problem areas by doing "lower" tasks such as producing reports. "Since procedures are 'standard' they do not change quickly or easily. ... Because of standard procedures, organizational behavior in particular instances often appears unduly formalized, sluggish, or inappropriate" (Allison, p. 700). Organizations decide what problems they will tackle based on constraints such as organizational health and others' expectations (Allison, p. 700).

One gets the sense looking at the history of Okinawan protests against the U.S. military that policy-making has been sluggish and formalized. Okinawans protested the military presence for more than 20 years before any new policies were announced. And, despite the high-profile formation of the high-powered Special Action Committee on Okinawa after the rape, it is possible that the bulk of the work in analyzing the Okinawa situation and suggesting alternatives was already in progress, was mainly conducted by the same policy-makers and continued at the same rate.

Whatever the case, the desire to resolve the Okinawa issue was not outweighed by the bureaucracies' need to make policy in a deliberative fashion and their desire to announce policy according to their own timetable. It was not until two months after the rape that the Japanese and American governments announced the formation of SACO. It took another five months before the committee released an interim report, which coincided with President Clinton's visit to Japan in April 1996. A previous presidential visit scheduled for November 1995 had been canceled because of the budgetary shutdown of the U.S. government. A cynic might wonder if SACO's creation was announced to make up for the fact that Clinton, in effect, had snubbed Japan so soon after the rape. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa's final report was issued in early December 1996 – more than a year after it was formed.

Just as bureaucratic politics helps explain why the policy deliberations seemed to proceed at their own pace, bureaucratic politics also helps explain why the overall policy toward Okinawa – measured by the actual number of U.S. troops there – did not change significantly. Earlier, in the discussion of the rational decision-making model, it was argued that the policy chosen by U.S. officials was the alternative with the maximum benefits and least costs. Another interpretation is possible: The policy outlined by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa reflects the bureaucracies' natural attachment to the status quo. Policy-makers were insistent that the rape case would not have a direct effect on the overall security relationship – the status quo. As Clinton told NHK television in November 1995, "I don't believe that we should, without great discipline and care, just revise a relationship that has plainly contributed to economic growth and political security and stability not only for Japan but for the rest of Asia as well" (Clinton, 1995). Of course, in a testament to bureaucratic politics model of policy-making, Clinton noted that the two countries had "established a high-level committee" to review the situation.

Finally, bureaucratic politics helps explain why policy-makers would be so attached to the status quo. Overall, research shows the politics of policy making to be:

> more conducive to the status quo than to change. Money and personnel mean political power. Once acquired, institutions protect them. They oppose changes that threaten to erode their sources of influence. Incremental changes at the edge are acceptable, but fundamental reorientations that would require massive budgetary and personnel cuts must be resisted (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996, p. 464).

Some of those arguing for changes in the U.S.-Japan security arrangement seem to know this well. Paul S. Giarra, who wants policy-makers to come up with an airtight rationale for the alliance, argues that while the logic does not have to be brand new, it may be easier to sell if it is not. "New policy conclusions need not represent an abrupt departure from established policy. In the present situation, U.S. security policy has been extrapolated from the persistently beneficial Cold War-ethic of engagement to new circumstances that require consistent U.S. leadership, commitment and presence" (Giarra, 1997, p. 19).

The status-quo mentality helps explain why it was considered viable to consolidate bases on Okinawa but not to significantly reduce the overall size of the troop force there. If U.S. policy-makers could not come up with a justification for keeping the same number of troops in Japan, where else could their deployment be justified? In the United States, military bases were being closed, not opened. And, elsewhere around the world, the U.S. military would not have enjoyed the same amount of financial support from a host country. In short, if the presence of U.S. troops in Japan could not be justified in the post-Cold War world, the military might have been downsized some more. Even Michael O'Hanlon, who advocates dramatically scaling back the Marines in Okinawa, tried to downplay the impact of his proposal by noting that the Marines in Okinawa represent only about 10 percent of whole U.S. Marine Corps and just more than 1 percent of all the active-duty military personnel (1997, p. 15). Nonetheless, any cut is not likely to be seen as acceptable to a bureaucracy trying to preserve its prestige and relevance in a changing world. Indeed, that option, it seems, was never considered.

In his arguments, O'Hanlon acknowledges the difficulty of going against the status quo:

> Since many policy makers seem reluctant to consider major changes in U.S. military troop strengths in Japan so soon after the Nye report was published, and the currently authorized troop strength for U.S. forces in Japan reaffirmed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1996 and 1997, a gradual course may be the most realistic (1997, p. 15).

In short, it should be no surprise that the United States only incrementally changed its policies toward American bases on Okinawa. Doing otherwise was never publicly considered an option.

Conclusion

Nicholas Kristof, Tokyo bureau chief for the *New York Times*, believes the rape on Okinawa had a significant impact on U.S.-Japanese relations. He says:

> That incident was not just some peripheral news story but an episode that profoundly shook bilateral relations and still reverberates. It generated rage at the American military presence in Japan and Okinawans' frustration at their treatment by the rest of Japan. It helped end the taboo in Japan about discussing security issues and provoked a far-reaching debate about military ties with the United States. It forced the United States to announce the consolidation and closure of some of its facilities on Okinawa, and it led the Japanese government to explore ways to treat Okinawa more equitably. One can make the case that no one has affected U.S.-Japanese relations more in the last few years than those marines" (1997, p. 140).

Although Kristof does not explicitly refer to agenda-setting theory, his comments imply he believes agenda setting occurred. Public and media attention to the Okinawa story, he suggests, put the Okinawa issue on policy-makers' action agenda and shaped a larger debate about the U.S.-Japan security alliance. To an extent, that probably occurred. However, even before three Americans raped the young girl on Okinawa, U.S. and Japanese policy-makers had agreed on the need to discuss bases there and had begun an overall reassessment of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

What the rape case almost certainly did was to move the specific issue of U.S. bases on Okinawa up higher on policy-makers' agenda. Before the rape occurred, the two governments were preparing to agree on the need to come to an agreement on Okinawa. After the rape, policy-makers came up with an explicit agreement to reduce the burden on Okinawans.

What the rape case did not do was to influence overall U.S. policy in Asia. Here agenda setting by the public and media was tempered by the way the foreign-policy establishment makes decisions. The U.S. and Japanese plan for Okinawa does not call for a dramatic restructuring of the American military presence in Asia because rational decision-making and bureaucratic politics would not facilitate such an outcome. Instead, the U.S. military will continue to be based in Japan in an effort to promote stability – and, therefore, prosperity – in the region. The U.S. Marines will stay in Okinawa for the foreseeable future, albeit while occupying less physical space, to help deter the unpredictable military powers of North Korea and China; to meet American obligations to provide for Japan's defense; and to slow down the arms race in Asia. Choosing to stay the course, more or less, in Okinawa appears to be a rational, value-maximizing decision. And, even if it were not, the way bureaucracies function tends to support the status quo. Hence, even as the United States plans to close some bases in Okinawa, it is not likely to pull the bulk of American troops from Okinawa any time soon.

Although further analysis of the Okinawa case is warranted, this study illustrates how applying one theoretical framework – e.g., agenda-setting, rational decision-making or bureaucratic politics – is not enough for a complete understanding of the dynamic between media coverage, foreign policy and international relations. Furthermore, much of the research on media and foreign policy has focused on crisis situations (see for example, Larson, 1986; O'Heffernan, 1991; Serfaty, 1991; Iyengar and Simon, 1993; and Livingston and Eachus, 1995). Okinawa, however, was not a full-blown foreign policy crisis as defined by political scientists, primarily because there was not a high probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser, 1988). Furthermore, a U.S. president did not face a strict deadline for deciding whether to send U.S. troops abroad. The troops were already there. Examining the agenda-setting process on a less salient, less controversial issue can help refine the theory.

Scrutinizing the Okinawa case in terms of agenda-setting, rational decision-making and bureaucratic politics suggests ways those theories complement each other. Further research is needed on to what extent policy-makers perceive negative, or just extensive, media coverage as a cost to be considered in making their cost-benefit analyses. Is media coverage explicitly addressed in those analyses? One possibility is that rather than being seen as a liability, media coverage of a catalyst event such as the Okinawa rape could be perceived as a benefit. It may be, for example, that the publicity and public pressure give policy-makers more freedom to negotiate as the status quo is seriously questioned for the first time in years. Finally, a big question for agenda-setting theory is to what extent extensive media coverage of a noncrisis shakes up a bureaucracy or is just absorbed in its everyday routines. Cohen (1983) suggests a difference between policy-makers' information policies – their efforts to shape news coverage and the public's perceptions of events – and their substantive policies (for example, the U.S. military presence abroad). By examining the links between agenda setting, rational decision-making and bureaucratic politics, scholars may discover why the media's influence on information policy is greater than their influence on substantive policies on noncrisis issues.

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Western Press Coverage of the United Nations Operation in Somalia: A Comparison of Extra- and Intra-media Data Sources

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Abstract

Extra-media data (UNOSOM II press briefing notes) were compared to intra-media data (newspaper content). Newspapers were: the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Guardian.

Findings show that little news was reported and most was "bad." While the focus was on conflict, correspondents did cover non-violent government activities. Finally, the data show that correspondents in the field are more likely to report that which they witness rather than rely on sources, official or unofficial.

Introduction

The demise of the Cold War, the resurgence of the United Nations, the new-found expectations of the United States as the remaining super power and the dependence upon the United Nations and the United States by the developing world for aid and intervention describes, in part, a New World Order with tremendous implications for the American public. For example, the United States intervention in Somalia cost Americans the lives of 44 servicemen and $2 billion. As a result of these implications, it may become increasingly important that the western press adhere to the tenets of social responsibility theory that hold it accountable for providing to its public accurate, fair, balanced, contextual and holistic reporting. According to Horvat (1993), the Hutchins Commission held that, "It is no longer enough to report fact truthfully. It is now necessary to report the truth about the fact" (p. 5).

This paper recognizes that this is not an easy task, especially for international correspondents. In addition to the multitude of forces already facing them, other factors that have further confounded their performance include the transformations in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Iron Curtain, and the Berlin Wall. These complex changes bestowed upon the U.S. press a disconfigured world, not the familiar one with a distinct dividing line between the East and the West, Communism and Democracy, good and bad (Horvat, 1993). Further changes were the emergence of countries that, for the most part, heretofore, had not been heard of by the American public, nor by the press: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia, among others.

Horvat (1993) predicated that this New Order differed from that of the Cold War era in that it is ". . . no longer characterized by superpower conflicts, 'small' nations are commanding an increasing share of what constitutes 'important news' and are having an increasing influence on U.S. policy and policy-making" (p. 5). Distant places will continue to spar for more and more news coverage in this New World Order not characterized by bipolar conflict, and, at the same time influence U.S. politics and policy-making.

For this reason, the United States involvement in Somalia serves as an excellent example of a foreign policy initiative with implications for the American public. It also serves as an excellent example because Somalia is a country that has had, since the inception of the Cold War and because of the Cold War, a long, though intermittent, relationship with the United States. The relationship existed because of superpower rivalry. As backers of UNOSOM II, America as well as many other United Nations member states financed important UN Security Council mandated nation-building activities in Somalia. In addition, the newspaper coverage of the intervention in Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations and the leadership of the United States is ideally suited for study because it represented a first-time effort by these entities to co-jointly implement the United Nations Security Council mandated activities of UNOSOM II.

Purpose

This study will seek to determine whether Western correspondents, in their coverage of UNOSOM II, parted with the familiar Cold War news frames to cover United Nations Security Council mandated development activities. To this end, this gatekeeping study compares two data sources to determine the overall quantity and quality of news available in UNOSOM II press briefing notes (extra-media data sources). The press briefing notes are compared to the quantity and quality of news covered by four newspapers (intra-media data). In addition, in this study topics, slant, and the use of sources are compared in the extra- and intra-media data.

Definitions

Development

In this paper, development is defined as only those UNOSOM II mandated activities: social and safety measures, public health and welfare, political training/education; judicial system, prison, jails, police force; educational facilities, equipment supplies; demining, disarmament; provision of food aid and expansion of supplementary feeding, agriculture, seeds, tools, animal vaccines; and economic infrastructures, banks, stores, trade.

North-South/East-West

Although there are a number of connotations implicit in the terms North-South, for purposes of this paper, the North refers to developed countries and the South refers to developing countries. In this paper, East refers to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The West refers to the United States and its non-communist allies in Europe and the western hemisphere. However, the United States has been the leader of the Western bloc since the 1940s; therefore, in this study, the terms West and the United States will be used interchangeably. East-West are geopolitical terms that define these powers within a Cold War context.

Literature Review

Gatekeeping

While gatekeeping dates back to Lewin (1947), the concept was first applied to newspapers by White (1950). Shoemaker (1991) posited that simply put, gatekeeping is the process by which the many messages that are available in the world get sorted out and transformed into fewer messages which are then made available to consumers. In other words, some messages are selected and some messages are discarded. McNelly (1959); Snider (1967); Donohue, Tichenor and Olien (1972); Brown (1979), and others, including Shoemaker (1991) have ostensibly modified the gatekeeping concept as proffered by White.

Among the revisions to White's original gatekeeping concept are McNelly's (1959). He proposed a model which involved several individual gatekeepers who play different roles in the process. But the flow of foreign news, he said, begins with the correspondent.

Others (Brown, 1979; Bell, 1983; Peterson, 1979; and Shoemaker, 1991) have recognized that there are multiple gatekeepers involved in the production of news, a key point left out of White's study. Brown (1979) also noted that White should have focused on news items selected, not news items discarded.

Shoemaker (1991) offered another gatekeeping observation. She contended that while White (1950) analyzed Mr. Gates from a micro-level of analysis, Lewin's (1947) intent was to explain gatekeeping from a macro-level of analysis, a holistic perspective. In other words, he did not isolate individuals from their surrounding environment. Because correspondents do not work in a vacuum, news content is influenced by a wide array of factors (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Manoff and Schudson (1986) agreed. They observed an interaction between the world and how it is reported, an observation made by Lippmann (1922) years before.

Moreover, Lippmann posited that perceptions of events are also influenced by this interaction. Consequently, he distinguished between 'reality' and 'social reality,' that is, the world external to actual events and our mediated knowledge of those events. Much of what we know comes from mediated knowledge of those events. Because the media are critical to our exposure to the world outside our immediate environment, it is, as argued by Shoemaker and Reese (1996), logical for us to question how closely the mediated world resembles the external world. By using an extra-media data source, this study will attempt to determine this, and, at the same time, consider the influences under which correspondents perform their duties.

Level of influence

As Shoemaker and Reese (1996) suggest, correspondents are influenced by a number of factors. Some of these influences can be evaluated from more than one level (Dimmick and Coit, 1982; McQuail, 1987; Shoemaker, 1987, 1991; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Gans, 1979; Chang and Lee, 1992; Tuchman, 1973, 1978; Carey, 1986) Relevant to the findings in this study are both micro-level and macro-level influences.

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Micro-level influences

At the micro-level of analysis, researchers have focused on individual characteristics (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1994; Johnstone, Skawski, and Bowman, 1976 and Nair, 1991), such as background and the role of background as an important determinant in the selection of the news items that are ultimately selected to make it through the gates. Nair considered age, gender, education and race as among the important variables to consider. Also at this level are values and beliefs held by journalists. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and Gans (1979) are among the researchers that contend that values and beliefs influence news contents. Gans argues that an important value held by international correspondents as it relates to coverage of distant places is ethnocentrism. News consistent with this value receives coverage and news not consistent with this value does not.

Another level of analysis is news content influenced by job routine. At this level, constraints on news content as a function of news production is examined. Researchers (Tuchman, 1973, 1978; Sigal,1986; Carey, 1986; Bennett, 1988 and others) have studied how content is affected by news work. Tuchman (1973 and 1978), suggested that time constraints is one result of routinized news gathering. Sigal (1986), found that because of the beat system, only the official version of a news story is known. Carey (1986) agreed. This reliance on officials as sources distorts reality.

Further, in considering deadline pressure, Carey (1986) said important cause and effect questions do not get asked, such as "how?" and "why?" Finally, Bennett (1988) examined how the everyday practices of journalists and organizations contribute to bias in news content. One bias identified by Bennett is dramatization. Dramatization bias occurs when reporters and editors search for news with dramatic properties and emphasize those properties. This trivializes news content because it fails to show continuity and because it emphasizes crisis.

Macro-level influences

Influences upon the gatekeeper can be analyzed from a supra-national/national level, macro-level. From this dimension, consideration is given to international government workings.

United Nations

At this level, one must also consider the influences upon the source. In this case, that source is UNOSOM II's official spokesman who has a multitude of forces to consider. First and foremost, the UN member nations have influence. Next, the UN Security Council influences the spokesperson. Mandated by the UN Security Council, the secretary-general directed the rebuilding of Somalia, a nation devastated by civil war. Eight objectives were identified by the Security Council and to execute these objectives, the secretary-general appointed his special representative. For the time period under study, Admiral Jonathan Howe of the United States functioned in the capacity of the special representative, commonly referred to as the SRSG. In Somalia, the flow of information was from the SRSG to UNOSOM II's official spokesman and to UNOSOM II's official military spokesman.

New World Information Order debate. Based upon Dimmick and Coit's (1983) model, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (UNESCO) acted as the gatekeeper by providing the venue from which the New World Information Order (NWIO) debate took place. The impetus for that debate resulted, in part, from criticisms of the developing world (many of which were the incipient post-Colonial African countries), about the quantity and quality of news about them in the developed world's papers. Third World countries outlined their concerns in their document to UNESCO. They argued, among other things, that there was an imbalance in the flow of information from the developed world to the developing world, that is, more news flowed from the developed world to the developing world than vice versa. Ethnocentrism was another concern. Most of the news was conveyed through the perspectives of the North, and of the little news conveyed, most was negative.

With regard to these claims, empirical findings on both quantity and quality of news have been mixed (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1981; Charles, Shore and Todd, 1979; Potter, 1987; Haque, 1983; Gerbner and Marvanyi, 1977; Lent, 1977; Riffe and Shaw, 1982 and Kirat and Weaver, 1987). In terms of quantity of news Weaver and Wilhoit (1981) found evidence that the "B" wires of Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI) carried significantly more foreign news from the less developed countries than from the more developed countries.

But other research supports an information imbalance. In their examination of the New York Times coverage of 18 southern Africa nations for the first six months of 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1975, Charles, Shore and Todd (1979) found that coverage was limited to a few countries. These countries received bare mention until they made efforts to gain independence. Potter (1987) examined international news coverage in a sample of eight newspapers representing the nation's prestige press. He found that 72% of the international newshole was devoted to the North and only 7.5% was devoted to countries of the South. Other findings (Hague, 1983; Gerbner and Marvanyi, 1977; and Kirat and Weaver, 1987) have been consistent with Potters.

Studies that have sought to validate criticisms that foreign news covered by the U.S. media is generally "bad" news include Lent (1977). He found that international news coverage by the U.S. media is generally crisis-oriented. Riffe and Shaw (1982) analyzed Third World coverage in two elite newspapers and confirmed that news coverage of the Third World is strongly conflict-oriented. Potter (1987) found that more than half of all Third World news coverage was sensational. Crime was the most frequently coded subcategory. Kirat and Weaver (1987) verified that the North focused on the three "c's" in the Third World: crisis, conflict and crime. Moreover, they reported that the North ignores

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economic matters, international aid, ecological issues, education, scientific and medical achievement. They also found that 60% of all foreign news dealt with violent conflict.

While not everyone agrees with the findings from empirical research, Stevenson (1984), among the dissenters, there is generally agreement that this global debate is far from over. Gerbner, Mowlana, and Nordenstreng (1993) believe that "the changing geo-political circumstances and shifting alliances of the 1990s create the opportunity, and obligation to re-examine the facts, views, and aspirations whose representation fell victim of the Cold War and of the distortions of self-serving mass media" (p. ix). Galtung and Vincent (1992) suggest that "new channels of communication will emerge and these channels will be marked by candid dialogue" (p. 239).

Researchers apparently share the view that the New World Information Order debate is again brewing. While the debate had essentially been quelled since the United States and Great Britain pulled out of UNESCO in 1984 and 1985 respectively, researchers are again citing NWIO considerations as a rationale for their international news studies (Tsang, Tsai and Liu, 1988; Riffe, Aust, Gibson, Viall and Yi, 1993; Riffe, Aust, Jones, Shoemake and Sundar, 1994; Meyer, 1991; and Soderlund, 1992). From this renewed empirical interest in quality and quantity and/or impediments of news flow, it appears that scholars are not satisfied that the issues that initially prompted the global media debate were resolved.

Generally, this study seeks to determine to what extent there was content agreement between extra- and intra-media data sources about the United Nations Security Council resolution 814 (1993) mandated development activities of UNOSOM II between August 1, 1993 and September 30, 1993.

Research Question

Specifically, this study seeks to answer:

Research Question: How does the quantity and quality of coverage about UNOSOM II in UNOSOM II's press briefing notes--extra-media data compare to the coverage by the New

York Times (United States), the Washington Post (United States), the Guardian (London) and the Christian Science Monitor (United States)--intra-media data during the time frame studied?

The following was hypothesized:

Topic

Kirat and Weaver (1987) verified that in covering the Third World, the North not only focuses on crises, conflict and crime, but they ignore economic matters, international aid, education, scientific and medical achievement. As the literature review reveals a number of studies have confirmed these findings; therefore, it would not be expected that United Nation's development topics would be in the content of the intra-media data. Thus,

H1: Extra-media data (UNOSOM II daily press briefing notes) will have more development topics than will the content of intra-media data (newspapers).

For hypotheses 2 and 3, Riffe and Shaw (1982) found that conflict was the most prevalent topic in news coverage of the Third World. Lent (1977) said the coverage is crisis-oriented. Others, among them, Potter (1987) and Kirat and Weaver (1987) have confirmed these findings. Thus,

H2: Extra-media data (UNOSOM II daily press briefing notes) will have less violent political opposition topics than will the content of intra-media data (newspapers).

H3: Extra-media data (UNOSOM II daily press briefing notes) will have more non-violent government news than will the content of intra-media data (newspapers).

Slant

Charles, Shore and Todd (1979) reported that the news of the Third World, is bad. Thus,

H4: Extra-media data (UNOSOM II press briefing notes) will have less unfavorable news than will the content of intra-media data (newspapers).

Source

Sigal (1986) said official sources, the "knowns," are relied on more than on other sources, the "unknowns." Thus,

H5: Intra-media data (newspapers) will rely more on official sources than on non-official sources.

Data

This study used a method proposed by Berelson in 1952: it compared an external measure (press briefing notes) to news content. Extra-media data as proposed by Berelson (1952) and Rosengren (1970) and as used by Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger (1987) ; van Turk (1986); Lang and Lang (1972) and others, provide one aspect, or piece of social reality that would not have been known to us otherwise. As posited by Rosengren (1970), by using this method of comparison, one can determine if a wider universe of news events exists from which correspondents could choose.

Intra-media data

Four newspapers were selected: the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Guardian (London) and the Christian Science Monitor. Each of these newspapers was chosen because they had a correspondent represented in Somalia during the time frame studied. In addition to having correspondents in Mogadishu, what these papers have in common is that all are considered among the world's great papers (Merrill, 1980). These newspapers were represented respectively by Donnatella Lorch, Keith Richburg, Mark Hubband and Robert Press.

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Extra-media data

The press briefing notes were content analyzed. These notes were the compilation of reports from the various UNOSOM II divisions, such as the humanitarian division, the political division, the judicial division, and others about the daily activities of UNOSOM. This information was gathered by a public information assistant. The official spokesman reported daily to the correspondents from these briefings, which were the official recorded activities of UNOSOM II. The press briefing notes also contained the military division's report. The official military spokesman also reported to the correspondents the daily military activities. As part of the briefing notes, they were also analyzed.

Method

UNOSOM II's press briefing notes were the starting point for this research. The press briefing notes were reviewed to determine categories of coverage for topic. UNOSOM's topic categories corresponded to those in the literature, while, at the same time, matching up with the nation-building/development objectives mandated to UNOSOM by United Nation Security Council Resolution 814 (1993) and disseminated via the press briefing notes.

Recording unit: The recording unit was the paragraph. In part, this unit was selected because of the paucity of news coverage.

Context unit: The context unit was the paragraph immediately preceeding and immediately following the recording unit. If categorization could not be ascertained from within this context, the entire news story was the context unit.

Intercoder reliability

The data were first pre-tested by two external judges. The investigator coded both the extra and intra-media data.

At mid-point of the coding process, a test of reliability was conducted. The reliability coefficient yielded by the Holsti formula was .85 overall.

A second reliability test was conducted at the completion of the coding process. This check yielded coefficients of .89 overall.

Intracoder reliability

Tests for intracoder reliability were conducted at the same points in the coding process as the intercoder reliability tests, with overall coefficients of .91 each time.

Category classifications

This study used categories culled from the literature.

Topic variable:

Development. The "development" category consisted of those objectives (as defined earlier) identified by Resolution 814 and the objectives mandated by the Security Council in the fall of 1992.

Violent Political Opposition. For violent political opposition, the following was coded: injuries, killing, shooting, rock throwing, mortar, hard to code and other.

Non-Violent Government. Coded here were topics showing relations among the participating governments, social and other administrative UNOSOM II functions.

Slant. The direction of news content were coded favorable, neutral and unfavorable.

Source. For source cited, these were coded: UNOSOM official spokesperson, official Somali spokesperson, unofficial UNOSOM source, unofficial Somali source, and man on the street.

Findings

With regard to quantity, data from this two-month period yielded 1,662 paragraphs. Of this total, 920 paragraphs (55%) resulted from the extra-media data (UNOSOM II's daily press briefing notes) and 741 cases (44%) resulted from the intra-media data (the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Guardian). These 741 paragraphs were contained in 40 news stories.

Within the intra-media data category, the Washington Post outdistanced the Guardian by a ratio of more than 2:1. The Christian Science Monitor beat the nation's

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newspaper of record, the New York Times. The New York Times generated far less coverage than any of the papers.

While UNOSOM II's military forces were under the command of the United States for much of August, the 741 paragraphs of data reflect only a handful of newspaper stories with a Somalia dateline (see Table 1). Even so, data from this investigation yielded a large sample. Therefore, the alpha level was set at $p < .01$.

With regard to development news content, the hypothesis was supported. There was a statistically significant chi-square difference between extra-media data and intra-media content of UNOSOM II's development activities.

As part of the daily press briefings, the official UNOSOM II spokesman explained to the correspondents the organization's development work undertaken by or to be undertaken by UNOSOM II. If an out-of-town development activity was to occur, notice was given to the reporters, and transportation was provided.

What the data indicate are that this topic (development) was largely ignored by the correspondents. Of the total 1,662 total paragraphs (extra- and intra-media combined), 22% of the topics were development-oriented. But while one-third of the press briefing notes contained development topics, only about 8% (58) of the newspaper content contained development topics (see Table 2).

The data supported Hypothesis 2 as well. There were differences found in the frequencies of violent political opposition topics between newspapers and press briefing notes (see Table 3). The press briefing notes can be explained by considering the inclusion of military reports in the briefings. The portion of the briefing conducted by the military spokesman focused on military operations. During the time period under study, the military component of UNOSOM II was often engaged with various Somali factions.

Hypothesis 3 was also supported. This topic category was non-violent government. An example of non-violent government news includes the reporting of functions undertaken by UNOSOM II administrators to facilitate positive human relations among the 28,000 participating troops. Because this was the first-ever peace-keeping mission and because some of the countries balked at the idea of the United States leading this effort,[1] great effort went into informing the media of routine relations among the troops. This may explain why the United Nations reported on this topic to the extent that it did.

But the findings here were surprising. While earlier studies reported that much of the news about the Third World is conflict and crisis-oriented (Lent, 1977; Riffe & Shaw, 1982; Wilhoit & Weaver, 1983), this study shows that nearly a third of the coverage of UNOSOM II during the time frame under study focused on government-related topics of a non-violent nature. As shown in Table 4, 37% of the non-violent government topics were reported in the press briefing notes and 30% of the non-violent government topics appeared in intra-media data. So, while the extra-media data did provide a greater percentage of non-violent government content, this finding suggest that the intra-media presentation is not as crisis-oriented as previous researchers have suggested.

In addition to the topic variable, slant, and source were two other variables considered.

For the slant variable, it was expected that extra-media data would have less coverage slanted in an unfavorable direction than would intra-media data. The newspapers contained 645 paragraphs slanted in an unfavorable direction, 33% (307) were contained in UNOSOM II's press briefing notes. Again, just as in the case of the topic category of violent political opposition, this noteworthy number of unfavorable references in the press briefing notes may be explained because of the inclusion of the military spokesman's report. While one-third of the total number of unfavorable references were contained in the press briefing notes, the remaining unfavorable content, 67%, was contained in the newspapers (see Table 5).

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[1] Italy and France wanted the leadership role because of their previous colonial relationship with Somalia.

Rosenblum (1979) proffered that news from the Third World is bad. He argued that news out of Africa is about earthquakes, famine, and coups. The data in this study underscore that news from Somalia was more likely to be unfavorable.

Another important finding was that official sources were attributed more than non-official sources, but to an even greater extent, neither official nor non-official sources were relied upon for information about Somalia during this time frame. "None" represented the single most frequent response under the category "other." Because the correspondents were present at many of the events (conflict and fighting), they did not need to depend upon any source for attribution (see Table 6).

Discussion

Central to understanding gatekeeping and influences upon the gatekeeper is understanding what news is selected and what news is discarded; how the news is displayed and what messages are repetitive. To elucidate this body of research, this study bridged the methodological and theoretical gaps of earlier news flow studies by comparing two data sources: extra-media data (UNOSOM II press briefing notes) and intra-media data (newspaper content). In so doing, the data in this study show that Western newspaper coverage of UNOSOM II activities bore a striking resemblance to that of newspaper content of the Third World during the Cold War, to the content as premised by proponents of the New World Information Order, and as supported by many of the early news flow studies: Little news was reported and most was "bad."

The contribution of this study lies in its use of an external criterion as a normative methodological measure. By using such a measure, disparity between coverage and a version of reality can more readily be detected, and was in this study.

Generally, journalists claim that for information to be considered for news selection, the criteria that must be adhered to include: oddity, conflict, prominence, significance, and timeliness (Chang & Lee, 1992; Gans, 1979; Harris, 1961; Mencher, 1995; van Turk, 1986). These criteria comprise often-cited determinants of whether news is selected. Chang and Lee (1992) added to these. They found threat to the United States and world peace, timeliness, and U.S. involvement among the factors affecting gatekeepers' selection of news items. Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger (1987) identified relevance to the United States and deviance if event among predictors of foreign news coverage. These criteria should determine passage of a news item into the channel. However, these criteria seemingly did not guide correspondents in Somalia. Two events can be considered: One event did not require the correspondents to leave the city of Mogadishu and the other did.

On August 21, the "Food for Work" program began and reporters were briefed August 20. The accomplishment of this development goal meant that Somalis were no longer lining up to receive food as they had in the past. Under the "Clean-Up Mogadishu/Food for Work Program," the World Food Program (WFP) supplied 10 tons of grain to each of the 22 feeding sites throughout the city. Bags of grain were distributed three days a week and on alternate days, bags of trash were collected. The elders and clan leaders were in charge of trash collection.

Although reporters did not have to travel from Mogadishu for this on-going activity, there was not one mention of this program in the newspapers under study August 21, 22, 23 or 24. Reporters were informed of the program again September 4 in a press release that highlighted UNOSOM II's progress after 120 days. Again, in the next several days, there was not a single mention of this program that clearly illustrated that UNOSOM II was accomplishing one of its important mandated objectives. Instead, Keith Richburg of the Washington Post filed a 21 paragraph story September 4 (published September 5) from Mogadishu with the following headline: "Somali Eludes UN Hunt:" Ally Warns of Backlash if Warlord Caught."

The second event: On September 16, 1993, the press was notified at the press briefing (and given a press release) that UNOSOM officials would attend. September 18, two concurrent openings of six week-long training workshops for district councilors. These workshops were designed for men and women selected by their communities to serve as representatives on district councils, the first step in establishing a representative government for Somalia. This effort represented a monumental achievement by UNOSOM II's political officers as well as the accomplishment of one of UNOSOM's mandated objectives. With the political officer's assistance, the Belet Weyne, Bulo Burti, Jalasasi and Mahas districts of the Hiran region were formed. This meant that various clans put aside their differences and worked together to rebuild, from a grassroots level, their local government.

UNOSOM II's official spokesman advised the correspondents that approximately 18 seats were available for them on the helicopter. The correspondents were told that one of those openings would occur in Merca in the Lower Shabelle region and the other would be in Belet Weyne in the Hiran region. On September, 18, as a United Nations public information officer, the author of this study accompanied the deputy director of humanitarian affairs to Belet Weyne, a small town about 12 miles from the Ethiopian border. There were approximately 15 unoccupied seats on the helicopter.

The story went unreported. The papers under study were examined for coverage September 18, 19, 20 and 21. There was one story in the Washington Post, dated September 21. Richburg's headline read: "Stuck in Somalia: American Mission is Unclear, Open-ended."

In the Toronto Star[2], the coverage did not correspond to the press briefing notes. On September 18, Paul Watson reported an enterprise story, much like Richburg's September 5 story, about the same subject, Osman Atto. The one-column headline read: "Arms dealer lives good life amid Somali devastation." The slant of the story was unfavorable. The overall theme was conflict and violence: focusing on warring between Somalis and UNOSOM II.

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[2] The Toronto Star had a correspondent, Paul Watson, in Somalia. It was the intention of this author to use this paper in the study, but it was unavailable in time to be included as part of the study. But for purposes of this paper, it will suffice to use it as an example.

This was very much the case in all of the papers studied. Even when deadline pressure and space limitations are not factors and even when Western social norms are being propagated, journalists, the first gatekeepers in the channel, shun news events that do not promise conflict and violence themes. When presented with the choice to cover a development story or an enterprising story that focused on conflict and violence, both Richburg and Watson chose the latter.

Equally important to the finding that correspondents in Somalia preferred to report "bad" news over "good," is the finding that UNOSOM II's official spokesman was not effective in influencing correspondents to cover the mission's nation-building objectives. This is an important finding because it is a widely-held belief that sources can and do "stimulate or constrain the diffusion of information according to their own interests" (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p. 219). Researchers suggest that while reporters say they are skeptical of information emanating from public relations and public information officers, they do rely on them as sources of information (Cutlip, 1962; Cohen, 1963 and van Turk, 1986). Miller (1987) goes a step further. She asserts that journalists and their sources share a symbiotic relationship. That was not the case with the correspondents covering UNOSOM II and the official spokesman.

The explanation may rest within learning theory, which "predicts that expert sources will be effective in persuasion because receivers have been rewarded in the past for taking "'correct'" stands on issues . . ." (Tan, 1985, p. 114). As a career bureaucrat with the U.N., the spokesman was not perceived as an expert or as trustworthy.

The spokesman failed to anticipate journalists' questions and was often caught off guard by them as can be discerned by the following example which took place September 11 when the spokesman responded to questions he had been unable to answer at a press briefing two days before. The question was about the background of Ms. Fattun Hassan, the charge d' affaires of the Mission of the Republic of Somalia to the United Nations. This delayed response came after the spokesman had read from a document Ms. Hassan addressed to UNOSOM. Following the response, a correspondent asked, "Why did you find it newsworthy to read the document issued by Ms. Hassan?" The spokesman responded, "It showed full understanding and support of UNOSOM." The correspondent fired back, "Would you have read it had it been critical of UNOSOM?" The spokesman replied, "I will seek guidance on that." The correspondent asked, "Does that mean that you'll tell us the answer tomorrow?"

Expertise depends on training, experience and intelligence as well as other traits, but it appeared that the correspondents thought the spokesman lacked these qualities. At times the correspondents showed open disdain for his abilities. For example, the following exchange took place when the spokesman was asked by one of the correspondents to respond to U.S. President Jimmy Carter's statement that the United Nations should terminate efforts to kill or capture General Aideed: When the spokesman said he could not, the correspondent asked, "Can you respond to anything?" When the spokesman said he would have to seek guidance, the correspondent asked, "Could this '"guidance-seeking'" process be speeded up to make these press briefings worthwhile?"

These examples clearly illustrate that the spokesman was not regarded as credible. His inability to be perceived as such by the correspondents explains why he was ineffective in communicating the work or matters related to the work of the United Nations. In part, the spokesman was ineffective because of power held by those above him. Influence by those at the supranational level was so great that it left him stripped of any authority to effectively influence the media.

So one could surmise that more than the spokesman, it was the United Nations that failed. As one of UNOSOM's official information gatekeepers, the official spokesman had a multitude of forces to consider. According to a report from the U.N.'s post-hoc

"Lessons Learned Unit,"[3] the spokesman should have had three target groups to which he was responsible for reaching with information: "worldwide distribution, the Somali people, and the U.N. staff.[4] Another important consideration was reaching the diplomatic community.[5] This included the more than 180 U.N. member nations, 28 of which were troop-contributing countries to UNOSOM II. It was important for UNOSOM to convey positive messages to its target groups about the work of the mission, in part, to help counter the negative criticism about the mission, its objectives, and its strategies. Financial backing of the mission was also a consideration. The U.N. depended on its members for support.

Yet no strategic information plan was in place prior to sending information officers to Mogadishu. U.N. personnel were sent to Somalia lacking knowledge of the culture, history and politics, but more importantly, they lacked knowledge of a strategic information plan.

There were other reasons why the correspondents were not influenced by UNOSOM sources. Public Information Officers who were skilled and properly trained were under-utilized. Consequently, some Public Information Officers would engage in passive work strikes. For instance, one public information officer failed to report to work for several days; it was finally learned that he was in Nairobi and had been in his home of Uganda. He was ordered to return to Mogadishu. He said, privately, that no one had given him a job description and he would not work without one. There were also instances in which unqualified people were employed because their governments had applied pressure on the U.N. In one instance, the Information Officer spoke little English and

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[3] The Lessons Learned Unit was established post-UNOSOM II by the U.N. Department of Peace-keeping Operations to provide opportunities for in-depth study and analysis of that and other U.N. missions.

[4] The failure of UNOSOM's mission can be blamed, in part, on its failure to have a developed information plan. That is why this sentence is phrased as it is. These target groups were identified well into the mission's life. As a public information officer, the author was sent to Somalia after meeting at headquarters with two supervisors (one was the spokesman), both of whom had a "wait and see" strategy.

[5] To this end, this author planned and implemented the first newsletter outlining UNOSOM's work.

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wrote even less.[illegible] This point is made only to illustrate the misuse of human resources in such an important international endeavor and to point out that more appropriate utilization of information personnel may have yielded an improved information outcome.

Without a clear-cut information strategy; with ill-prepared, under-utilized and unqualified personnel, and with a powerless official spokesman, UNOSOM II could do little to affect international news content. These constraints, while pertinent, do not absolve the media from providing more fair, balanced, contextual coverage of UNOSOM II's activities; nor do they explicate what the correspondents used as criteria in their selection of news items. The media were provided with many opportunities to cover development activities in both Mogadishu and the outlying areas of Somalia. In fact, some areas outside of Mogadishu were less threatening for the correspondents than were areas in the south of Mogadishu (the Washington Post's correspondent, Richburg, developed an enterprise story about a man who lived in the south Mogadishu), and ample opportunity was provided to the correspondents to cover these areas.

Conclusion

Kraus and Davis (1976) defined methods as a set of procedures that permit the observation of phenomena to temporarily draw useful conclusions. They suggest that research findings be of pragmatic and meaningful utility. To that end, this content analysis is important to the field of journalism mass communication because it has yielded important and practical information to the academician.

This study shows the importance of utilizing an external criterion for measuring news content to make normative statements as to whether substantial or appropriate amounts of coverage are being given to an issue, as suggested by Rosengren (1970). By using an external measure, this study showed that there was good news to report, but correspondents failed to cover it. This disputes Stevenson and Gaddy's (1984) assertion that all of the available news of the developing world is bad.

[illegible] All information materials and briefings were in English.

While this study confirms that there is a tendency for Western correspondents to focus on conflict, it also revealed that nearly a third of the coverage of UNOSOM II focused on government-related topics of a non-violent nature.

Another important finding is that correspondents relied more on eyewitness accounts than on any source of information about UNOSOM II, but when using sources, they tended to rely on official sources as findings from previous research have reported.

Finally, this systematic study supports the contentions that Western news coverage has not changed post-Cold War. It still focuses on the three c's and avoids topics that deal with substantive, development issues.

APPENDIX

Table 1

Frequencies: quantity of coverage

	n	%
Extra- and Intra- Media		
Press Briefing Notes	920	55
New York Times	55	3
Washington Post	378	23
Christian Science Monitor	140	8
Guardian	167	10
Total	1,660[7]	100

Table 2

Development Topics Cross-Tabulated by Data Source

	Press Briefing Notes		Newspapers	
	n	%	n	%
Development	301	33	58	8
Not mentioned	619	67	678	91
Total	920	100	736[a]	99

$\chi^2 = 162.34$, 1 df, $p < .001$

[a]Indicates missing cases

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[7] Totals of less than 1660 are due to missing values.

Table 3

Violent Political Opposition Topics Cross-Tabulated by Data Source

	Press Briefing Notes		Newspapers	
	n	%	n	%
Violent political opposition	229	25	239	32
Not mentioned	691	75	503	68
Total	920	100	742	100

$\chi^2 = 11.60$, 1 df, $p < .001$

Table 4

Non-Violent Government Topics Cross-Tabulated by Data Source

	Press Briefing Notes		Newspapers	
	n	%	n	%
Non-violent government mentioned	339	37	221	30
Not mentioned	581	63	521	70
Total	920	100	742	100

$\chi^2 = 9.08$, 1 df, $p < .01$

Table 5

Slant Cross-Tabulated by Data Source

	Extra-media Data		Intra-media Data	
	n	%	n	%
Unfavorable	307	33	645	87
Other	611	67	93	13
Total	918	100	738	100

Note. A discrepancy resulted in total because of six missing cases.

$\chi^2 = 487.34$, 1 df, $p < .001$

Table 6

Sources Cited Cross-Tabulated by Newspapers

	New York Times		Washington Post		Christian Science Monitor		Guardian		
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	Total %
Official	4	.5	96	13	28	4	54	7	25
Other	51	7.0	282	38	112	15	113	15	75
Total	55	7.5	378	51	140	19	167	23	100

Note. Percentages were rounded to nearest whole number; therefore, they may not add up to 100.

$\chi^2 = 16.01$, 3 df, $p < .001$

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Telling the Truth or Framing a Crisis?: Comparative Analysis of the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Threat as Portrayed in Two American and Two South Korean Newspapers

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Abstract

This study investigated how two elite American newspapers and two leading South Korean newspapers used different news frames in covering the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. The study unsupported a key hypothesis that the two American papers would focus more on the confrontational aspect of the crisis than the two South Korean dailies. But another main hypothesis that the two American newspapers would more fervently advocate sanctions against North Korea than the two South Korean newspapers was supported.

Telling the Truth or Framing a Crisis?: Comparative Analysis of the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Threat as Portrayed in Two American and Two South Korean Newspapers

I: Introduction

Background of Study

A "second Korean War," according to some U.S. news media accounts, was looming in the summer of 1994 over North Korea's refusal to accept international inspection of its nuclear programs. The United States was threatening to call for international sanctions against North Korea if North Korea resisted the inspection to the end.

At the same time, the North warned that it would consider sanctions against it an act of war. Adding to the uncertainty, the United States was refusing to "rule out a preemptive strike" at the North Korean nuclear sites (Phillips, 1994, A1). The American media, among them Time and U.S. News & World Report, were reporting as if a war would break out at any time, reminiscent of American news reports on the eve of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Time, in a June 13, 1994, article titled "What if . . . war breaks out in Korea? . . . " (Smolowe, p. 32) reported on a war scenario. The article was accompanied by a map showing how attacks and counterattacks could take place. The map was scarily reminiscent of the war scenario map which appeared on U.S. news media just before the Gulf War broke out. Quoting Pentagon officials, the Time report said that all key ports and airfields in South Korea were "being fine-tuned for action," and "fuel supplies and depots are being topped off at maximum capacity" (p. 32).

A week after the Time report, U.S. News & World Report published a similar yet more graphic article, titled "The Most Dangerous Place on Earth." The story included a map named "A second Korean War," in which it graphically showed how the war could unfold. The magazine titled another article about Korean tension "Could it become a nuclear war?" (Galloway & Auster, 1994, p. 44).

Leading American dailies such as the New York Times and the Washington Post were no exception. They frequently carried opinion columns from the hawks in Washington who were urging a preemptive military strike at the North's nuclear sites.

The reality in Seoul, however, was far different from the American news media's accounts. There was little sense of crisis, and people were leading normal lives. The mood was just business-as-usual. Korean people in Seoul were dismissing the North Korean threats as nothing more than "typical bluster from an isolated enemy that would not dare attack lest it suffers ferocious retaliation at the hands of U.S. military" (Blustein, 1994, pp. C1, C7).

The seemingly overstated reports of the American news media left South Korean government officials desperate to dispel the alarm being hyped up by the American media. The South Korean Ministry of Information had to issue a special statement on June 14 calling on foreign news media "to depict accurately the current national

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security situation . . . so as to preclude unnecessary anxiety among the foreign community" (Reid, 1994, p. A33).

Purpose and Significance of Study

This study was designed to determine whether the two leading American newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, covering the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, focused more on the confrontational aspect and advocated the U.S. military action against North Korea than did the two leading South Korean dailies, the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-A Ilbo.

The importance of this study to find out how the two elite American newspapers with enormous global influence covered the international crisis is very significant. The American news media can sway domestic and international opinion and change the direction of an international crisis, depending on how they frame and cover it. In fact, the United States' intervention in international conflicts has traditionally been preceded by leading American news media's reports overstating the crisis or favoring the U.S. intervention, as evidenced by the Spanish-American War at the turn of the 19th century and the Yugoslavian conflict (Wiggins, 1995; Carpenter, 1995).

While there was much debate about the objectivity of Western news media reports about an international crisis, not many studies have been conducted. The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis provides an excellent case for such a study in a new world order in which the United States has become the sole global superpower.

II: Literature Review

Theoretical Background of Research

This study's main theoretical framework came from the news framing concept advanced by Irving Goffman (1974) and popularized by Entman (1993). Framing—in short, promotion of a certain aspect of reality over others through selection or exclusion of words—lends itself to this study designed to find out how American and South Korean news media employed different frames in coverage of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis.

The news framing concept postulates that framing serves to make some aspects of a story or a situation more or less salient than others and thus to promote a certain audience reaction (Entman, 1993). Through framing, the story of an international crisis, for example, can look more serious than it is, or vice-versa. Depending on how a situation or an event is framed, popular interpretation or reaction could, of course, be totally different.

As such, news framing has enormous implications for reporting an international crisis like the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. In other words, just the presence of particular inflammatory words, such as a "second Korean war" and a "preemptive strike" in a story about the crisis situation, can create a popular impression that the situation is extremely dangerous.

Kuypers (1995) found that framing has more powerful effect when it comes to a certain issue to which people have limited, if any, first-hand access, such as an international crisis event. This implies that the American people, being denied direct access to the 1994 North Korean crisis, "were likely to interpret the issue as the news media framed it for them" (p. 88).

The power that framing has on popular interpretation of a certain issue dealt with by news media has been corroborated by a few recent studies such as that by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) which examined the shift of popular support as stories about proposed mandatory testing for HIV-holders were differently framed. Sniderman et al. discovered that people supported "the rights of persons with AIDS when the issue is framed to accentuate civil liberties considerations—and supports . . . mandatory testing when the issue is framed to accentuate health considerations" (p. 52).

Earlier, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) showed how prioritizing or marginalizing of certain aspects of issues over others could drastically change popular interpretation of reality. He used an unusual Asian epidemic as an imaginary study case in which study subjects were offered four alternative programs to combat the imaginary disease. Popular choice of the program to combat the epidemic shifted drastically depending on how the possible consequences of the outbreak of the disease were framed.

American Media's Exaggerated Coverage of International Crises

Western media's penchant for crises has long been a major issue of international debate. The bigger issue in the debate, however, seems to be some Western media's tendency to exaggerate an international conflict into a crisis by focusing on a dim possibility of a military confrontation.

Some scholars claimed that Western media tended to report even an ordinary event as if it was a crisis event. Richstad and Anderson (1981) argued that "even non-crisis news is often reported with undertones of crisis" (xix).

Echoing the point of Richstad and Anderson (1981), Weaver (1994) claimed that journalists in collaboration with officials tended to present ordinary daily events as "crises" and ordinary days as "times of great excitement and historical consequence" (p. 2).

Western media's crisis-oriented reporting of foreign news may well be supported by an American journalist's saying, "Why the hell should anyone but a specialist be interested in the Congo when there is not a crisis?" (Yu & Lutter, 1964, p. 9).

Godkin (1898, as cited in Wilkerson, 1967) said that media sometimes did more than overstate an international crisis. Godkin (1898) claimed that media frequently advocated war in the hope that a new war would secure them sensational, exciting news on a daily basis.

The controversy over whether, at a time of a crisis, news media employed sensational words or distorted facts to create a war psyche has been ripe, but the controversy still remains a controversy in the absence of a full-scale research into the issue. There are some early studies of the issue, but they were at best fragmentary, and failed to grasp the entire issue. The following international crises are a few examples of how American media manipulated the American public in favor of a war.

III: Political Background

Background of 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis

The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis headed for its climax in late March of 1994 as the United States began to round up international support at the United Nations to take punitive actions against North Korea, including economic sanctions, and began to bolster its military strength in South Korea. The U.S. action came amid North Korea's repeated warning that it would consider a sanction against it a declaration of war.

The U.S. move drew immediate response from North Korea. On March 24, 1994, the North Korean government reiterated its threat in a radio broadcast that it would view economic sanctions as " a declaration of war against us and will strongly deal with it" (Gordon, 1994, p. A13).

Responding to the North's threat, the United States began to reinforce its forces in South Korea. The United States' military buildup began with the dispatch of Patriot anti-missile interceptors to South Korea despite South Korea's opposition. South Korea, however, had opposed the U.S. move to introduce Patriot missiles for fear of provoking the North into hostilities.

While North Korea was reiterating its threats of war, some American hawks such as Brent Scowcroft, who was the national security adviser to President George Bush, were calling for a preemptive attack against North Korea's nuclear sites.

In addition to dispatching Patriots, Defense Secretary William Perry ordered the Air Force to build up reserve ammunition and spare parts at U.S. bases in South Korea. The U.S. Army began to replace older helicopters in Korea with new Apache attack helicopters (Gordon, 1994, p. I9).

On June 2, the U.S. called for global economic sanctions against North Korea after international inspectors said that North Korea had destroyed evidence of whether they diverted material for a nuclear bomb. North Korea immediately reacted to the U.S. move with a more ominous threat. On June 6, the North issued a new statement warning that "sanctions mean outright war" ("Warning," 1994, p. A7).

This warning created the first major concern in South Korea, which had been inured to North's often too inflated language. South Korean Prime Minister Lee Young Dug, after holding an emergency meeting of the heads of various security agencies, announced that "now is the time to prepare the people for a series of contingency steps" ("Warning," 1994, p. A7).

In a first-step sanction, the IAEA announced on June 10 that it would suspend its technical assistance to the North. North Korea responded by announcing its immediate withdrawal from the international organization. On June 12, Washington announced that South Korea and Japan had agreed to its plan to start economic sanctions against the North. The United States had bolstered its

37,000-strong ground and air forces in South Korea by deploying aircraft carriers, squadrons of fighters, as well as Patriot air defense systems into the South.

The crisis came to an unexpected end after former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to meet North Korea leader Kim Il-sung to persuade him to accept international inspections. The North expressed its willingness to temporarily freeze its nuclear programs, and Washington responded by agreeing to open a high-level talks the following month in Geneva (Jehl, 1994).

Research Hypotheses

Based on the above review of the previous studies, as well as the political background, the hypotheses of this study were established as follows:

Hypothesis 1: The two American newspapers will frame the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis in a more conflict-oriented fashion than the two South Korean newspapers. In other words, the American newspapers will have a significantly higher proportion of conflict-oriented stories than the South Korean newspapers.

Hypothesis 2: The American newspapers will publish a significantly higher proportion of stories favoring sanctions and military action against North Korea than the two South Korean newspapers.

Hypothesis 3: The South Korean newspapers will carry a significantly higher proportion of stories favoring a negotiated settlement of the crisis than the American dailies.

Hypothesis 4: The American papers will have a significantly higher proportion of stories which have overtones of the danger of war than the South Korean newspapers.

IV: Methodology

This study conducted a cross-cultural content analysis of the news coverage of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis published between April 1, 1994 and June 21, 1994, in two leading American dailies, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and the two leading South Korean dailies, the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-A Ilbo.

This study examined all front-page and inside-page straight news stories, news analyses, editorials, opinion columns, plus captioned photos and graphics from the above-mentioned publications.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is an entire story. The justification for using an entire article as a unit of analysis is that anything less than the entire story cannot determine accurately the overall tone, impression, and meaning of an entire story.

Sampling

Sampling was necessary only for Chosun and Dong-A stories, whose number was too large, compared to the two American dailies under study. For the New York Times and the Washington Post, all of their articles published during the study period were analyzed. Systematic sampling was employed to sample 156 Chosun articles which were related to North Korean nuclear crisis and published during the study period. Through the same sampling method, 148 stories were picked from Dong-A.

Coding System

Theme of Story. All stories were classified into two major categories: (1) conflicted-oriented stories and (2) solution-oriented stories. When a story did not belong to either of them, it was coded into (3) mixed/neutral stories.

If a story gave an impression that the crisis was likely to lead or was heading to a military conflict, it was coded as a "conflict-oriented" one. If an article left an impression that the crisis can be resolved through negotiation, it was coded as a "solution-oriented" one.

A story is considered "conflict-oriented" if it has any of the following topics in a prominent spot (such as a headline or lead paragraph): (1) North Korea's threat of war, (2) U.S. warning of or call for military strike, (3) U.S. military deployment or war scenario in Korea, (4) war alert in South Korea, (5) North Korea's defiance of international inspection, (6) North Korea's nuke programs, and (7) sanctions against North Korea.

An article was classified into "solution-oriented" if it created a prospect for a negotiated settlement. A solution-oriented story addressed the following topics in the headline, lead paragraph, or any other prominent spot: (1) North Korea's cooperation with international inspection or gesture toward negotiated settlement of the confrontation, (2) U.S. or South Korea's similar gesture, (3) mediation efforts by Jimmy Carter or China.

Favoring Sanction. All editorials and commentary pieces were additionally examined to determine whether they had a tone of favoring economic sanctions or military action.

Tone of Danger of War. All articles were evaluated on whether they had strong or weak overtones of danger of war. Overtone here refers to the tone of danger of war which a reader gets of a story.

Reliability

The inter-coder reliability test was administered on the 123 randomly selected stories, which was approximately 27% of the 455 stories analyzed for this study. The overall inter-coder reliability coefficient by Holsti's (1969) formula was 0.90.

The Holsti's formula used by this study is as follows:

Reliability = $2M/(N1 + N2)$

M = the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree.

N1 + N2 = The total number of coding decisions made by two coders independently.

V: Results

Did the American newspapers focus more the conflictual aspect of the crisis than the South Korean newspapers?

The Times covered conflict-oriented topics in 42.2% of its total stories, compared to the Post's 47%, the Chosun's 41.7%, and the

Dong-A's 43% (see Table 1). Solution-oriented topics appeared in 20% of the Times' total stories, against to 13% of Post's, 9% of the Chosun's, and 13% of the Dong-A's.

A chi-square test failed to support the existence of any significant differences among the four newspapers in the thematic composition of stories (the Pearson coefficient of contingency=0.24). Thus the hypothesis 1 that there would be a significant discrepancy was rejected.

Table 1

Company-By-Company Comparison in Theme of News

Row Pct	Conflict-Oriented	Solution-Oriented	Mixed/ Neutral	Total
Times	42.2%	20.5	37.3	100% (N=83)
Post	47.1	13.2	39.7	100% (N=68)
Chosun	41.7	9.0	49.4	100% (N=156)
Dong-A	42.6	12.8	44.6	100% (N=148)
Total	N=95	N=59	N=201	100% (N=455)

Note. Chi-square=7.97 with df at 6; p>0.05

When compared by nationality, the outcome was similar. In a little surprise, the American newspapers had a slightly higher proportion of solution-themed stories than the South Korean newspapers, as is shown in Table 2.

This finding was certainly contrary to the pre-study expectation and popular belief in South Korea that the two American newspapers might have carried a higher proportion of conflict-oriented stories than the South Korean newspapers. The reasoning for the assumption was that the American newspapers might have tried to overstate the crisis as the U.S. government tried to bluff North Korea into accepting an unconditional international inspection of its nuclear sites, whereas the South Korean news media did the opposite—to calm down people.

Table 2

Comparison in News Theme by Nationality

Row Pct	Conflict-Oriented	Solution-Oriented	Mixed/ Neutral	Total
Times & Post (USA)	44.4%	17.2	38.4	100% (N=151)
Chosun & Dong-A (South Korea)	42.1	10.9	47.0	100% (N=304)
Total	N=195	N=59	N=201	100% (N=455)

Note. Chi-square=4.97 with df at 2; p>0.05

However, such an assumption was not completely groundless. Of the 195 conflict-themed stories published on the four newspapers, 46% originated from the United States, whereas 34% came from South Korea.

Did the American newspapers focus more on stories favoring sanctions than the South Korean dailies or vice versa?

The hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested through analysis of only the four newspapers' editorial and op-columns. The rationale for doing so is that other types of stories, particularly straight news, usually report facts without opinions, and thus to accurately determine whether they have any content favoring sanctions or any other actions against North Korea certain policy line was judged to be impossible.

As shown in Table 3, the American newspapers favored sanctions or military actions against North Korea in 29.4% of their total number of editorials and Op-column pieces, whereas the South Korean newspapers supported sanctions against the Stalinist state in 15% of total. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported.

In the stories favoring negotiated settlement, the American newspapers outnumbered the South Korean newspapers 20.6% to zero percent. As a result, Hypothesis 3 was rejected.

Table 3

Comparison in Stories Favoring Sanctions by Nationality

Row Pct	Favoring Sanctions	Favoring Dialogue	Mixed/ Neutral	Total
Times & *Post* (USA)	29.4%	20.6	50.0	100% (N=34)
Chosun & *Dong-A* (South Korea)	15.0	--	85.0	100% (N=20)
Total	N=13	N=7	N=34	100% (N=54)

Note. Pearson Chi-square coefficient=7.65 with df at 2; $p<0.05$

These hypotheses were based on an assumption that both the American and South Korean newspapers reflected their respective governments' foreign policies and popular sentiment in coverage of the crisis. Whereas the U.S. government was enthusiastic about seeking sanctions against North Korea, the South Korean government was hesitant about following the U.S. lead for fear of war. South

Korea took seriously North Korea's threat to start a war if any sanctions were imposed.

Did the American newspapers focus more on stories implying danger of war?

In the proportion of stories with overtones of danger of war, the South Korean newspapers outscored the American newspapers 26.6% to 17.9%. Thus, the hypothesis 4 was rejected. Rather the reverse of the hypothesis was supported (see Table 4).

Table 4

Comparison in Tone of Danger of War by Nationality

Row Pct	Strong	Weak	Total
Times & Post (USA)	17.9%	82.1	100% (N=151)
Chosun & Dong-A (South Korea)	26.6	73.4	100% (N=304)
Total	N=108	N=347	100% (N=455)

Note. Pearson Chi-square=4.28 with df at 1; p<0.05

VI: Conclusions and Discussions

Conclusion

This study based its hypotheses primarily on the assumption that American news media would focus more on the confrontational aspect of the crisis than South Korean news media. In other words, it was hypothesized that the American news media would project the crisis in a more ominous light than the South Korean media in tandem with the

U.S. foreign policy goal--to coerce North Korea into dropping its opposition to unconditional inspection of its nuclear sites.

As far as the quantitative findings were concerned, the assumption proved to be mostly unsupported. The proportion of conflict-oriented news stories and solution-oriented stories in the four newspapers examined for this study was surprisingly balanced.

The results were inconsistent with the previous research findings as well as Third World scholars' claims that Western news media, particularly the American news media, tended to focus on crisis or conflict when they reported an international event.

Rather, the findings appear to partly support Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) claim that crisis and conflict news is every media's preference in either Western or non-Western news media. As Shoemaker and Reese reasoned, the world is usually free of conflicts and harmonious, and thus people have no reason to be interested in things that are harmonious and peaceful.

The findings also gave some credence to Merrill's (1981) argument that the non-Western world countries' editors complaining about predominantly negative content of the news in the Western news media were having their own reporters write and submit stories of the "same genre" (p. 158). It is worthy of note that while the South Korean government was warning Western media not to overstate the 1994 situation, the South Korean newspapers did cover the situation in a similar way, as was revealed in the quantitative analysis.

The findings of the research also seem to be partly consistent with Cohen's (1963) view that the American press, in times of national crisis, advocate the government's interventionist policies.

As was reflected in their editorials and commentaries, the two American newspapers, particularly the Post, fervently favored sanctions or military action against North Korea, whereas the two South Korean newspapers kept silence.

Overall, the findings of this study do not totally support or invalidate any previous theories on the cross-cultural comparison of international crisis reporting. One reason for the conclusion might be that the findings of this study are mixed.

The bigger reason might be the fast-changing global media environment, characterized by the growing influence of Western media, particularly American news media, on the news content of foreign news media. In a situation where the American news reports increasingly are carried by foreign news media even without any editorial change in the content almost every other day, to compare news contents between the American newspapers and the foreign news media may have less meaning.

In fact, the two South Korean newspapers printed the two American newspapers' reports as many as 22 times, and 21 of them were conflict-oriented. The fact may as well lend much credence to the above argument.

Contribution to Research

This research made several improvements over the previous research in the coverage of international crises. The improvements involved key research designs depending on which the research outcome can be totally different.

First, this study analyzed two American newspapers and two South Korean newspapers, instead of the usual one from each country. The rationale for using two newspapers from each of the two countries is that there is a likelihood that any one newspaper may represent a highly skewed sample which is far from representative. In this case, the credibility of the study would be in great jeopardy.

The occasionally dramatic discrepancies between the two American newspapers, and between the two South Korean newspapers themselves, as was exposed in the previous results section of this study, may well prove that this is not just a minor concern. In reality, many previous cross-cultural analyses of reporting international crises used one newspaper from each of the countries selected for the studies, despite the possibility that selection of newspapers can drastically alter the outcome of the study.

Qualitatively, this study used the leading vernacular newspapers of South Korea, instead of English-language newspapers in the country frequently used by most previous research involving South Korea. Most previous studies involving newspapers of non-English-speaking countries used the countries' English-language newspapers which are usually not the leading papers and also differ significantly from the countries' mainstream news media.

In most cases, English-language newspapers of non-English-speaking countries serve foreign residents or a small number of Western-educated elites, and are often very different from the vernacular newspapers in their news content. Continued use of English-language newspapers of non-English-speaking countries, despite such a problem, is in most cases motivated by convenience. Of course, a researcher who comprehends only the English language may have no alternative.

Probably the largest contribution to research made by this study was use of a new categorization system. Most previous research on international crisis reporting classified news stories into three categories in terms of tone of news content: (1) positive news, (2) negative news, and (3) mixed or neutral news. In contrast, this study divided a story into (1) conflict-oriented news, and (2) solution-oriented news, and (3) mixed or neutral news.

The rationale for trying a completely new classification system is that the positive vs. negative division is too broad, and is inadequate for the purpose of this study, i.e., to determine whether the two American newspapers focused more on the conflict aspect of the crisis than the two South Korean newspapers. In addition, most of news about a crisis is usually negative in tone, and thus the positive vs. negative classification is unfit for analyzing news reports of a crisis or other event of a dominantly negative nature.

Limitations and Future Agenda

This study has several limitations. First, this study examined the news content only of print news media, not that of broadcasting news media. The study results might have been greatly different if broadcasting news, particularly CNN reports, was included in the study. CNN was accused by South Koreans to air what they called "sensational" reports.

Second, this study was primarily based on the coder's subjective judgment, which is a common shortcoming of content analysis, though every effort was made to increase reliability. In that sense, this study would have been more complete if it had included a survey to determine what people of the two countries thought of the way the crisis was reported by the four newspapers. The polling idea was abandoned because it was judged that most people are unlikely to have a good memory of a crisis that occurred four years ago.

Finally, the findings of this study should not be generalized to different international crises in different regions. It is because of the special relationships between the United States and South Korea, particularly in security areas. South Korea largely depends on the United States for its security, and such a strong alliance may have influenced South Korean news media to reflect the U.S. foreign policy in reporting the crisis to an unusual degree.

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Media, Democracy and Human Rights in Argentina

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ABSTRACT

Media, Democracy and Human Rights in Argentina

This paper examines how the constraints of Argentina's mass media limit conditions for a healthy democracy. Media politics, corporate concentration, foreign ownership and market constraints are viewed as new censors of information in Argentina. In addition, vestiges of authoritarian control such as government regulation and threats against the press continue to plague the mass media. These conditions limit discussion of human rights issues while undermining basic rights to pursue, gather and disperse information.

Media, Democracy and Human Rights in Argentina

Media and Democracy

The media are an intricate part to a democracy. At least two basic and fundamental conditions need to be present for a healthy democracy to exist and flourish. The first condition requires the unrestrained ability to pursue, gather and disperse information freely. The second condition, directly related to the first, consists of an informed public. Decisions pertinent to social, economic, military, political and cultural policies need to be rooted and influenced by a diverse spectrum of well researched ideas. The media are often the only check on social and governmental institutions in addition to the only means of communication at a mass level. It is in a democratic government's best interest to protect the public's ability to acquire and freely disperse information. Any deterrent to the two basic conditions questions the standing of a democratic system.

Argentina has recently returned to "democracy" after a brutal military dictatorship which lasted for several years. The return, however, still contains several vestiges of authoritarianism in regard to mass media systems and freedom of the press. Although direct government censorship does not exist anymore and the media can report almost everything that happens in the country; the press is far from free (Lavieri, 1996, p.188). According to an article published by the New York Times "Freedom of the press remains a goal rather than a reality across much of the region [Latin America], and often the antagonists of free speech are the democratically elected governments promising to protect it" (Sims, 1997, p.A16). The ability to pursue, gather and disperse information is still a goal rather than a protected right. Several trends in Argentina's media systems threaten Argentina's democracy since free elections took place in 1983 ending a bloody dictatorship where some 30,000 people were killed. Before discussing current obstacles to Argentina's democracy in relation to the media, a brief introduction to the role of the press during the "dirty war" - occurring between 1976-1983, is needed to place the media in a historical context.

In general, the media in Argentina did not actively confront or expose the atrocities committed by the military government (Andersen, 1993; Carlson, 1996; Knudson, 1997; Nino, 1996). Fear of death, economic interests and desires not to disturb social structures are cited as the main reasons behind the presses collaboration with the military regime (Knudson, 1997, p.96). At least eighty four journalists were killed during this time period while another 400 fled the country if they could afford it (Knudson, 1997, pp. 93-94). The military also sent out "instructions" to the media prohibiting references to kidnappings, disappearances, police or security men unless such information was sent out by means of military communiqués. The military also took over the Federacion de Trabajadores de Prensa (Press Workers Federation) as well as the government news agencies Saporiti and Telam. In addition, military members often surreptitiously doubled as journalists (Andersen, 1993, p.216). Various laws were also passed to silence people with prison terms of up to 10 years. Despite the state terror and censorship, a few brave and courageous people publicly spoke out against the atrocities committed by the government. These people risked being tortured or killed. They also risked the lives of family members and friends. Fortunately some people persevered and survived.

Two papers were active in reporting the events carried out by the regime. The Buenos Aires Herald, a newspaper printed in English, and La Opinion, a liberal newspaper, investigated several of the deaths and disappearances (Knudson, 1997; Lavieri, 1996). The Buenos Aires Herald probably got away with it due to its limited audience; only English speakers could understand its contents. La Opinion did not publish as many stories on the dictatorship because the editor of the paper, Jacobo Timerman, was abducted and tortured until he eventually fled the country. The Herald was also under a lot of pressure not to publish articles through death threats. Media coverage diminished as death threats and disappearances took their tolls.

The only way the pubic was able to communicate with itself about what was going on was through purchasing space in newspapers. Although not a common occurrence, these "advertisements" were printed with the names of the disappeared after the peak years of killing occurred. At least one paper - La Prensa - published them (Knudson, 1997). These "advertisements" may have been influential in the creation of free elections in 1983.

The 1983 elections created a positive environment for the return of several democratic characteristics in terms of political freedom and the media. Newspapers began to publish and acknowledge the deaths involved with the dictatorship. Direct government censorship no longer dominated while other media began to appear voicing diverse opinions. These outcomes of the transition to democracy obviously helped foster a more pluralistic environment with regard to information.

However, new threats to democracy were on the horizon as Argentina entered the 1990s. Media politics, corporate concentration, foreign ownership and market restraints became the new censors of information in Argentina. These restraints can be seen as contributing to self censorship. Unfortunately, tactics aimed at censoring information also became somewhat institutionalized for elite powerholders leftover from the dictatorship. Threats and aggressions toward the press have continued and do not appear to be disappearing. The Argentine government has also vehemently tried to control information through numerous regulations aimed at limiting journalist's rights to gather and disseminate information.

Media Politics

Despite the limited conditions conducive for a robust democracy, Argentina can be characterized with a low to moderate level of diversity in terms of media politics. A few investigative media publications are available in addition to an influx of illegal radio stations. However, the majority of media are conservative with ties to either the government or the church. These ties are important to note as both institutions supported the military regime between 1976-1983.

La Razon, an evening paper allegedly linked with the intelligence services, is known for its secret recordings of ex-president Alfonsin's deliberations about human rights abusers (Nino, 1996, p.68). Its owner, Carlos Sapadone, a former government official, is also accused of making his personal fortune while in public office (Lavieri, 1996). La Nacion, one of Argentina's most circulated dailies, is described as a conservative paper representative of Argentina's large landowning interests (Andersen, 1993, p.140). It is often labeled the voice of the establishment. La Nacion also has close ties to the Catholic church and often sides with its position on political issues (Langan, 1991). La Prensa, also a conservative daily, is owned by Ambassador Amalia Lacroze de Fortabat, a wealthy right wing business woman who agrees with the majority of the government's economic policies (Lavieri, 1996). El Cronica is the newsprint version of sensational television news with rape, murder, and fire coverage while two other papers, Ambito Fananciero and El Cronista, cover financial issues and give support to the government (Lavieri, 1996). According to the Argentine business magazine Noticias, Eduardo Eurnekian, the former owner of El Cronista, has been very impressed with President Menem's way of thinking ("Cable a Tierra," 1993)[1]. Neither of these papers frequently deal with issues of government corruption.

Two papers stand out within the Argentine media market. El Clarin, which has one of the largest circulations and Pagina 12. Despite the Clarin's immense vertical and horizontal integration within its media outlets, it has a reputation for having a center-left political position. Human rights groups also have a fair relationship with this media conglomerate. Nonetheless, it does not practice anything akin to day-by-day aggressive investigative reporting (Langan, 1991). Pagina 12 on the other hand, is one of the few papers which practices investigative journalism and exposes corruption. It is an independent and locally based newspaper.

Currently, the majority of media are private but the government has a substantial number of media outlets operating under the auspices of the "public media." The government owned media are tools of powerholders which rarely contain self critical content. The larger corporate media that dominate Argentina rarely practice investigative journalism as it puts them at risk politically and financially. These firms also hire journalists who uphold the objectives of the corporation. Media owners are entitled to select journalistic employees who support the ideas and commercial objectives of the larger conglomerate or media corporation (Haas, 1996, p.26). Despite the limitations associated with corporate control and media politics, Argentine media publications are available throughout society.

Argentina has a large and well developed media system which is concentrated in and on Buenos Aires. The provinces have their own newspapers, but the majority of news comes from the capital region. Here is the newspaper circulation.

Number of People who read the Paper:

Clarin: 1,606,000
La Nacion: 293,000
Ambito: 211,000
Cronica: 202,000
Pagina 12: 170,000

Taken from the August 8th, 1993 edition of Noticias.

Media Concentration and Conglomeration[2]

Media concentration is a threat to democracy because it limits the diversity of ideas, perspectives and opinions. The media are becoming more and more concentrated on both local and global levels. Argentine newspapers, magazines, radio and some cable corporations are increasingly expanding and acquiring more media outlets since the early nineties. In terms of transnational global media, they manifest themselves in Cable and satellite television production and distribution. Non-local media can often undermine the value of local information by supplying a steady diet - a cheaper one at that - of mass produced news designed for an international audience. In terms of cultural production, the global media often operate on a continental level or even global level which questions national sovereignty. In Argentina, a virtual monopoly - dominated by two or three transnational firms, exits for the cable and satellite industry. These firms are the gatekeepers and producers of the content that they choose to go on the television sets for the Argentine public.

The past decade has changed Argentina's media landscape through a series of mergers and acquisitions. According to Argentine sociologist Atilio Boron at the University of Buenos Aires "The way in which these companies are forming into large conglomerates is an attack on the freedom of expression. These oligopolistic groups can not guarantee a suitable balance in the treatment of information because they are limited when their own interests are at stake" ("Quien es Quien," 1992). The United Nations Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information of 1992 "appealed to the political community to foster as much as possible a variety of media and plurality of information sources" (Haas, 1996, p.23). The concentration of media and information sources goes against this declaration. Currently Argentina is dominated by 3 large media conglomerates. Two of the three are locally based while the third is owned by a large transnational corporation.

The largest of the media conglomerates is Clarin. Clarin owns a number of media outlets. It owns television channel 13, the newspaper Clarin, three radio stations: Radio Mitre, FM100, FM La Red, Torneos y Competencias - a sports programming powerhouse, some of Multicanal and other cable channels in addition to a host of news, journalism, and pubic opinion agencies. The Clarin is also the most vertically and horizontally integrated media firm in Argentina. It owns a number of smaller businesses such as graphic art designers, ticketron outlets, in addition to furniture and farming businesses.

Groupo Atlanta/Telefe may be the second largest multimedia corporation in Argentina. It owns the largest number of magazines - at least 11, 2 TV stations: telefe and canal 2, and radio station Continental (am and fm) that has the 4th highest ratings.

In May of 1997, Eduardo Eurnekian's Corporacion Multimedios America, worth over 217 million dollars, was sold to behemoth transnational corporation Cisneros Television group. Eduardo Eurnekian considered himself a friend of President Menem and those who worked close to him indicated he managed his multimedia corporation like he used to manage his textile factory. Before the corporation was sold it managed to acquire several media outlets. Corporacion Multimedios America owned Cablevision, with 36 channels mostly consisting of film, sports, cartoon and entertainment content. It also owned 5 satellite signals, TV channel America 2, newspapers El Cronista and Extra, radio stations Radio America - a news station with the six highest ratings and 102.3 FM Aspen with the 9th highest ratings which concentrated on broadcasting pop music in English.

Cisneros has holdings in a large number of media, entertainment and telecom companies around the world. It also owns at least 70 different companies involved in everything from gold mining to retailing. Its global satellite group - Imagen Satelital - includes Infinito (documentary programs), Space (24 hour movie channel), Jupiter

(Comedy channel), I-Sat (movies for younger audiences), and Uniseries (popular US and foreign weekly series). It also owns one of Latin America's largest film libraries. The more media outlets Cisneros has, the more it will be able to cross promote its products in order to maximize profits.

The government, Catholic church and 4 other minor firms round out the rest of the Argentina's media systems. Bartolome Mitre, one of the minor firms, owns La Nacion, Radio Del Plata (am and fm) - which has the 4th highest ratings, cable channel Cele Video Color and satellite channel Nahuel. Bartolome Mitre is important as its objective is to construct public opinion. One way it has been trying to do this is through publishing rock supplements in its papers trying to attract younger readers.

Argentina has the third largest cable viewing population in the world. The telecommunications companies that own the cable industry form a complicated web of foreign transnational ownership and partnerships. Almost all of the major firms have some type of investment or alliance with the other. Citicorp Equity Investment - which is 40% owned by US company Citicorp Inc., combined with Spain's Telefonica - which now has an alliance with MCI communications corporation and Worldcom Inc., make up 50% of Argentina's cable operations. Citicorp has expanded to own stock in Multicanal (22.5%), Torneos y Competencias (33.4%), Telefonica de Argentina (27.3 %), and Cablevision/TCI (64.5%). Multicanal, which is also 25% owned by Spain's Telefonica, and Video Cable Communication (VCC) make up the rest of the cable operating market. Video Cable Communication is 90% owned by US West and has the largest percentage of cable operations in Argentina. The ownership and accountability of these large transnational telecommunications companies is difficult to gauge as they change almost monthly.

Foreign Ownership

Foreign ownership, especially in politically "tense" countries such as Argentina, can act as a deterrent to progressive change. Being locally based helps media workers understand, represent and be accountable to the public. Large transnational corporations need to have positive relations with the government in order to operate in the desired country. As a result, critical views will most likely not be aired on the news channels. In addition, very little news that is carried on foreign owned media corporations, especially cable, will be local. Most transnational corporations enjoy the fruits of vertical and horizontal integration with regard to news and entertainment programs. The internationalization of the world's media threatens pluralism and cultural diversity while the transmission of news and ideas becomes concentrated in the hands of a few transnational media corporations at the expense of local organizations (Scarone, 1996). Carlos Cisneros, the managing director of Cisneros TV group, sums up the industry's position quite well: "Whatever we do in terms of production, in very few situations would we go into producing for one window and for one country. Most of our efforts are going to be geared toward an entire continent...I think we can continue to consolidate the cable channel business, program and distribution" ("Cisneros Jumps Ahead," 1998). The public has little say in terms of what it gets. The entertainment shows created, owned, or exchanged in partnerships by the transnationals will dominate.

What is also unfortunate about foreign ownership is that large amounts of money will leave the country. The money charged by the cable companies will relocate to another location. This is damaging especially in "developing" countries and in countries with huge amounts of foreign debt, such as Argentina.

Market Forces

The fact that media conglomerates are businesses and are therefore subject to the competition that a free market entails curtails the information presented. Information must be made in order to sell and not offend large groups of potential and regular consumers. Newspapers and news programs are directly competing with each other for high ratings, which means more advertising revenue. More revenue means stockholders and owners become more satisfied with larger returns. Argentine Sociologist Ricardo Sidicaro points out how the free market has changed the media environment in Argentina. He noted that in 1989 an ideological transformation occurred in the media due to President Menem's neo-liberal economic policies. Some of the liberal media suddenly became conservative due to the intense competition between media firms ("Nuevos Tempos," 1993).

Market forces can also affect journalists on a micro level as well. Through downsizing and low pay, many journalists are turning to another form of supplemental income, pay-offs. Pay-offs have become a common occurrence among many journalists (Lavieri, 1996). Many government employees and politicians are accessing the media with money. Pay-offs further limit access and dissemination of information.

Aggressions Against the Press

The press need to operate without constraint in order for a democracy to survive. The public needs to be informed in order to make important decisions. In Argentina's case, the stability of society may rest not only on accurate and truthful information, but on discovering and solving the uncertainties of the previous military dictatorship. Powerful and violent interests are opposed to this freedom. The only way the public can be informed is if the press is able to operate freely to gather and disseminate information.

Unfortunately, Argentina has been plagued by an absurd number of direct attacks - often violent - since the return to democracy in 1983. According to an article published in the Los Angeles Times "Journalists exploring the frontiers of the press in Argentina are coming up against a long tradition of political thuggery in this South American country...Some analysts have depicted the wave of aggression as a throwback to repressive practices under authoritarian governments of the past, including the military regime of 1976-1983" (Long, 1993, p.A3).

According to Agresiones a la Prensa (Delgado, 1995), a book published by the Asociacion Madres de Plaza de Mayo, roughly 452 acts of aggression[3] were committed against the press between 1991- 1994. "Acts of aggression" included: murder, death threats, bombings, bomb threats, intimidation, physical violence, violent threats, and termination of broadcasts. If "acts of aggression" were to include refused access to various media of communication and accusations against journalists by government or authority figures, such as name calling like "alienated," "delinquent," or "conflictive," the total number of aggressions against the press between 1991-1994 would include close to 584 acts. That is the equivalent of one act of aggression every 2.5 days. More threats occurred than actual violence and deaths. Nonetheless, a significant number of people have been seriously injured or killed since the return to democracy. One should note that these are conservative figures as they only represent the incidents in and around Buenos Aires. Other acts of aggression occurring in the interior of the country may have not been reported.

Ninety-one Argentine journalists disappeared during the military dictatorship. At least twenty-five journalists were killed between 1975 and 1992. During the last decade, some 520 journalists have died in Latin America due to political violence (Ulibarri & Trotti, 1996). In 1992, Argentine President Carlos Menem blamed the attacks on "unidentified beasts who don't deserve to live in a civilized society," but he went on to add that the attacks "go with the job" of journalism (Long, 1993, p.A3). In early 1997, the death of Jose Luis Cabezas - an investigative journalist who was beat up, assassinated, and then set on fire, captured a lot of attention in Argentina. He was investigating a series of burglaries which appeared to point to several police officers before his death. Numerous newspapers and commercials - even public "commercials" on subway television sets declared "don't forget Cabezas." Very few, if any, took Cabezas death a step further to denounce the lack of government empathy or protection. Few, if any critiqued the policies and conditions that would allow such a brutal murder to occur. It is the duty of a democratic government to assure safe and unrestrained conditions for journalists to operate freely. One death sends a strong message to the rest of journalists investigating similar topics.

Threats and murders are an effective way of diverting the public eye away from what is being said or investigated. They also hamper future investigations while sending fear throughout society - especially in media circles. Those who choose to investigate some issues will be penalized. The most recent threat to journalists came from Alfredo Astiz - otherwise known as the "blond angel of death" - for his boasting of how many people he killed during the dirty war. He only recently retired in 1996 from the Argentine Navy. According to an article published in the New York Times "Mr. Astiz said all journalists writing about the 'dirty war' should be careful not to suffer the same fate as the photographer Jose Luis Cabezas, who was murdered in January last year while investigating police corruption in Buenos Aires Province. 'Do you know what?' he asked. 'I am technically the best-trained man in the country to kill a politician or a journalist'" (Sims, 1998, p. A5). These incidents recall the days of the military dictatorship. According to Ulibarri and Trotti, "In this respect it is worth recalling the Argentine Military regime, especially during the 'dirty war', when the soldiers, angered at the reports of human rights violations, would often accuse foreign correspondents of portraying a distorted image of the country" (1996, p.197).

Government Regulation

The Argentine government has continued its hesitation in allowing the media achieve their proper role in democracy. Several restrictive laws have been created and considered by the government which would impede access to information. During the mid-1990's the following laws threatened the media. The government considered doubling a libel conviction for up to six years. A right-of-reply law, which would require a newspaper to publish a response from a person who thought that he or she was wronged in print, was also considered as an amendment to the constitution. The senate also proposed a rule allowing congressmen to arrest and detain anyone who broadcasted or wrote about something that they found offensive. Finally, the senate also tried to create a self-imposed journalist code of ethics (Lavieri, 1996). These potential laws have intimidated the media and their ability to investigate and communicate effectively. It is also important to note that the government controls the airwaves. Anyone who wants to broadcast needs to acquire a license. A number of cases have been reported where the government denied licenses to people who had been "unfriendly" to authorities in the past (Lavieri, 1996).

Media politics, concentration, foreign ownership, market restraints, aggressions against the press and government regulations limit and often censor information in Argentina. The culmination of these trends questions the relationship between the media and Argentina's democracy. The media should have the right to pursue, gather and disperse information without constraints. In theory, a democracy would protect this right.

At least wo after effects have resulted as an outcome of the previously mentioned limitations of the mass media. First, the open disscussion of human rights issues has been negatively affected. Second, civic groups, such as human rights groups, have persevered with healthy debates and discussions of topics that may not have been regulary covered in the mainstream media. In addition, some journalists in the mainstream media have been able to publish reports on controversial topics such as government corruption or the effects of the "dirsty war." The constraints of transnational corporate ownership combined with threats and violence have not completely deadened controversial topics. In fact, they may have inspired more public deliberation on these matters within civic groups. Nonetheless, the range and depth of controversial issues, such as human rights issues, has been negatively affected in the mainstream media. International declarations on human rights issues and the media help in the creation of a normative model.

Human Rights and the Media

There are several international declarations relating to human rights issues, media and democracy. The Second United Nations Human Rights Conference of 1993 unanimously adopted the Vienna Declaration and the Action Programme, which were designed as international systems to protect human rights. Among the several declarations, one asserted the following principle:

> Democracy and the development of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent concepts that strengthen each other. The inseparability and interdependence of civil, political, economic and social rights are unanimously recognized, in the same terms as in former United Nations declarations (Prieto, 1996, pp.214-215).

In a similar vein, paragraph 13 of the Iberoamerican Summit's declaration of principles stated that freedom of expression and of the press, is an unalienable and irreplaceable value, and a fundamental part of the democratic structure of nations (Lavin, 1996). Both declarations imply a necessary relation between the open discussion of human rights issues with a democratic and free press. However, open discussion of human rights issues is a complex and multi-layered matter.

Respecting human rights is the basis for a humane and just society. However, punishing human rights violators is more difficult. Communicating these issues at a mass level is also a "touchy" subject. Nations in the process of transitions to democracy need to provide full accountability for these violations of humanity as the stability of the country may rely on it. Nonetheless, transitions are often the result of a negotiation between the new "democratic" government and the old military regime. The constant threat of the military frequently looms overhead explaining the hesitation and risks of bringing to trial human rights violators. If too many military members are tried, the military may decide to try another coup thus ending the newfound democracy.

Argentina's post-authoritarian democracy appears to be living this "paradox." Its democracy may depend on a forgetful, amnesia ridden public concerning the "dirty war." Limited discussion of this topic, as well as other topics such as government corruption, would appear to uphold Argentina's present form of democracy which is a much better alternative to the previous dictatorship. If too many people investigated and discussed theses issues at a mass level, the military or the government could revert back to their old ways of direct control. Nonetheless, the lack of open discussion of these topics due to the difficulties and threats associated with them infers a limited form of democracy.

However, if mass human rights violations are not accountable for after a democratic transition - as in Argentina's case, the social fabric may be jeopardized. Nearly everyone involved in the 30,000 disappearances has been pardoned. Argentine Professor Elizabeth Jelin believes "We could venture here the hypothesis that the Argentine society is still immersed in the traumatic experience of disappearances, not fully elucidated, still not sufficiently symbolized, too close to deep suffering and pain. It has not yet been possible to eradicate terror and fear and move beyond the reality of the lived experiences"(1994, p.53).

The media have a responsibility to report and discuss these effects resulting from Argentina's dictatorship and impunity. They often do not live up to their expectations. According to Argentine media critic and author Horacio Verbitsky "The media are an expression of civil society - and civil society has changed very much...there has not been enough clarification on the part of the media regarding the corrosive impact of impunity" ("Debate Sobre," 1997). Human rights groups make up the majority of organizations interested in discussing the effects of impunity and other social problems. These civic groups provide a "healthy" discussion of human rights issues where mainstream journalists fall short. Unfortunately, they often have problems accessing mass communication media systems. Several human rights groups indicate they are still having difficulties communicating with the public since the return to democracy. These difficulties limit the creation of a public sphere, which in turn, limit discussion of human rights issues relating to the "dirty war" and impunity.

Responses from a questionnaire[4] presented to 11 Argentine human rights groups indicated several groups complained that their communiqués had been censored or edited in various media. In some cases communiqués were simply shortened. Some groups indicated that although journalists wanted to publish their information, editors often preferred not to. Two groups stated access to the media has become more difficult due to recent changes in media concentration. Other groups said that ratings and sensationalism had become more important while one group noted the politics of the media made it difficult to access the mass media.

Human rights groups appear to have access to the media when reporters come to them. However, when they try to communicate through the media, communication becomes more difficult. The media are not as accepting of information created by human rights groups when they are not looking for it. When media are looking for human rights information they often concentrate on cases and people with specific facts relating to the most recent dictatorial period. The media are ***not interested*** in denunciations, social critiques, political remarks or comments relating to institutional reform according to several human rights groups. As one member of H.I.J.O.S. poignantly stated, "The media are more interested in who we are rather than what we say." This is a serious impediment to progressive change. For this reason every human rights group in Argentina publishes its own newsletter or magazine. Their own publication enables them to publish the information which is not likely to be published by other media. However, publishing information is expensive and difficult for these struggling organizations.

Human rights groups rarely if ever communicate through public/state owned media. A near majority of human rights groups have difficulties with, or simply do not work with official government media. State owned media have strong relations with government officials and policies. Privately owned media appear more receptive to the information generated by human rights groups. Human rights issues can be found in a number of privately owned media forms on television, in newspapers, on the internet as well as on the radio. Of course some media are more open than others depending on their political positioning. For example Pagina 12, a "left" leaning newspaper, has better relations with human rights groups then La Nation or Clarin. As a result, Pagina 12 publishes more articles covering human rights issues.

In terms of which medium is preferred to communicate through, almost every human rights group in Argentina believes that television has the most impact on influencing public opinion. Most groups prefer using TV as a means of communication but indicate access is extremely difficult. They claim TV stations are not accepting and ideologically against their objectives. The difficulties human rights groups have communicating through the media may have been influential in limiting public outcry against the government's decision to pardon everyone involved in the "dirty war."

Government Pardons and Public Representation

Given Argentina's constraints on investigating and dispersing information, it is not surprising to note that the media have on occasion sided with powerful interests for important political issues. The media's coverage of Menem's 1990 pardons of human rights violators during the "dirty war" provides an insightful example. Menem's pardons are still questioned if they were constitutionally legal because several military members were still on trial and had not yet received a verdict. Opponents of Menem's pardons maintained that such a move represented a disregard for the legal process and justice system which are fundamental elements of a democratic system. Supporters of the pardons argued that Argentina's democracy could not continue with the issue of the military still lingering and dividing Argentines. They believed people needed to forget about it and move ahead in order to stabilize democracy (Langan, 1991). Nonetheless, the two largest Argentine newspapers supported Menem's decision to pardon everyone involved in the "dirty war." The Clarin published almost twice as many articles supporting the pardons than did La Nacion, which did not take an immediate editorial stance until the Catholic church took a stance to support them (Langan, 1991).

What Langan forgets to note in his discussion about the media's impact on Argentina's democracy concerning the presidential pardons is the role of the public. Seventy to eighty percent of the country believed that the military should have remained in jail (Jelin, 1994, p.49; Nino, 1996, p.104). These people had no input in the decision making process nor representation in the two largest papers regarding the construction of "public opinion." El Clarin and La Nacion had nothing to do with the public opinion at the time; they reflected the interests of the military, government and Catholic church. Obviously, this is not representative of a democratic press with close ties to its citizens. "As Scott Mainwaring (1987), discussing Argentina in the first stages of democratization, has put it, 'Although the stability of democracy does not depend on being responsive to popular movements, the *quality* of democracy does' (p.132, emphasis added)" (as cited in Schwarz, 1997, p.138).

Almost all print and broadcast media in Argentina are private and public access has been limited since Cavallo's free-market economic reforms in the early nineties. This has obviously raised concerns that the programming is changing to reflect an orientation towards profit instead of public service (Scarone, 1996). When the public has a choice between "official" state media apparatuses and mostly conservative conglomerate media, genuine "public opinion" becomes marginalized.

Conclusion

Given the constraints on Argentina's press through various political and religious ties, media concentration, foreign ownership, market restraints, threats and government regulation, the relationship between a free press and a democracy is strongly questioned.

Problems of human rights issues and media access create a difficult environment for free speech. Important historical topics and decisions such as human rights violations, impunity, and government corruption affect the stability of society. Given the current media system, these topics now have to pass through sensationalistic and entertainment shows based on ratings. These constraints have negatively affected news content, the information the public receives, in addition to the creation of a public sphere. Since the eighties news in Argentina has tended to resort to sensationalistic entertainment instead of focusing on rich national debates. The trend to entertain and sensationalize news has trivialized important information. Communication scholars Morgan and Shanahan believe that the trend to entertain and sensationalize news contributes to more of an authoritarian political system than that of a democracy (1995, pp. 157-158). In addition, the proliferation of right-wing political talkshows such as "New Time," which features a journalist who supported the military regime which killed close to 30,000 people for political reasons, may contribute to the neglect of important topic discussions (Lavieri, 1996, p.193). .

The limited conditions of free speech may be influential in leading the media to take safe views on these issues. Instead of condemning actions or advocating change the media may invoke a certain degree of powerless on behalf of media consumers. Elizabeth Jelin believes "Moral and social condemnation, however, cannot replace the centrality of justice, especially when seen in the light of the challenges of the construction of new democratic institutions; 'to the extent that a society or government dismisses the principle of accountability as unnecessary, it undermines its possibilities of becoming a true democracy, in which citizens can feel confident that their rights are firmly protected'"(1994, p.51). Given Argentina's history of drastic political change, hope for a more democratic media system may arrive with a new political party. Now that elections are allowed, the possibility for a more democratic government could turn into a reality.

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NOTES

[1] This citation was translated from Spanish by the author. Additional translations were done by the author as well.

[2] The following sources comprise this section:

Cable a tierra. (1993, Sep. 5). Noticias.

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[3] These figures were acquired by categorizing the first 54 reported cases in the aforementioned book. I then doubled the total number of aggressive acts after having counted them half way through the book. Finally, I created two proportions with the categories which represent the rough estimates of the aggressive acts.

[4] This information was gathered with the assistance of a 1997 Tinker/Nave Short-Term Field Research Grant during the months of July and August 1997. Three methodologies were used in gathering this information. Informal conversations with Argentine professors regarding my research objectives consisted of the first method for data acquisition. The second methodology consisted of a questionnaire which was presented to each human rights group. The third approach used informal open ended interviews/conversations with each human rights group.

I met with professors at the University of Buenos Aires as well as with individuals outside of the university community to discuss the objectives of my research project before its implementation. I wished to gain insight into media accessibility by human rights groups from a varied source of opinions. The purpose of these meetings was to share the objectives of my project with Argentines working on similar issues while gaining as many different perspectives as possible. Their ideas, comments, and suggestions were then taken into consideration for the creation of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire entailed fifteen questions designed to seek information in four areas. The first area of concern consisted of "access" to the media. Did human rights groups communicate through the media? Were the media receptive? The second objective asked which media (public, private, specific channels) were used and why, while the third asked if the information was changed, censored or rejected. Finally, the remaining questions sought information regarding the recent change in ownership of major media corporations from Argentine to North American multinational corporations. In 1994 and in 1995 laws were passed in Argentina allowing United States multinational corporations to directly own various media. I was interested if this affected human rights groups abilities to communicate with the public.

The questionnaire was then presented to 11 "local" human rights groups (Las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, Movimiento Ecumenico por los Derechos Humanos, Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre, H.I.J.O.S., Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Asemblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Madres de Plaza de Mayo - Linea Fundadora, Correpi, Serpaj, and F.D.D.R.P.). Every group was able to participate except for Movimiento Ecumenico por los Derechos Humanos. After the questions had been filled out by a representative of the organization, a short open ended interview/informal conversation may have occurred if desired by the representative. I asked each interviewee if the questionnaire lacked important questions, concepts or subjects important to their organization. At this point representatives were given the opportunity to express any concern which was not covered on the questionnaire in an open ended manner.

Student Competition
James W. Markham Award

International Communication
Division

Bahamian TV Programming, 1977-1997: A Case Study of Cultural Proximity

By

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Abstract

Bahamian TV Programming, 1977-1997: a case study of cultural proximity.

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This paper revisits the debate on the international flow of television within the context of Straubhaar, et al., 1992, theory of cultural proximity and asymmetrical interdependence. The main focus of the paper is to examine how Straubhaar, et al.'s, 1992 study applies to a small developing country like the Bahamas. 1,628 television programs on the national television station, ZNS TV-13, were analyzed for a period of twenty-one years, beginning with the start of local television in 1977 and ending in 1997. This study of Bahamian television history reveals some of the conditions for the continued cultural dependence of small developing countries.

INTRODUCTION

Small countries like the Bahamas find it more economical to buy media products than produce their own. As Caribbean media scholar John Lent (1990) notes, the most expensive programs in the United States become available to the broadcasters at low prices, not related to costs but to the demand characteristics of the importing market. As a Bahamian producer, you can create a very good program on a national subject. To begin with, it will cost you many thousands of dollars to produce; it will occupy an hour of screen time, and it will not earn more than a couple hundred dollars of advertising revenue. So you both spend more and earn less.

> The percentages of foreign programming, mainly from the U.S., tell their own story. In the Bahamas, there is now 100% foreign domination of television (Lent, 1990, p. 280).

This statement comes close to describing programming on the Bahamian television and radio networks, but the accurate amount would probably be 90 percent, as recent events have spurred renewed activities in local production.

Aggrey Brown (1995) estimates by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the entertainment hardware market alone will be worth US$ 3 trillion. After aerospace, the entertainment industry is the USA's second largest source of foreign earnings, generating $5.5 billion or 5.5 thousand million dollars in 1988 (p. 45). Is it any wonder then that the development of inexpensive global information continues to saturate the Caribbean region?

Brown believes that the Anglophone Caribbean, with an average of over 80% imported content, is the most penetrated region of the world by foreign television content (Brown & Sanatan, 1987). This preponderance of external media dependency was further supported by two studies that were conducted in the Caribbean in the mid '70s and '80s by Everold Hosein (1973) and Aggrey Brown (1987) which revealed that an average of over 70% of television programs transmitted in the region originated from outside the region. Brown's study in the late 80s found an increase in the percentage of foreign content in regional television over that found by Hosein in the mid '70s.

As of the beginning of the decade of the '90s, together Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for approximately 10% of the world's television audience, having approximately 35 million television receivers. The extended region formally accounts as well for 5% of the world's television program purchases (Telecommunications Update No. 19). However, Brown (1995) notes, when private satellite reception and video tape recordings are added, the figure more than doubles. The vast majority of formal programming purchases is from the USA, not only because it is the world's largest supplier of software, but also because of geographic proximity and familiarity.

Background

The Bahamas is an archipelago of seven hundred islands and more than two thousand Cays, about 80 km (50 miles) off the southeast coast of Florida and extending in a 1,200 km (750 miles) arc towards the northern edge of the Caribbean (see map appendix A). Oceanic waters separate each island from the next. The capital of the Bahamas is the island of New Providence, which is commonly referred to today as simply Nassau. According to the 1995 World Almanac, the country has a natural rate of growth of 1.3 percent annually. The 1980 Census maintains the country has a moderate growth with just over a quarter of a million inhabitants. In 1990 the population was estimated as 273,000 of which 60 % live in New Providence. Nassau's estimated population is 172,000. The second largest city, Freeport, Grand Bahama, has approximately 26,000 people. The remainder of the population is spread out in the other twenty inhabited Out Islands (the outlying islands that surround Nassau, which have been renamed the Family Islands). The closest U.S. ports are the cities of West Palm Beach and Miami. The Bahamian economy is basically healthy; the United States enjoys the lion's share of the country's billion-dollar import market. Tourism and banking are the major industries. The Bahamas accounts for about 15% of the Caribbean's total stayover visitor arrivals; 5 % of the charter boat fleet; 25 % of cruise arrivals and 15% of visitor expenditure. Tourism drives the Bahamian economy. The Gross Domestic Product at current factor costs of US$2.2 billion makes the per capita income of this commonwealth of islands rank among the top 25 countries in the world, just 4 points below the United Kingdom (Poon, 1992).

Broadcasting in the Bahamas

Broadcasting began in the Bahamas in 1930 under the British government. The first government radio station, ZNS 1, began operations in 1937. With the change in government in 1968 and independence in 1973, the new black majority government continued the policies of its former colonizer. Today, the British influence is seen and felt in the educational system, the structure of the government, and in the broadcasting systems that have emerged. However, the government has shaped the national broadcasting system in keeping with its own nature, especially its political nature. The state-owned broadcasting system is operated by the Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas (BCB). The state system comprises one national television station and five radio stations. To date, there are no private television stations as yet. However, since 1993, five privately owned radio stations exist. Local television production began in 1977, four years after the country became independent.

Historically, the Bahamas, like other Caribbean countries, has had a long political and economic association with developed Western countries as a colony. Geographically, the Bahamas' close proximity to the large North American markets has resulted in close political, economic and geographic associations, such that "demand has been created for products and services in advance of the domestic economies' productive capacity to deliver these items. The result is an endemically exaggerated propensity to import throughout the [Caribbean] region" (Higgins, 1994, p. 8).

Like most Caribbean countries, the Bahamas has a special mix of regulated broadcasting and unregulated technology in the form of VCR, cable, satellites and receiver dishes. As a consequence, the government-owned television monopoly has had to compete with "well-organized and unregulated private entrepreneurs who have developed ingenious schemes to distribute, often 'pirated', satellite signals" (Surlin and Soderlund, 1990, p. 7). Added to this mix in the Bahamas are the spillover signals from

Florida, which some islands can pick up clearly, weather permitting. Thus, despite government's intentions, technological developments in television and transborder transmission from neighboring Florida have given audiences unplanned program offerings.

Thus technological developments have led to widespread availability of foreign TV programming in the Bahamas. And, while some people see this as a potentially positive development in terms of "press freedom" and "access to information," others argue that this availability has intensified another problem, "maintaining an indigenous Bahamian culture" in the face of a massive influx of foreign images and values, mainly American (Brown and Sanatan, 1987, p. 235).

Another problem associated with the widespread availability of foreign television is the lack of incentive for local production of television programming. "Such production, being expensive in the best of circumstances, is affected by the need to approximate foreign production standards" (Surlin and Soderlund, 1990, p. 7).

Purpose of the Study

This paper explores theoretically and empirically the key problem posed for the Bahamas, a small developing country that lies just 50 miles off the coast of Florida, by the development of electronic media technology and unequal flows of television programs between cultures. This research explores these questions:

1. How do we explain the continued outflow of cultural products from the United States?
2. How has the increase in the production of cultural products by other countries, who themselves are exporting, affected the United States' percentage of imports?
3. Are accelerating changes in and diffusion of technology increasing world cultural flow and also facilitating local productions?

LITERATURE REVIEW

The debate about American influence has dominated the literature on international communication since the 1970s within the context of the call for a New

World Information and Communication order by the developing world. As Brown (1995) states, "the notion was fueled by the failure of the 1960's approaches to modernization and development through the rapid adoption of Western media technologies by developing nations, and by the all-pervasiveness of primarily American media in the marketplace" (p. 57).

Cultural Dominance

Tapio Varis (1985) has documented the extent of U.S. dominance. In terms of hours of programming, he gives the U.S. share of exports in 1983 79 percent for the Caribbean. Many critics argue that the major concern with U.S. dominance has been cultural rather than economic and question the nature and extent of the influence of U.S. television programs on viewers. Fejes (1981) writes,

> generally a perception of cultural consequences of the context of various media products is based on a view of the mass media as primarily manipulative agents capable of having direct, unmediated effects on the audiences' behavior and worldview (p. 287).

American television programs are blamed for many of the receiving countries' societal ills. Many countries have tried to protect and insulate their societies from American stimuli, but these attempts have been futile. Because of market imperatives, institutional infrastructures in country after country have been recast to facilitate the transmission of American informational and cultural products.

The problem of dependence on imported television content in the Caribbean is also seen in the context of other aspects of dependence on the industrialized, developed (metropolitan) countries. Prime Minister Eric Williams (1970) points out that dependence on the outside world in the Caribbean is economic, as well as, cultural, institutional, intellectual and psychological.

In the beginning, Caribbean television had very little emphasis on profitable local program production; it was safer to depend on inexpensive imports. This rationalization still remains. The constraints of low profitability are coupled with the problem of relative appeal.

Efforts on the part of the Caribbean Broadcasting Union (CBU) to produce regional news exchange programs and documentaries and the popular acceptance by regional audiences of these efforts, also indicate the importance regional viewers attach to such programs. However, Hilary Brown (1995) notes Caribbean citizens have been willing consumers of both hardware and software and were never coerced into consumption: "That the images reflected on the region's television screens are not often enough likenesses of ourselves, cannot be denied. However, cultural ennui is the price we pay for passive consumption" (p. 52).

As Denis McQuail (1994) notes, there is no international media system as such, but many scholars have pointed to the fact that market forces have in practice led to the rise of a rigid and inescapable structure of global media ownership, production and distribution, which is dominated by the richer (and capitalistic) countries of the North (especially North America, Europe and Japan). The term 'cultural imperialism' has been widely used to refer to the phenomenon. A few countries certainly do dominate the international flow of news and culture, supplying the other countries of the world with what they cannot easily produce for themselves to fill domestic media. Self-sufficiency, in media terms, seems to be out of reach and even receding (p. 178).

Asymmetrical Interdependence

Modeled on Straubhaar, et al., (1992), this study examines the issues in terms of a more complex and dynamic set of relationships called 'asymmetrical interdependence'. Straubhaar, et al., defined asymmetrical interdependence as a complex and dynamic set of relationships in which various nations and cultures have a varying range of production and importation of television programs, in the context of a series of interdependent but asymmetrical relationships, economic, technological and cultural. They argue that television flows are becoming genre specific and conditioned by producers' perceptions of their audiences' preferences. Those preferences "are essentially for increased cultural proximity, a desire to see either national or similar, regional culture on television most of the time, even though certain U.S. export genres do retain a place in broadcast schedules and apparently in audiences' preferences, as well" (p.1). Re-examining the theory of cultural dependency, the paper discusses the internal and external conditions that determine continued dependence in small developing countries like the Bahamas.

Straubhaar, et al., (1992) approach to cultural industries recognized the limits placed on many nations' media systems which operate within subordinate positions in the world economy, but also recognized and gave analytical emphasis to the distinct dynamics of each nation or industry's historical development. This view fits the case of the Bahamas, whose history and development have perhaps been more influenced by the United States of America than any other country in the region.

With cultural proximity as the definitive idea for increased local production, Straubhaar, 1991, explains why television production is growing within Latin American and other regions of the world at both the national and regional levels. He builds his argument on Pool (1977), and contends that all other things being equal, audiences will tend to prefer that programming which is closer or most proximate to their own culture: national programming if it can be supported by the local economy, regional programming in genres that small countries can afford. However, the United States continues to have an advantage in genres that even large Third World countries cannot afford to produce, such as feature films, cartoons, and action-adventure series.

Straubhaar, et al., (1992) hypothesized that when national production is available, audiences tend to prefer it, and this demand leads to an increase in national production. This would be reflected in an increase over time in the proportion of national productions in prime time, and thus, according to Straubhaar, et al., reflected audiences' preferences.

Straubhaar, et al., selected East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, the U. S. Hispanic population and the Caribbean for regional comparisons. The theory of cultural proximity and increased national production held true for some of the larger regions, but in the case of the smaller regions like the Caribbean, where the audiences are smaller this did not hold true for the selected countries. In the three decades--1960, 1970, 1980--Straubhaar, et al.(1992), found increased national programming for Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. In these countries, U.S. programming has decreased dramatically in both total amount and proportion in prime time. International programming showed a small but notable increase, and regional programming had not developed very far. Hong Kong had a similar pattern. The overall pattern from the Asian countries seemed to be strong nationalization and supported the researchers' first and second research propositions, a predicted increase in national production and its relatively greater domination of prime time. However, the regionalization they predicted in their third proposition was not supported. In the Latin American countries, the first and second propositions was partially supported. The third proposition, that regional imports will be preferred to U.S. or other international imports, was strongly supported. The three Caribbean countries included in that study were: Barbados, Trinidad and Jamaica.

Besides looking at local shows as a proportion of total programming for each country, Straubhaar, et al.(1992), also looked at them as a proportion of prime-time programming because prime time has proven to be a strong indicator of audience demand and preference. In Barbados, the amount of time devoted to local programs during prime time steadily declined over the years (from 15.8 % in 1996, to 12.7 % in 1972). In the larger Caribbean islands of Trinidad and Jamaica, however, local programs fared better: in Trinidad, local programming share rose from 26.3 % in 1963 to 45.9 % in 1972. In Jamaica, local programs during prime time occupied an increasing share of prime time over all three periods (from 16.7 % in 1964 to 29.9 % in 1972). The answer to why local programs fared better in the larger islands (Trinidad and Jamaica) seems to lie in the greater production resources available. Where Jamaica is concerned, Aggrey Brown (1987) notes that this island "has more sophisticated broadcast-quality production facilities available for making local programmes…" (p. 11).In terms of foreign programming trends, the U.S. has been the dominant source of content ever since the advent of television in the Caribbean. In 1982, American shows claimed over half of the total programming time in all three countries (Straubhaar, et al., 1992, p. 13).

Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical considerations above, this study repeats Straubhaar, et al., to see whether these findings also hold true for the Bahamas. The research proposes the following propositions:

1. Assuming the Bahamian audience's desire for cultural proximity, when national

production is available, audiences will tend to prefer it. Thus increased local production should be reflected in an increased amount of national production in the Bahamas' overall TV schedules for the twenty years of its existence, 1977 to 1997.

2. This preference will be reflected in an increase over time in national productions appearing in prime time.

3. When national productions in certain genres are not available, broadcasters will use imports, but again because of a search for cultural proximity, they will increasingly turn to regional imports when those are available. This should be reflected in an increase over time in regional productions and co-productions appearing in broadcast schedules.

4. Although imports from the U.S. and other major international (non-regional) producers will decrease overall, they will remain relatively stronger in some genres which are not produced locally or regionally. This should be reflected in a decrease over time in the quantity and proportion of U.S. and other international productions in broadcast schedules, particularly in prime time.

5. These developments will be genre specific. Regional imports should increase in genres which emphasize shared cultural characteristics but are relatively expensive for small or poor countries to produce. Similarly, U.S. imports will be larger in those genres which are most expensive and/or difficult to produce.

METHOD

This content analytic study used the television listings of the local Bahamian newspapers for the period 1977 to 1997. Each program was categorized; then the number of minutes of duration of each program was added to the total for that category. The categories are based on the Straubhaar, et al., 1992 study and are located in a matrix between program types/genres (news, variety shows, movies or feature films, action series, drama series, cartoons, children's entertainment, children's education, mini-series, daytime soap opera/serial, week evening soap opera, weekend soap opera/serial, quiz show, game show, discussion, music-popular, music-traditional, music-classical, comedy, sports, secondary/adult education, religious, government/election, documentary/information, cultural, adult program-pornography, and other) and program sources (national, regional, U.S., other international, coproduction) (p. 6).

Like Straubhaar, et al. (1992), prime time was distinguished from the total broadcast day: "This permits a rough measure of which programs were relatively more popular" (p. 6). Prime time is defined in the Bahamas between 7 and 11 p.m.

A graduate student who was trained by the researcher did all coding. The data was crosschecked by the researcher because of her familiarity with program names, types and source in the Bahamas over time. When there was any doubt about how to identify or categorize a program, the researcher contacted sources who worked in the programming department at the Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas to make sure that the type and source of the program were correctly identified. Straubhaar, et al.'s list of standard genre category descriptions or coding instructions was used. Some categories did not fir the overall pattern genres.

Sample

The study starts with the first year of national television in the Bahamas, 1977, and covers the next 20 years of its existence, yielding a comprehensive overview of Bahamian TV history. The sample periods are one week in May for 1977 to 1997. Some minor variations took place, particularly in 1978, where only two days for that year were available on record, and so that year was not included. Overall, the dates provide comparability with the Straubhaar, et al., study done in 1992.

The month of May was selected for consistency and comparison. There are two years when data was not available for the month of May, 1993 and 1997. The month of January was selected for 1993, as this was the first month that TV listings were available for that year. A similar decision was made for 1997. The data has not been placed on microfilm/microfiche as yet for 1997 and the only available hard copy was the month of December.

The study looks at the programs listed for the sole national TV station, ZNS-TV 13, in the television guides found in the two national daily newspapers. The data was collected during the month of December 1997.

RESULTS

The sample of 1,628 television programs that were listed in the published television schedules between the years 1977 and 1997 is listed in Table 1. Sixty-eight percent of the programs were of American origin while 18% were national, 9% international (other than the United States) and less than one percent (0.36) were regional. There has been no co-production between the Bahamas and other countries in the region. While regional integration has played a part in bringing the countries of the Caribbean together, particularly the Anglophone countries, the region still lags behind in co-productions and local production. As Straubhaar, et al., note this absence is most likely due to limited production resources.

Of the 1,628 programs, children's educational/entertainment had 15 % of the program content followed by local news with 12 %, drama series with 11 % and comedy--mostly situation comedy--with 8 %. It should be pointed out that ZNS TV 13 placed special emphasis on children's education from its inception, and this may probably be the cause of the high children's programming content.

Table 1 - Program Origin: History of Bahamian TV

Program Year	National	Regional	U.S	Int'l	Co-Prod	Unknown
1977	0.4		2.27	0.36		0.42
1979	0.6		2.08	0.42		0.12
1980	0.5		2.64	0.24		0.30
1981	0.6		2.21	0.30		0.06
1982	0.4		2.76	0.18		0.18
1983	0.4		3.50	0.36		0.12
1984	0.4		3.31	0.36		0.73
1985	0.9		3.68	0.49		0.49
1986	1.04		3.31	0.42		0.24
1987	0.7		2.76	0.49		0.18
1988	1.04		2.94	0.73		0.18
1989	1.16	0.06	3.56	0.55		0.36
1990	1.16	0.06	4.17	0.36		0.18
1991	1.22		3.62	0.36		0.12
1992	0.9	0.06	4.11	0.42		0.30
1993	0.9		2.94	0.49		0.00
1994	1.35	0.06	3.86	0.36		0.06
1995	1.47		4.36	0.73		0.18

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1996	1.47		4.23	0.79		0.42
1997	1.28	0.12	4.1	0.92		0.30
Total Percent						
	18	0.36	68	8.5	0.00	5.0

Fifty-seven percent of the programs in prime time originated from the United States while 28% were national and 10% were international in origin (mostly Australian/Canadian) and 5 % were unknown (see table 2). Regional program made up less than one percent of the prime time schedule (see table 3 below). Of the prime time program content, local news scored the highest with nineteen percent, followed by drama series with sixteen percent, comedy with fourteen percent, soap opera with twelve percent and documentary/information with seven percent.

Table 2- Program Prime Time: Bahamian TV History

National	28 %
Regional	0.3 %
U.S.	57 %
Co-Production	----
Unknown	5 %

Table 3- Program Type: History of Bahamian TV

Time in minutes	Nat'l Time	Reg'l Time	U.S. Time	Co-Prod	Int'l Time	Unknown Time
Movies or Feature Films			4.85			
Action Series			3.19		0.06	0.06
Drama Series			10.25		0.79	
Historical Drama Series						

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Cartoons			4.97		
Other Child Entertainment			8.23		
Children's Education			6.63	0.06	
Mini-Series			0.05		
Daytime Soap Opera/Serial			2.45	3.07	
Week Evening Soap Opera			4.48	1.04	0.24
Weekend Soap Serial			0.49	0.18	
Variety			0.36		
Quiz Show	0.30				
Game Show			0.12		
News	12.10				
Discussion	1.59				
Music (pop)	0.42		1.16		0.18
Music (traditional)					
Music (classical)			0.06		
Comedy			6.51	1.65	
Sports	0.18	0.06	5.28	0.30	0.06
Secondary/Adult Education	0.06				
Religious	1.90		4.23		0.12
Government/Election	0.36				
Documentary/Information	0.98	0.12	3.43	1.28	0.55
Cultural	0.18	0.24			
Adult Program (pornography)					
Other	0.06		1.35	0.42	3.31
Total Origin Share	18.13	0.42	68.1	0.00	8.85

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1-Local Production/Overall: Figures 1 shows the increase in national (local) production. While there were local production increases over the time period, from 0.4 percent in 1977 to 1.28 percent of the total broadcast schedule in 1997, there was a greater increase of imported U.S. programs from 2.27 percent to 4.17 percent for the same time period. This gives Straubhaar, et al., theory of increased local production credence and supports the first hypothesis, increased local production should be reflected in an increased amount of national production in the Bahamas' TV schedules for the twenty-one years of its existence, 1977 to 1997. However, this must be weighed against the likewise increased hours of operation which were filled with more U.S. programs. Therefore, U.S. programs also increased, and at a faster rate. Figure 2 shows this increase in U.S. programs.

Whereas local production increased over time from less than one percent in 1977 to more than one percent in 1997, with a total of 19% overall, there were only slight increases over the 21 years in this study. The majority of the increase took place between

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1994 and 1997. Furthermore, there was also an increase in U.S. programs for the same period. This could be attributed to the extended broadcasting schedule. The station began in 1977 broadcasting from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m. by 1997 the broadcast day had expanded to 2 p.m. to 1:30 a.m.

Hypothesis 2-Local Production/Prime Time: Hypothesis number 2, increase over time in the production of national productions appearing in prime time, was not supported. National programs made up 28% of prime time schedule. U.S. programs made up 57% percent. As Straubhaar, et al., (1992) noted in their study, small countries like the Bahamas cannot sustain local production. However, there are exceptions. Straubhaar, et al., found that in 1982 local programming had increased in Jamaica; local programming claimed two fifths of prime time, while U.S. shows claimed less than half of prime time.



Figure 1 National Origin Programs ZNS TV 13 1977-1997

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

Figure 2 U.S. Origin Programs - ZNS TV 13 1977-1997

Hypothesis 3-Regional Productions: The third hypothesis was also not supported. Regional productions and co-productions did not increase over time. Co-production was consistently absent from the schedule of program listings. However, there was an effort to incorporate regional broadcasting in 1989 with the introduction of the regional program 'Caribscope'. But, there were no listings of this program in the television schedules selected for 1991, 1995 and 1996. Overall, regional and co-productions made up less than one percent of the programming content for the sample. Although the region has several integration organizations that deal with communication strategies for regional integration, the region, like many others (Asia) has not found a way to encourage the exchange of cultural products. As many scholars of the region have noted (Brown 1995, Dunn 1995, Hosein 1973), the region suffers from economies of scales and lack of production facilities.

Hypothesis 4-Imports: The fourth hypothesis was also not supported. Imports from the United States and other international (non-regional) producers did not decrease overall. Further, the proportion of U.S and international productions in ZNS TV 13's broadcast schedule increased, particularly during prime time.

Hypothesis 5-Genres: Imports from the Unites States remain particularly high with certain genres. As Straubhaar, et al., concluded, because of greater costs of production, the production and export of documentaries, action adventure, cartoons and feature films seem to still be dominated by industrialized countries. The most prominent program genres over time were children education/entertainment, drama series, daytime/evening soap opera/serial, comedy (situation comedy), documentary/information sports, and religious. Thus the hypothesis was not supported.

DISCUSSION

There is little doubt that American programming still retains the largest share of the international flow of information and entertainment. In the Bahamas some evidence of this is obtained from a cursory glance at the local television programming. This study found that Straubhaar, et al., (1992) theory of cultural proximity was not supported. Thus, the argument for asymmetrical interdependence needs to be amended for small countries in a region like the Caribbean.

There was an overall increase in national/local production over the twenty-one years, however, this can be explained by the increase in operating hours. Further, there was an even greater increase in U.S. programs for the same time period. Hosein (1976) in his study of four television stations in the Commonwealth Caribbean noted that the problem of dependence on imported television content must be seen within the context of other aspects of dependence on the industrialized, developed countries. The dependence on the outside world in the Caribbean is not only economic but also cultural, institutional, intellectual and psychological. Foreign programs reinforce already established consumption-oriented lifestyles (Hosein, 1976). However, Hosein added, we cannot dispense the excessive dependence on imported content solely on the threat of cultural annexation. There is also the question of ownership and operation of television services. In most of the Caribbean, governments, acting on behalf of the people, own the television systems and accept responsibility to use these services in the public interest. "The people's 'right to communicate' is now exercised on their behalf, by those to whom governments entrust operations of the medium" (Hosein, 1976, p. 12). From a profit making position, it was less important to create the necessary facilities for local program production. Hosein (1976) writes,

> The costs involved for equipment, station space, training of personnel and talent could not be met by advertising revenue which was the primary source of income for those stations ... Yet the advertising revenue was sufficient to meet the costs of cheaply available import programmes. The programmes sold on the international market were programmes which had already made profits for their production companies and could then be rented at minimal rates. A half-hour programme which might have cost U.S. $50,000 to produce could now be rented on the international market for U.S. $30 (p. 12).

Cheryl Gooch (1995) discussed this issue in her analysis of Barbados's television programming content. Gooch believes this persistence for American or foreign programs is influenced by the attitudes of program decision-makers, namely, the widespread belief that foreign is better, or if not better, at least more marketable.

The increase in local productions in prime time, also did not occur. Managerial decisions and attitudes to import the 'better' U.S. products can also explain this finding. Further, proximity to the United States and familiarity with American television programs encouraged this reliance on U.S. products. The cost of producing local programs also continued to play a role, especially in light of the financial indebtedness of the national station since the late 1980s. After the 1992 general elections, several members of the new government voiced their discontent with the management of the television station, and the BCB in general, under the former government. These factors, combined with the relative inexpensive U.S. programs, made it difficult to increase local production during prime time.

Regional production did not increase over time. A number of factors explain this finding. Many scholars of regional integration have advocated the development of regional co-productions and exchange of regional programs but this has been hindered by economic, political and social factors. The region continues its struggle for integration. Caribbean countries, although they share similar histories, cultures, and customs, have a number of impeding factors that inhibit integration, such as language, parochial governments and island insularity. However, CARICOM, the regional Anglophone community, has developed organizations like the Caribbean Broadcasting Union (CBU) established in 1970 and Caribbean News Agency (CANA) founded in 1974 to develop regional news exchange programs. These efforts have culminated in productions like

Caribscope, a regional newsmagazine and the 1991 Caribbean Eye, a UNESCO/Banyan co-sponsored production.

As Hillary Brown (1995) notes, these productions, assisted by external financial and technical aid, gained popular acceptance with regional viewers. However, Caribbean citizens have been willing consumers of both the hardware and software of foreign countries and were never coerced into consumption. Aggrey Brown (1995) believes this is due to geographic proximity, familiarity, shared language and by extension culture, continued monopoly of television broadcasting by governments in the region, and ease of travel between Caricom and North America. At the political level, Aggrey Brown (1995) noted that some regional leaders voiced appropriate platitudes about the role of media in national and regional development during the 80s but, for the most part, were found wanting in terms of meaningful policy formulation and decisive action. Brown writes,

> While the enormous sums required for research, development, production and distribution of infocom hardware will be beyond our collective capacity perhaps permanently, CARICOM does possess the technical skills and creative imagination to participate decisively in the development, production and distribution of visual media software (p. 53).

Other programs that have gained popular acceptance within the region have been Jamaica's 'Oliver at Large' and Trinidad and Tobago's 'No Boundaries' and ' Gayelle'. Within the Bahamas, the local production 'Tall Tales' was very popular among Bahamians but, the continuous problem of funding limits production quantity and quality. However, these programs indicate a yearning on the part of regional television viewers for more regional and local programming. The explosion of music videos of local soca and reggae hits, reflects as well external influences and the popularity of the genre within the region (Dunn, 1995). "The region," says Aggrey Brown, "possesses the potential to participate in the (global entertainment) sector by producing software, if not hardware, that could earn significant revenues while simultaneously contributing to the evolution of global (regional) culture" (1995, p. 53).

Caribscope, the newsmagazine which has also been shown in Britain and Canada (Abend, 1994), appeared three times (0.24% of the overall programming schedule) in the Bahamian television schedules that were used in this study. Members of the English-speaking countries (CARICOM) submit their stories to CBU, and they are then compiled into a news magazine format and distributed via satellite to Caricom members.

The majority of the programs (68%) were products from the United States. Imports from the U.S. did not decrease as Straubhaar, et al., (1992) predicted but increased, particularly during the 1990s, especially after the introduction of cable television in New Providence in 1995. In a 1997 interview, Mike Smith, Chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas (BCB), noted that the advent of cable television in New Providence forced the national television station to increase the amount of U.S. content. More than ten years ago, one of the recommendations of the 1985 Media Symposium in the Bahamas was that the BCB "should display greater willingness to undertake production of local programs of quality, and actively seek sponsorship for these" (Brown and Sanatan 1987, p. 50-69). This has not materializedin the Bahamas. However, Chairman Smith also noted that the BCB was changing its program focus to facilitate more local production by 1999. The new media environment, fostered by the change in government in 1992, has allowed private commercial radio and cable companies to operate in the country. Smith noted that cable television fragmented the audience even more and felt that the only way the national station would be able to compete with the commercial companies would be to emphasize local production. "We will be going to an almost completely local programming format within the next year," says Mr. Smith. The issue of funding, he said, which had influenced the quantity and quality of local production in the past, will no longer be a concern, as the government will contribute annual grants specifically for the production of local programs. Also, local production companies will be encouraged to produce programs for the national television station, thus alleviating some of the station's production responsibility.

There were no plans to include more regional programs. On that note, the Bahamas' position within the Caribbean region also offers some explanation for the decreased amount of regional content. CARICOM was formed in 1973. Since the Bahamas became a member, it has remained adamant about not participating in certain aspects of the common market--namely the common currency and free flow of people within the region. This stance has often created tension between the Bahamas and other members of CARICOM. Further, the Bahamas has always had a stigma of being more closely associated with the United States than other countries in the region. These factors have sometimes hampered the spirit of cooperation between the Bahamas and other countries in the region.

Unlike Straubhaar, et al., (1992) predicted imports of certain genres, documentaries, action adventure, cartoons and feature films did not remain high, in some cases, especially the documentary/information programs, there were decreases. Movies remained the same throughout the twenty-one years, showing no significant increase. However, there were increases in children educational/entertainment, drama series, daytime/evening soap opera/serial and comedy (situation comedy). This can be explained by the decision of management to import the cheaper program--half an hour programs at a cost of $30 or less (Hosein, 1976).

Small countries still find it more beneficial to import media products than produce them. However, this may change in the Bahamas if government plans to increase local production are implemented. International pressure also contributes to the changing environment. More and more open markets are being encouraged through privatization and deregulation processes. If private television is allowed to compete with state-owned television, this may lead to more local production (as in the case of the Bahamas); state-owned television stations in the Caribbean may be forced to produce local programming to compete with commercial entities. Another factor that may encourage more local and regional programming is the launching of the Caribbean satellite, CaribStar, in 1999. This could lead to increase programming opportunities for local and regional producers.

Although the cultural exchange gap seems to have widen for small countries like the Bahamas, there is renewed interest in increasing local production. Cultural proximity holds promise for decreasing cultural dependency for these developing countries. However, this is an area that requires further research before any definitive statements can be made about the changed and changing order of international communication and information flows.

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Appendix A


The Bahamas
National capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 Kilometers
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UNITED STATES (Florida)
Fort Lauderdale
Miami
Walker's Cay
Grand Bahama
Cornishtown
Freeport
Moore's Island
Hope Town
Abaco
BIMINI ISLANDS
Great Harbour Cay
North Cat Cay
South Cat Cay
South Riding Rocks
Orange Cay
Nicholls Town
NASSAU
New Providence
Andros Town
Current Island
Dunmore Town
Eleuthera
Governors Harbour
Highbourn Cay
Norman's Cay
Hawksbill Cay
Waderick Wells Cay
Arthur's Town
Cat Island
New Bight
Andros Island
Congo Town
Great Guana Cay
Cockburn Town
San Salvador
Conception Island
Rum Cay
Elbow Cay
DAMAS CAYS
(THE BAHAMAS)
ANGUILLA CAYS
Great Exuma
Georgetown
Long Island
Clarence Town
JUMENTOS CAYS
Flamingo Cay
Samana Cay
Crooked Island
Colonel Hill
Guinchos Cay (THE BAHAMAS)
Cay Lobos (THE BAHAMAS)
Seal Cay
Nurse Cay
Ragged Island
Acklins Island
Mayaguana
Abraham's Bay
Cay Verde
Hogsty Reef
Little Inagua
Cay Santo Domingo (THE BAHAMAS)
Great Inagua
Matthew Town
Santa Clara
Cienfuegos
Sancti Spiritus
Ciego de Ávila
CUBA
Nuevitas
Camaguey
Holguín
Santa Cruz del Sur
Manzanillo
Bayamo
Guantánamo
Santiago de Cuba
Guantanamo (U.S. Naval Base)
Caribbean Sea
Cayman Islands (U.K.)
HAITI
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
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76
74

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The price of ignorance:
How correspondents' language skills limit their work in Japan

Abstract: Many of the American correspondents working in Japan do not understand the Japanese language. Their language skills limit their access to a wide range of sources, which may help distort their reporting, and pose other practical constraints. At another level, not knowing the language, both verbal and nonverbal, limits their ability to understand the Japanese culture, which is reflected in the language.

Beverly Horvit, doctoral candidate
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A paper to be submitted to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Baltimore, August 1998.

The price of ignorance:
How correspondents' language skills limit their work in Japan

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In 1917, journalists for *The New York Times* unknowingly misled their readers about the likely outcome of the Bolshevik Revolution.[1] During their reporting, they relied on those sources to whom they had easiest access, and their choices were limited by their lack of expertise in the area. Today, it seems unlikely that American journalists working abroad would miss a big story. English has become more ubiquitous, as have the Cable News Network and the Internet. Nevertheless, it is likely that journalists are missing some of the subtleties of the cultures on which they report. This paper will focus on American international correspondents working in Japan and how their linguistic abilities can limit their access to sources, as well as their ability to communicate and to understand the culture.

In the early days of foreign correspondence, "The wire service correspondent was, by and large, a generalist picked on the basis of his ability to get a story and wing it into the cablehead quicker than his rivals. If he had any ability as a linguist, or if he knew something more about the background of his assignment at first than the average college junior, it was purely accidental."[2] Even now, editors disagree whether it is better for international correspondents to be generalists or specialists. Although one can argue that generalists might be able to take a "fresher" look at another culture, specialists, especially those who know the language and culture, will be able to look more closely.

Stephen Hess asserts that "knowledge of a country's history and culture beyond what can be picked up in the clips, and languages"[3] are among the core skills needed by correspondents abroad. However, in a somewhat disconcerting finding, Starck and Villanueva report that of 75 books written by and about foreign correspondents, only 44 percent explicitly mentioned culture.[4] The term culture was defined as a shared way of life, including a society's language, social acts, history, art, religion, ritual, knowledge, experience, technology and so forth. Based on their research, which included in-depth interviews with journalists, Starck and Villanueva conclude that, "Without a sensitive eye searching for cultural context, stories can result that convey invalid information or misguided meanings. Without an understanding of events, interpretations can be erroneous, possibly enforcing stereotypes and ethnocentrism."[5]

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[1] Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, "A Test of the News," *The New Republic*, Aug. 4, 1920, pp. 1-42.

[2] John Hohenberg, *Foreign Correspondence: The Great Reporters and Their Times*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 282.

[3] Hess, "Who is the Best Foreign Correspondent You Have Ever Known," Media Studies Journal, New York: Freedom Forum Center, Fall 1993, p. 71.

What is lacking in the research literature, however, are concrete examples of how cultural preparation affects the quality of a reporter's work. That's no surprise because defining quality is a subjective matter. Even when quality reporting is defined as in-depth, nonstereotypical reporting that provides context, experts disagree on who the best reporters are. Nevertheless, the practical advantages of learning Japanese, both the verbal and nonverbal language, can be concrete in terms of access to sources and, at another level, access to culture as it reflected and shaped by the language.

Correspondents' preparation for the job

Before examining the benefits of knowing the language, consider first the level of training American journalists receive before taking assignments abroad. Hess reports that although international correspondents working today speak fewer languages than their peers in previous decades, they are likely to be more proficient in the language of the country to which they are assigned.[6] More news organizations are giving journalists language training before sending them abroad. Of those who began their overseas careers before 1960, 11 percent had received training, compared to 24 percent for journalists who started their international correspondent careers in the 1980s.[7]

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[4] Starck and Villanueva, "Cultural Framing: Foreign Correspondents and Their Work," a paper presented to the International Communication Division of the annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Montreal, Canada, August 1992, pp. 8-9.

[5] Ibid., p. 29.

As for the journalists sent to Japan, columnist Edward Neilan, a Hoover Institute fellow, reports that "more and more newspapers are willing to go the extra kilometer and send correspondents to language school for six months before an assignment in Tokyo, in addition to paying for language lessons on the spot. Other editors claim it is not worth it, but they are in the minority."[8] Regardless, Hess says the level of training provided to correspondents assigned to Japan and other Asian countries may not be sufficient. Correspondents who receive training are given an average of 25 weeks of instruction, according to his survey. "By comparison, the U.S. State Department provides diplomats with 24 weeks for Romance languages and German, 88 weeks for Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Arabic."[9] Of the American journalists working in Japan whom Hess surveyed, 49 percent said they had no language proficiency, while 28 percent said they were able to conduct a serious interview in Japanese.[10] A more recent study also found that fewer than half of those surveyed said they could conduct an interview in Japanese.[11]

The level of language proficiency does not appear to be related to the size of the journalists' news organization. For example, Newsweek correspondent Catherine Manegold said she had to rely on English-speaking sources or interpreters in Tokyo, while Washington Post business reporter Paul Blustein said he managed thanks in part to the five English-language newspapers published

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[6] Hess, "Speaking in Tongues," Nieman Reports, Fall 1994, p. 30.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Edward Neilan, "The New Foreign Correspondent in Japan," Japan Quarterly, July-September 1995, pp. 309.
[9] Hess, "Speaking in Tongues," p. 31.
[10] Ibid., pp. 30, 32.
[11] Beverly Horvit, "Getting the News: How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Their Sources," an unpublished thesis presented to the faculty of the graduate school at the University of Missouri-Columbia, December 1996.

daily in Tokyo. Other journalists such as The Los Angeles Times' Leslie Helm, an American born in Japan, are linguists trained to be journalists.[12]

The most practical reasons for learning Japanese

Two former bureau chiefs for the New York Times, Clyde Haberman and Steven Weisman say they regret not being more fluent during their time abroad. "The emperor wasn't going to die on me without me knowing it," says Haberman.[13] "But were there societal stories that I missed? Definitely." Similarly, Weisman says the big stories were not missed. "But were stories missed or difficult? Yes, all the time. ... I regretted it every day that I couldn't understand and speak (Japanese) better."[14] What are the benefits of learning the language? Most important to journalists, language ability allows greater access to a wider range of potential news sources. Some disadvantages of relying on English include the impact on the interviewing process, and the reliance on interpreters and Japanese editorial assistants. In addition, some question how representative English-speaking sources in Japan are of Japanese society as a whole.

Being able to speak the language of the host country can open up doors for reporters and give them access to a wider range of sources, including government bureaucrats, individual businesspeople and ordinary citizens. Michael Berger, who worked as a journalist in Japan for 14 years and now serves as a media consultant at Tokyo-based Intercom Co., says access to government officials, including access to the Japanese press clubs, is more difficult for a foreign reporter. However, if a journalist speaks Japanese, "those majority of bureaucrats who are not comfortable speaking English will generally be more willing to meet you."[15] Edith Updike, a Tokyo correspondent for *Business Week*, says speaking even a little Japanese can also help open doors with ordinary Japanese citizens. "If you've got to talk to some housewife whose daughter just died, she'll be much happier if you can offer condolences in Japanese before resorting to the translator."[16]

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[12] Hess. p. 30.

[13] Telephone interview with Clyde Haberman, former New York Times bureau chief in Tokyo, April 10, 1996.

[14] Telephone interview with Steven Weisman, Steven, former New York Times bureau chief in Tokyo, now on the Times editorial board, on April 8, 1996.

Berger, who has worked for the McGraw-Hill World News Service and San Francisco Chronicle, says one problem with reporting from Japan is the limited number of sources on whom journalists rely.

> Many of these most favored media sources, both Japanese and American, are present or former government officials, macro economists and academics. Their views can add depth to reporting, but when it comes to stories based in the marketplace, as most Japan stories are these days, the primary sources ought to be the best-informed people of all -- those working day-to-day in the marketplace.[17]

Berger believes it is important for journalists to "have a frame of reference which is not dominated by government officials and other talking heads." "If you're not regularly talking to business executives and managers, company employees, everyday people such as taxi drivers and shopkeepers, academics and the local media, you are isolated from the local scene, whatever the topic may be," he warns. For her work, Updike says good story ideas often come from conversations from local residents. "Some of my best sources are taxi drivers," says Updike, who covers the auto industry. "Taxi business is a great economic indicator; they ride around all day listening to people, and you've got a captive interviewee."

Aside from having a greater range of sources if a correspondent speaks Japanese, there can also be definite disadvantages to relying on interpreters and/or English-speaking sources. Elisabeth Bumiller, who wrote for *The Washington Post's* Style section while her husband, Steven Weisman, was stationed in Tokyo for *The New York Times*, says getting stories was always harder with an interpreter.[18] "I wasn't so worried about factual things. It was the nuances you worried about," she says. "You feel like you're working in the dark." For his part, Weisman believes he would have had a better understanding of the Japanese people if he had been able to read the popular press and overhear conversations on the train, for example.

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[17] Michael Berger, e-mail post to author, April 15, 1996. He forwarded an edited version of correspondence he had sent to Stephen Hess for Hess' book, *International News and Foreign Correspondents*.

Updike finds practical disadvantages to only speaking English: "Simply, there are too many views one cannot hear without language ability, and even using translators ... or native stringers and assistants doesn't fill the gap. For one thing, the best reporting includes give and take in conversation, nearly impossible without language." Another potential problem is that translators tend to make business executives' statements sound as bland and corporatelike as possible, Updike says. "I've heard presidents say stuff that could be translated as 'he's an idiot,' and the translator invariably renders that as 'he's not made the best decisions' or something equally pablumatic," she reports. An anecdote suggests how journalists who lack Japanese-language skills can be at the mercy of their interpreters. When American reporter Kevin Smith was working for NHK, Japan's public broadcasting network, on a story about alternative energy sources:

> The producer ordered a translator to expunge any references to nuclear energy when translating an interview into English for Smith, who did not speak Japanese. Knowing that the producer wanted to ignore the nuclear energy issue, Smith double checked the original interview with another translator. Confronted with the deleted material, the producer included it in the final story.[19]

Smith was astute enough to suspect when he was being duped, but other journalists might be too trusting.

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[16] Edith Updike, e-mail post to author, April 21, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, all information attributed to Ms. Updike came from the e-mail correspondence.

[17] Michael Berger, e-mail post to author, April 15, 1996.

[18] Elisabeth Bumiller, telephone interview with author, April 16, 1996. Unless otherwise noted, all information attributed to Ms. Bumiller came from the telephone interview.

[19] Spencer Sherman, "NHK TV: Japan; a Westerner's experience of working in Japan's biggest network, Nippon Hoso Kyokai," Columbia Journalism Review, March 1994, p. 32.

Another factor that could distort reporting is an overreliance on English-speaking sources. Steve Markowitz, a former financial journalist in Tokyo and now a managing partner with Dialect Group LLC, a language software company, found that wire service reporters without Japanese language skills "rely on a small cadre of English-speaking sources, which limits and skews the perspective of their articles."[20] He argues that it is dangerous and fallacious to assume that the frequently quoted English-speaking Japanese sources, who have often traveled abroad, speak for their countrymen. He said he can think of many occasions in his reporting on the stock market, for example, that had he been "content interviewing only foreigners and English-speaking Japanese -- the story would have been plain wrong. Moreover, on securities stories that shout out for the views of individual investors ... quality reporting simply could not have been done by a non-Japanese speaker/reader." He said that although many of the oft-quoted sources are authorities in their fields, others have "taken on the role of authorities because they answer phone calls on the fly in English."

Language as a reflection of culture

Edward T. Hall would be appalled by many news organizations' approach to the Japan assignment. Unless Americans sent abroad have been taught the language of the country and are thoroughly informed of the culture, he says, "we simply waste our time and money overseas."[21] Even language and cultural training are not enough, Hall says. "Of equal importance is an introduction to the nonverbal language of the country."[22] That this is the case can clearly be seen in Japan, where knowledge of the language -- both verbal and nonverbal -- can shed light on the country's culture. Culture, Hall says, is more ingrained than "mere custom that can be shed or changed like a suit of clothes."[23] Studying Japan's language and, as a result, its culture, can increase the odds of effective communication and improve cross-cultural understanding. In many respects, the Japanese language reflects Japanese history and culture and reinforces that culture. Some prime examples are the classification system often used to make distinctions between people, the indirect and often ambiguous use of language, and the levels of politeness used in Japanese grammar.

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[20] Steve Markowitz, e-mail post to the Dead Fuzukawa Society list serve, April 17, 1996, reprinted with permission.
[21] Hall, The Silent Language, New York: Anchor Books, 1990, p. ix.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid., p. 23.

Historically, the Japanese formed groups to help each other cope with a harsh natural environment. "Cultivating rice made the sense of the group stronger. A long feudal history strengthened this 'group consciousness' further, and many kinds of groups were born: families, relatives, neighbors, occupations, social classes, etc."[24] In traditional Japan, members of a group were governed by the group, and harmony within the group was of prime importance. This tradition carries over to modern Japan, where individuals tend to be "very passive and receptive to their groups."[25]

In Japanese culture, a fundamental classification is made between insider vs. outsider,22 also called the in-group and the out-group. The insider is determined by a frame, criteria that classify and identify individuals as part of a group -- for example, a company or a family. Reeves-Ellington explains:

> In all cases, a frame indicates a criterion that sets a boundary and gives a common basis to a group of individuals who are located or involved in it. Outsiders are those who are excluded from the frame. Hence, the use of the word "foreigner" (gaijin) is frequent in Japan. If one is not part of the frame, i.e., Japanese (insider), then one is a foreigner (outsider).[26]

Similarly, one Japanese word for family, *uchi*, can also mean "inside." "This indicates the strict distinctions made between those who are inside the family and those who are not."[27]

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[24] Kenji Kitao and S. Kathleen Kitao, Intercultural Communication: Between Japan and the United States, Tokyo: Eichosha Shinsha Co., p. 82.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Richard H. Reeves-Ellington, "Using Cultural Skills for Cooperative Advantage in Japan," Human Organization, Vol. 521, No. 2, 1993, pp. 206-207.

[27] Ibid.

How the Japanese communicate changes drastically, depending on whether the communicators are in the same group and on the closeness of their relationships.[28] The in-group vs. out-group classification helps explain an apparent contradiction in Japanese society: the Japanese people's extreme politeness in one-on-one situations compared to the unrestrained pushing and shoving at a train station during rush hour. "The proverbial Japanese politeness is totally absent, replaced with a 'survival of the fittest' behavior pattern, which is accomplished, in part, by avoiding eye contact, thereby assuring that everyone around stays on the outside."[29]

The art of ambiguity and harmony

Because of the importance of group ties in Japan, most Japanese try to avoid disagreeing openly with other group members. A top priority is preserving *wa*, harmony within the group. In the quest for *wa*, the Japanese often use indirect and/or ambiguous language -- a tactic that can create hurdles for non-Japanese speakers. When Japanese group members disagree:

> they try to find indirect ways of expressing this disagreement. Such expressions as "Many people say..." and "It is said..." are used frequently so that the speaker can express an opinion without actually making a commitment to it. In discussing issues with other group members, they try to find out the opinions of the other group members before expressing their own so that the opinion they express will be in line with that of the other group members.[30]

Or, if the Japanese feel the need to complain, they may do so as indirectly as possible and sometimes even state the opposite of what they are complaining about. Kitao and Kitao offer the following example: "A Japanese woman who wanted to complain that her neighbor's daughter was practicing the piano too late did so by commenting on how well the girl was doing, how diligent she was, and what long hours she practiced. The girl's mother understood the neighbor's intention and said that she would not let her daughter practice so late anymore."[31] An American might not have even realized the neighbor was complaining. By the same token, Americans who express themselves too directly may offend the Japanese. Or, when a Japanese is reluctant to express a direct opinion, an American may feel the Japanese is not taking an active part in the group.[32]

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[28] Kiyoshi Midooka, "Characteristics of Japanese-style communication," Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 479-480.
[29] Reeves-Ellington, p. 207.
[30] Kitao and Kitao, p. 52.

"Please answer yes or no"

Just as the Japanese tend to use indirect language to express individual opinions and complaints, they also try to avoid saying no because they do not want to disrupt harmony. Kunihiro says there is:

> the strong fear that by opening up one's heart with full candor, that is, 'sincerity,' as one would say in English, one might become isolated from the group to which one belongs. In the homogeneous society of the Japan of former days with its large population and scarcity of resources, limited opportunity for employment, and no possibility at all for fleeing abroad, such isolation would have been equivalent to committing suicide.[33]

In 1993, President Clinton got into a bit of a diplomatic jam at a summit when he told Russian President Boris Yeltsin, "For the Japanese, saying yes can mean no." The Japanese people were so offended that a White House spokesman had to explain that the president meant no criticism by his remark but was just commenting on Japanese etiquette.[34] In Japanese, what would usually be translated directly into English as a yes can sometimes mean no. The structure of the Japanese language and the Japanese culture itself help explain this occurrence.

I-Wen Su explains that a Japanese yes can sometimes mean no because there is no precise equivalent for translation from Japanese into English. "Japanese depends heavily on the speech context (the situation, the speaker, etc.) for the interpretation of the word."[35] From English to Japanese, common translations of yes are *hai* and *ee*. In Japanese, *ee* can be used in positive or negative sentences, and the interpretation depends solely upon the speech context. I-Wen Su gives this example:

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[31] Ibid., p. 107.
[32] Ibid., p. 53, 55.
[33] Masao Kunihiro, "The Importance of Language in Communication: A Japanese Viewpoint," in Learning about Peoples and Cultures, edited by Seymour Fersh, Evanston, Illinois: McDougal, Littel & Company, p. 84.
[34] Lily I-Wen Su, "On Cross-Cultural Communication: Why a Positive Answer Should Not Be Taken Seriously," Eric retrieval services, ED 372605, p. 1.

Question

Japanese:	Kono enpitsu wa Honda-san no dewa arimasen ka?		
Literal English translation:	this pencil	Mr. Honda's	is it not?
Translation:	Isn't this pencil Mr. Honda's?		

Honda's Answer:	Ee,	watashi	no	de wa arimasen.
Literal English translation:	Yes,	I	possess	it not.
Translation:	No, it is not mine.[36]			

Although this example may seem relatively simple to decipher, the potential for miscommunication can be great. Sometimes more than a good translation of the language is necessary; a translation of culture is needed. In general, Japanese people do not want to say no. "Because a blatant, direct refusal is potentially very threatening to the other's face in most conversations, situations in which persons know or expect that they will have to refuse a request demand an indirect approach."[37] To avoid saying no, Japanese people have been found to often use the following approaches: silence, vague and ambiguous answers, counterquestions, changing the subject, conditional and delaying answers, and apologies.[38] One of the most common ways to say no is "saying yes and then following this with an explanation which may last half an hour and which, in effect, means no."[39] Or, in business transactions, for example, many Japanese may seem to agree with what's said because they want to avoid offending the speaker. A "yes" answer in a business meeting could mean: a) "I understand what you said but I don't necessarily agree." b) "I don't understand what you said but I don't want to offend you, or embarrass myself, by saying I don't understand you." c) "I agree."[40]

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[35] Ibid., p. 5.
[36] Ibid., p. 7.
[37] Bradford "J" Hall and Mutsumi Noguchi, "Engaging in Kenson: An Extended Case Study of One Form of 'Common' Sense," Human Relations, Vol. 48, No. 10, 1995, p. 1137.
[38] I-Wen Su, p. 11.

For American correspondents, the Japanese tendency toward indirect language can be frustrating. As a language, English can be more clear and direct. Japanese, on the other hand, "is not a language that prizes explicitness in areas that need it most," says Weisman. "Once you know Japanese, it's sometimes harder to get to the point and clarify things yourself." Similarly, Business Week correspondent Steve Brull noted in a questionnaire, "The difficulty with Japanese sources is not so much the language as the difficulty in getting clear, concise and insightful commentary."[41] Consider this example of how language and cultural differences can create misunderstandings :

> A professor once complained about a graduate student recently from Japan because, while indicating she would go to the advisor-advisee dinner meeting, she did not even apologize for failing to keep the appointment. The professor recalled the Japanese saying, "Yes, yes," two times to his invitation. Since the student had only lived for one or two months in an English-speaking country, she might not have understood the message but was afraid to admit it. She was afraid of losing her face, especially because she was dealing with her advisor. Even if she understood the message, she probably said "yes, yes" because she was translating literally, "hai, hai," a Japanese expression often used at the beginning of one's turn to speak, to show that one has paid attention to what is said.[42]

In addition to saying yes when they may mean something different, Japanese people sometimes take advantage of another aspect of their language to preserve harmony. The structure of Japanese allows speakers to change their sentences midstream without it being apparent. Although English sentences usually have a subject-verb-object structure, Japanese uses a subject-object-verb sentence structure.

Because the verb is at the end of the sentence, this enables the Japanese to begin to

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[39] Kitao and Kitao, p. 88.
[40] I-Wen Su, p. 11.
[41] Horvit, p. 82.
[42] I-Wen Su, p. 11.

> express a thought and watch the receiver's reaction. Depending on how the receiver is reacting to the message, this verb may be changed, thereby changing the whole meaning of the sentence. For example, a Japanese might start to say, "Please go away from me now," and change it to, "Please stay with me now," by changing the verb, which is said last.[43]

Levels of politeness

An additional way the Japanese language reflects the nation's culture is in its levels of politeness. When the Japanese people talk to their superiors, they use honorifics, or *keigo,* a language different from the one they use to communicate with those in equivalent or lower ranks.40 Different words also are used to refer to in-group members compared to out-group members. For example, a speaker might use one word, *haha,* to talk about his own mother and another word, *okaasan,* to talk about another person's mother. The "o" that begins okaasan is honorific. "It is modest to place oneself in a lower position than that of the hearer. Assuming an equal position with a person of a higher or lower position is impolite."[44] Some of the major factors determining a person's rank in a hierarchy are age, position, experience, and wisdom and knowledge.[45] When meeting strangers, the Japanese often exchange name cards, or *meishi,* to determine which group they each represent and what title or position they hold in their groups. "Then they can decide who is higher. On the phone, it is more difficult to decide, and people use the politest expressions until they find out their relative positions."[46] Interestingly, although *Los Angeles Times* correspondent Leslie Helm is fluent in Japanese, he says native speakers realize he is not a native after about 10 minutes of phone conversation because he does not use *keigo.*[47]

Once Japanese speakers have determined where each other ranks in the group hierarchy, there are cultural rules governing the spoken communication between superior and subordinate:

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[43] Ibid., p. 9.
[44] Kitao and Kitao, p. 53.
[45] Midooka, p. 483.

> 1. under normal circumstances, one cannot call a superior by personal pronouns such as Anata (you). On the other hand, one in a higher rank can use personal pronouns to a subordinate;
> 2. it is normal to address someone of a high social position by the name of the position, such as Sensei (teacher), or Kacho (section chief). But the reverse is not true;
> 3. a superior can call a subordinate by his or her surname, e.g. Mr. A or Ms. B. But when one uses a superior's surname, one must normally attach the superior's occupational title after it, e.g. President A or Director B;
> 4. when speaking to a superior, the speaker can refer to himself or herself by his or her surname alone, but the reverse can never occur;
> 5. when speaking to a subordinate, the speaker can call himself or herself by the word representing his or her own social position, but the reverse never occurs.[48]

In a cross-cultural setting, the levels of politeness can create confusion and hurt feelings. "If the American does not speak humbly enough, he/she may unintentionally offend the hearer. A Japanese, on the other hand, may be too conscious of the relative difference in status and so may be hesitant to express him/herself to an American superior -- to assert an opinion, to make a request, etc."[49]

A silent language

Although understanding a nation's verbal language is a crucial element in effective communication, it is not the only language that should be mastered. "In addition to language there are other ways in which people communicate that either reinforce or deny what they have said with words."[50] For Hall, the other ways encompass the "silent language," the ways people talk to one another without using words. In Japan, researchers have found that this form of communication can be more important than verbal communication. Compared to the United States, for example, Hall has found that Japan is a high-context culture, one in which "more information is either in the physical context (such as nonlinguistic gestures and facial expressions) or internalized in the

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[46] Kitao and Kitao, p. 87.
[47] Hess, p. ?.
[48] Midooka, p. 484.
[49] Kitao and Kitao, p. 54.
[50] Hall, p. 28

communicators (such as values and creeds), while less information is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message."[51] To understand Japanese culture and communicate effectively, a good understanding of the nonverbal methods of communication is just as important as an understanding of the verbal language. "It is essential that we understand how other people read our behavior (not our words, but our behavior)."[52]

Some scholars on Japan have noted the Japanese people's distrust of spoken language. Although the general semanticists urge individuals to carefully consider the words they use and how those words might be interpreted by others, many Japanese would rather not use words at all. "It has been considered poor policy to use language to express one's views, persuade the other guy, and establish mutual understanding."[53] In their communication, the Japanese rely heavily on nonverbal activities and leave much to interpretation.[54] The Japanese even have a special term, *haragei,* for their ability to nonverbally discern another person's intentions, meaning or thoughts.[55] Several factors have contributed to the prominence of nonverbal communication, including the nation's cultural homogeneity and the influence of Zen Buddhism. And, just as Japanese culture is reflected in Japan's verbal language, so do Japan's nonverbal forms of communication reflect cultural patterns such as hierarchy, group affiliation and harmony.[56]

One explanation for the Japanese's ability to rely so heavily on nonverbal communication is the people's homogeneity. "Japan is an island country surrounded by seas on four sides, and there have been few, if any, countries in the world where a single ethnic group has lived for such a long time using the same language throughout its history."[57] All the mass immigrations to Japan occurred before about 500 A.D., and for more than 250 years during the Tokugawa Period (1603-1867), Japan was isolated from the outside world.[58] As a result, the Japanese people's cultural homogeneity:

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[51] Midooka, p. 486.
[52] Hall, p. x.
[53] Kunihiro, p. 81.
[54] Edwin R. McDaniel, "Japanese Nonverbal Communication: A Review and Critique of Literature," a paper presented to the International and Intercultural Division of the Speech Communication Association, Miami Beach, Fla., November 1993, p. 3.
[55] Ibid., p. 4.
[56] Ibid., p. 5.

> creates a strong identity bond and greatly facilitates intragroup and interpersonal familiarity. This social closeness, or intimacy, which can not be replicated in other, more diverse, cultures, promotes an instinctive, nonverbal understanding between people. It permits greater intuitive, nonverbal comprehension by reducing the need to specify details.[59]

However, what works well among the Japanese may not be so effective in cross-cultural settings. "They (the Japanese) may try to apply the only strategies they know for communication, those that they use with other Japanese, such as indirection and silences to communicate with non-Japanese people. This generally does not work with Americans, who are accustomed to communicating more explicitly."[60]

Another influence that contributes to the importance of nonverbal communication is Zen Buddhism, which "makes a virtue of reticence and a vulgarity of open expression of one's inner thoughts."[61] This way of thinking is embodied in the expression, fu yo mon ji, or "words are of no use."[62] The philosophy is that man is "capable of arriving at the highest value only when he makes no attempt at verbalization and discounts talking or anything that can be expressed in words as being the height of superficiality."[63]

Like Japan's spoken and written language, the forms of nonverbal communication used reflect the culture. For example, the hierarchical nature of Japanese society and the importance placed on social harmony, or *wa,* increase the use of nonverbal communication. In Japan's ever-present superior-subordinate atmosphere, "the junior is socially compelled to take a passive role and await, and hopefully anticipate, the senior's desires and actions. The senior, wishing to evince a mien of humility and obviate any type of social or personal discord, will endeavor to nonverbally ascertain the junior's expectations."[64]

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[57] Kunihiro, p. 82.
[58] Kitao and Kitao, p. 121.
[59] McDaniel, p. 6.
[60] Kitao and Kitao, p. 111.
[61] Kunihiro, p. 83.
[62] Ibid.

Just as the spoken language makes a distinction between the in-group and out-group, so does the silent language. "Away from the in-group, the Japanese use of body language is usually remarkably restrained. ... This self-restraint of body movement in out-group environments is designed to avoid attention and maintain situational harmony."[65] By the same token, researchers have found that Japanese hand gestures are generally not used to refer to people present at the time, which "reduces the opportunity for offending anyone present and helps sustain group harmony."[66]

"That's not what I meant"

Despite their prominence in Japanese culture, the forms of nonverbal communication used are by no means universal and can be difficult for foreigners -- outsiders -- to interpret. One researcher concludes that "nonverbal behavior is not a reliable indicator of what the Japanese are actually thinking. Rather, it appears to be employed to foster a positive, congenial image, while camouflaging an individual's true feelings, desires, or opinions."[67] So what is an American journalist who has not studied Japan to think when an interviewee smiles or laughs in response to a question about a tragic event? What should she conclude if a source nods affirmatively after most statements the journalist makes? If the journalist interprets these cues in the same manner in which she would in the United States, she could get her story wrong. She and others may "have difficulty

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[63] Ibid.
[64] McDaniel, p. 7.
[65] Ibid., p. 9.
[66] Ibid.
[67] McDaniel, p. 21.

believing that behavior they have always associated with 'human nature' is not human nature at all but learned behavior of a particularly complex variety."[68] To help improve cross-cultural communication, researchers have identified several Japanese nonverbal cues that are easily misread by foreigners. They include the smile, laughter, direct eye contact, silence and even some hand gestures.

Although a smile can show happiness or friendliness, it can also be used to mask displeasure, anger or grief. "A Japanese would consider it unpardonable to burden someone else with an outward show of irritation or anguish. The smile is also used to help gain advantage or maintain an individual's privacy."[69] Using the smile as a mask has its roots in the Tokugawa Period when Japan was ruled by a highly centralized, authoritarian military government. During that period:

> Nonverbal behavior of the masses of people was strictly regulated, including the degree of smile a person should show when taking an order from a superior. An elaborate code of deportment was developed. Not only did the code require that any anger or pain be hidden but that opposite feelings should be expressed. Samurai women were required to express joy when hearing that their husbands or sons had been killed in battle. No natural expression of grief was allowed.[70]

In addition, because little can be more embarrassing than "losing face" in an Asian culture, "nodding and smiling from an Asian is no guarantee that you are being understood."[71] More generally, I-Wen Su writes, "One keeps silent, nods, smiles or laughs because to ask stupid questions or to admit that one does not understand what is said is losing one's 'face.' "[72] Like the smile, laughter can also be used to mask various emotions such as embarrassment, sadness or anger.[73]

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[68] Hall, p. 43.
[69] McDaniel, p. 11.
[70] Kitao and Kitao, p. 121.
[71] I-Wen Su, p. 12.
[72] Ibid.

Another potential area for miscommunication and misinterpretation is the use of direct eye contact. Unlike the case in the United States, prolonged eye contact is considered rude, threatening and disrespectful. From childhood, the Japanese are taught to avert their gaze or look at a person's throat.[74] They consider "mutual gaze the equivalent of seeing into the mind of the other, and only feel comfortable with mutual gaze in relationships of strong mutual reliance."[75] For both Americans and Japanese, the cultural differences could be troublesome. McDaniel asks Americans to imagine "the effect of seeing your listeners looking away from you or simply sitting silently with their eyes closed. But for the Japanese, such behavior indicates attention to, and possibly agreement with, the speaker."[76]

Silence, on the other hand, may or may not signal agreement with the speaker. Just as the Japanese pursuit of *wa* can encourage ambiguity and vagueness in verbal communication, the quest for *wa* also can trigger silence. "Reluctant to voice personal opinions or attitudes, a Japanese will draw from the situational context and attempt to instinctively discern what the other person is thinking."[77] In any given conversation, a period of silence can be used to "tactfully signal disagreement, nonacceptance, or an uncomfortable dilemma" or be used to buy time for formulating an opinion.[78] In any case, there is room for misinterpretation by those who are not "fluent" in Japanese modes of communication. Kitao and Kitao provide an example:

> In one case, a Japanese member of a discussion group at a university used silence to respond to statements with which she disagreed, in order to express her disapproval. In addition, however, when someone said something that she agreed

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[73] McDaniel, p. 18.
[74] Ibid., p. 11.
[75] Kitao and Kitao, p. 129.
[76] McDaniel, p. 12.
[77] Ibid., p. 7.
[78] Ibid., p. 20.

> with, she also did not respond, because her opinion had already been expressed. ... The American students were upset with her because of her lack of participation.[79]

Other elements of nonverbal communication also can be confusing in a cross-cultural setting. For example, the hand gesture that means money to a Japanese is similar to the American hand signal for OK, and the gesture that means "come here" in Japanese is similar to the American gesture for "go away." And, the "thumbs up" sign in American culture refers to a father, patron or gang leader in Japanese culture.[80] In short, the potential for miscommunication and misinterpretation in the nonverbal sphere is tremendous.

Although it would be beneficial for correspondents to understand these common features of Japanese language and culture, a word of caution is in order. In discussing Japanese culture, some obvious two-valued orientations that might arise are East vs. West, collectivism vs. individualism, and indirectness vs. directness. These phrases are abstractions only, however. They do not account for individual differences or shades of differences in meaning. "These characteristics are not dichotomous; they are points on a continuum. For example, Japan may be said to be group-oriented and Americans individualistic, but this does not mean that Americans do not care anything at all about groups or that Japanese do not hold any opinions of their own."[81] Although this paper may appear to some to perpetuate stereotypes about the Japanese, that has not been the intent. Wherever possible, care has been taken to state that "many Japanese" "may" or "tend" to communicate in certain ways.

Conclusions

Is learning the host country's language essential to doing quality work as an international correspondent? Calling it essential is too strong. As Margaret Noreen O'Malley, a lawyer who teaches Japanese law, business and political economy at Washington University in St. Louis, says, "Language capability does not guarantee sound analysis, thorough research or accurate insight."[82]

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[79] Kitao and Kitao, p. 113.
[80] Ibid., pp. 125-126.

Although being a good correspondent requires more than foreign language skills, knowing the language can provide immense benefits – among them wider access to sources, a better understanding of the culture and an improved ability to communicate. Understanding the Japanese language also opens doors for correspondents. Not every Japanese speaks English, and those who do may not be that representative of Japanese society. To get the most details in their reporting and a fuller understanding of the day's news, journalists need access to as many sources and as many kinds of sources as possible. If language is a barrier, chances increase that reporting will be distorted. It is unlikely that distortions would be as great as that which occurred in the *New York Times'* reporting on the Bolshevik Revolution, but distortions are possible nevertheless.

Not knowing the language – both verbal and nonverbal – complicates journalists' ability to communicate and understand the culture in which they are working. In the movie *Casablanca,* Sam sings that a kiss is just a kiss. In Japan, one cannot assume a smile is just a smile or that silence is just silence. There is meaning in everything human beings do and say. Trying to decipher those meanings is a challenge that, if met with an open mind and some preparation, can be enriching. Kitao and Kitao argue that Americans and Japanese who have contact with one another should learn as much as possible about one another's attitudes, values and behavior. "This includes not only information about what communication behavior is expected in a given situation but how those behaviors fit logically into the pattern of the culture as a whole and an openness and appreciation for that pattern."[83]

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[81] Kitao and Kitao, p. 104.

[82] Email from Margaret Noreen O'Malley, attorney and adjunct professor of Japanese law, business and political economy at Washington University, St. Louis, on April 22, 1996.

[83] Kitao and Kitao, p. 115.

When an American pharmaceutical company used anthropological tools to teach its employees about Japanese culture and how the Japanese do business, the results were clear. Its employees became more self-assured working in Japan; their Japanese counterparts said they preferred working with that company over other foreign companies; the time needed to complete projects was shortened; and the financial returns from contracts negotiated by employees who had received the cultural training were higher than from those contracts handled by employees lacking the training.[84]

The pharmaceutical company's experience clearly shows the benefits of knowing something about Japanese culture. For an international correspondent, learning the language and understanding the culture will make time spent in Tokyo more rewarding. Even a cursory examination of the structure and use of the Japanese language tells something useful about Japanese culture. Just how important are groups and harmony in Japan? Study the language. I-Wen Su warns, "To overcome cultural differences regarding language problems and mentality differences, one should never underestimate the language barrier."[85]

One should also not underestimate the potential difficulties involved in cross-cultural communication. The American editors who send their correspondents to Japan with little preparation are overestimating the universality of human nature. They seem to believe that "everyone knows a fact when he sees one" and to disregard the reality that a "fact appears different depending on your point of view."[86] When does yes mean yes or something else? When does a smile mean a person's happy? In Japan, particularly, it depends on context. At the very least it would help Americans to realize things are not always what they seem. The international correspondent should guard against making assumptions about human nature and recognize that his culture influences how he interprets reality. "We do not merely discover facts; in some degree we fashion them," Johnson says. "The world as known to us is a joint product of the observer and the observed."[87]

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[84] Reeves-Ellington, p. 213.
[85] I-Wen Su, p. 13.

Although many news organizations may not feel they can afford to free up -- and pay -- journalists for the time it takes to become fluent in Japanese, whatever effort they expend will likely reap rewards for the journalists and consumers. Taking time to learn the language will only make a good reporter a better international correspondent.

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[86] Johnson, pp. 93-94.
[87] Ibid.

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Michael Fay in 'Lash Land':
A Case Study of Social Identity Construction in Foreign News Coverage

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ABSTRACT

Michael Fay in 'Lash Land': A Case Study of Social Identity Construction in Foreign News Coverage. By Meredith Li-Vollmer, Graduate Student, University of Washington School Communications.

Foreign affairs reporters may routinely come across opportunities to enhance or protect the social identity of their national group; thus, their identities as U.S. citizens may influence the construction of international events. A framing analysis of articles covering the caning of American Michael Fay in Singapore reveals that journalists not only actively defended and enhanced the social identity of the United States, but also attempted to mobilize a social identity dynamic in the American public.

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Michael Fay in 'Lash Land':
A Case Study of Social Identity Construction in Foreign News Coverage

In the spring of 1994, the American teen-ager Michael Fay was found guilty of vandalism in Singapore and sentenced to six lashes of a rattan cane, among other punishments. This seemingly small news item managed to capture the attention of the public, as demonstrated by its appearance as a topic in national public opinion polls, stand-up comedy routines, and talk-shows. The caning of Fay became a news icon, as defined by Bennett and Lawrence (1995), in that it not only emerged in a variety of forms and contexts, but also evoked larger cultural themes. Few of the news articles focused exclusively on the caning incident itself– most included discussions of broader issues, such as the nature of government in Singapore, contrasts between Singapore and the United States, and the reaction of the American public to this event. Throughout these articles, journalists tended to highlight the differences between Singapore and the U. S. in ways that enhanced and protected American values and defined American cultural traits in contrast to Singapore. Clearly, this was more than a simple crime-and-punishment story. News coverage of the Michael Fay caning brought deeply-held identifications with the nation to the surface and serves as a case study of how journalists tend to construct and support their social identity in the reporting of foreign affairs.

FRAMING

Behind the notion that journalists integrate their social identity into stories about international events is the assumption that all news is socially constructed by news-workers who make " reality judgments" that are inextricably linked to their values (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979). Journalists generally do not deliberately insert their own values but these values are implied in the selections and interpretations that are chosen for the stories. Using positive connotations, a story can indirectly express desirable values; likewise, in a story covering events and issues that are widely considered undesirable, the use of negative connotations can imply what, in contrast, is considered desirable (Gans, 1979). Such value judgments are often manifested in the framing of a news story.

Journalists construct frames by selecting particular aspects of a perceived reality to make them more salient in the news text (Entman, 1993). When words and images are used consistently, the frames that emerge can create definitions of the problems under discussion and attribute the source or agency. Frames also have the ability to imply the costs and benefits of actions and events and impose moral evaluations on incidents and actors (Ibid.). By increasing the salience of select aspects of the text, framing can promote particular solutions to the problems, and in the reporting of government-related stories, can explicitly or implicitly offer policy options and preferences (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Journalists may also use frames to encourage or discourage audience identification with actors. The use of frames in this way tends to coincide with particular news discourses that operate within the shared beliefs about a society, accepted by the majority of the audiences as " common sense or conventional wisdom" (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

Framing not only reinforces particular discursive domains, but also guides audience's understanding of new events. By making selected elements of news texts more prominent, frames promote specific mental representations of what happened that influence an individual's initial interpretation as well as all subsequent information about the event (Entman, 1991). Individuals within audiences interpret news independently, processing the frames according to their own understandings and knowledge about structural and lexical features and semantic meanings in the text (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). However, while individuals will derive their own meanings from the frames, framing will tend to have a common effect on the majority of a receiving audience (Entman, 1993).

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

If journalists construct their presentations of reality for large portions of the audience, then what influences journalists' reality judgments? In the case of foreign affairs reporting, one factor that may be pertinent to their coverage of news is the journalists' social identity. Social identity is an individual's self-conception as a member of certain social groups in which some emotional and value significance has been placed on that membership (Abrams & Hogg, 1990); in other words, it is how people define themselves according to the characteristics of the social group to which they belong.

Social identity theory is predicated on the assumption that society is comprised of social categories that exist along dimensions that are culturally relevant to the group making the distinction (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Social categories systematize the world by segmenting and classifying the social environment and provide " a system of orientation for *self-reference*; they create and define the individual's place in society" (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social categorization then assists a person in defining who she is by developing the perception that she shares the same social identity with other members of her category (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The categorization process also produces stereotypic perceptions by assigning all members of a social category or group some characteristic which distinguishes them from other groups (Ibid.). This process leads to the recognition of " in-groups" versus " out-groups."

The identification of in-groups and out-groups plays a key role in clarifying social identity because it allows groups and individuals to further define themselves through comparison to others. According to social identity theory, individuals are motivated by the desire for positive self-evaluation to differentiate their own in-group from others. Not surprisingly, in-groups will tend to make these differentiations according to dimensions that are of most importance to their group and that will favor the in-group. Such favorable comparisons create the perception of positive distinctiveness that enhances the social identity of the in-group and therefore enhances the individual's sense of well-being, self-worth and self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Based on their social comparisons to other groups, people develop some conception of a social structure that places social groups into a hierarchy in which they are often put into competition with other groups for resources, rights, power and prestige (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). As with any hierarchy, some groups will dominate over others. In this situation,

> More powerful groups generally seek to maintain the status quo, promulgating their own system of values and ideology. Membership of subordinate groups may potentially confer negative social identity, especially if the dominant group's values are accepted (Ibid.).

However, subordinate groups are not necessarily trapped in the same position on the social identity hierarchy. They can employ creative strategies, such as determining new criteria for intergroup comparison that will reflect more positively on their group or finding an alternative group for comparison, to compete for superiority with the dominant group. In this way, social identity is a " dynamic process in which collective identities are continually being reconsidered, renegotiated, and recomposed relative to other groups" (Rivenburgh, 1997, p. 84). Social identity is only secure when the status relations are not questioned; a challenge to a dominant group's superior position can lead to insecurity over its social identity because it implies a potential loss of positive comparisons and forebodes possible negative comparisons. Consequently, dominant groups will generally respond to such threats by attempting to justify their status positions and find ways to enhance their own distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

In general, social identity becomes relevant whenever a member of an in-group is being contrasted or compared to another group (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). National identity, as a particular type of social identity, is activated when an individual comes into " personal and direct contact with people of another nationality" or when the mass media or national leaders articulate " perceived matters of national interest and national security in relation to other nations" (Rivenburgh, 1997, p. 84). Like other aspects of social identity, national identity is essentially competitive and can trigger intergroup discrimination just by the awareness of another nationality. Members of the in-group country will therefore tend to maintain distinctions between themselves and other nationalities that reflect positively on

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their own country. Furthermore, because national identity carries some level of emotional value for all group members, the successes and failures of the country will affect feelings of pride and self-esteem (Ibid.). Rivenburgh (1997) notes that this causes members of the in-group country to credit successes to the national character and dismiss failures as circumstantial.

In an occupation in which there is daily exposure to other nationalities and international issues, journalists, particularly those that report on foreign affairs, may routinely experience the activation of their national identities (Ibid.). According to Bloom (1990), journalists, like all other citizens, will consciously or unconsciously call into action their " national identity dynamic" when they are " confronted with opportunities to preserve, defend, or enhance national identity;" in order to fulfill these opportunities, they may construct biased media presentations that enhance the national identity, leading to overall patterns of biased reporting. Rivenburgh (1997) asserts that these kinds of interactions may indicate how a media worker's identity as a member of a group influences the construction of international events in the overall pattern of mainstream media; such constructions ultimately influence how audiences perceive the external world.

Patterns and routines in the reporting of international events and affairs, then, are likely to be linked closely to national identity. Gans (1978) has identified how national identity affects news values when he observed that stories that depict threats to the nation become newsworthy:

> [The stories] focus attention directly on the nation as a unit, since specific stories often judge individual happenings in terms of their consequences for the country as a whole. Foreign news involving American foreign policy readily invites a view of the

> nation as a unit vis-à-vis other units as well...Typically, such stories conceive of the nation in anthropomorphic terms; and when the news is tragic or traumatic, it become the nation-cum-individual whose character and moral strength are tested.

As Gans indicates, the nation is often framed in comparison to an " other" in portrayals that accentuate positive national characteristics. Rivenburgh (1997) argues that national identity is also active in the depictions of other nations since other nations are evaluated in terms of the home nation's perspective:

> Those considered " more like us" in terms of economic philosophy, political system, values, language, and so forth tend to be evaluated more favorable relative to those " least like us' (p. 81).

Thus, there is a double-standard favoring nations similar to the in-group in the social comparisons made. This double-standard is evident in the reporting of developing nations in the Western press, according to Dahlgreen and Chakrapani (1982). Their study indicated that disorder, violence, and corruption in the Third World are framed as systematic problems that evolve from the " essential essences," or natural character, of these countries, whereas the same problems in the West are framed as mere deviances or temporary imperfections. Furthermore, the problem motifs used in Third World coverage imply bipolar opposites that reflect the West's self-conception and its relation to the other. As an example, Dahlgreen and Chakrapani (1982) argue that the motif of human rights abuses in developing nations implies that Western nations are more humanitarian. This motif, along with its implications about the nature of the in-group and the out-group, emerged in coverage of the caning of Michael Fay.

BACKGROUND

Michael Fay, 18, had been living in Singapore for two years with his mother and stepfather. He and several other foreign teen-agers were arrested in October of 1993 and held by the Singapore police for nine days. The police charged Fay with two counts of vandalism, alleging that he had been involved in spray-painting cars and throwing eggs at other vehicles, as well as possession of stolen goods. Fay pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to four months in prison, a $2,200 fine, and six lashes of a rattan cane. In Singapore, Fay's sentencing immediately made front-page news, but the story was not picked up by the American press until March of the following year while Fay was in the process of appealing the sentence. By this time, Fay had retracted his confession, stating that it had been coerced by the police who had, he alleged, slapped and punched him and threatened to hold him in a cold room until he confessed. He also accused the police of beating another teen-ager arrested for the same charges until the youth's eardrum ruptured. Fay denied any involvement in vandalism and asserted that the stolen signs and flags that the police had found in his room had actually been stolen by the son of a Swedish diplomat.

When the news of Fay's sentencing, and the subsequent denial of his appeal, hit the news media in the United States, it proliferated widely, as previously noted. The newspapers routinely covered the story for several months and the incident generated numerous opinion pieces and letters-to-the-editor. The caning sentence apparently struck a chord with the American public, which, according to public opinion polls, had large constituencies that supported the punishment. Perhaps due in part to the heavy media coverage, President Clinton twice issued an appeal for clemency on Fay's behalf. The Singapore government responded by reducing the number of lashes to four and the caning was carried out in May. After his punishment had been carried out, Fay returned to the United States.

METHODS

In the analysis of news coverage of Michael Fay's caning, all articles that related were selected from the *New York Times* local edition from the first article on March 16, 1994 to the end of the year when the issue had subsided. The *New York Times* was chosen not only because it has more extensive coverage of foreign news and is often identified as a newspaper that sets the agenda for other news media, but also because the *New York Times* was criticized by the leading English-language newspaper in Singapore for its coverage of the issue. The fact that it was singled out by the *Singapore Straits Times* suggested that the *New York Times* may have been provided with more opportunities to activate the national identity dynamic in order to respond to such criticism; this possibility made this newspaper of even greater interest. Key terms used to identify relevant articles in a search through the National Newspaper Index included: Singapore, Fay, caning or flogging, public opinion, and punishment. The search yielded thirty-four articles. Opinion pieces were included in the sample because they are the most clear statements of journalists' values and opinions, and therefore likely to express national identity; letters-to-the-editor were disregarded because they were not written by journalists.

In order to identify and analyze the frames utilized, a matrix was constructed that cross-referenced the sources attributed (including " no source cited") with references to Michael Fay, Fay's family, the Singapore Government, the U. S. Government, the U. S. public, the nature of the incident, and the nature of the punishment. Guided in part by Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) descriptions of framing devices in media discourse, the author conducted a close reading of the texts and systematically filled in the matrix with the following indicators: catch phrases, metaphors, depictions (of actors and actions), visual images, and labels. Once the indicators had been identified, themes and frame components for each article were derived, as defined by Gamson & Modigliani (1989) and Entman (1993): definition of problem, causal analysis, moral evaluation, and treatment of the problem. These components in turn enabled the author to determine frames that journalists applied to this topic overall.

FINDINGS

Through textual analysis, four dominant frames emerged repeatedly in the articles:

- Singapore is an authoritarian " lash land."
- East versus West.
- Disrespect from Singapore.
- Support for America and Michael Fay.

Singapore is an authoritarian " lash land."

This first frame defines the problem as one in which Singapore is unfairly punishing Michael Fay and finds the cause of this problem in the Singapore government's authoritarian posture. In its moral evaluation, the frame implies that Singapore is by nature a repressive regime. The treatment of the problem, according to this frame, would require the Singapore government to be just and compassionate by granting clemency to Fay.

The frame constructs an " essential essence," to borrow a term from Dahlgreen and Chakrapani (1982), of Singapore as a fundamentally harsh, repressive, uncompromising, and even brutal entity. This is evident in the articles' assertions about the nature of Fay's crime compared to the severity of Singapore's sentencing. None of the articles ever refers to Fay pleading guilty to a *crime*; instead, they refer to it as " youthful mischief" (Shenon, 1994, April 1), " spray-painting cars," or at the very worst, " vandalism." In several instances, the journalists cited official sources who charged that the sentencing was " excessive," such as Ralph Boyce of the U.S. Embassy who declared that there was a " large discrepancy between the offense and the punishment" (Shenon, 1994, March 16). An opinion piece even went so far as to state: " the grossly disproportionate flogging punishment akin to torture, cries out for condemnation" (A flogging in Singapore, 1994, April 2). Thus, Singapore's inappropriate sentencing, not Michael Fay's actions, is identified as the source of the problem.

This frame is further developed by depictions of Singapore itself. In eleven articles, Singapore was labeled as either a futuristic order-loving city-state or a wealthy authoritarian city-state.[1] Other articles offered various indications of Singapore's harsh repression, such as the headline that read " Singapore, the Orwellian Isle" (Sesser, 1994, April 30) or the more extreme labels of " fascist city-state" and " dictatorship" used by William Safire (1994, May 19). The frame also incorporates examples of Singapore's strict laws and regulations. An article by Philip Shenon, the chief correspondent from Singapore, explains that " the Americans [living here] know, Singapore is a nation with laws so tough and unforgiving" (1994, April 10); he further notes that the city-state " has executed four foreigners for drug trafficking...and has laws so strict that it is illegal to fail to flush a public toilet" (1994, March 16).[2] In reference to such extreme forms of regulation, an opinion piece states that " Overkill can indeed be a powerful deterrent and keep streets clean, but such superficial neatness can mask a repellent sense of justice" (A flogging in Singapore, 1994, April 2). Additional criticisms of Singapore's tough system of justice help to flesh out the definition of Singapore as a harsh authoritarian state. " Not only [is] Singapore's barbaric penal code on trial," proclaims an opinion piece, " but the integrity of its judicial system. Its authorities must have the courage to throw out sentences that are the result of a tainted prosecution" (Singapore justice on trial, 1994, May 5). The author not only implies a moral evaluation that the justice system is backward and corrupt, but that the solution to the problem would be for Singapore to dismiss Fay's sentencing.

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[1] However, eight of these articles were written by the same journalist, Philip Shenon.

The frame's strongest moral evaluations, as well as its most vivid construction of Singapore's essential essence, come from the many allegations of torture and brutality involved in the caning punishment and Singaporean police interrogations. Many of the articles portray the caning in graphic terms that imply torture, as exemplified by Shenon's description: " Prisoners who have been caned say the scars are permanent, and may go into shock from the intense pain of the flogging, which tears open the skin and causes copious bleeding" (1994, May 5). Similar descriptions of the shock and scarring resulting from a caning were present in nine articles.[3] Although one article gives official Singapore sources an opportunity to provide their own depiction of the caning, which is much more subdued than the American versions, their portrayal loses credibility when the reporter inserts a qualification that the " description...appeared to be an effort to convince its public that the punishment is not as brutal as news accounts suggested...Until today, the Government declined to answer any detailed questions about the procedures carried out in a flogging" (Shenon, 1994, May 2). The frame also includes accounts of police brutality, including a report by Fay on the treatment of one of his co-defendents:

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[2] Allusions to this public toilet ordinance appear in two other articles.

> According to Mr. Fay's statement, the Malaysian, Tze Khong Choo, returned bloodied from one interrogation. " When Tze sat down, he told me that the investigator punched him in the nose, smacked his ear and hit him with some kind of bat," Mr. Fay wrote. " The shirt had been all bloody from the nose, and Tze said he couldn't hear out of the ear which was hit. (Shenon, 1994, April 17)

Often, torture was explicitly stated rather than implied. William Safire was most blunt in making this connection when he wrote, " Singapore's torture of choice is flogging by rattan cane, which elicits screams satisfying to the torturer and scars the torturee mentally and physically for life. A doctor attends only to make certain the victim remains conscious to feel the excruciating pain" (1994, April 7). In making such a strong statement, Safire goes beyond characterizing Singapore as merely harsh and repressive and suggests that Singaporeans are by nature sadistic and cruel.

The articles justify the framing of Singapore as an unnecessarily harsh and repressive regime by providing comparisons to other nations which offer subtle, implicit moral evaluations about the nature of Singapore. In an article on April 10, 1994, Shenon makes indirect jabs at Singapore by first stating that " Singapore shows no sign of following countries like South Korea and Chile, which only temporarily were able to suppress democracy in the name of economic development," insinuating that Singapore's suppression is of a more lasting nature. Shenon then makes an aside about the Philippines as " an impoverished nation but one with a true democracy," suggesting that despite its low socioeconomic status, the Philippines is still morally superior to Singapore. In the same issue of *The New York Times*, an opinion piece criticizes Singapore's tough punishments by offering the following comparisons:

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[3] Seven of these articles were written by Philip Shenon.

> Japan, however, is an orderly and relatively safe society; its order is not paid for with the fear of torture. Neither is Australia's. On the other hand, Brazil, whose police shoot vagrant children for picking pockets, has not made the streets any safer. (Condemn Singapore's brutality, 1994, April 10)

A later opinion piece also finds flaws in the reasoning behind Singapore's legal code in stating, " there's nothing Draconian about Taiwan's penalties for errant teen-agers, yet it's largely free of vandalism and violent crime" (Sesser, 1994, April 30). By enumerating cases in which strict rules and brutal punishments are not needed to maintain a safe society, these social comparisons complete the frame of Singapore as an entity that is authoritarian and oppressive not by necessity, but because it is part of the essential nature of the society.

East versus West

The problem in this frame is defined as Singapore's inability to see the just course of action in the Fay case due to fundamental differences between Asian and Western value systems. The frame's moral evaluation finds the Singaporean and similar Asian values flawed and oppressive, whereas, in contrast, American values are democratic and humane. As treatment of the problem, the frame urges Americans to voice their rejection of oppression and demand clemency for Michael Fay.

In defining the problem, the frame makes a clear distinction between the American model of individual rights and the Asian model of an orderly society; much of this dichotomy was developed using statements made by Singapore officials. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore for 31 years, is frequently quoted for this purpose, as when he asked, " Which is more important, the interests of the whole society or those of the individual?...The majority of our people support the Government's efforts in protecting the interests of society" (Shenon, 1994, April 13). The framing also places the dichotomy between East and West in the context of the Fay caning:

> [Singapore leaders] have also cited Mr. Fay's case in arguing the value of a so-called Asian model of democracy and human rights, in which the rights of the individual are less important than the rights of the larger society...The theme was raised again today when Foreign Minister Shanmugam Jayakumar said in a speech that draconian laws had kept this nation virtually crime free and foreigners had no right to interfere in how a country governs itself (Shenon, 1994, May 5).

This excerpt functions on many thematic levels. First, the use of the descriptor " draconian" raises the specter of Singapore's authoritarianism. It also calls the Asian model of democracy and human rights into question by pre-empting it with the loaded term " so-called." As it raises doubt and skepticism about Singapore's claim that its laws protect its people, this brief passage also implies that Singaporean officials are raising a challenge to Western values. Other articles provide further quotations from Singapore to demonstrate how the Fay caning is used as an " opportunity to demonstrate again its contempt for the Western concept of individual human rights" (Shenon, 1994, April 10) . One such article is an interview with Lee Kuan Yew in which he finds that the America's social problems stem from a flawed model of rights in which " (t)he expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of an orderly society" (Zakaria, 1994, April 11). Lee is also cited when issuing statements that directly challenge the West's, and in particular the United States', commitment to human rights; in one example, Lee is quoted as saying, " [Americans] always talk about human rights. I think it is just a convenient slogan" (Shenon, April 13). Although Lee and the Singapore government's arguments are given voice in the framing, overall, the frame gives support to the American model through insinuations about the harshness of the Singaporean model, as demonstrated in the previous frame, and through direct moral evaluations:

> Singapore is the richest nation in Asia outside of Japan...but success has come with...a terrible price- the loss of free speech, even free thought, and the endless intrusion of a government so obsessed with the daily life of Singaporeans that it is a crime even to fail to flush a public toilet (Shenon, 1994, April 4).

These moral evaluations maintain the Western model of individual rights as the best alternative.

The frame also highlights fundamental differences between Western and Asian values by using the Fay caning as an opportunity to criticize human rights abuses and authoritarianism throughout Asia, with Singapore as its leader. A. M. Rosenthal writes in an opinion piece that Fay is not alone in his punishment, nor is caning the only concern in Singapore:

> But for a list of other offenses, 1,208 Singaporeans and other Asians were caned to the blood in 1987-88 alone...the issue is not only vicious flogging, but the other laws of which that is

> part and symbol: detention without trial, administrative imprisonment and political, press, and academic control, the whole nasty authoritarian collection" (1994, April 15).

In this train of thought, the greater fear is that this " tiny city-state has become a role model for China, Vietnam and other one-party governments in Asia" (Shenon, 1994, April 10). Rosenthal provides examples of human rights violations throughout Asia, but in several articles, there is an implication that Singapore is particularly dangerous because its rhetoric about an Asian model of human rights may give power to other Asian oppressors, " [Singapore's] comforting bit of sophistry helps governments from China to Indonesia rationalize abuses and marginalize courageous people who campaign for causes like due process and freedom from torture" (Time to assert American values, 1994, April 11). The insinuation here is that violations of human rights are epidemic throughout Asia, where values are much different from the West, and that Singapore may give Asian countries a justification for such brutality.

In contrast to Asia, America is established as a democratic, humane society. Early in the coverage, an opinion piece declares that the caning in Singapore " would shock Americans and people everywhere who value humane punishment" (A flogging in Singapore, 1994, April 2), thus projecting humanitarianism upon all U. S. citizens. In another, the United States is elevated above the unethical system found in Singapore, " America, the land that led the world in decrying cruel and unusual punishment, must demonstrate that order bought with torture is never worth the price" (Condemn Singapore's brutality, 1994, April 10). Several articles call upon Americans to express their moral outrage as members of a just society, such as one headlined " Time to assert American values," that makes this eloquent statement:

> At times like this, Americans need to remember that this country was also founded by dissidents— people who were misfits in their own society because they believed...that it was wrong to punish pilferage with hanging or crimes of any sort with torture...these values are worth asserting around the world (1994, April 13).

Safire expresses his own outrage at Singapore and at the same time portrays the West as saviors:

> The people of that island city were liberated by the blood sacrifice of 'decadent' Westerners...Someday, Singapore will be threatened again...The rich and repressive city-state will cry for help to the West, despite our cultural quirks about freedom and human rights (1994, May 19).

This portrait of the United States as a defender of freedom and democracy is juxtaposed against the criticisms of Asian, and in particular Singaporean, human rights abuses.

Disrespect from Singapore

The third frame perhaps conveys the most inflammatory definition of the problem in that it asserts that Singapore used the Fay caning as an opportunity to humiliate and criticize the U. S. society, President, and the American press. The cause of this problem is found in the criticisms of America by the Singaporean press and government, as well as the Singapore government's denial of President Clinton's appeal. According to the moral evaluations within this frame, such criticism is unwarranted and even insulting to the U.S., and therefore, proper treatment of the problem would be to deny credibility to these criticisms.

The frame argues that Singaporean officials have used the Fay incident as an excuse to disparage social conditions in the United

States. According to an article on April 10, the Singapore government's " response is simple: Compare life in Singapore to life in the developed Western nations, especially the United States, that criticize Singapore" (Shenon). The author implies that Singapore is able to dodge valid concerns about the caning by making the U. S. a scapegoat. Another article echoes the same implication more prominently in a headline reading " To justify flogging, Singapore cite 'chaos' found in the streets of the United States" (Shenon, 1994, April 13). Within this article, Lee Kuan Yew is quoted as saying,

> ...tough criminal laws had saved [Singapore] from 'chaos' found in the streets of the United States...American society is the richest and most prosperous in the world, but it is hardly safe and peaceful...The whole country is in chaos.

Rather than accepting such statements as valid critiques of social problems, the frame views them as opportunities for Singaporeans to " ridicule Americans for tolerating graffiti-soiled cities" (A flogging in Singapore, 1994, April 2).

The frame further suggests that the Singapore government has insulted the U. S. President by rejecting his pleas for Fay's clemency. A quote from Michael Fay's father, George Fay, portrayed the clemency denial as " cynical and an insult, an insult to our country and to the President of the United States" (Shenon, 1994, May 5). This view was reinforced and given credibility by an unnamed American official, who stated, " There are people in Washington who took the caning as an insult to the President" (Shenon, 194, June 22). Columnist William Safire, in an opinion piece titled " President doormat," turned this theme into a barrage against Singapore, as well as a jab at the President's effectiveness:

> Lee Kuan Yew, the aging dictator of Singapore, saw a way to make himself the ethnic hero of Asia by posing as the upholder of law and order against the decadence of the West. His method was to provoke and ultimately humilate the President of the United States by brutalizing and then torturing one of our citizens...As Dictator Lee lectured the West about morality, he directed his courts to deliver an exquisite insult to the President: Take a couple of lashes off the six-lash sentence. Clinton's intercession was worth all of two lashes; how's that for superpower?...An American was railroaded, the world treated to a spectacle, and our President's pleas were rejected with contempt (1994, April 19).

In addition to declaring that Singapore is a dictatorship and inferring that Clinton is incompetent, Safire's piece implies that Singapore's action not only humiliated the President, but also insulted the dignity of the United States.

Support America and Michael Fay.

This final frame tries to reconcile the problem that much of the American public actually supported Fay's punishment. The source of the problem is defined as the American public's ignorance of all the circumstances in the Fay case as well as their overwhelming desire for an orderly society which has led to misjudgments regarding Michael Fay. The frame presents moral evaluations of Fay as a fellow American with typical American values who is an innocent victim; at the same time, it presents the American public as misguided and even callous for turning their backs on Fay. Additionally, as a treatment of the problem, it attempts to persuade readers to support Fay and condemn the caning.

The framework presents a sympathetic portrait of Michael Fay as a brave but vulnerable American. He is characterized as " one our citizens" (Safire, 1994, April 7) and " stoical" (Shenon, 1994, April1). One description of Fay in prison, provided by his father, evokes the image of a traditionally strong son consoling his mother,

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" He's doing fine...his mother couldn't hug or touch him, which was hard on her, but Mike kept telling her to be strong" (Shenon, 1994, April 20). The frame also emphasizes Fay's role as a typical American teenager, " [Fay] wanted to get on with finishing high school and then go to college 'like any other kid in America'" (Reuters, 1994, June 26). Furthermore, sources close to Fay vouch for his character, " ...teachers and administrators who knew Mr. Fay said he was never a disciplinary problem...'I don't think you could find one person on this faculty who would say that he's a trouble maker. He's a really nice boy" (Shenon, 1994, April 17). While Fay is shown to be decent and courageous, the word and image choices also indicate that he is vulnerable and worthy of sympathy. The framing argues that " Fay is being singled out" (Condemn Singapore's brutality, 1994, April 10) and that the " legal screws are being turned hard against Mr. Fay" (Rosenthal, 1994, April 15). Fay, who had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, is reported to be " hospitalized for depression" (Shenon, 1994, April 1) and " reported to suffer from a serious neurological disorder" (Shenon, 1994, April 10). The portrayals of Fay as a victim of Singapore's legal system and as a mentally ill young man create a frame in which he is clearly the underdog.

The frame continues to encourage sympathy for Fay and also appeals to Americans' sense of justice by asserting Fay's innocence. Fay himself is cited as swearing that his confession was " 'a total lie I gave to police because I was only scared of what they will do to me...they had physically and mentally hurt me'" (Shenon, 1994, April 17). The same article notes that

> While Mr. Fay's allegations might be seen as desperate excuses, it may be possible to substantiate large portions of his

> statement, which suggests that Mr. Fay and his friends may have been so physically abused that they confessed to crimes they did not commit (Ibid.).

Lawyers in Singapore reinforce this claim by stating that " the summary prepared by Mr. Fay has the ring of truth, especially his description of the brutal interrogation" (Ibid.). Even more credence is given to Fay's plea of innocence by support from the President of the United States:

> President Clinton renewed his protest over the flogging sentence imposed on Mr. Fay and suggested for the first time that the teen-ager's confession may have been coerced by the Singapore police...'It's not entirely clear that his confession wasn't coerced from him (Shenon, 1994, April 21).

Convinced of his innocence, an opinion piece declares, " It now seems clear that Mr. Fay is the victim of a tainted prosecution... there are enough signs of police misconduct to warrant setting aside a penalty" (Singapore justice on trial, 1994, May 5).

As one theme attempts to defend Fay's innocence, another tries to come to terms with the sizable number of Americans who are reported to support the sentencing. Several news stories acknowledge the position of these Americans and try to provide some kind of explanation, such as this one offered by a radio talk show host, " A lot of people related the lack of crime to the severe punishment in Singapore...A lot of people here are fed up with juvenile crime" (deCoucy, 1994, June 23). The framing acknowledges this point of view, but at the same time, it presents this view as a problem because it is irrational and lacking compassion. Writes one author, " The defense of torture has persuaded many Americans, but it is totally specious" (Sesser, 1994, April 30). An opinion piece on April 10 raises concern about the " general callousness about what Mr. Fay is facing" and then observes that it is

" disheartening to watch Americans, in their yearning of order, endorsing medieval torture" (Condemn Singapore's brutality). The piece further warns that " American detractors are simply helping Singapore score propaganda points" (Ibid.). The response of the American public is defined as a problem, but it also promotes a solution by exhorting readers to show compassion and " raise their voices in protest" (Condemn Singapore's brutality, 1994, April 10).

DISCUSSION

Previous studies contend that national identity has an influence on journalists' coverage of news events and that the collective efforts of these journalists in the mass media are actively involved in triggering a national identity dynamic, that is, the enhancement and protection of national identity, in the mass public (Rivenburgh, 1997; Bloom, 1990). The news reports and editorials concerning the caning of Michael Fay serve as a case study of both phenomena.

The activation of a national identity dynamic in the U. S. regarding the Fay caning may have its origins in Singaporean nation-building and press coverage. As a relatively new nation and one with a multi-ethnic population, nation-building is a high priority for the Singapore government (Quah, 1990). According to Bloom, governments commonly engage in nation-building by employing symbols to enhance identification with the state; one way that symbols can have the desired effect is if they elicit an appropriate attitude toward a threat (1990). Birch argues that Singapore uses this strategy by staging discourses of crisis in the media that project symbols of " inappropriate external influences" as threats to the state (1993). Michael Fay may have been used as one of these symbols, a Singaporean news icon of the " moral defects of the West" (Lingle, 1996, p. 115). The arrest of Fay and other alleged vandals was given immediate front-page coverage in the Singapore Straits Times, and the accused were initially all labeled as Westerners, despite the fact that several were later revealed to be Asians. Fay may have been an even more effective news icon once the U. S. press picked up the story as it gave the Singapore government an opportunity to challenge the superiority of Western values (Ibid.). Suddenly, Singapore had an opening to renegotiate its position on the national identity hierarchy.

The American press's response to Singapore's challenge was typical of any dominant group: with the security of the U. S. social identity at stake, American journalists felt compelled to justify the status of the United States and find ways to enhance America's distinctiveness along both political and cultural scales.[4] In order to maintain distinctions that favored the U.S., American news-workers created the " Singapore is an authoritarian 'lash land'" frame that ascribed an essential essence to Singapore as an unjust, brutal and authoritarian state. Following the same pattern described by Dahlgreen and Chakrapani (1982), by depicting Singapore as a violator of human rights and personal freedoms, the frame implies that the United States is humane and ethical. This competitive element of national identity is also manifested in the direct evaluations of Singapore's culture. In the " East versus West" frame, Singapore is categorized according to the perspective of the U. S. and judged to be in opposition to Western values; it is consequently given a highly unfavorable evaluation. This is further emphasized by comparisons of Singapore to other nations which are portrayed as having values similar to America and are framed in a much more positive light. Through the social comparisons offered in these frames, the American press enhances the social identity of the United States.

In addition to using enhancement strategies, American journalists also employed strategies that protect the U. S. national identity. The " Disrespect from Singapore" frame attempts to discredit criticisms directed at the United States by depicting the criticisms as Singapore's opportunistic ploys to humiliate the U. S. In the process, the frames also protect the American national identity by deflecting attention away from the criticisms and diverting it to grievances with Singapore's behavior.

One aspect of this incident that is more unusual is that the American press had to contend with the American public, which seemed to respond independently to the initial framing. Public opinion polls, conducted early in the life of the Fay caning coverage, indicated that a sizable proportion of the general public seemed to support the sentencing. This difference between the reactions of the mass public and the journalists may be due to the ways in which they interpreted the story. The public may have initially perceived Michael Fay as emblematic of the domestic problems involving American youth rather than any international threat. Journalists, on the other hand, may have been more inclined to detect the overtones of international competition; this may have been particularly true for those reporters stationed in Singapore for whom national identity was especially salient.[5] In response to the reports of the public's stance, newspapers apparently

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[4] For the purposes of this study, an assumption is made that The New York Times is representative of U. S. newspapers.

[5] Eighteen of the thirty-four articles were written from Singapore.

tried to activate the national identity dynamic among audience members. Journalists constructed the " Disrespect from Singapore" frame to elicit outrage and defensiveness toward the Singaporean government's charges and criticisms. " Support America and Michael Fay" was an even more direct admonishment of Americans' lack of identification with a fellow citizen as well as a call to patriotic instincts. By presenting a threat to national identity and reinforcing the positive characteristics of the nation, the media attempted to mobilize the national identity dynamic in the mass public in order to protect the social identity of the United States. Since no relevant public opinion polls were conducted in the later part of the coverage, it is difficult to ascertain whether the journalists' efforts had an effect on their readers' understanding or interpretations of this news event.

This study has made the assumption that The New York Times is indicative of newspaper coverage of this issue in general. However, the fact that the Times' special correspondent from Singapore, Philip Shenon, wrote thirteen of the articles makes this somewhat problematic if he was biased in a different direction than most other American news-workers. While it is possible that Shenon is not typical of all the journalists covering the Fay caning, the sample from Shenon and the relatively small circle of New York Times, Associated Press and Reuters reporters and columnists used for this study are still powerful indicators of a national identity dynamic within the American press and therefore still serves as a good case study. However, additional studies involving wider groups of journalists, including those who were not stationed overseas, would certainly add depth and breadth to this discussion.

An investigation of the national identity dynamic in the Singapore Straits Times coverage of the caning might also make an interesting comparative study that could provide insight into the interaction between the two competing social identities. Another useful study suggested by the findings of this case study might be to determine whether journalists have a stronger sense of national identity than other members of the national group. If this is the case, how might this affect the production and reception of foreign news?

CONCLUSION

News coverage of the caning of Michael Fay demonstrates how journalists construct frames that enhance and defend their national identity, as well as how they attempt to mobilize the national identity dynamic in the mass public. The Fay caning incident is also significant because it became a news icon that tapped into American insecurities about its status in global community. This story ceased to be a public interest item about one individual American overseas; instead, it illustrated how Singapore, one of the growing economic powerhouses in the Pacific Rim, is seen as a threat by the United States, a political and economic giant that is struggling to maintain its position of affluence and influence. In other words, this is a case study of competing national identities in which the subordinate group becomes a threat to the dominant group. In a post cold-war world, the position of nations along competitive hierarchies may be less stable and redistributions of wealth, power, and prestige will occur with more frequency (Mathews, 1997). As a result, there is likely to be an increasing number of challenges to the status quo, particularly in defiance of American hegemony (Rivenburgh, 1997). As workers who come into regular contact with these renegotiations in international arenas, journalists will probably respond to threats from outside nations by increased activity in the definition, protection and enhancement of U. S. national identity. Their articulation and defense of American national identity may shape the ways in which the American public perceives these changes and orients the position of the nation in the global society.

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Pleasure, Imperialism, And Marxist Political Economy: Exploring A Biological Base

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Pleasure, Imperialism, And Marxist Political Economy: Exploring A Biological Base

ABSTRACT

Marxist imperialism theses have problematized the consumption of Western media by non-Western cultures. This is an exploratory investigation into possible reasoning behind this consumption. An overview of cultural imperialism theory is presented, along with a problematic issue of Marxist imperialistic theory: the treatment of the concept of pleasure. Studies concerning the intrinsically pleasurable characteristics of color, sight, and other "building blocks" of media fare are presented as in-roads toward the possibility of Western media being intrinsically pleasurable.

Evident within present-day cultural imperialism discourse is the collective voice of prominent Marxist theorists touting capitalistic forces as catalytic to the homogenizing of cultures (Tomlinson, 1991) via the global spread of Western (read United States) media fare. Western culture and capitalist dogma, according to Herbert Schiller, are consumed worldwide by mutually-reinforcing media texts that demonstrate the attractiveness of consumerism and the "American Way." The media, to Schiller, entice and instruct non-Western audiences toward the values of capitalistic culture (Tomlinson, 1991). Golding and Murdock posit that global dependency on capitalistic culture is fundamentally a product of economic domination, and Samarajiva has expanded on this thesis by showing how transnational media corporations (essentially Western organizations) effectively block, via the realities of economic structures, Third World media fare from influencing the corporations' media product (Tomlinson, 1991).

This paper is an exploratory investigation into possible reasoning behind a central behavior defining the cultural imperialism thesis: the consumption of Western media fare by Third World populations. This exploration into the issue of consumption will begin with a brief overview of cultural imperialism theory and of what is seen here as a problematic issue of Marxist imperialistic theory—namely, the vague and incomplete treatment of the concept of pleasure*. Next, the paper will turn to Marxist ideology—particularly the idea of man as fundamentally a biological organism—and then approach (via the tenets of hedonism and intrinsic value) the concept of pleasure as being a universally-shared aspect of human biology. Finally, findings of studies concerning the intrinsically pleasurable characteristics of color, sight, and other fundamental "building blocks" of media fare will be presented, and questions will be raised for further exploration into the possibility of Western media fare as being intrinsically pleasurable.

A Brief Synopsis of Cultural Imperialism Theses

McAnany and Wilkinson (1992) recognize three distinct phases defining the progression of cultural imperialist theses: Phase One, The Third World Focus; Phase 2, Europe and Hollywood Phobia of the 1980's; and cultural imperialism of the 1990's, which focuses on political economic approaches to the topic.

At the heart of the Third World Focus was Latin America of the 1950's and 1960's. Communication and economic scholars formulated a theory of dependency to explain the effects of trade and investment relations with Britain and the United States. Around 1970, scholars veered away from economic dependency and denounced United States interference with Latin American *cultural* life. The climactic moment of imperialism's Phase One, according to McAnany and Wilkinson, was Mattelart and Dorfman's *How To Read Donald Duck,* which warned of the United States' (and Hollywood's) manipulation of Latin American cultures. With this book, popular culture products had become offending forces of cultural domination.

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* For this research, the author defines *pleasure* as *enjoyment, delight, or sensual gratification* (The American Heritage College Dictionary, 1993).

The virulent strain of cultural imperialism defining Latin America of the 1970's drifted to Europe by the 1980's and moved cultural imperialism into its second phase of development. Spearheaded once again by Mattelart, the new cultural imperialist drive warned European nations that increased privatization and newly relaxed regulation of European television industries would open the door to a glut of cheap U.S. programming, and that television stations dominated by U.S. fare would promote negative cultural consequences. The European Community in 1989 addressed such concerns by evoking a quota system against the importation of American media fare.

The authors point out that Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches to the political economy of the media frequently inspire discourse on the cultural imperialism thesis today. For scholars such as Miege, the content of Western media products is necessarily borne from the capitalist thrust for profit, and any creative endeavor passed from Western to Third World countries is a commodity foremost and a reflection of Western culture secondarily. The authors also point to the influence of Schiller's assertion that capitalist interests in profits are becoming as much a part of Western media messages as the message itself, and to Mahamdi's concerns about the economic and exchange processes between nations that allow Western fare to reach Third World screens in the first place.

Of special import here is the concept of cultural imperialism forwarded by Fejes in 1981. Cultural imperialism, Fejes argues, is actually a whole comprised of two parts: the *institutional* aspects of transnational media, and the *effects* of media products on their consumers. Fejes believes that political economists have dealt extensively and well with the macro-level analyses of the media messages produced by transnational corporations, but have failed to confront successfully the impact of reception of these messages on the lives of Third World populations (Tomlinson, 1991).

One Effect of Media Messages:
Cultural Imperialism and the Problem of Pleasure

In their book *Channels of Desire,* Ewen and Ewen (1992) elegantly describe the daily labors of young Anna Kuthan. As a Third World domestic servant, she comes in contact regularly with American products with "brightly decorated packaging" sealed "mysteriously in beautified vessels, with painted scenes gracing their outsides." The authors relay how such "enticing containers" lead Anna to form in her mind "a vision of America as a land of plenty."

Such descriptions of effects caused by the display of Western values (through packaging and, most importantly, mass media) have frequently cropped up in political economic discussion of cultural imperialism under the broad category of *pleasure*. Just as Ewen and Ewen describe Anna's optical pleasure derived from gazing upon the colorful and beautiful containers of American consumer products, other political economic endeavors have touched upon the concept of pleasure as it relates to the cultural imperialism thesis, media consumption, and consumption in general.

In his critique of the consumer-centered approach to the scholarly analysis of media products, Garnham (1995) acknowledges that it is important to recognize the investment people make in the consumption of media and the pleasures derived from such. Samarajiva (1996) argues that agents, within the sphere of consumption, experience a collage of pleasure, dissonance, and insecurity, and refers to researchers such as Lyon who posit that the act of consumption itself is based on pleasure.

Other studies mention the principle of pleasure in consonance with the mass media aspect of cultural imperialism. Roach (1997) states that common Western fare in the vein of soap operas and MTV videos routinely denigrate women and treat them as sex objects, but adds that resistant modes of feminist theory argue that such shows provide pleasure for many women. The aforementioned Mattelart recently gave passing mention to the pleasure experienced by the consumption of cultural texts by noting in his book *Rethinking Media Theory* that the pleasure derived from popular culture should be observed from within the "mode of legitimization of a system of communication" (Roach, 1997).

Perhaps most pertinent to this research is the political economic work of Ien Ang. Ang generated from her own enjoyment of the American television show *Dallas* an hypothesis stating that the consumption of such a show can take place on a level of enjoyment unconnected to the ideological assumptions of the text. In other words, Ang saw the global popularity of *Dallas* as a complex phenomenon owing a good deal to "the intrinsic pleasure to be derived from its melodramatic narrative structure." The intrinsic "pleasure of the text" was found by Ang to be central to non-American (Dutch) consumers of the show, who nonetheless deplored the cultural values *Dallas* presented (Tomlinson, 1991).

Although the work of Ang has pinpointed quite clearly the residence of the principle of pleasure within political economy theses, it can be argued that Fejes' reservations concerning current knowledge of the effects of texts (such as the creation of pleasure) still rings true. Precisely, we can take Ang's ideas one step further by asking *just what it is* that makes ideologically ingrained fare like *Dallas* intrinsically enjoyable. Marxist political economists like Ewen and Mattelart seem to agree that pleasure is a factor in the consumption of texts but still treasure macro-level economic and social reasoning to explain the rabid global consumption of Western media texts.

In short, it is argued here that Marxist political economy habitually steers away from (or, in the case of Ang, seriously considers without further analysis) the concept of pleasure and refuses pursuit into what may be a valuable in-road to the understanding of the cultural imperialism phenomenon.

Marx and the Biological Foundation of Man

Marxist ideology contends that it is the material world that defines what man is and what man becomes, and that man is less an intellectual individual than a determined social being. Marxist philosophy, rooted firmly in the ideas of historical materialism, defines the human being as a social and creative animal (Gottleib, 1992) born into predetermined societal relationships. Among the many societal relationships into which man may be born, the most determining relationship is man's relationship to society's mode of production.

But beneath this concept of man as a creative and socially-determined being is the fundamental notion of man as a biological entity. When constructing his ontological concept of man, Marx found it "necessary to start from the existence of individuals as specimens of a biological species" (Schaff, 1970). Marx frequently referred to the satisfaction of needs, and called man's biological needs—food, drink, protection from nature, and sex—"true" needs. He also stated that life involves before everything else the satisfaction of the needs related to one's very biological sustenance (Archibald, 1989).

In short, Marx's concept of man is rooted in the concept of a fixed biology integral to human nature (Fromm, 1966) and precursory to the activities in which man engages (Plamenatz, 1975). Even Marx's eulogy, given at his graveside by lifelong collaborator Friedrich Engels, expounded on man's biological nature:

> "...the simple fact hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science..." (Callinicos, 1983).

Intrinsic Value and Hedonism: Moving Toward A Link Between Pleasure And Biology

Whereas political economy has dealt only superficially with the concept and makeup of pleasure, the philosophical sciences have pursued the phenomenon of pleasure with a relative furor. In particular, philosophers entrenched in the philosophy of intrinsic value provide pleasure a central role to human existence. Brentano recognizes many forms of sensual pleasure as instinctive and connected to men and animals alike. Brentano states that "we are endowed by nature with a pleasure for some tastes" (Brentano, 1902). Other intrinsic valuists hold that pleasure is the only intrinsic human good and apply a "thesis of universality" to it's goodness, e.g., the intrinsic value of pleasure is a universal phenomenon shared by all humans (Lemos, 1994).

Most importantly, the philosophy of hedonism has recognized (albeit in theory only) this universality of pleasure and its links to the common biology of man. Some versions of hedonism maintain that the pursuit of pleasure is the sole activity of which human beings are capable, and all hedonist philosophies denote pleasure (defined as inner qualities and agreeable feelings we would naturally like to perpetuate) as something ingrained in human nature. Hedonists believe that we all presumably have the capacity for experiencing pleasures of the "lower," biological form (such as food, drink, and sex). According to Edwards (1979),

> "the assumption of a common human nature...is not as doubtful as it appears to be on the surface. Certainly there are many individual and cultural variations in our sources of enjoyment and frustration, but it is also true that a few sources of the same are almost universally human. After all, the person who designs a torture chamber or a weapon of war usually does not have to consider cultural and personal idiosyncrasies to remarkably efficient instruments of suffering and death" (Edwards, 1979).

To summarize, we can recognize in certain strands of philosophical thought the idea that man's capacity to experience pleasure is, in many ways, rooted in the biological nature of man and considered to be universally applicable.

Pulling It All Together:
Man And Pleasure As Biological, Media As Intrinsically Pleasurable

While denouncing the cultural homogenization threatening to take over the globe, Schiller (1974) decries television program material "*designed* especially to secure and hold mass audiences in thrall to the *delights* of consumerdom." Further, Collins (1993) hypothesizes that the worldwide dominance of American media is partly determined by a "fundamental *attractiveness* of U.S. product to audiences" (all emphases added).

In attempting to answer the question of *what it is specifically* about the design of Western programming that makes it fundamentally attractive and causes such delight in audiences, it is argued here that, perhaps, *the production* *elements of Western programming* (from lighting, sound, and color, through direction, plot, etc.) *commonly create media products that capitalize on man's innate biological sources of pleasure.* In other words, the beautiful and magical (see Ewen above) design of Western media may provide more pleasure, on a fundamentally and universally biological level, than other non-Western media fare.

As concerns the current imperialist notion of the worldwide consumption of Western media fare (specifically television and film), Aristotle once noted that man delights in the pleasures of sight above all other sensory pleasures (Edwards, 1979). It also has been noted that pleasures of sight necessarily involve stimulation of the senses, and that neurological processes probably are causes or components of such experiences of pleasure (Edwards, 1979).

Scholarly research concerning the intrinsic and biologically-based pleasure of the visual components of media is, for the most part, tangential to the grander idea of Western media being more pleasurable (in terms of production aspects) than non-Western media. Some studies, though, do support the possibility that certain components of visual productions (mainly color, the use of sex, and emotion-eliciting storylines) may, essentially, catalyze feelings of pleasure in viewers.

Valdez and Mehrabian (1994) studied the effects of color on emotions. By presenting color chips to subjects, the researchers found that the saturation and brightness of colors showed strong and consistent effects on emotions. The research also showed that blue, blue-green, green, purple, and purple-blue were considered the most pleasant hues, and green was among the most arousing.

In his attempt to explain audiences' attraction to texts that are fear-inducing, tension-producing, and otherwise unpleasant, Haskins (1981) draws on various psychobiological and sociobiological theories that posit all human behavior as motivated by a biological need for electrical stimulation of the brain. The author hypothesizes that certain forms of mass media satisfy survival instincts based in man's biological needs for pleasant stimuli as well as dangerous stimuli.

In her study of viewers of the American television show *Dynasty,* Schroder (1986) found that regular viewers of the show need and like the program because "somehow its signifying structures stimulate the pleasurable attempt to make sense of the human condition in post-industrial capitalist society." The researcher also posits that the general pleasures garnished from viewing *Dynasty* stem from, among other things, the sexual attractions between the characters.

Schwichtenberg's (1986) elegant study of the popular American television show *Miami Vice* posits how the show's production techniques (extreme close-ups, dissolution of distance, etc.) sensualize the surface of the show so that the viewer is engaged in an "autoperformance" that takes over the body in an act of surrender. Thus, "pleasure arrives on the screen which is the site where the body is abandoned and given over to hyper-affects."

In their study of the emotion eliciting qualities of television political campaign advertisements, Masterson and Biggers (1983) state that, generally, persons approach stimuli that elicit feelings of pleasure. They also state that research shows arousal operates as a drive to the basic pleasure response, e.g., as arousal (brought on by certain television campaign advertising) increases, so does the level of pleasure felt toward the ad.

Finally, marketing research has shown that colors can be manipulated in supermarkets to induce consumers into "high comfort levels" (Hitt, 1986). Researchers hold that, to persuade such comfort in consumers, East coast stores should use gray, turquoise, and salmon colors because the sun rises over the water and provides such colors with a soft, comforting hue.

Conclusions and Further Questions

Schwichtenberg (1986) has stated that pleasure has been a source of embarrassment for Marxism. The preceding exploration into the Marxist notion of cultural imperialism; the fundamental biology of the Marxist man; and the proposed universality of the biological concept of pleasure has attempted to locate a possible inroad toward an enhanced understanding of why Western media products—central to all cultural imperialistic theses—are consumed en masse. Here has been attempted a deeper exploration into Ang's general notion that the universal attraction to Western media fare may somehow be embedded in the "intrinsic pleasure to be derived from its melodramatic narrative structure," and the intrinsic "pleasure of the text." We have questioned here if *specific elements* of Western narrative structure and texts act upon the senses and fundamental biology of man in such a way that feelings of pleasure from the text are a natural outcome.

Obviously, such an exploration raises numerous questions beyond the general thesis. For instance:

1. Can other common production characteristics of Western narrative structure beyond color and sex (such as bright lighting, fast-paced action, etc.) cause feelings of pleasure?

2. Is it possible to operationalize the myriad components comprising a text such as film into mutually exclusive and measurable phenomena?

3. Although the link between human nature and pleasure has been duly spelled out, should we not also inquire into the idea of *escaping from displeasure?* In other words, may Western productions be designed to provide temporary *escape from intrinsically bad* human conditions, therefore providing viewers the pleasure of leaving the human condition behind?

4. Along with the biological causes of human pleasure, can we not delve deeper into the *cognitive* aspects of pleasure—what Brandt (1997) refers to as the "motivational theory of pleasure"? In other words, does Western media fare act as a source of pleasurable *thinking?*

5. Haskins' research raises the interesting notion of man's biological need for *danger*. Can the consumption of thrilling, suspenseful American films that are so popular around the world be explained biologically?

6. In the case of popular *non*-Western fare: Can such media texts be enticing to viewers because these media products take advantage of production and aesthetic elements typically associated with Western media, e.g., are borrowed Western production practices determining the poopularity of indigenous fare?

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MEDIA, MARKETS AND MESSAGES:
GHANA'S RADIO FORCED TO MAKE CHOICES

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ABSTRACT

Until Structural Adjustment, Ghana had an extensive, state-run broadcast system oriented toward education and development. Now, forced to privatize its media, the country is faced with the competition between fostering consumer culture among the growing urban elite class and fostering development of the rural majority of the country. Development messages are particularly relevant to women who generally have less education and fewer resources than men. Conflicting interests and consequent problems are examined.

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MEDIA, MARKETS AND MESSAGES:
GHANA'S RADIO FORCED TO MAKE CHOICES

This research examines the ways in which radio is used to encourage development among women in Ghana. Ghana has one of the oldest and most extensive media systems in Africa, and has used radio--and later, television--for education, information and development from the beginning. However, Ghana's broadcast media system is in the process of revolutionary change. The system, once totally under government control, is becoming privatized and more profit-oriented.

"Development" is a controversial topic in many circles. Who, for example, defines development, the development professionals or the people being "developed?" Who decides who should be/become developed? Who determines the success or failure of development projects? While acknowledging the legitimacy of these questions, this paper does not explore definitions of development, but rather allows Ghanaian professionals to define what is appropriate for their people. After numerous interviews with experts on women and development in Ghana, I am convinced that the government's current efforts are based on an in-depth analysis of the needs of poor Ghanaian women that is informed by a long history of development successes and failures. As part of its development agenda, the government is concentrating on the education of women, helping them to increase their economic potential, and improve the quality of their daily lives. Radio is a part of that effort.

Research Questions

In what ways is radio being used to foster development, particularly among women?

Are women receiving the messages?

Are the messages useful and helpful to women?

Do the competing agendas of privatization of the media for profit versus the use of media for development and education have implications for women?

Ghana's media

Until the 1990s, the government-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) and affiliated stations in rural areas were the only broadcast media in the country. Then, in the early 1980s, the international lending agencies--the IMF, World Bank and many donor nations--declared that countries who wanted to continue to receive loans from them must restructure their economies for more efficient operation. Included in that economic restructuring (which became known as Structural Adjustment)[1] was privatization of most state-run industries.

Ghana is in the process of complying with the mandates of Structural Adjustment. In the realm of media, new licenses for private radio and television stations have been issued, and since 1995, several private radio stations have been broadcasting in the capital city, Accra, and more recently in Kumasi, the nation's second largest city. In December 1997, the first private television service went on air in Accra.

International satellite services also have their corporate eye on Africa, and on Ghana in particular. Plans to beam television and new digital radio into Africa are moving ahead at a rapid pace. World Space, an international partnership of communications moguls who plan to make digital radio available around the world, has an office in Accra and an agreement with GBC for future business. World Space plans to launch its first digital satellite over Africa. That is scheduled to happen in June 1998.[2]

While all of this new technology is perhaps a sign that Ghana (and some of the rest of Africa) is leapfrogging into the telecommunications revolution, the reality is that most people won't have access to the new media because they are too rural and too poor to afford them. Ghana's new radio and television stations, along with the other telecommunications services are, at this point, part of a budding consumer culture that is still based in the urban centers of Accra and Kumasi.

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[1] Structural Adjustment has become a proper noun which implies a similar pattern for most lender countries: devaluation of currency, opening up domestic markets to foreign goods, lowering or revoking protective tariffs, cut-backs on government expenditures for social services and employment, large-scale privatization of state-run industries.

[2] B. GyeKye Tanob, Director, Research/Marketing, World Space, Accra, personal conversation, October 15, 1997; Chris Tackie, Director and Personal Assistant to the Director General, GBC, personal conversation, November 4, 1997.

Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) consists of a television service and three radio channels. The GBC radio system includes two short-wave services--GBC 1 and GBC 2--and an FM station, Radio GAR. GBC 1 broadcasts in six Ghanaian languages (Hausa, Dagbani, Ewe, Ga, Akan, Fanti) and English in a complex programming schedule of language blocks. Included with the daily schedule is the national and international news in English. Historically, GBC 1 has had entertainment, information, and educational programs, including formal classes, as well as development-oriented messages (Ansah in Karikari, 1994, p. 23). GBC 2 is an English-only service of entertainment, information and some educational programming, including classes in speaking better English. Radio GAR (Greater Accra) is a commercial FM station whose signal can be heard in the urban area and surroundings of Accra. This station airs news, public affairs and entertainment mostly in English, with an occasional foray into Twi or other language during call-in shows.

In 1995, the government issued the first private license to JOY-FM in Accra. JOY's big, urban, hip sound is similar to those found at many US urban stations. Several other stations have also been granted licenses to operate. The dynamic programming mix on the airwaves in Accra has so challenged GBC's monopoly over the audience and advertisers that GBC has been forced to change its approach from a somewhat pedantic and plodding style to a more lively fare.[3]

JOY-FM's call-in public affairs shows have dominated Accra's morning air-waves. In taxis, buses, shops and most public spaces, JOY's popular AM DJ pushes the agenda of a budding consumer market--insurance, home furnishings, "Levi's jeans," and even home security systems--things most Ghanaians couldn't hope to afford, if they could imagine their use at all. At the same time, the disc jockey sends a subtle entreaty to his listeners to join the regular schedule of an industrialized work-force by chiding them to get out of bed for work. Talking to callers in a fluid combination of Twi and English, the two most common languages in the Accra area, private stations occasionally challenge the actions of government officials, more often focus on personal relationships, consumer items, or famous personalities. The success of the call-in shows on JOY, and to a lesser extent on the other stations, is all the more startling when one considers how few people have telephones, even in Accra, and how unreliable the phone system is. Radio GAR and the other private stations have similar programming to JOY-FM's, with varying degrees of imitation and skill. When the talk shows end, an energetic mix of domestic and world music rocks the day with public affairs discussion programs interspersed here and there, the schedule depending on the station.

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[3] Chris Tackie, Director and Personal Assistant to the Director General, personal conversation, November 11, 1997.

On all of the stations, there is a healthy dose of religion. Stations begin and end the day with prayers, most include a sermon from a local preacher. During the day, programmers frequently mention churches and religious themes--usually Christian--and much of the advertising is paid for by churches. Churches buy not only "spots" of 30- or 60- seconds, but whole program blocks. One producer at GBC, Gertrude Opere-Addo,[4] told me the new, private FM stations had influenced GBC policy on religious programs. The previous director of GBC had forbidden religious advertising and programming on GBC because, he said, the country has so many religious groups and there is room for misunderstanding about favoritism. However, when the private FM stations began to air religious commercials, the new director changed the policy to allow religious broadcasts as long as they were sponsored. Opere-Addo saw this as a very positive change. She immediately began a series of programs sponsored by a local church group for which she received added income, allowable under GBC rules. The programs air on GAR and GBC 2 on weekends.

The advertising from churches is all the more important to GBC since the central government declared that the system would have to become more self-supporting. At this point, the government pays for GBC salaries, but the corporation has to pay for the rest of its operations. This new policy has caused GBC management to devise a number of cost-cutting schemes, including a plan to pass fiscal and managment responsibilities for running the rural stations on to the District Assemblies (elected local government bodies) of the communities in which the stations are located. The District Assemblies receive money from the central government from which they allocate funds for civic maintenance and improvement, including schools, sanitation, water, the operation of the markets, local police, etc. The portion of funds given to each activity depends on the decisions of each community's District Assembly.[5]

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[4] Gertrude Opere-Addo, producer of *Woman to Woman*, a talk show for women that played three times a week, 2:05 - 3:00 PM, Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, personal conversation, November 4, 1997.

Community Stations

In 1964, Ghana was selected by UNESCO as an experimental training site for using rural radio to foster development (Head, 1974). Since then, a number of rural radio stations have been built. They offer "education in the broadest possible sense of the word" (Ansah in Karikari, 1994, p. 23) in the local languages with the high quality sound of FM. Although the definitions of education, information and development often have included pro-government propaganda (Bourgault, 1995; Mansell, 1982), the content of the rural stations has, for the most part, contained at least some development-oriented fare (Ansah, 1985).

Development through Non-Formal Education

Two rural radio stations, in the cities of Tamale and Ho, were built by the Department of Education's Non-Formal Education Division in the 1990s with financial help from the World Bank.[6] The stations were placed in the regional capitals of under-served areas; Tamale in the Northern Region, and Ho in the Volta Region in the southeast of the country. Both stations are powerful FM stations with signals that reach miles from the transmitter. The station at Ho is particularly strong. Literacy House, as the Non-Formal headquarters is known, has plans to build ten more stations. Those stations would be small, low powered stations (500 watts) run by local District Assemblies for very localized audiences.[7]

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[5] C. Tackie, November 4, 1997.

[6] Each of the local stations was created at a different time with different funding sources, different mandates and different agreements with GBC. For purposes of simplicity, this discussion will focus on the stations at Tamale and Ho, where the bulk of the research was done.

The Ho and Tamale stations were created to assist Literacy House in the education of adults, specifically to reinforce basic literacy classes for women. The classes use quasi-Freirean sessions that focus on the daily realities of the learners not only to teach literacy, but to enhance development (Freire, 1994/1970). The twenty-eight lessons include topics such as safe motherhood and child care, nutrition, teen pregnancy, taxation, environmental hygiene, borrowing money for work, and AIDS (1992).

The classes themselves are not aired on radio. Instead, radio is supposed to provide additional information about the issues in the primer, teaching tips for facilitators, and up-dates on current government policies, e.g., changes in the inheritance laws (Chapter 27 in the primer). Radio is also supposed to offer a forum for the participants in the classes to talk about their experience with the literacy program (1992, p. 46-48). Producers from GBC, and sometimes from the local station, visit different classes, record the learners' comments, and play them over the air. GBC and the rural stations share some of this programming. Facilitators are supposed to be given radios to bring to class. Outside the class, facilitators call attention to programs that address important issues, turn on the radio in a public place, and encourage everyone to listen.[8]

The Non-Formal program is the most specifically development-oriented radio programming targeted toward women, but there are some other programs which targeted women as well. Those programs, for the most part, have a lighter, less pointed fare.

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[7] Kwami Ansre, Deputy Director of Radio, Ministry of Education, personal conversation, October 22, 1997.

[8] "Pre-sets" as they are called, are battery operated radios. They are pre-set to the short-wave frequencies of GBC 1 and GBC 2. The listener can click the knob from one to the other. The more modern version of the pre-set also has an additional tunable FM dial.

Why women?

The changes wrought by Structural Adjustment have made women's role in national development all the more pressing. Clark (1994), Robertson (1984) and others have documented the important place of women in the Ghanaian economy. Ghanaian women grow most of the food for domestic consumption and sell most of the food and household items used by the majority of the population (Chamlee, 1993). Structural Adjustment has forced the government to open its borders to foreign goods which are often cheaper than domestic goods thus cutting into profits of local vendors, i.e., women, and to devaluate the currency that once protected Ghanaians from dire poverty (Brydon and Legge, 1996). Women have borne the brunt of the resulting economic devastation. Women assume almost total responsibility for child care (Dolphyne, 1991) and have less access to productive resources like land and credit (see, e.g., Konings, 1986).

Since Ester Boserup's famous book urging development professionals to consider the role of women in communities that host their projects (Boserup, 1970), much has been written to support Boserup's claims that women hold up more than "half the sky" in developing economies, particularly in Africa. (See, e.g., Ardayfio-Schandorf, 1994; Hill, 1986; House-Midamba, 1995). However, other writers have pointed out that, in many cases, development projects have actually made life more difficult for women. Dolphyne writes that a number of development projects have focused on women, but because they were designed and paid for by foreign donors, non-governmental organizations, and others who weren't directly involved in the final outcome, they have often been inappropriate for the communities and people for whom they were designed (Dolphyne, 1991).

Ghana's First Lady, Nana Konadu Rawlings, has made women's development a major priority. Through the 31st December Women's Movement, she has overseen and encouraged projects for women all over the country. Mrs. Rawlings' timing is reinforced by financial assistance from a number of foreign governments, the United Nations, and the World Bank.[9]

Radio Programs for Women

In addition to the Non-Formal education programs, there is a variety of programs for women. Research for this paper on the listening habits of women was concentrated in Ho. The following gives an overview of women's programs from GBC as well as those from Ho. Many women in Ho were able to listen to GBC 1 and GBC 2 from Accra, as well as Volta Star Radio in Ho, and didn't make a distinction as to the source when asked about their favorite programs. This was further complicated by the fact that GBC programs are sometimes also played on Volta Star Radio.

GBC offers several programs in English, including *Woman to Woman*, *Women's World*, and *Women's Magazine*, all of which offer advice on traditional women's issues like health, education, nutrition and child maintenance. Experts are interviewed and occasionally sketches are used to reinforce new ideas. *Ideal Woman* is a personality-driven program featuring successful women who talk not only about their work, but about their personal lives and favorite causes. *Ideal Woman* is done in different languages depending upon the language of the guest, the "ideal woman."[10]

Gertrude Opere-Addo hosts *Woman to Woman*, a three-times-a-week advice program that focuses on health, psychology and the law. She has the same guest for a block of time--several weeks--who will answer questions from phone calls and letters. Translators are available during the program to make it easier for people to ask their questions and for the audience to understand them. Opere-Addo is also the host of *In Touch*, a brief, 6-7 minute spot that airs on Sunday. Like the weekly show, *In Touch* also offers advice on social issues related to women's domestic lives--health, parental roles, abortion, stress, alcoholism, etc.--but solutions to problems are offered based on the teachings of the Christian Bible. Breaks in the program are filled with what Opere-Addo calls "the encourager spot." She begins the break with, "Let me introduce you to somebody," then plays the song, "What a friend we have in Jesus." *In Touch* is sponsored by the Lutheran Media Ministry of Ghana which also pays Opere-Addo to host the program.[11]

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[9] A brief trip in the Tamale area revealed projects for women funded by the governments of Iran, Japan, Canada, Denmark, and the US. The radio stations in Tamale and Ho were built with World Bank loans while the proposal for the preliminary work on the ten new stations was sent to a Japanese agency.
[10] Group interview with GBC rural producers, November 4, 1997.

A program called *Housewives' Favorite* airs on most stations around the country in a variety of languages. However, each program is not an exact translation of an original, but rather a local language version that is unique to the individual station where it is playing. A particular program may or may not feature the same subject as the *Housewives' Favorite* on another station.

The above does not offer an all-inclusive compendium of women's radio programs in Ghana. Radio programming is fluid, as in most media environments, with new programs being added and others being discontinued regularly. The above descriptions are intended to give the reader a sense of the kind of programs targeting women. Reactions to the programs by some of the women in Ho are described below.

Methods

This research was conducted for dissertation research on radio as a tool for development among women in Ghana. Research methods were qualitative with an emphasis on interpretive ethnographic approaches using participant observation, textual analysis and interviewing. Archival research was also used.

The research was conducted over a three-month period from October 1997 - January 1998. The project was begun at the University of Ghana, Legon, where experts on women, development, and media policies were interviewed.

Although I conducted extensive research on Ghana before leaving the US, I found that a snowball approach to sources was helpful once I was in-country. The list of authors and experts compiled in the US served as a guide, but there were often more helpful individuals who held positions of power, or had information that was essential to the study. It was sometimes helpful to have a letter of introduction from one influential person to another. For example, after visiting GBC four times, and sitting, waiting to be seen for long periods, I found that a letter from a particular professor to a person in power finally opened the gates to the big corporation. It was only a fluke that I'd mentioned my problems to the professor in the first place, but after allowing me entrance, GBC management was very open and gracious.

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[11] Gertrude Opere-Addo, personal conversation, November 4, 1997.

Management professionals from Ghana Broadcasting Corporation were interviewed about past, present and future policies of the GBC, including funding priorities, policy changes, and liaisons with other government agencies. Audience research studies from 1978 through 1997 were also examined. GBC's rural radio reporters offered insight into their jobs and the communities they serve, as well as the changes they have seen in policies and resources available in recent years. One reporter, Sawuratu Alhassan, accompanied me to Tamale where we conducted interviews in several communities and Non-Formal education classes. Managers at local radio stations in the village of Apam and the city of Ho were also interviewed.

Management at the Department of Education's Non-Formal Education Division was interviewed, including repeated interviews with the Deputy Director of Radio about the use of radio for basic literacy classes and the relationship between the Non-Formal Division, GBC, international donors like the World Bank, and the rest of the central government. Regional staff from the Non-Formal program also were interviewed repeatedly.

Facilitators (teachers) of the Non-Formal classes were interviewed, as were participants (learners) of the classes. The meetings with the literacy classes were somewhat formal, as they were always set up by a third party and always included the whole group. In the North, I was assisted by staff from the Non-Formal program and the 31st December Women's Movement, a national group whose objective is to initiate and support development projects for women. It was on this trip that the GBC rural reporter mentioned above accompanied me.

Because the groups were assembled by their facilitators and staff members from the Non-Formal Division, I was concerned that answers to my questions might not be totally candid. The responses were generally enthusiastic about the Non-Formal classes, but they were not without criticism. So, while I accepted at face value what the women said, I tried to phrase new questions to get a sense of what was working for them and what was not. I interviewed a number of women outside the classes as well to get a more detached view.

In Ho, the Non-Formal Division allowed me to visit, observe, and later question the learning groups. I was also allowed to observe facilitator training in two locations, Akatsi and Kpandu. At times, I was accompanied to the literacy classes by a staff member of the Non-Formal Division, otherwise, a staff member from the National Council on Women and Development in Ho assisted me. All of the encounters with the Non-Formal classes would more appropriately be called group interviews than focus groups as they were free-flowing, but slightly more formal than what is commonly described in the US as a focus group.

Finally, women who work in the markets at Tamale, Ho and Akatsi were interviewed in-depth, some more than once. The market women represented a variety of economic positions as some were illiterate and had virtually no capital to work with, while others were very well educated. In addition to formal education, some of the women were fourth or fifth generation traders who had learned the skills necessary for success in the marketplace almost from birth. Although there were wide disparities among women in terms of economics, there were no defining factors that predicted success or failure, other than the obvious: women who started out with more, generally ended up with more. The "more" varied from reading and math skills to ownership of land to credit, etc. etc. I could find no direct correlation between a particular woman's economic position and her reaction to specific radio programs.

To speak with the Non-Formal classes and most of the women in the markets, I required translators. In the Tamale area where people speak Dagbani, the reporter from GBC, S. Alhassan, along with two staff members from the Non-Formal program, interpreted questions and answers, as well as offering useful information about the day-to-day realities of the people in the communities we visited. Ms. Alhassan was also there to gather tape for stories she would produce for GBC, and I found some of her questions were helpful as well.

All of the interviews in the North were tape recorded.

In addition, a young man accompanied me to the market and acted as an on-the-spot translator for spontaneous questions to vendors. Those questions were not tape recorded.

In Ho, the information gathering was more careful as that city became the main focus of the research. The same translator, Sitsofe Amegboe, accompanied me every time interviews were done and interpreted for me and the Ewe-speaking women of Ho. All interviews were tape recorded and logged into the computer. Later, a second translator re-interpreted the tapes and that information was added to the data. Most of the time, the translations were in agreement. Occasional differences usually reflected the original translator's attempts to clarify the responses of the interviewees by adding details she assumed I did not know.

In Akatsi, interviews were done in the marketplace as well. However, a different translator was employed. The translations were insufficiently detailed, so the interviews at Akatsi became less useful than those at Ho or Tamale.

Throughout the research process, observations were recorded daily, along with supplemental information gleaned from casual conversations and reading. Several radio programs from a variety of stations were also tape recorded and when necessary, translated into English. Texts were analyzed for their content, messages, attitudes, and over-all approach to women as an audience.

Findings

1. *Do the competing agendas of privatization of the media for profit, and the use of media for development and education have implications for women?*

If the rural stations are to be the main source of media for development in Ghana, the competition for funds within local communities must be considered. As mentioned above, local District Assemblies are faced with competing interests and problems which must be addressed with limited funds from the government and whatever other sources of income the Assemblies can create. Advertising from churches and local businesses may work in larger communities, but in some of the smaller communities, there are not enough businesses to support local radio stations. Although many of the people who were interviewed for this research said they believed the District Assemblies would "find the money," no one was able to say where that money would come from beyond the operating funds given to the Assemblies by the central government.[12] It appears likely that Assemblies, faced with limited funds, may feel supporting a radio station is not as important as, for example, community sanitation or children's education. In such a situation, the government's commitment to women's development radio will be challenged.

An examination of GBC audience research from 1978 to 1997 shows a surprising lack of data about women's reaction to programming. In the earliest days, "programming councils" in each region were appointed by the government. The councils were totally or almost totally comprised of men whose job it was to rubber stamp GBC policies. Later research included overwhelming majorities of male respondents. In 1996, 91.3% respondents were male. In one survey in 1995, 72 men and 5 women responded, while in a second survey that year, 84 men and 2 women responded. In 1993, 100 men and 50 women responded. In 1991, 98 men and 3 women.

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[12] E.g., C. Tackie, November 4, 1997; K. Ansu-Kyeremeh, Professor Communications, University of Ghana, Legon, personal conversation, October 23, 1997.

In a 1997 survey of listeners of the women's program, *Woman to Woman*, 64 men and 144 women responded. Director of Research, Hamidu Chodi, told me that the 1997 survey represented a new policy of equality in research. In future research projects, for every two men, at least one woman had to be interviewed.[13]

At the same time, women are not totally unrepresented at GBC. Most of the rural radio producers are women. Gertrude Opere-Addo, mentioned above, is in a management position, and there are several other women in positions of some power. At the rural stations, this does not appear to be the case. Management at the three stations I visited--Ho, Tamale, and the village of Apam--were all men.

2. *In what ways is radio being used for women's development?*

As mentioned above, development-oriented programs for women are found in the programs for the Non-Formal education and in what could be called regular women's programs. However, there are reasons to question the government's long-term commitment to the use of radio for education. The Non-Formal education system is running out of money.[14] The system was funded with loans from the World Bank beginning in 1989 and was designed to last until 2000 with "virtual eradication of illiteracy" by that year (*Facilitator's Manual*, 1992, p. 14). However, the program spent more than was expected with fewer results. As of October 1997, a highly critical independent report was being produced about the Non-Formal program.[15] Staff from Literacy House were in the process of requesting additional funds from the Bank to continue the program.

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[13] Hamidu Chodi, Director of Research, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, personal conversation, November 5, 1997.
[14] Indira Tettegah, Director of Research, Non-Formal Division, Ministry of Education, personal conversation, October 23, 1997.
[15] Tettegah. The report, done by Professor David Korboe from the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, was not available when the interview was done.

Reinforcement tools are already becoming scarce. Many of the classes in the North had no radios. Sanyo, the company that has made the radios for the classes for many years, has become reluctant to manufacture any new ones.[16]

In Ho, the Non-Formal education program would seem to contradict what was going on at the main headquarters in Accra. As late as December, groups of new facilitators were being trained--a minimum 18-month commitment--to lead classes all around the region.

Volta Star Radio, the FM station in Ho, is owned by the Non-Formal program. Unlike most of the other rural stations, it is not formally scheduled to be passed on to the local District Assembly. The Assembly Chief at Ho, George Forjoe, acknowledged that eventually the station would become the Assembly's responsibility, but as of December 1997, he had no knowledge of when.[17] The considerable expenses of that station were still being paid for by the central government through GBC and the Ministry of Education.

Even with support from Literacy House, Volta Star Radio did not always air the programs from the Non-Formal education, even though they were scheduled. When I attempted to monitor and record Non-Formal programs for this research, I found that they were replaced with religious programming--which was sponsored by a church--and, on other occasions, by music. Based on the interviews done with women, it is safe to say that this rescheduling does not always occur, but based on my own experience, it is also clear that the Non-Formal programs are not as sacrosanct as one might expect considering the ownership of the station. When asked about the discrepancy between the scheduled programs and the actual programming, station management said my lack of comprehension of the Ewe language probably led to a misinterpretation of what I was hearing, but, in fact, a native speaker translated the programs and came to the same conclusions as I.

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[16] K. Ansre, Deputy Director Radio, Non-Formal Division, Ministry of Education, October 17, 1997.
[17] George Forjoe, Chief Executive Officer, District Assembly at Ho, personal conversation, December 17, 1997.

3. *Are women receiving the messages? Are the messages useful and helpful to women?*

In the Non-Formal classes where radio was used as a supplementary tool, women remembered quite clearly which programs they had heard, not only subject matter but details of the subject. They were delighted when they heard other learners on-air, although I did not meet any group who had been on the air themselves. Several said they'd invited the local rural producer to visit their class, but so far, she/he had not come. Learners said they had learned a lot from the radio, although they seemed to merge the lessons of the class and primer with the lessons from the radio, which is the ideal. Only a few learners from the Non-Formal classes said they had radio in their own houses, but when they did, they listened in the evenings after the day's chores were done, and on Sunday mornings before church.

In addition to the Non-Formal education programs, the programs for women concentrate almost exclusively on domestic issues. The question of whether women are receiving the messages could be answered in a number of ways.

It must first be acknowledged that only about half of the women I interviewed (more than 60 in total) had any access to radio. Of those who did, not all owned the radios themselves. A few women said that their husbands or other men (sons, brothers) owned the radio in the house, so when he was home playing the radio, they heard it. When he was not home, the radio was often locked up in his room. To understand why a man might lock up his radio, it's necessary to consider the way property is divided between men and women in Ghana. It is not necessarily communal. Husbands and wives often live in separate houses, and when they live together, each has a separate room or section of the house. This separation of economies carries over to material goods like radios. Many rural houses have no electricity which means the radios use batteries. The cost of batteries in proportion to incomes is so high that it represents a hardship to buy new ones. A woman may not consider replacing the batteries in a radio that is not hers. A man may be unwilling to buy batteries for someone else.

Other women said they had no time to listen to radio. This was especially true of market women whose days begin at 4:30 AM and don't end until well after dark. Many women's programs are scheduled during the day which is inconvenient for market women unless there is a radio playing in the marketplace. In one small cantina, I interviewed eight women. While the women worked together in a closed space which one radio would easily accommodate, each woman wanted her own radio. One woman did have a radio in her stall, but none of the others acknowledged hearing it.

This was consistent with another confusing detail of the research findings. While it might be assumed that women who are together all day would, at least occasionally, discuss things they hear on the radio, questions about whether they did, in fact, discuss things heard on the radio elicited blank looks. This does not necessarily mean women do not discuss such things, but that, perhaps they don't see themselves in such discussions, or they don't connect the subject matter of their conversations with the source of the information.

Many women in Ghana speak no English, or their comprehension is minimal. For them, programs in Ghanaian languages are obviously more relevant. Some market women speak three or four languages and listen to the same information on the radio in several languages. Others only benefit from programming in their own language. Some said they speak no English, but they listen to and claim to understand radio in English.

The women who did listen to radio programs were, for the most part, unable to differentiate between GBC and Volta Star Radio programs, despite the fact that they needed to switch from FM to short wave or vice versa to hear particular programs. At the same time, most of the listeners named *Housewives' Favorite* as a favorite program and could discuss issues they had heard on that program. Also popular were religious programs which many women listen to on Sundays, and sometimes on Saturday afternoons.

The women, for the most part, said they were satisfied with the overall program content, although on further discussion, I learned that some women were mentioning programs they had heard years ago. Many women mentioned the religious programs as favorites. One Muslim woman mentioned Opere-Addo's *In Touch*, the religious program which uses the Bible as a foundation for its advice. I asked her why she liked it, given that she is a Muslim. She replied that the Bible is a good book for anyone.

Women had a difficult time answering the question: Are there any things you'd like to hear on the radio? or a variation: Can you think of any ways radio could help you? It was quite obvious no one had thought of radio as something on which she could have any impact. The few who were able to re-think the possibilities most often named income-generation and credit as the things they most needed help with. (There was very little of such pragmatic programming content.) A few others named program topics they'd already heard. The most innovative answer came from a weaver in Kpetoe, a village known for its weavers. She said she would like the radio to feature the products from her village so that people "around the world" would come and buy their work. She may not have understood the limits of individual radio stations, but she instinctively knew the value of advertising.

Upon being asked whether they ever listened to the programs for the Non-Formal education, only a few women outside the classes said they listened. Most of the literate respondents answered curtly that they knew how to read; the programs were not for them.

Finally, many women complained that they would like very much to listen to the radio, but they had no access to it. A few market women in Ho pointed out that, at one time, there were public speakers in the market and in other places, and everyone could listen to the radio then. No one could remember when the speakers had been removed, or why.

Conclusions

Although women are being targeted somewhat, the government's commitment to women's development programs, particularly the use of radio to reinforce those programs, appears very limited. The de-funding of the Non-Formal program, the competition within the districts for funds, and the need of GBC to become self-sustaining seem likely to leave the country's poorest women left out of the media in the future.

Based on discussions with many women outside the Non-Formal classes, it is apparent that the interests of literate women, both poor and middle-class (for lack of a better descriptive term), already have been set aside for programming that encourages urban consumerism, traditional domesticity, and the woman's responsibilities in the home. Programs for women frequently use a monophonic lecture mode, usually with a man as expert, and appear to this outsider to ignore whatever knowledge or problems women have in daily life. When women are brought onto the radio as experts, they are frequently experts on recipes, child care or nutrition. This orientation is consistent with Ghanaian feminism, which reiterates the importance of women's responsibilities in the home (see, e.g., (Oduyoye, 1995) but it ignores the burden most women face of having to support the family financially as well as taking full responsibility for child care, and the maintenance of the home.

It could be argued, as many have before, that most of women's problems in Ghana come from the irresponsibility of men, particularly toward child care and the household. There are many historic, traditional, political and economic forces coming into play in the domestic and financial relations between men and women, but within that complex framework, radio offers no entreaty to men to help make women's lives easier. While there are many programs to help women be better wives and mothers, I could find none that encouraged men to be better husbands or more responsible fathers.

Religious programs typically offer spiritual advice for material problems. In one program on family difficulties, for example, the preacher said, "Those who find themselves drinking, who have marital problems...Don't drink too much because you'll regret the situation you find yourself in." There was no further advice on how to stop drinking, only a promise of hope.[18] While there may be nothing inherently wrong with a spiritual entity giving spiritual advice, the increasing role of the churches on the air may mean less and less assistance for women in terms of material programming content. The large number of women who spoke of a need for increased cash and credit are unlikely to find new information on how to obtain those resources if churches control most of the non-music program blocks.

In programming for women, it appears that Ghana has seen them as a resource more than as a group of individuals whose lives could be made easier. Radio is being used with varying rates of success to reinforce new ideas and information, but the daily hardships women face are not being challenged. While elite women advise the government on how to address women's development, including teaching them to read, the voices of the recipients seem to be silent.

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[18] Program from Redeem Evangelistic Church in Ho, Saturday morning, November 1, 1997.

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Journalism Under Fire:

Reporting the El Mozote Massacre

Markham Competition
International Communication Division
AEJMC National Convention
August 5-8, 1998
Baltimore, Maryland

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Journalism Under Fire: Reporting the El Mozote Massacre

Abstract

In January, 1982, *New York Times* reporter Raymond Bonner came across a gruesome scene in El Salvador — the charred skulls and bones of dozens of men, women and children. His January 27 article, headlined "Massacre of hundreds reported in Salvador village," brought shock and outrage, but was soon discredited and criticized by U.S. government officials and media conservatives, including a vicious editorial in the *Wall Street Journal.* El Mozote has come to represent years of brutal repression in El Salvador. But for journalists, El Mozote represents another kind of tragedy. It's a tale of how daring journalism that brought sinister facts to the American people was labeled untruthful and biased. It's a story of media bias, in which newspapers are expected to frame issues in accordance with official views. And finally it's a story of what happens when journalists step out of that frame and report things the way they see them.

Journalism Under Fire: Reporting the El Mozote Massacre

Introduction

In January 1982, *New York Times* reporter Raymond Bonner came upon a gruesome scene in El Salvador — the charred skulls and bones of dozens of men, women and children.

He later reported in his newspaper what appeared to be a massacre. More than 700 people were murdered by the Salvadoran military a few weeks earlier, villagers told him.

His January 27 article, headlined "Massacre of hundreds reported in Salvador village," brought shock and outrage, but was soon discredited and criticized by U.S. government officials and media conservatives, including a vicious editorial in the *Wall Street Journal.* Later that year, his editors pulled Bonner off the beat and reassigned him to New York.

El Mozote has come to represent years of brutal repression in El Salvador. The U.S. government supported Salvadoran military regimes that continuously abused human rights and murdered thousands of Salvadorans.

But for journalists, El Mozote represents another kind of tragedy. It's a tale of how daring journalism that brought sinister facts to the American people was labeled untruthful and biased. It's a story of media bias, in which newspapers are expected to frame issues in accordance with official views. And finally it's a story of what happens when journalists step out of that frame and report things the way they see them. For Raymond Bonner, who dared to break that frame, he paid the consequences. Long after the story was forgotten by many, the United Nations Truth Commission revealed the facts — again. Except this time nobody denied the awful truth.

This article will focus on the journalistic debate surrounding El Mozote. First, it will briefly describe what happened in El Mozote starting in December 1981, and how journalists reported the massacre. Then, it will analyze why Bonner, and to a lesser extent, *Washington Post* reporter Alma Guillermoprieto, came under conservative attack themselves. And finally it will place the events into the context of media bias and framing. As this article will show, the mainstream press often is content to deliver the official U.S. version of events in Latin America and elsewhere. Occasionally that frame is broken, but at what cost?

The Truth Commission vindicated the journalists who reported on the El Mozote Massacre; journalists who continue to promote the official government line on things Latin American remain under indictment.

The massacre

El Salvador has a long, violent history, including *la matanza* of 1932, when the military murdered some 10,000 to 40,000 peasants and Indians to root out the 'infection' of rebellion (Danner, 1994). The government of El Salvador has continued to use killing as a way to control the populace. In the 1970s and 1980s, government-sponsored violence wiped out the political center in El Salvador (Binford, 1996). Government critics were killed off, forced to flee the country, intimidated into silence or impelled to join the leftist guerrillas, the FMLN. The United States continued to support the Salvadoran government. "These were years when Ronald Reagan and many Latin

American governments saw communism in anything left of George Washington" (*The Economist*, 1994). The Reagan administration wanted to hold the line against leftist governments, especially after the Sandinistas took over in Nicaragua. As writer Joan Didion (1983: 14) describes the Salvadoran scene of police cars, soldiers and bodies, "terror is the given of the place." She adds, "The dead and pieces of the dead turn up in El Salvador everywhere, every day, as taken for granted as in a nightmare, or a horror movie" (19).

During the time of the massacre, the FMLN had been mounting successful offensives, and the Morazán region was a guerrilla stronghold. The military's U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion mounted Operation Rescue in December 1981 to clear Morazán of the rebels. El Mozote stood in its path. The Army slaughtered hundreds of men, women and children in El Mozote and surrounding villages. Rufina Amaya, the lone adult survivor in El Mozote, describes the brutality she witnessed: "Then I heard one of my children crying. My son, Cristino, was crying, 'Mama Rufina, help me! They're killing me! They killed my sister! They're killing me! Help me.' I didn't know what to do. They were killing my children. I knew that if I went back there to help my children I would be cut to pieces. But I couldn't stand to hear it. I couldn't bear it. I was afraid that I would cry out, that I would scream, that I would go crazy. I couldn't stand it, and I prayed to God to help me. I promised God that if He helped me I would tell the world what happened here" (Danner, 1994: 75-76).

Journalist Bonner had heard of the massacre after the guerrillas' clandestine radio station began broadcasting details. Reporters wanted proof. The FMLN offered to take reporters from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* to the scene. Bonner, accompanied by photojournalist Susan Meiselas, was taken to the scene first, and Guillermoprieto arrived a few days later. Both of their stories were published on Jan. 27, 1982.

"From interviews with people who live in this small mountain village and surrounding hamlets, it is clear that a massacre of major proportions occurred here last month," was how Bonner's 1,427-word story opened (Bonner, 1982). He told of seeing skulls and bones buried under burned-out roofs, beams and shattered tiles.

Guillermoprieto's article, headlined "Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killing; Woman Tells of Children's Death," opens this way: "Several hundred civilians, including women and children, were taken from their homes in and around this village and killed by Salvadoran Army troops during a December offensive against leftist guerrillas, according to three survivors who say they witnessed the alleged massacres" (Guillermoprieto, 1982).

The public furor was intense but short lived (Binford, 1996).

The criticism of the journalism

Shortly after the stories, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders criticized the stories before a congressional committee. He said "no evidence could be found to confirm that government forces systematically massacred civilians in the operations zone, or that the number of civilians remotely approached the 733 or 926 victims cited in the press" (Danner 1994: 126). It suggested that the numbers could not be credible because the population of El Mozote was "probably not more than 300."

That's when the *Wall Street Journal* led a media campaign attack on the story. It ran an editorial that criticized U.S. press coverage of El Salvador, singling out Bonner for being "overly credulous" and accusing the *Times* of closing ranks "behind a reporter out on a limb" (Hoyt, 1993). Most of the criticism was focused on Bonner, although a Reagan official wrote a letter to the *Post* claiming that Guillermoprieto had once worked for a communist newspaper in Mexico. Editor Ben Bradlee questioned her about it, and she told him she never worked for any newspaper in Mexico. She later said, "The price I paid, and that all reporters in El Salvador in those critical and brutal years of the war paid, was a loss of confidence in themselves, and the besieged feeling of always having it be our word against the State Department (Hoyt, 1993: 31-35).

Bonner received much more criticism. Ambassador Deane Hinton, on a visit to Washington to speak against a cut in military aid to El Salvador, called Bonner an "advocate journalist" at a breakfast meeting with other *Times* reporters. "He does not hide the fact that he's engaged in advocacy journalism." Accuracy in Media, a conservative press-watchdog group, devoted an entire issue of its monthly publication to Bonner. "The issue included some artful insinuation about Bonner's political sympathies, noting that he had once worked for Ralph Nader, omitting that he had been a Marine Corps officer in Vietnam, and all but calling him a communist agent" (31-35).

In August, Bonner was ordered to work out of the *Times* offices in New York. *Times* Executive Editor A.M. Rosenthal said political pressure had nothing to do with the transfer. Nevertheless, journalists had learned a lesson. "The episode has made reporters wary of provoking the embassy. Bonner's transfer, one reporter says, 'left us all aware that the embassy is quite capable of playing hardball,' and as a result, 'people treat it carefully. If they can kick out the *Times* correspondents, you've got to be careful'" (Massing, 1983).

In 1992, the *Times* and *Post* reported on the unearthing of skeletons for forensic experts in El Mozote, confirming what both newspapers had reported a decade earlier. It was part of the work of the Truth Commission, which later released its entire report detailing the violence that plagued El Salvador in the 1970s and 1980s. The findings, as well as the publication of a book detailing the story, *The Massacre at El Mozote* by Mark Danner, brought renewed attention on both the massacre and the role of U.S. officials and journalists.

Here's what *The Humanist:* had to say: "It is now a matter of historical fact that then-Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders went before Congress and lied about the killings — and this despite the extensive on-site reporting from the region provided by Raymond Bonner of the *New York Times*. In fact, Bonner's finds were corroborated by two officials from the U.S. Embassy, who sent a later, suppressed and heavily edited cable to the State Department" (O'Sullivan, 1993). The article goes on to say the *Times* initially supported Bonner while the *Wall Street Journal* launched its attack. But later, with the recall of Bonner, the *Times* muffled its coverage of the atrocities committed by the Salvadoran military. Regarding a *Times* story about the Truth Commission, it then criticized the *Times* for not mentioning its own "complicity in obscuring the facts about El Salvador, or the role former Editor-In-Chief Abe Rosenthal played in punting those *Times* writers who were deemed less than servile to state interests" (36).

The Economist, in a book review, took the *Wall Street Journal* to task for a 1993 editorial that said, "It was clear enough at the time that something awful had happened" at El Mozote. "Yes indeed," said *The Economist*. "Strange that its 1982 editorial had not said so, indeed had called the *New York Times* man 'overly credulous' when he 'reported 'it is clear' the massacre happened.' Even stranger that the *Journal* was still impugning his credibility in 1993 when his report had just been conclusively proved right" (Economist, 1994).

Several other book reviews praised Danner's work. "The memory of El Mozote remains inconvenient and this book is a courageous indictment in the classical tradition of American journalism," said one (Maxwell, 1994: 172). A columnist (Lewis, 1993: A-17) said, "After the Danner report, no rational person can doubt that Salvadoran Government forces carried out a massacre. They killed hundreds of people in El Mozote and other hamlets nearby: men, women, children, infants. They killed with a savagery that is hard even to read about."

Others used the publication of the book to examine anew the attack against the journalists. In a review of the book, Joan Didion wrote that there seemed to be two clear reasons why Bonner became the target of choice. One was that Bonner continued to report on a daily basis from El Salvador until his recall. "The other clear reason was that Benjamin C. Bradlee and the *Washington Post* backed up their reporter; A.M. Rosenthal and the *New York Times* did not" (Didion, 1994: 12).

The Nation also didn't let the Rosenthal off the hook. "Abe Rosenthal may deny that he sent Raymond Bonner into exile after a *Journal* editorial went on a rampage over Bonner's reporting of the Salvadoran Army's 1981 massacre of perhaps 900 civilians in and near El Mozote, but anyone who was around the *Times* back then will tell you otherwise. The *Journal*'s editorial established the climate of opinion on El Mozote, carried the U.S. government's water on the matter and was able to get the 'no massacre' line established in the press even though it had no independent information on the events" (Pochoda, 1993).

Many observers have concluded that the incident involving Bonner did affect journalists. "The episode had a profound effect on press coverage of Central America in the 1980s. Until Bonner's recall, in August 1982, correspondents reported extensively on the dismal human-rights situation in El Salvador. This greatly complicated the Reagan Administration's efforts to prop up the Salvadoran military and 'draw the line' against leftist forces in the region. Bonner's sudden recall to New York, however, cast a deep chill over correspondents in Central America. It also raised a number of troubling questions that have yet to be answered: Did the *Times* bow to pressure from the government? When does official criticism of a reporter amount to a threat? What happens to a reporter when his or her interpretation of events contradicts that of the powers that be?" (Massing, 1993: 64).

It is the argument of this article that this is not an isolated incident. Media critics long have maintained the news media are biased.

Media and the government

In the United States, the media operate with a great deal of freedom. Yet they still operate under some formal and informal government and social controls. "The media limit their criticism to what they perceive as perversions of fundamental social and political values or noteworthy examples of corruption and waste. They rarely question the fundamentals of the political system. Because journalists depend heavily on established elites as their sources of news, their links to the existing power structures are strong" (Graber, 1997: 21).

The news media are generally supportive of political and social institutions in the United States. American political symbols and rituals — such as the presidency and elections — are respected. While overt political considerations don't play a major role in news selection, the profit motive does. News stories are designed to attract and entertain, not educate people about the political process. Journalists and politicians also are in a symbiotic relationship. Journalists need to get information from congressional and administration sources, and those sources in turn need journalists to help get their message to the public. In an early study, Cohen (1963) says that information is power in foreign policy matters. Thus, governments occasionally find it necessary to manipulate press information as they would with other instruments of national power.

Graber says news selection depends on demographics, training, personalities and professional socialization of news personnel. News stories become stories based on news values and audience appeal. Journalists select stories based mostly on the news values of conflict, proximity and timeliness, along with familiarity and novelty. Journalists also operate in a political context. Gerbner (1964) says a non-partisan, non-ideological news-gathering system does not exist. Lasorsa and Reese (1994) found that news media hold a powerful gatekeeping role in their selection of news sources. Looking at the sources used in four national media in stories about the 1987 stock market crash, they found different facts and interpretations of the events depending on the sources used. In other words, stories differ based on how they are framed.

News framing

Entman (1993) provides a summary of framing. He says framing offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text. It involves both selection and salience. He offers the following description: "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (52). Frames, he says, define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies.

Entman says frames highlight bits of information about an item, making that information more noticeable, meaningful or memorable to audiences. In political communication, frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements. The framing paradigm helps draw attention to the details of how a communicated text exerts its power.

Many researchers use framing as a tool to find news bias in the media. Remember, frames involve selection and salience. Thus, researchers can analyze news coverage by looking at what gets selected in individual news stories about an issue.

News bias

Studies abound of news bias in international news coverage by the U.S. media. But this article will look only at a few that concern Latin American coverage. Bennett (1990) argues that journalists slant their coverage of events to reflect the range of opinion within the government. He calls this “indexing.” In his study of *New York Times* coverage of U.S. funding for the Nicaraguan contras, he finds that the coverage does indeed reflect the range of views that exist within the U.S. government. Dickson (1994) analyzed *New York Times* coverage of the Panama invasion and found that while the *Times* provides a forum for criticism, the government still defines the parameters of the debate. The reliance on government sources and themes, she concludes, supports the idea of the press's ideological bias in favor of the U.S. government line.

A content analysis of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* from 1983 to 1987 showed a pattern of legitimizing U.S. government policy of support for the "contras" in a war against the government of Nicaragua (Dickson, 1992). Another study of how images of Nicaragua and El Salvador are portrayed in the media found that while there is a positive correlation between U.S. government policy and newspaper coverage, all types of reporting do not necessarily contribute to such a relationship in the same manner (Kelly, 1988).

McCoy (1992), who studied the *New York Times*' coverage of El Salvador, including the El Mozote reporting, concludes that the newspaper rarely disturbs Washington's foreign-policy strategies. Reporters who are socialized in the ways of the *New York Times* usually comply with an acceptable range of perspectives to present news involving life, death and human dignity. When Bonner was criticized for his reporting, it led to Bonner's "fall from grace" (80) with Rosenthal. "A truly free press must feel at liberty, even obligated, to criticize the powers that be, especially in matters that concern the character and makeup of a whole society, involving matters of life or death for many in the society. Yet, at least insofar as foreign policy and El Salvador are concerned, the *New York Times* displays a profound pattern of accepting, promoting and disseminating the official government line" (McCoy, 1992: 82).

Why this matters

Many studies have indicated that news stories in the U.S. media favor the position or the view of the U.S. government. This is certainly the case in El Salvador. This strikes at the heart of a belief among journalists and the public that there is a clear separation between press and state. It is important for the public to know whether the media they trust to provide objective, unbiased reporting are indeed just a conduit for the official government "line." Journalists, too, need to realize that their standards of "objectivity" are not as balanced as they may think. As Entman (1993) indicates, an explicit and common understanding of framing might help reporters take a more active and sophisticated role. "If educated to understand the difference between including scattered oppositional facts and challenging a dominant frame, journalists might be better equipped to construct news that makes equally salient — equally accessible to the average, inattentive, and marginally informed audience — two or more interpretations of problems"(56-57).

Both the public and journalists benefit from explorations of framing. The public, made aware of the potential for news bias, should read, listen or view stories with a more critical eye. Journalists also should become more cognizant of news bias in their own stories and news organizations. If journalists are the eyes and ears of the American public in a distant place like El Salvador, they need to portray the news of that society with as little bias as possible — they must be willing to break the frame and tell the truth.

And when journalists like Bonner or Guillermoprieto are willing to do that, other journalists and the public need to support them, not criticize them.

Newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis points to the sad lesson that was learned (Lewis, 1993: 17): "Some of the Americans who denied the massacre have come to regret their actions and said so. Others, politicians and editors, have been unrepentant. I hope they will read Mr. Danner's report. They might try to read aloud, to their families, the passages about the killing of the children of El Mozote."

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Telecommunications Policy Reform and the Legacy of the Indian Post-Colonial State

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Telecommunications Policy Reform and the Legacy of the Indian Post-Colonial State

Abstract

The core concern of this paper is to understand the social context which frames the politics of the state's changing role in economic development in India. In this paper, I argue that central to understanding the policy process of telecommunications is the issue of state legitimacy in a democratic regime. I argue that seemingly clear-cut telecommunications policy issues such as access to services, information disparity, regulation and public accountability, are actually fought over in the larger politics of nationalism and corruption.

Introduction

Since 1994, the Indian state has been radically expanding as well as fundamentally changing the role of the telecommunications sector in its overall agenda for economic development. The formulation and implementation of telecommunications reform in India in the past four years has proven politically volatile, with the state's policy process contested domestically on the grounds of corruption mediated through a politics of nationalism, while the liberalization process has been publicly scrutinized internationally as unstable and erratic. With liberalization, it is clear that the Indian state instead of disappearing from the telecommunications arena is instead redefining its role in this suddenly strategic economic sector.[1]

The core concern of this paper is to understand the social context which frames the politics of the state's changing role in economic development in India. Telecommunications expansion not only symbolizes whether or not a "developing country" will be a player in the global information economy, but the convergence of technologies also links changes in this sector with the growth of communications industries ranging from the expansion of internet services to the changing market in cable and satellite television. In this paper, I argue that central to understanding the policy process of telecommunications is the issue of state legitimacy in a democratic regime. Specifically, I argue that policy making is bound by the ability of the state to remain legitimate in the context of a legacy in which the DoT (the Department of Telecommunications) as a centralized government bureaucracy was guided by a vision of 'meeting universal public interest.' The failure to meet this objective was used to justify a new vision of development structured by the logic of the market. The legacy of 'universal public interest', or more plainly, meeting the informational needs of the poor, has not disappeared and this presents a problem for a liberalizing state in a democratic arena.

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[1] Telecom ranks as one of the highest recipients of foreign investment, receiving Rs. 217 billion between 1991 and 1996, and has been ranked as a priority infrastructure sector receiving high-level policy attention and focus in international trade. See *Telecom Summit: An International Conference on Indian Telecom*. Confederation of Indian Industries, Bangalore: April 4, 1997

Critical discussions on the politics of policy reform in an era of globalization tend to focus exclusively on the state's changing relationship to the market, often overlooking the specific cultural context which articulates the state's role within a particular society and moreover constitutes notions of "civil society" or community. I argue that seemingly clear-cut telecommunications policy issues such as access to services, information disparity, regulation and public accountability, are actually fought over in the larger politics of nationalism and corruption.

After providing a brief overview of the history of telecommunications reform in India, I examine the limitations of the neo-institionalist literature which has been influential in discussions of the changing role of the state in relation to high technology sectors in emerging markets. I then look at why the cultural construction of the state is an useful point of entry to understand the politics of telecommunications reform in India. Focusing on the telecommunications reforms since 1994, the next section links the legacy of the Indian state to the specific politics of corruption and nationalism. Finally, I outline the competing visions of 'the public' and 'public interest' emerging in the context of liberalization which broadens the scope of democratic intervention in the telecommunications policy making process.

Telecommunications Reform in India: A Brief Overview

The recent and rapid transition to privatization and deregulation of telecommunications worldwide is based on the rationale that inefficiency of monopoly state enterprises coupled with advances in technology undermine the arguments for 'natural monopoly' in this sector. The "digital revolution" in particular shaped the consensus in domestic and international policy-making bodies over the need for reliable and extensive telecommunications networks for economic growth -- from the integration of domestic economies into the global economy through financial markets to the viability information-technology (IT) and media-related industrial and consumer expansion.

Following global trends, the move towards liberalization of telecommunications in India was a result of technological innovation in the sector, increased commercial demands for services, and a shift in political sensibilities favoring privatization and foreign investment. In 1984, Rajiv Gandhi's national Congress government first highlighted telecommunications reform by separating the telecommunications services from the postal services and creating separate public sector corporations to handle telecommunications services in the busiest metropolitan regions of New Delhi and Bombay. In the manufacturing end, the state placed a great deal of emphasis on the development of indigenous switching and software capabilities through the creation of the Center for the Development of Telecommunications (CDoT). The growth and success of the C-DoT experiment, as well as the changes introduced by its founder and close friend of the Prime Minister, Sam Pitroda, heralded a new era for telecommunications as an engine of growth in India. (S. McDowell, 1996: 130-137) Alongside India's growing software industry, telecommunications reform suddenly figured in public discourse, with daily news-reports on prospective expansion and reform in the sector, while images of the "computer revolution" proliferated in elite popular culture.

1991 marked the year when pro-liberalization Finance Minister (Manmohan Singh) of the Narasimha Rao Congress government introduced the Eighth 5 Year Economic Plan, and the government signed for its biggest loan from the IMF. As the Indian state redefined its economic development strategy favoring foreign investment and expansion of its high-technology sectors, the strategic significance of expanding telecommunications services became increasingly apparent. The objective was to open up services which were not provided by the public sector corporations to private capital, with a 49 percent equity cap for foreign investors. Licenses for cellular mobile phones were proposed, and value-added services (including electronic mail, voice mail, data services, auto text services, video text services, video conferencing) mainly for use by the private sector, were introduced in July of 1992. (S. McDowell, 1995: 42)

In 1994, the government passed its most extensive reform package by announcing the *National Telecommunications Policy* which was quickly followed up by specific guidelines and then open public bids for the liberalization of the basic and cellular service sectors. As one of the first areas in India's economy to allow private investment, especially foreign investment in a formerly state-owned and operated monopoly, the issue of telecom reform and the public bidding process generated a great deal of media coverage and public debate. Cellular services became operational in 1995 in all of the metropolitan areas, with regional services beginning in 1996. However, well into 1998, the much more crucial issue of the privatization and expansion of basic services remains at a stalemate. There is little enthusiasm in the private sector for investment in the economically underdeveloped regions of the country, and confusion persists over the financial feasibility of basic services as a whole.

While allowing competition, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) retained its status as monopoly operator and policy-arm of the government, evoking vocal criticism from the private sector against unfair business practice. Although the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was finally appointed in 1997 to serve the interests of customers and to serve as an impartial moderator between the various parties, consistent judicial battles between different arms of the state and the private sector reflect a policy regime in midst of an uneasy transition with uncertain consequences.

The details of policy reform since 1994 will be discussed at length later in the paper. However, what we can establish from this brief overview is the significance of the rapid pace of change, the increasing visibility of the politics of policy formulation and implementation in the realm of public politics, and the corresponding changes in the role of the state as it allows private investment, particularly foreign private investment, to participate in a strategic sector. With these issues in mind, we can now turn to a discussion of some of the theoretical literature on the changing role of the state in industrial transformation, and why analyses informed by a broader understanding of the cultural construction of the state might be useful to analyze telecommunications reform in India.

Why India is no Korea or the Limits of the Neo-Institutionalist Approach

The critical literature most pertinent to a study of the changing role of the Indian state vis-a-vis high technology sectors like telecommunications consists of neo-institutionalist analyses of industrial transformation, primarily in East Asia, and the implications for market-state-society relations. Debunking neo-liberal assumptions about the state's retreat from the economic arena, theorists like Alice Amsden, Pranab Bardhan, Peter Evans, and Robert Wade, have examined how states in Asia and Latin America have shaped industrial transformation in a global economy.

At the most basic level, the developmentalist model is predicated on the proactive role of the state in guiding economic development through cooperation of and coordination with local private capital. The developmentalist model of the state thus serves as a new paradigm for state intervention in economic development, in contrast to state socialism, mixed economic models of import substituting industrialization (ISI), and the Keynesian welfare state. Amsden argues that the faster growth rate of the East Asian countries is "attributable less to free markets than to institutions that have allocated subsidies more efficiently than elsewhere"; they have subsidized the price of capital and exports. (A. Amsden, 1990: 7) Neo-institionalist theorists have persuasively demonstrated that export-oriented growth in the East Asian countries has been a result of a different model of state intervention in economic development where the state subsidizes domestic private industry to stimulate growth in exchange for stringent performance criteria met by domestic firms.[2]

Most germane to this paper is Peter Evans' influential comparative study of the Brazilian, Indian and Korean states and the growth of the information technology (IT).[3] Evans introduces the concept of 'embedded autonomy,' whereby the state's relationship and maneuvering capabilities vis-à-vis the market and society is analyzed through the economic expansion of the information technology, or IT sector. Evans explains his concept of embedded autonomy by writing:

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[2] See A. Amsden, 1989, R. Chalmers, 1985, P. Evans, 1995, R. Wade, 1990

[3] Evans has been writing about the developmentalist state and the IT sector since the early 1990s. His work is central to the theoretical assumptions of many scholars analyzing telecommunications and IT development in the Indian economy. See B. Mody, 1995, B. Petrazzini, 1996. S. McDowell, 1996, E. Sridharan, 1996.

> It is autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society and provide instituionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies...(Embeddedness) implies a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation. (P. Evans, 1995: 59)

As his comparative study demonstrates, states in three diverging societies have all intervened with varying degrees of success, creating and then sustaining the information technology (IT) sector in some form in each country. Korea represents a society where the state is both embedded and autonomous, allowing the state to play a constructive role in terms of capital accumulation and social welfare. In contrast, Evans finds that the "intermediary states" of Brazil and India are less able to sustain economic development in the IT sector precisely because the state lacks either autonomy from the interests of capital in Brazil, or lacks embeddedness with the interests of capital in India.

The key defining factor for a state that is able to pursue a developmentalist agenda rests on the nature of its linkages with private capital. Only when the state has "successfully bound the behavior of incumbents to its pursuit of collective ends" can it act with "some independence in relation to particularistic societal pressures." (P. Evans, 1995: 59)

Evans found that in the Indian context what capital lost in autonomy to the "license, permit, quota raj"[4] of the bureaucracy, it gained in security from the state. Capital's gain, however, "was at the expense of the overall dynamics of the industrial sector." (P. Evans, 1995: 68) In other words, the state is seen as having sufficient autonomy from the private sector in India, but is unable to play an optimal developmentalist role because it lacks embedded institutional networks linking the state bureaucracy to capital.

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[4] The terms "license raj" or "permit raj" (raj meaning rule) is frequently invoked to refer to India's specific mixed market system from the time of independence, where the state through its various agencies, regulated most aspects of production and distribution in most formal economic sectors.

Responding to an earlier article on the concept of embedded autonomy, economist Pranab Bardhan argues that a coherent development vision shared by public bureaucrats and private capital is absent in India, precisely because of the existence of a democratic electoral system where collusion between the two would be understood as a breach of fair governance. The state is constrained in its role of facilitator of expanding the interests of private capital because of the competing interests represented by the different sections of, what Bardhan has labeled, India's "heteregeneous dominant classes."[5]

The weak linkages between the Indian state and capital are obviously in the process of dramatically changing in the current era of liberalization. From the work of both Bardhan and Evans, it is apparent that drawing out the process by which the state negotiates between the competing interests of the dominant classes in an era of economic liberalization is key to comprehending the viability of the developmentalist state in India. Nonetheless, the focus on the machinations between competing interest groups and specific bureaucratic structures and the resulting dynamics in economic and policy outcome, tends to preclude attention to the cultural context within which these state institutions operate.

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[5] Contrasting the Indian state's position relative to its East Asian counterparts, Bardhan writes:

> There is none of the close, tightly integrated working relationship of the East Asian government with private business, none of the well-developed networks of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan or the Industrial Development Bank (IDB) in Taiwan, which allow industry experts within the state apparatus to be continuously involved in information dissemination and consensus building, coaxing and even arm-twisting with representatives of private capital....in the Indian context of contending heterogeneous classes, such close liaison and harmonizing of the interests of the state with private business would have raised an outcry of foul play and strong political resentment among the interests groups, the electoral repercussions of which Indian politicians can afford to ignore much less than, say, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians in Japan. (P. Bardhan, 1992: 328)

But why is cultural context important? The conjunctural factors which led to the weak linkages between state and capital relegate the Indian state to an "intermediary developmentalist state" in Evans' model. In other words, the comparison demonstrates why India is no Korea. The framework of the embedded autonomous state proposed by Evans leads us to consider which factors would enhance the state's ability to play a developmentalist role, without questioning how the state's role in economic development is socially constructed. As Partha Chatterjee argues, a critique of the Indian state which focuses on competition between groups over resource allocation overlooks "the fundamental ambiguity of a state process that must further accumulation while legitimizing the modern sector itself as representative of the nation as a whole." (P. Chatterjee, 1993: 217)

Taking into account the cultural context of economic change is important in understanding the complex symbolic role of the state in society which shapes and is shaped by its policy-making and implementation. In the case of economic liberalization in India, the state's ability to redefine its role in economic development is structured by the legacy of bureaucratic culture which can only be understood if we examine the nature of the cultural construction of the post-colonial Indian state.

The Legitimacy of the Post-Colonial State in India

The work of two theorists of the Indian state, Partha Chatterjee and Sudipta Kaviraj, points out that the legitimacy and hegemony of the Indian state's Nehruvian vision of development must be examined to make sense of its strategies of accumulation. Although telecommunications reform in India in the 1990s is taking place under dramatically different circumstances, the theoretical reconceptualization of the categories of state analysis embodied in this work is of great significance in a period when the role of the state is being questioned in Indian political culture.

Sudipta Kaviraj argues that the post-colonial state reinforced the discursive division in society, between "those who made the world they inhabited intelligible via modernist discourse and those who did not."(S. Kaviraj, 1991: 85) Partha Chatterjee contends that the Indian post-colonial state in its attempts to ensure accumulation in the modern sector, set out to legitimate its policy of a narrowly conceived strategy of industrial development as serving universal interests in the political domain. The Nehruvian development agenda initiated through the 5-Year-Economic Plan, beginning in 1956, placed the state directly in the "domain of production as mobilizer and manager of investable 'national' resources." (P. Chaterjee, 1993: 312) Kaviraj argues that the Planning process extended the state's economic bureaucracy, which relied on the "rhetoric of social justice and redistribution" to legitimate its actions beyond the interests of elite. (S. Kaviraj, 1991: 87)

In contrast to Europe where bourgeois revolutions created institutions within civil society which later challenged inequality produced by the market through the state, in India "many of capitalism's classical initiatives within civil society were undertaken by the state."(S. Kaviraj, 1991: 87) Under the Nehruvian strategy of industrialization through the development of large public sector heavy capital goods industries with deep linkages to ministerial bureaucracies, Kaviraj argues that it is misleading to conceptualize the state as "interventionist" based on the European example. The result was the enormous presence of the state in everyday life. As Kaviraj argues, however, it was the colonial style of the state--"wholly monological, criminally wasteful, utterly irresponsible" and unresponsive to public sensitivity, that made "its manner rather than its policies" the target of public political resentment.(S. Kaviraj, 1991: 89)

The colonial roots of the telecommunications bureaucracy are readily apparent. Bella Mody argues that the telecommunications administrative system, like other arms of the Indian civil service, was established by the British colonial administration to "control the natives". This system was not modified in the post-independence era for "public accountability, decentralization, or state-guided capitalism", with administrative and legal organization largely unchanged until the mid-1980s.[6]

The *new* Indian state was distinct from its colonial predecessor in that the *new* bureaucracy positioned itself as the universal class pursuing development for the nation state. However, the "technocracy of the modern sector" followed a program normatively defined by modernity "which was not sought to be grounded in the political vocabulary of the nation, or at least of its major part."[7] Kaviraj contends what followed was a widening gap between populist government policies for economic development and redistribution, and "popular consciousness".(S. Kaviraj, 1991: 91) Extending this analysis to the current neo-liberal era, it is clear that although the shift in economic policy might be explained as a result of a change in elite consensus, foreign pressures, etc., the practice of economic governance today must contend with this central issue of cultural reproduction, or the symbolic power of the state.

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[6] Ownership and operation of the telecommunications sector was under the Indian central government's jurisdiction through the conventional Post Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) system until 1985. Legal jurisdiction of telecommunications followed the guidelines determined a century prior by the colonial Indian Telegraph Act of 1885. See B. Mody, 1995.

[7] One problem with this approach is the rigid distinction between the discursive world of the 'popular' versus that of the 'elite'. As critics have pointed out, fifty years of economic development and institional interventions of modernity represented largely through the state in India, cannot be discounted. For discussion of this point refer to P. Bardhan, 1997

What are the specific implications of this theoretical work for telecommunications reform? Discussions about an advanced economic sector like telecommunications are not generally framed in terms of the 'political vocabulary of the nation' but rather in terms of a language of 'progress'. The redefinition of the role of the state in the context of liberalization and the contestations around this role always occur within this legacy. So when Peter Evans discusses the relative autonomy of the Indian state vis-à-vis specific interests, he does not consider that the very construction of those interests and the 'permissible terrain' for discussions around these interests is to some extent bounded by this cultural legacy. Its 'autonomy' is limited by, and is 'embedded' within, these cultural contexts just as its autonomy is limited by elite interests.

Telecommunications Reform and the Volatile World of Nationalism and Corruption

Policy reform in the seemingly apolitical world of telecommunications--with policy changes predicated on the technical logics of advances in technology and rationality of markets--has been besieged by the unpleasant world of politics. Gleaning insight from the work of Chatterjee and Kaviraj and focusing on telecom reform since 1994, in this section I argue that the legacy of Indian bureaucratic culture, consisting of the colonial style of rule and insensitivity to the public it was supposed to serve, helps explain the public skepticism of the state's changing role in the context of economic liberalization. On the other hand, the public will not so easily abandon the earlier promise of redistribution after 40 years of

Nehruvian state-led development . The politics of telecommunications reform in the 1990s has negotiated between these different legacies.

The Congress and successive United Front national governments in the 1990s have prioritized telecommunications reform and expansion, reflected in the greater visibility of the sector in policy debates and in terms of increased investment in the sector in the five-year plans since 1992[8]. Although telephony penetration in the country is very low, 1 in 1000 people own phones, the Indian telecommunications network ranks 14th in the world with 12.1 million lines. Expansion of telecommunications services has been significant as teledensity (telephone penetration) has increased from 0.6 in 1991 to 1.4 in 1996, concentrated in urban areas. Access to telephony in urban areas has also grown through the tremendous proliferation of privately operated public call offices (PCOs) in the form of local/STD/ISD booths.[9] The development of the mobile and computer-mediated communications network has also been rapid, with demand for these value-added services growing, again in urban centers. A conservative estimate for projected growth in network expansion put the figure at $60 billion by the turn of the century.

As an emerging market, vying for the coveted title of the "next Asian Tiger," liberalization was seen necessary on financial and technological grounds; telecommunications as a newly defined infrastructure area was in immediate need for massive expansion which required private capital and foreign know-how. Both domestic and foreign software and computer service export companies led the push for reforms in the telecommunications sector which served as the physical infrastructure for exports through sympathetic agencies within the state. However, the strategy of liberalization had to take into account traditional bureaucratic interests, which often openly conflicted with the "reformers" vision of policy reform: a legacy of centralized bureaucracy through the DoT in the form of dominant operator, policy maker and regulator with its own interests in capital accumulation. (S. McDowell, 1996: 167-176)

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[8] National investment in telecommunications in all six five-year plans since independence hovered between 1.4 and 2.7 percent. In 1985, investment increased to 3.6 percent. With the Eighth plan in 1992, investment in telecommunications shot up to 11.9 percent. The 1997 budget has yet to be ratified, but places investment in telecommunicaitons at approximately 15 percent. (See *The National Infrastructure Report*. National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1997)

Thus, before looking at the Indian state's "autonomy" in implementing its new-found development vision, we must first recognize that the liberalization vision does not have monolithic support within the state itself. By liberalizing, the state through its dominant operator and governmental department, the DoT, is designing and implementing policy which threatens its own existence. Moreover, the new logic of competition and cost-based pricing of services which is fundamental to the liberalization of telecommunications services, overturns the older logic of subsidy of rural areas, low-income regions and the majority of residential consumers through the revenue generated from the high-end business users. The dominance of the dominant operator and the issue of redistribution (who will pay for telecommunications services for the poor?) which motivated the explicit logic of the state's prior telecommunications policy can be traced to the legacy of the Nehruvian development vision.

Most important in terms of over-all policy in the sector was the introduction of the *National Telecommunications Policy* (NTP) in 1994; an ambitious piece of legislation

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[9] Although exact data on the numbers of people these booths serve is difficult to establish, industry analysts argue that in urban areas "PCOs have been opened for every 500 persons". (See B.G. Talloo, 1997: 36)

which tries to compromise between the new demands of capital and the established interests of the state bureaucracy, with an urgency evident in its short deadline of three years.[10] While prioritizing universal service obligations and massive expansion of rural telephony, the NTP calls for foreign investment in services without spelling out any institutional reforms within the DoT itself.[11]In September of the same year, the DoT introduced the broad guidelines for private sector entry dividing the country in 20 circles for basic services, and 18 for mobile and cellular services, corresponding roughly to the main states in the country. The two centralized public sector corporations[12] were to compete with the private entrants in each state, retaining their monopoly on domestic and international long distance services until 2000. Private sector domestic firms with foreign participation capped at 49 percent were allowed to bid on the circles, with the criteria for selection weighed heavily in terms of monetary value of the license fee.[13]

The Indian state's unconventional decision to open up local services before its long-distance market was motivated by the assumption that this formula provided incentive to private firms which have the resources and technology to undertake the necessary massive infrastrucrural investment, improving telecommunications "for all" in the short-run. The state argued that it was strategically luring capital, especially foreign telecommunications companies with technology and experience, to first invest in infrastructure which is expensive long-term investment, instead of the conventional route whereby private operators target business users and the long-distance market.(N. Sinha, 1996) By so doing, the state was able to privatize without seemingly abandoning its larger goal of national development; the deal in basic services meant that new linkages with capital were designed to force investment in priority areas and extract hefty license fees for the right to set up local services.

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[10] Despite overall network expansion, a year after the 1997 deadline, telephone availability on demand and the telecommunications infrastructure covering "all villages" in the country is far from reality. (NTP, 1994)

[11] The NTP established a regulated liberalization reform agenda by allowing private entrants to compete with the separate public telecommunications corporations, rather than corporatization whereby the state monopoly would become an autonomous corporate entity, or privatization where the assets of the public corporations would be sold to private owners.

[12] In 1986 the DoT decentralized operations by establishing two corporate bodies to provide basic and long-distance services: Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd (MTNL) and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd (VSNL). MTNL is responsible for providing local services to the metropolitan aeas of New Delhi and Mumbai, accounting for 20 percent of the countries telephone lines. VSNL is responsible for the provision of international services throughout the country. See B. Petrazzini, 1996: 40 for more details on ownership and operation of the two bodies.

[13] Only one private company would be licensed per circle in basic services, and two companies per circle for mobile services. Licenses would be granted initially for 15 years, but could be exteded after 10 years based on a review of performance after the first 5 years. Bids would be evaluated based on: 1) net present value of the license fee at 72%; 2) network rollout plan for the first 3 years at 10%; 3) percentage of rural lines installed in excess of mandatory ones at 15 %; and 4) use of indigenous equpment at 3%. See B. Petrazzini, 1996.

The private sector responded with unprecedented enthusiasm to the state's "middle road" policy decision. Initial euphoria over the enormous potential of India's "vast untapped market" led to bids for licenses in both cellular and basic services far exceeding the state's expectations. The joint-venture proposition outlined by the state which was keen on promoting "national" telecommunications corporations was embraced by foreign firms who recognized "that participating in joint ventures with the right business partner with local cultural and political expertise made a lot of business sense when they did not know the unwritten domestic rules." Meanwhile, domestic capital scrambled to develop telecommunications ventures as they were guaranteed 51 percent equity and had as much mobility as their foreign counterparts to invest their returns wherever they chose.(B. Mody, 1995: 118)

The state's linkages with capital in the telecommunications sector were clearly in the process of changing. The public process of bidding and licensure in telecommunications politicized the state's role in the liberalization process. Despite corporate enthusiasms in the initial period of bidding for cellular and basic services, public attention quickly turned to the irregularities of the licensing process. A consistent theme raised by critics of liberalization of the sector was the state's myopic focus on income generation through license sales, as opposed to longer-term operational interests. (P. Purkayasatha, 1996)

Mobilizing against the state's liberalization policy, the Department of Telecommunication's (DoT) three main unions went on strike in June of 1995. The political potency of accusations against the government for "selling out" to "multinationals and private enterprises," (PTI, June 19th, 1995) limited the state's ability to engage in the type of privatization encouraged by the World Bank and private investors.[14] The nation-wide DoT strike in June was short-lived, with the government refusing to acknowledge the unions' charge that its liberalization policy favored multinational corporations by formulating technical requirements that only foreign companies could meet. Nevertheless, the government agreed to union proposals "relating to service conditions and training programs essential for workers to compete in a post-privatization environment." (S. Verma, June 22, 1995)

Although the preceding example is not an indication of the invincible power of organized labor in India, it is clear that the 450 000 unionized employees were relatively successful in deploying the language of "national interest" against the pro-liberalization sectors of the state. Mody argues that Minister of Telecommunications from 1991-1996, Sukh Ram, "stood with the unions against corporatization and decentralization of the DoT," in order to ensure union support in "raising the DoT to a status on par with their new competitors." (B. Mody, 1995: 120)

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[14] This includes the privatization of the DoT, or at least coporatization of the body, as well as opening up the long-distance market and setting up cost-based tariff structures promoted by the ITU, World Bank and WTO.

This balancing act of promoting domestic industry and national public interest, while selling licenses for private entry into the service market, kept the issue of telecommunications in the public spotlight until 1997. After placating the immediate concerns of the unions in terms of training and retrenchment, the state sped up its licensing process and started announcing winners in basic services for each circle. Although the biggest multinationals like AT&T and British Telecom among others had bid for several circles, they mostly lost out to often unknown domestic start-ups with foreign equity from smaller telecommunications service providers. (See Appendix A) A clear pattern emerged which showed extraordinarily high bids (for Indian standards) for lucrative circles like New Delhi, Bombay and Tamil Nadu, while relatively economically underdeveloped areas like the Northeast, Orissa and even West Bengal and Kerela remained without what the state considered an acceptable offer. Despite the fact that some states remained without bidders, the value of license fees for the 1995/1996 financial year alone was estimated by *The Times of India* to be $1 (US) billion "helping keep a lid on the fiscal deficit."(N. Graves, February 29, 1996)

The state's announcement of the first round of winners in basic services in December of 1995 was quickly followed by a dramatic "telecom scandal" which set a precedent by shutting down the upper house of the Indian parliament (*Rajya Sabha*) for six weeks. The Opposition, including parties from both the political right (BJP) and the left (Janata, and CPI(M)), accused the Minister of Telecommunications Sukh Ram of mishandling a tender to award the license for local services in his home state of Himachal

Pradesh.(A. Agarwal, February, 1996) The Minister denied the allegations that he unfairly favored the consortium led by Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd (HFCL), with joint foreign participation from Bezeq Telecom (BEZQ.TA) of Israel and Thailand's SHIN.BK. Faced with extensive accusations in both houses of parliament and consistent media coverage, the Congress government turned over relevant papers to the Opposition but refused to launch a parliamentary inquiry "as it would send the wrong signal to both local and foreign investors." (P. Iredale, December 1995)

This scandal represented a volatile political response to the state's new linkages with capital. Controversy over the liberalization of basic services continued when it was pointed out by critics that the lack of limits to the number of circles one company may be given to operate could easily lead to the emergence of a private monopoly in the lucrative sector. Although the state responded by suddenly enforcing a limit of three licenses per private firm, the political furor over the HFCL/BEZQ/SHIN case showed that the telecommunications reform process was vulnerable to public scrutiny.

Following on the heels of parliamentary breakdown over the tendering of basic service licenses in the 1996 winter session, was an even greater media frenzy in August of the same year over a major corruption scandal involving the then Minister of Communications, Sukh Ram. This new "telecoms scandal" involved allegations of millions of dollars of bribe money for the granting of licenses for basic services accepted by the Minister and certain key Ministry and DoT officials. The scandal came to a climax when a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) raid on the Minister's personal residence literally revealed billions of Rupees in unexplained cash in his bedroom.(M. Gairola, August 30, 1996) Sukh Ram became an icon of corruption in this period and along with former Prime

Minister Narasimha Rao, among other powerful politicians, faced ongoing criminal investigations, trials and counter-trials, most of which have yet to find any resolution two years after initial allegations.

The repercussions of the telecommunications scandals for the state noticeably slowed down the pace of overall sweeping policy changes. The current impasse in basic services and the Indian state's ambivalence and inaction over operationalizing the reforms reinforces the politically volatile nature of telecommunications liberalization. The fragility of coalition governments which have led Indian politics since the decline of the Congress Party's majority in parliament in 1996 has worked against coherent policy formulation and are increasingly finding *ad hoc* resolution through litigation and bilateral compromise. For example, the most recent political battles in the telecommunications sector involve hostile legal disputes over jurisdiction between the DoT as the dominant operator and policy making arm and the new state regulatory body, the TRAI. With frequent national elections and the stability of the central government in question, The Ministry of Communications has been reluctant to step in and take any strong policy decisions.[15]

For corporate players, enthusiasm about vast markets has been replaced with cautious optimism and strategic lobbying for cooperative state policies. Since 1996, the highly organized telecommunications corporate lobby has been pushing for greater maneuvering power within the telecommunications market for private firms, especially in relation to the dominant operator in the form of the DoT, MTNL and VSNL.[16] The telecommunications market in a low telephone density country like India means high capital costs and requires long term investment with low rates of return for a potentially long period of time. The major foreign companies have been wary, especially in terms of the service market, and are pushing for better concessions and waiting for better deals. The success of telecom reform from their perspective is consequently pegged to "fair" interconnectivity agreements, quicker access to revenue sharing schemes in long-distance, restructuring tariffs, extension of the period in which to pay the license fees, and other measures making investment in the sector more lucrative as soon as possible.[17]

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[15] In their first day as ruling party of India in 1998, the BJP coalition government announced the corporatization of the DoT as part of its overall economic agenda. The BJP-affiliated trade union federation immediately launched a strike against its own party on the grounds of "national interest". See M. Gairola, "Dotted Leaves Turn Asian Lotus." Economic Times. March 17, 1998.

Liberalization of the telecommunications sector opened new possibilities for development involving new linkages between bureaucratic institutions and capital. However, the terms of the state's linkages with capital were not clearly spelled out, partly resulting out of the state's own ambitions in capital accumulation and partly out of its older vision of national development.[18]

The corruption scandals which severely slowed down the pace of reforms in 1996, illustrates the weaknesses in the state's ability to reinvent a new and legitimate role in development without restructuring its inherited colonial institutions. At the same time, the political outcome of the scandals also shed light on the questionable business practices of private firms. Although, both domestic and foreign capital have been quick to point to the legacy of the license raj as the explanation for corruption in India, it cannot escape the general electorate that the number of corruption cases involving reputable firms have grown astronomically since the onset of the state's liberalization policy. (V. Pavarala, 1996: 101-109)

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[16] Some of the most assertive telecom industry bodies include the Cellular Operators Association of India, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, The Confederation of Indian Industry, and the Telecommunications Equipment and Manufacturing Association, among others. Points of ongoing contention include: reaching agreement on inter-connectivity, negotiating tariff schemes, renegotiating license-payment schedules, contesting the right of state-operators to enter value added services, and demanding quicker access and greater revenue sharing opportunities for long-distance markets.

[17] For discussion of private firms' perspective on telecommunications reform in India see See *Telecom Summit: An International Conference on Indian Telecom*. Confederation of Indian Industries, Bangalore: April 4, 1997

[18] For example, despite imposing a 49 percent cap on foreign equity, the state did not spell out any limitations on "foreign management control through representation on the boards of the new joint ventures," nor did it specify the terms of interconnection and revenue sharing" which will determine the profits for the new entrants.(B. Mody, 1995: 118) Disagreement between the private sector and the DoT over rates for inter-connectivity and other contractual terms has meant that several successful bidders have yet to sign licenses, and only 3 of the 20 circles are to be operational as of 1998.(See Annexe I for details)

Redefining Public Interest: Contesting State Omniscience and Market Benevolence

The state's capacity to promote its new development vision, specifically in the telecommunications sector, rests upon its ability to negotiate interests between the increasingly disparate needs of its separate publics. The simultaneous lack of credibility of state sector to provide telecommunications, and the entry of private companies into an arena which is seen clearly through the lens of national interest, has created a potential space where citizens can demand accountability from both parties. The final section of the paper briefly outlines the different instances and trajectories of public contestation of telecommunications policy reform in the larger context of the politics of liberalization.

1991 saw a significant shift in the state's overall logic of economic development in its acknowledgment of internal administrative reform coupled with a new faith in foreign investment and global competition. (A. Bhaduri and D. Nayyar, 1997) The Indian state was no longer symbolically wedded to Nehruvian state-intervention, and emphasis on high-technology sectors like the growing software industry and new telecommunications services represented a clean break from the old "socialist" road to development. The new development vision in the field of telecommunications and information technology (IT) has had the vocal political support of a younger generation of India's urban middle class who have the education and skills to meet the employment needs of the high-technology service sector, as well as the consumer Rupees to spend on the pay-per-user services ranging from cellular phones to direct to home television (DTH). (A. Chandra and A. Agarwal, January 31, 1996)

Questions about the appropriateness of this type of shift in policy point to the larger issues of economic development and national interest. Stephen McDowell has argued that since 1991, the state has used its resources to promote export revenue generation in the software industry, most of which has come in the form of "deputations"; Indian software workers going abroad to work on short-term contracts for foreign firms.(S. McDowell, 1996: 167) The legitimacy of the state's new vision of development has had to address the uncomfortable questions of who benefits from this new policy regime which places domestic research and development and telecommunications expansion on the basis of domestic need *behind* the need to generate export revenue?[19]

Although it can be argued that by the 1990s the interventionist Nehruvian development vision lost its legitimacy, especially amongst the elites, this in no way sanctions the state abandoning its commitment to redistribution and replacing it with the logic of the market managed by an efficient bureaucracy. As Atul Kolhi has argued "where cultures of efficiency are not well established, calls for efficiency and competitiveness do not buy broad political support".(A. Kohli, 1989: 324) Thus the state's move away from interventionist policy measures aimed at redistribution towards policies which promise universal services through market-led investment and competition, are clearly leave questions of legitimate governance unresolved.

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[19] From 1985-1995 the Indian software industry export revenue grew from $10 million to $800 million. It is expected to reach $2.5 billion by the year 2000. 60 % of the revenue generated is from deputation contracts abroad, or what is commonly known as "bodyshopping". 82% of the comapnies which "outsource" either in India, or by hiring Indian software workers, are American corporations. See S. Minwalla, WW4W25/NETSCAPE/Bodyshop.HTM

The issue of corruption and the legitimacy of the state's new development vision has been addressed with great media-savvy by the right-wing Hindu Nationalist Bharata Janata Party (BJP). While in opposition, the BJP in an uneasy alliance with the left led several popular campaigns against a wide range of "Western" corporations.[20]

The BJP politics in opposition has held an inconsistent populist line supporting a version of liberalization whereby national industry and interest is protected against foreign corporations. However, in the present context as the governing party in a tenuous coalition, the explicitly nationalist BJP, has already alienated its own affiliated labor federation by calling for the immediate corporatization of the DoT. It seems that in power, the central government regardless of political persuasion, continues in its path to reinvent the role of the state in relation to economic development favoring a vision of global integration.

What the legal battles and the heated political debates around the issue of corruption and the state's role in economic development in telecommunications point to is a new and coherent critique of the state's ability to unequivocally represent 'public interest', by new players outside the traditional policy making establishment of the state and market. Contesting the state in matters of public policy has a larger frame of reference beyond the specifics of telecommunications. The most salient example stems from the highly visible interventions of the Criminal Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in its pursuit of multiple corruption cases involving influential public servants and politicians, in which the Sukh Ram telecom case features prominently. The public uproar against corruption threatens the legitimacy of the state and forces governments in power and parties in opposition to address these issues in very real ways. In addition to bringing the state's legacy of corruption to the forefront, it also emphasizes a vigilant public gaze on the issue of corporate corruption which has been in greater limelight since the onset of the state's liberalization policies.

Thus macro-level analysis of policy outcome limits political possibilities to that of the state's autonomy or general efficacy in designing and implementing policy. For example, Peter Evans and Ben Petrazinni in looking at the Indian development of the IT sector and telecommunications sector respectively, interpret opposition to the state's policies in term of interest groups threatened by the state's new developmentalist vision, thereby acting as a hindrance to state autonomy. (P. Evans, 1995; B. Petrazzini, 1996)

While it is true that vested interests in the ranks of the public sector explains one site of opposition to the state's policies, other potentially more radical interests and visions of legitimate governance also influence what the state can and cannot do in these areas.

Union politics in response to the state's liberalization agenda is generally analyzed in terms of vested interests of organized labor in protecting their own jobs. However it is important to recognize that the 1995 strike, as well as legal actions against the government in the form of public interest litigation instigated by unions, public interest groups and politicians, have consistently emphasized the issue of the state not meeting its commitment

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[20] These include political campaigns against CNN, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Coke and Pepsi, among others.

in serving the nation's public interest.[21] In the past year, the unions have accepted the tenets of the NTP and are moving towards the acceptance of corporatization. Leaving aside the vested interest argument, the unions, particularly those who are shedding their party affiliations could play a central role in promoting public interest by linking workers rights with the rights of citizens , and holding the state and corporate players accountable to fair and equitable service provision.

In 1995, official opposition to the NTP took the form of several public interest petitions which contested the state's ability to meet its own universal service obligations and ensure fair terms for introduction of competition. The petitions drew attention to the important distinction between "general public interest" and "commercial or business interest", and argued that the government was not in a position to ensure fair terms of entry and operation without first establishing an adequate legal framework or autonomous regulatory authority to monitor changes in which the DoT set the rules.[22]

The legal battles which continued into 1996 raised issues of regional disparity whereby the state's policies overlooked the possibility of skewed infrastructure development in regions like the Northeast which were not as lucrative to investors as other more developed regions. They pointed out that prioritizing revenue generation through the sale of licenses coupled with an emphasis on foreign investment hurt the prospect of selecting projects that promised greater returns for both users and domestic research and development, as well as for domestic producers. Most importantly, the petitions made evident the basic issue of accountability in the state's policy-making and regulatory bodies by questioning the state's commitment to meet the public's interest. Despite the fact that the one public interest petition which was granted a stay and went to the Supreme Court ultimately lost, the legal and political precedence these petitions established is of considerable significance.

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[21] For example, see National Federation of Telecom Employees Tele Labor: June Issues 1995.

[22] See The Supreme Court of India: Delhi Science Forum Vs. Union of Inida: Michael Fernandez Vs. Union of India; R. Paphino Vs. Union of India; Kala Baran Vs. Union of India; Peoples Union for Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India

With the establishment of the TRAI as a regulatory agency whose main objective is to protect the interests of consumers, public interest organizations have one more site in addition to the courts, to attempt to play a pro-active role in telecom policy formulation and implementation. Since its inception in March, the TRAI has largely served as a mediating body attempting to resolve disputes between the private players and the DoT. In the next few crucial years of reform in India, intervention through the TRAI is likely to become a strategic arena for public interest groups intervening in the debate on telecommunications. Already in August of 1997, the Consumer Coordination Council (CCC) launched a Citizens' Charter Campaign on Telecom Services, ensuring the enforcement of "minimum service standards" by both the DoT and corporate entities through the TRAI.

Conclusion

The lens through which subjects like technological change and economic development are studied tends to privilege institutional actors and policy outcomes. Once we turn away from this perspective to a broader consideration of the cultural construction of interests in these technologies, the political constestations around what 'public good' ought to be in the use of these new technologies - in short, the cultural context of these changes - we are able to ask questions normally outside of 'studies of economic change.'

Specifically, in this paper I attempt to show the analytic relevance of situating the politics of telecommunications reform in the culture of Indian bureaucracy in a period of dramatic transition from public-sector monopoly operator to mediator of and participant in global capitalism. Since this study begins with policy as a cultural process but turns to policy outcomes as well, I hope to have shown the multiple constraints on the state as an actor in economic development and the cultural embededness of the state as an economic actor.

Given the growing significance of telecommunications expansion in economic development and the trend towards the changing role of the state in guiding this development, my case study hopes to inform theories which probe the complex dynamics which constitute 'public interest' policy in the highly visible high-technology sectors in the context of globalization in the South.

Appendix I
Basic And Cellular Services

A Circles	Cellular	Cellular	Basic	Value of Basic Bid (Billion $)
Andra Pradesh	Tata/Bell Canada	JT Mobile	Tata/Bell Canada	1.17
Delhi	Bharti	Essar/Swiss Telecom	HFCL	4.19
Gujarat	AT&T/Birla	Fascel	Reliance/Nynex	.94
Karnataka	Modicom	JT Mobile	Hughes/Ispat	1.6
Maharastra	AT&T/Birla	BPL/US West	Hughes/Ispat	1.6
Tamil Nadu	BPL/US West	HHS Comm	RPG/NTT	3.23
Uttar Pradesh East	Aircell/Essar	Koshika/PilTel	No Bidder	Undecided
Uttar Pradesh West	Escotel	Koshika/PilTel	HFCL	1.83
B Circles				
Haryana	Aircell/Essar	Escotel	HFCL	1.13
Kerala	BPL/US West	Escotel	No Bidder	Undecided
Madhya Pradesh	RPG/NTT	Reliance/Nynex	Bharti/Telenet	.18
Punjab	Modicom	JT Mobile	Essar/Bell Atlantic	1.28
Rajasthan	Aircell/Essar	Hexacomm	Telelink	.31
West Bengal	Tata Telecom	Reliance/Nynex	No Bidder	Undecided
C Circles				
Andaban& Nicobar	No Bidder	No Bidder	No Bidder	Undecided
Assam	No Bidder	No Bidder	No Bidder	Undecided
Bihar	Reliance/Nynex	Koshika/PilTel	Usha/ MoscowTel	.063
Himachel Pradesh	Reliance/Nynex	Bharti	No Bidder	Undecided
Jammu & Kashmir	No Bidder	No Bidder	No Bidder	Undecided
North East	No Bidder	No Bidder	No Bidder	Undecided
Orissa	Reliance/Nynex	Koshika/PilTel	HFCL	.574

Compiled by author from various internet sources. For latest information search for: "telecommunications and bids" @ economictimes.com/today/pagehome.htm. Assuming $1 US=36.00 Rs.

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Human Rights in China:
A Pawn of A Political Agenda?
A Content Analysis of *The New York Times*
(1987-1996)

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Abstract

A content analysis of 10 years of *New York Times* coverage of human rights in China has found that *The Times* set its own agenda in covering human rights in China apart from president agenda. While U.S. president concerned more on U.S.-China trade than human rights in China, *The Times* continued its coverage of human rights in China as presidential concern subsided. The evidence over 10 years of news coverage also suggests that despite a relatively independent rate of production of human rights news stories by *The Times*, neither incumbent presidents nor their opponents treated human rights as a high-visibility, independent issue or as a separate issue in foreign policy. Instead, references to human rights were consistently entwined with other issues, both foreign and domestic.

Human rights in the People's Republic of China is the most controversial issue in U.S.-China relations. Human rights in China has attracted noticeable media coverage since China's pro-democracy movement in 1989, and subsequent efforts by the United States to link China's most-favored-nation trading status to the human rights record in China. While human rights in China often become the focus of debate among U.S. policy makers, the issue of how human rights in China is covered by elite media in the United States has not drawn much attention from media researchers. With much scholarship narrowly focused on the Beijing Spring demonstrations of 1989, this project attempts to explore how human rights in China is portrayed in an elite print medium, and to examine the relationship between the news coverage of human rights in China and presidential concerns in U.S.-China relations.

We purposefully selected *The New York Times* because of its status as an elite daily newspaper to which both Washington and Beijing pay close attention.[1] *The New York Times* arguably plays an active role in shaping elite public opinion and perhaps even influences U.S. policy towards China. News coverage of human rights in China by *The New York Times* is also closely watched by the Chinese officials and scholars.

Introduction

Much of the scholarly literature about news media and foreign policy examines the relationship in the context of the media's agenda-setting function. Cohen argues that the press is such an important institution in the foreign policy making network that any pattern of press coverage would in one way or another leave a substantial mark on the participants and thus on the process.[2]

Others suggest that the press is an independent actor in the process of policy making. Media have become a significant force in shaping political discourse and they do so independent of the government.[3] Reston noted that the news media affect foreign policy mainly by reporting the actions of government.[4] Others contend that the news media keep the debate on foreign affairs going and sometimes that may lead to policy changes.[5]

However, media are regarded as a weak player in foreign policy process if they ever have a position there. Chang noted that in a foreign policy environment where policy officials already control the initiative in both news making and decision making, institutional and social constraints in the process of news collection and production often lead to the media's dependency on the government for the first cue of what's happening in the world of foreign relations, thus weakening the media's position as a player in the making of foreign policy.[6]

Chang also found that the dominant source of U.S. policy information related to China from 1950 to 1984 was the executive branch. He noted that without diversity of sources, both foreign and domestic, the news media may become willing partners in U.S. government initiatives by allowing top policy makers to define the parameters of public discussion and debate on foreign affairs issues. Policy makers are likely to decide what, when and how to deliver the news, thus setting the news agenda for the media.[7]

The result could be what Graber observed, the bulk of foreign affairs news for American media actually originates in Washington. The president's views tend to dominate whenever situations are controversial.[8] American media basically follow official story lines emanating from Washington in reporting foreign events, and that media coverage of foreign issues is often biased, negative, unbalanced, and colored by Western perspectives, as predicted by hegemony theory.[9]

In the case of *The New York Times*, Kern et al found that *The New York Times* is among the media that are most independent of government and that the elite daily influences the coverage of other newspapers.[10]

Goodman's study found that press coverage of Clinton administration Sino-American relations seemed to be government independent. She found that the administration was unsuccessful at setting the media's agenda. For example, the amount of government attention to U.S.-China policy was not reflected by the press. In addition, the government seemed to have no influence on how the press played such issues. Not only did the press and government focus their attention in a different manner on China beat issue, but the press played it up as the government played it down.[11]

Hegemony theorists contend that ideology plays an essential part in making news judgments. Dominant ideology in a society is an expression of the dominant class. Contingent ideology facilitates the dominant ideology by emphasizing the political status quo in the foreign policy maneuvers of the dominant class.

Galtung and Ruge have hypothesized that events would become news the more they fit certain organizational and cultural, or "ideological", criteria. The "ideological" news factors described by Galtung and Ruge refer mainly to values which are embedded in Western society -- especially those which stem from an individualist and materialist philosophy.[12] .

Altheide suggested that the press tends to bolster the status quo, particularly as it relates to foreign policy and foreign news coverage.[13] Gans argued that the American media's foreign coverage tends to follow whatever the current U.S. foreign policy position happens to be, which is indicative of contingent ideology. Gans also suggested that journalistic ideology reflects a set of enduring values that enter into news judgments, and those values also are manifestations of the journalists' relationship to the larger social context in which the news is produced.[14]

Wang's study supports the claim that anti-communism remains an important principle for U.S. media, which use it, in part, to arrive at the distinction between good and evil in coverage of foreign affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Her analysis also suggests that this principle has not been consistently applied in all foreign news reports.[15]

While government agenda and dominant ideology are considered most important factors influencing media coverage of foreign news, Lee and Yang argue that national interest may outweigh the importance of sociopsychological factors in defining media accounts of the political world. Where international relations are concerned, national interest often transcends or subsumes partisan rifts, which are characteristic of domestic politics. The U.S. government's human rights policy -- one that is inseparable from the concepts of individual freedom and a free market economy -- wins media support even though it is a policy not implemented coherently or consistently.[16] Both the U.S.

government and U.S. media marginalize dissent in friendly countries and play up human rights violations in unfriendly and communist countries.[17]

Graber noted that the media routinely accept official designations of who America's friends and enemies are and interpret their motives accordingly. Whenever relationships change, media coverage mirrors the change.[18]

U.S. media coverage of human rights in China is believed to follow trends in U.S. domestic politics that are related to foreign policy issues. In the early 1970s, the United States was anxious to enlist China on its side in the cold war with the Soviet Union, and U.S. leaders as well as the press overlooked human rights in China. Only after the military crackdown on the Tiananmen demonstrators on June 4, 1989, did U.S. leaders, the American media, and the American public become more overtly concerned about human rights in China.[19]

The human rights issue is also regarded as a symbolic representation manipulated by U.S. politicians. "The power of human rights as a weapon in American political campaigns is no secret. Indeed, it is one of the few points on which thinkers from every school agree. ... the domestic appeal of human rights. ... The prophets of American foreign policy were thought to need an idealistic sword to help convert the unbelievers in their midst. That sword was to be advocacy of human rights."[20]

Human rights is a controversial issue within the international community because no consensus exists on a universally accepted definition of human rights. What might be regarded as inexcusably immoral domestically might well be justified internationally.[21] The news coverage of *The New York Times* reflects a Western view of human rights. The fundamental emphasis of human rights in the Western world is on liberty of the person, the right to physical security, and protection of basic intellectual belief.[22]

Traditional thinker George Kennan noted, for the purposes of an American human-rights policy, that a human right will be considered any right that protects those standards of civil, political, economic, and social behavior to which all human beings are entitled by the force of international consensus as reflected in American law.[23]

Although the literature does not provide consistent explanations on how human rights in China might be covered by elite U.S. media, it will be safe to say that in the area of foreign policy decision making, media have more dependency on government sources than in other areas. However, it is not always true to say that government is prevalent in setting the media agenda as long as most of the news about foreign policy and international relations is initiated from Washington, or government officials are its major sources. Other factors, such as the issues at stake, and the concern of national interest are also important predictors of the media content.

Two aspects of the design of this study will make it interesting in unveiling how *The New York Times* treat the issues that draw attention of U.S. government agenda. The first is the theme of the study: Human rights in China, which is high on the U.S. government agenda when it deals with relations with China in recent years. An analysis of how *The New York Times* reported this theme will shed some light on the effect of a government agenda on media coverage. The second is study's longitudinal character. A longitudinal analysis may provide more convincing findings regarding the process of agenda setting.

By closely examining *New York Times* coverage of human rights in China from 1987 through 1996, this study will try to explore the relationship between presidential concern regarding human rights in China and media agenda. It will try to identify whether presidential concerns on human rights and U.S.-China trade led the direction of *The New York Times* coverage of human rights in China, and whether *The New York Times* coverage of human rights in China changed over time as the focus of national interest shifted.

The following hypotheses will be tested through content analysis of *New York Times* coverage of human rights in China.

Hypotheses

H1. As presidential concern on human rights in China increases, the coverage of human rights in China increase.

Hypothesis 1 will test to what degree a media agenda is associated with a government agenda. It will also test whether policy makers are likely to decide what, when to deliver the news, and whether the president's views tend to dominate media whenever situations are controversial.

H2. As presidential concern on U.S.-China trade increase, the coverage of human rights in China decreases.

Hypothesis 2 is based on the assumption that as national interest embedded in U.S.-China trade become a major presidential concern, human rights issues in China will give way to it. If the media follow the presidential agenda, the same downplay could be seen in news coverage. H2 will test the relationship between a government agenda and a media agenda when president concerned more on U.S.-China trade than human rights in China. It will also test whether national interest may outweigh the importance of sociopsychological factors in defining media accounts of the political world.

H3. Stories about human rights in China rely on U.S. officials as sources more than Chinese officials as sources.

Hypothesis 3 incorporates an assumption from hegemony theory that media coverage of international news gives more weight to the voices emanating from Washington than those from its counterpart or other parties, and that such coverage serves as one of the indicators of the dominant ideology in American society.

H4. Stories about human rights in China emphasize disagreements in U.S.-China trade relations more than human rights in China.

Hypothesis 4 attempts to address linkages between human rights and issues, such as trade relations, of immediate concern to officials in Washington. If it is valid to assume that U.S. officials treat human rights as a symbolic issue, then it is probable that human rights is associated with other issues and de-emphasized or emphasized based on variation in the U.S. political agenda. When a *New York Times* story deals with a substantive issue such as U.S.-China trade, Hypothesis 4 posits that references to human rights will be incorporated into the story but they will be secondary to whatever issue is portrayed in the story as being more vital to the U.S. national interest.

> H5. Human rights in China appear more frequently during U.S. presidential election years than in non-presidential election years in presidential documents and news coverage.

A common assumption among human rights proponents and students of American government is the president sets the foreign policy agenda, and the issue of human rights is raised in presidential elections with consistency because of its domestic political appeal. Hypothesis 5 attempts to test this assumption. Hypothesis 5 also may provide insight into what degree the human rights-political agenda of presidents and their opponents are associated with a media human-rights agenda during the election campaign.

Method

Definition: News Coverage of Human rights in China

News coverage of human rights in China is defined as news stories portraying human rights conditions in China or presenting any issues associated with human rights in China. While distinction between foreign news and foreign policy news is a big concern in the study of press coverage relating to another country,[24] it will be necessary to note that such a distinction is not necessary for this study. The coverage of human rights issues inside China was selected together with stories reporting U.S. concerns on human rights in China and the Chinese government's handling of human right issues. The researchers consider that coverage of human rights issues inside China, which may be considered as foreign news according to Chang's definition, though comprised a very small portion of the coverage, is of the same importance as the foreign policy news in terms of their relevance to U.S. government concern and implication for foreign policy.

Source of Data

The News York Times

All news stories carried in *The New York Times* during the period 1987 to 1996 satisfying the above definition are included in the population. *The New York Times* coverage of human rights in China during the 10-year span includes the periods before and after the Tiananmen pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989, which will provide a contrast for how human rights in China was covered based on a landmark political event in China. The period also includes three presidential election campaigns, which offers the possibility of revealing how domestic American politics might affect news coverage of human rights in China, and how news coverage of human rights might be associated with formation of and changes in U.S. policy toward China. A longitudinal analysis, we believe, offers the possibility of making a meaningful contribution to the literature by identifying variance among variables across time.

The population was compiled from *The New York Times Index* and checked through a corresponding Lexis-Nexis database search. The news stories included in the population must have a demonstrated relationship with human rights in China. The stories were selected from a cross search in *The New York Times* Index under the subject "Human Rights" and the subject "China". The references "human rights" and "China" were used to search the Lexis-Nexis database. All content with at least two references -- human rights and China -- constituted the prospective population. A list of 1,050 articles, which included both news stories and editorials on human rights in China, was identified.

As this study examines only news stories, 277 editorials were excluded from the list. A further examination of the headlines and the news digest of the stories in *Times Index* excluded those stories that did not deal directly with the issue of human rights in China. This filtering procedure produced a list of 616 news stories, which constitutes the sampling frame.

Presidential Papers

For government concerns on U.S.-China relations, presidential documents on U.S.-China relations during the ten year period were used. U.S. president is the ultimate decision maker in foreign policy. Whatever the president says and does, whether formal or informal, can have far-reaching implications in international relations.[25]

The presidential documents included all the nonduplicate items listed in the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* and the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. These two sources covered all contemporary documents on U.S.-China relations released by the White House, including announcements, public speeches, agreements, news conferences, messages to the Congress, and other materials.

Sampling

Twenty-five percent of articles were initially selected for analysis from the sampling frame list. Systematic stratified sampling was used to select the sample articles. The sampling was carried out based on the articles by year. According to the sampling percentage, articles were selected from each year based on a systematic sampling procedure. Stories in 1987 and 1988 are fewer than ten, and all stories in these two years were selected. A list of 174 news stories was finally chosen for content analysis, which constitutes 28 percent of the population.

The news item was chosen as the coding unit. Among the variables that were coded were dateline, newsspot, newspeg, sources, reference to human rights and reference to trade. Content orientation is coded as a major variable, which refers to the issues that news stories deal with, including conflict within China, conflict between the United States and China, U.S. political debate regarding human rights in China, and stories specifically focused on human rights in China. The news stories were categorized according to a list of frequently addressed topics, such as U.S. China policy, U.S.-China trade, Chinese pro-democracy activity, and issues regarding Hong Kong and Tibet.

Two coders participated in the coding of the news content. For nominal variables, Scott's Pi was used to test intercoder reliability. For ratio variables, Pearson's correlation coefficient was selected to report intercoder reliability. An intercoder reliability test result greater than .80 was deemed satisfactory. For a 95 percent level of probability and an assumed 90 percent agreement between the coders, 87 stories were randomly selected for intercoder reliability testing,[26] a total average of .87 was achieved, with reliability of nominal variables ranging from .80 to 1.0, and that of ratio variables ranging from .93 to .97.[27] Each coder then coded half of the remaining news stories after satisfactory intercoder reliability was established.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States and *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* were examined according to the topics of the documents. Only the documents under the subject China were selected for coding. Each document is coded according to its theme using the similar categories of topic for coding the news stories, including U.S.-China relations in general, U.S.-China trade, and human rights. The topics were selected based on the categories identified by the subject index of the president documents, and thus no intercoder reliability check is needed. Each document is counted as one unit of topic.

Results

H1. The hypothesis that as presidential concern on human rights in China increases, the coverage of human rights in China increase was not supported. The presidential concern on human rights in China and *The New York Times*' coverage of human rights in China were not synchronized over the ten year period. During 1987 to 1988 Reagan administration, the president did not show any concern about human rights in China while *The New York Times* gave minimal attention to human rights in China. In 1989 and 1990 Bush's administration, both the president and the Times gave great attention to human rights in China. However, the presidential concern on human rights in China peaked in 1990, while the coverage of human rights in China by *The New York Times* did not recede until 1994. The presidential concern decreased dramatically in 1991 and 1992, while 1990 also see decrease of coverage in The New York Time, it was actually a starting point of a continunously ascending coverage.

Insert Figure 1

H2. As presidential concern on U.S.-China trade increase, the coverage of human rights in China decreases is not supported. During 1987 to 1996, except in 1989 and 1990, when human rights in China became an overwhelming issue brought by the pro-democracy movement and presidential concern on human rights in China far exceeded his concern on U.S.-China trade, the president concern on U.S.-China trade remained considerably higher than the concern on human rights in China. As the crisis in U.S.-China relations due to pro-democracy movement in 1989 subsided, U.S.-China trade was back on the priority agenda of the president. However, as human rights in China was given way to U.S.-China trade on president agenda in 1991, the same scenario did not occur in *The New York Times* coverage of human rights in China. During the ten years, president's concern on U.S.-China trade remained relatively constant except in 1988 and 1995, when the concern on U.S.-China trade was at relatively low level. Presidential concern on human rights in China was most noticeable in 1989 and 1990, and was on a remarkably descending pattern, while The New York Time's coverage of human rights in China continued to grow until 1994. Only after 1995, the presidential ascending concern on U.S.-China trade was accompanied by the decreasing coverage of human rights in China.

Insert Figure 2

H3. The hypothesis that stories about human rights in China rely on U.S. officials as sources more than Chinese officials as sources was supported. Chinese officials were cited in 43 percent of stories, while 61 percent of stories used U.S. officials as sources. The proportion test indicates that the difference is statistically significant ($Z = 4.8$, $p < .01$). U.S. official sources were categorized as White House, Congress, State Department, and other U.S. officials. Although for each category the percentage cited was no more than for total Chinese officials, when the four categories for U.S. sources are collapsed into one, and the overlap is controlled, the result reveals U.S. officials were consistently cited more often than Chinese officials and had more opportunity to express their views in *New York Times* stories about human rights in China than did their Chinese counterparts.

Insert Table 1

Of all *New York Times* stories about human rights in China included in the sample, 33 percent originated in Washington, D.C., and 40 percent carried Beijing datelines. Of the stories with a Washington dateline, 98 percent cited U.S. officials as sources but only 14 percent cited Chinese officials as sources. Of the stories with Beijing datelines, 39 percent cited U.S. official sources and 70 percent cited Chinese official sources.

H4. The hypothesis that stories about human rights in China emphasize disagreements in U.S.-China trade relations more than human rights in China was not supported by the data in the aggregate. Disagreement in U.S.-China trade relations is reflected in references to trade. Of all the stories sampled about human rights in China, there are more references to human rights (831) than references to trade (381). From 1987 through 1989, there was no reference to trade in any *Times* story about human rights in China. In 1990, however, the number of references to trade (39) exceeded references to human rights (27). In all subsequent years, references to human rights exceeded references to trade in stories about human rights in China.

However, in 1994, both references to trade and references to human rights were at their greatest frequency than in any other year throughout the 10-year period studied. The year 1994 accounts for 32.6 percent of the 834 human rights references in the study and 43 percent of the 381 trade references in the study. References to human rights were

10 times more likely to occur in 1994 than in 1989, the year of repression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.

Insert Figure 3

The data reveal that references to trade are clustered in the categories conflict between the United States and China and U.S. political debate, which comprise 87 percent of stories with references to trade, while references to human rights were spread relatively evenly across the content categories.

Although there were fewer references to trade than references to human rights over 10 years, when we examined stories with trade as the central topic, we found that they had 61 percent of the references to trade, while general human rights stories had 39 percent of the references to trade. The mean of references to trade in trade stories is significantly higher than the mean for such references in non-trade stories (9.0 versus 1.0). Trade stories over 10 years account for only 15 percent of references to human rights, while all other stories generated 85 percent of references to human rights. Stories identified with the topic of trade come exclusively from two categories of Dateline: Washington, 22 stories; Beijing four stories.

H5. The hypothesis that stories about human rights in China appear more frequently during U.S. presidential election years than in non-presidential election years in presidential documents and news coverage was not supported. In 1988, no concern on human rights in China was shown in presidential documents. In *The New York Times*, neither the number of stories nor references to human rights increased from 1987. In 1992, the president showed less concern on human rights in China than 1991. In Times, both the number of stories and the references to human rights were at the same level as in 1991, although relatively higher than in 1990. In 1996, the presidential concern remained the same as in 1995. Contrary to the previous two election years, 1996 saw a decline in Times both in the number of stories about human rights and in the number of references to human rights. The number of stories declined 35 percent from 1995, while references to human rights declined 34 percent. In contrast to 1994, the number of human rights stories in 1996 decreased 46 percent, while references to human rights showed a dramatic decrease of 72 percent.

Insert Table 2

Discussion

The findings for H1 and H2 confirm the notion that *The New York Times* is independent of government, and the newspaper did not necessarily follow the government agenda on the issues of human rights in China. During 1987 to 1988, China was a good strategic partner of the United States as Cold War was still going on. Human rights in China, even though remained to be problematic by the Western standard, was not an evident concern of the U.S. president. *The New York Times* picked its own story as it saw the problem, although on a minimal basis. The president's zero concern on human rights in China and *The New York Times* minimal coverage of human rights in China during the two years are consistent with the observation that both the U.S. government and U.S. media marginalize dissent in friendly countries.

The pro-democracy movement in 1989 brought a remarkable change both in presidential concern on human rights in China and Times' coverage of human rights in China. Big increase was seen both in presidential concern and Times' coverage. However, as the presidential concern went up from 1989 to 1990, Times' coverage went down during the same period. The treatment of human rights in China by the president and Times during the ten years showed no synchronization of president agenda and media agenda, which confirmed Goodman's findings that the administration was unsuccessful at setting the media agenda.

The findings for H2 have applications other than that government was not able to set media agenda in foreign affair issues such as human rights in China. First, it implies that the focus of national interest of government and media may vary over time. During 1989 and 1990, president and *The New York Times* had consensus in their priority on human rights in China. After 1990, the president's priority concern among all issues regarding U.S.-China relations shifted to U.S.-China trade, while The Times continue to see high priority in reporting the issues regarding human rights in China.

Second, while the U.S. president has to transcend the ideological boundary when considering U.S.-China relations, media tend not to. Under hegemonic assumptions, ideology plays a significant role in *Times* news coverage of human rights in China. Such a conclusion also would be consistent with the Galtung-Ruge model of international information flows, which asserts that ideological and cultural factors distort information about external reality as it flows through dominant Western media organizations. Such distortions, under Galtung-Ruge assumptions, are amplified through the patterned repetition of news routines that are themselves reflections of institutionalized Western cultural bias.

That H3 was supported is consistent with assumptions underlying hegemony theory, the Galtung-Ruge model, and studies that have examined the symbiotic relationship between news sources and reporters. Even as *The Times* sets a media agenda for perception of human rights as an issue and as a source of conflict both between the United States and China and within China, it does so by relying primarily upon the statements and actions of U.S. officials. Wang suggests that the assumptions that underlie the hegemony of ideology in foreign affairs reporting must account for the position of journalists in relation to the dominant class and the political bureaucracy in their own country.[28] That suggestion would appear to hold true for how human rights in China is portrayed in *The Times*.

Over 10 years, *The Times* tended to rely heavily but not exclusively on stories from Washington for its coverage of human rights in China, which is consistent with hegemony theory. It is also meaningful, however, that even though *The Times* relied slightly more on stories with Beijing datelines than on stories with Washington datelines, the views of U.S. officials on human rights in China nevertheless remained more dominant in *The Times* over 10 years than the views of Chinese officials, Chinese political dissidents, representatives of private international human rights advocacy groups, and representatives of United Nations agencies, including those responsible for enforcement of international human rights agreements..

The results reported for H4 pose an interesting challenge. If 10 years of coverage of human rights in China is aggregated, *The Times* consistently made reference to human rights with substantially greater frequency and in substantially greater proportion than it made reference to trade between the United States and China. However, if the data is disaggregated by year, reference to both human rights and trade varied substantially. By year, both the frequency of reference and proportion of reference to trade were greatest in 1994 when trade relations was the main story topic, and human rights references also increased substantially in that year when trade was the story topic. Trade references in stories about human rights in China in both 1993 and 1994 exceeded references to both trade and human rights in all preceding years, including during 1989 when the pro-democracy movement in Beijing captured worldwide attention and in the three subsequent years in which many Chinese dissidents were imprisoned or forced to leave China.

The finding for H5 that neither presidential concern on human rights in China increased significantly, nor *Times* news stories about human rights in China appeared with greater frequency during U.S. presidential election years than in non-presidential election years is not consistent with the views of human-rights advocates. Under Galtung-Ruge assumptions, a domestic policy agenda may set both a foreign policy and a media agenda. As the focus of national interest shifted, president foreign policy agenda could be shaped by other transcending interests. In failing to support H5, this study calls into question the views of human rights advocates who argue that in U.S. electoral politics, human rights is an issue popular with the American public and politicians. In this study, no significant increase in presidential concern on human rights in China could be attributed to other transcending interest in presidential agenda. No significant increase in news coverage of human rights in China could be attributed to presidential campaign speech-making. The study also found no identifiable impact of campaign rhetoric on the frequency with which human rights news stories were reported either from Beijing or Washington, which suggests *The Times*' pattern of human rights coverage in the election years constitute a media agenda independent of U.S. presidential electoral politics.

Conclusion

A content analysis of 10 years of *New York Times* coverage of human rights in China is consistent with the direction agenda-setting research has taken. Rogers and Dearing in 1988 noted that scholars should more critically examine how one media agenda item is entwined with other items on the media agenda.[29] Reese subsequently encouraged examination of the multiple factors that influence media content.[30]

A common assumption has been that the media agenda, public agenda, and policy agenda are consistently interrelated. Each is believed to routinely affect the other. Yet in the context of *The Times'* coverage of human rights in China, the failure to support H5 challenges the assumption of consistent agenda interrelatedness. The evidence over 10 years suggests that despite a relatively independent rate of production of human rights news stories by *The Times*, neither incumbent presidents nor their opponents treated human rights as a high-visibility, independent issue or as a separate issue in foreign policy. Instead, references to human rights were consistently entwined with other issues, both foreign and domestic. Moreover, the field stories focused on human rights conditions in China and the official human rights record of China was the content orientation least likely to appear in *Times* stories.

As more research is conducted, key questions might be: What are the factors that kept Times coverage apart from what U.S. President concerned most for a large part of the ten year period? Further research is also needed to answer the following questions: Why does *The Times* tacitly rely on cues about human rights provided by U.S. and other Western officials more than on cues from either Chinese dissident sources or official Chinese sources? What are the effects of such source reliance on media content and public perception about human rights issues? What factors might explain the variation over time in how *The Times* links human rights in China with other issues, both foreign and domestic, in American politics? And how and why do such issue linkages not only vary over time but also displace or replace each other on *The Times'* agenda?

Research findings related to these and other agenda-setting questions could prove useful in understanding the relationship between the media and government agenda, and expanding upon a core assumption of hegemony theory and the Galtung-Ruge model;

namely, that mass communication about issues of importance to the West by an elite, dominant U.S. medium may in itself be an act of hegemony.

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[27] Intercoder reliability for nominal variables at assumed 90 percent agreement (using Lacy and Riffe's formula and Scott's Pi), $P < .05$, Dateline, 1.0, newspot, 1.0, newspeg, .83, content orientation, .80, sources, .80-.96, topic, .82; Ratio variables (using Pearson's correlation coefficient), $P < .01$, Human Rights reference, $.97 \pm .02$, Trade reference, $.93 \pm .02$.

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Figure 1

Comparison of U.S. President Documents on Human Rights in China and The New York Times Stories about Human Rights in China (1987-1996)

(The New York Times n=174)



Figure 2

Comparison of U.S. President Documents on U.S.-China Trade and The New York Times Stories about Human Rights in China (1987-1996)

(The New York Times n=174)



Table 1

Comparison of Chinese Officials and U.S. Officials as Sources of Stories about Human Rights in China

Percent of Total Stories (n=174)

Source	*Frequency*	*Percentage*
Sources by Country		
Chinese Officials	74	43%*
US Officials Total	106	61%*
Source by Type **		
White House	48	28%
Congress	33	19%
State Department	64	37%
US Officials	59	34%
International Organization	53	31%
Chinese Officials	74	43%
Chinese Dissident	25	14%
Anonymous	13	7.5%
Other	91	52%

* Difference of Proportion Test, Z score = 4.8, P < .01

** One story might contain more than one source. So the summing up of percentage of source by type exceeds 100%.

Figure 1

Comparison of References to Trade and References to Human Rights in Stories about Human Rights in China (1987-1996)

(n=174)



Total Reference of Trade = 381
Total Reference of Human Rights = 834

Table 2

Comparison of Stories and References to Human Rights
In New York Times' Coverage of Human Rights in China (1987-1996)
(N=616 n=174)

Year	*Stories*		*Human Rights Ref*		*Mean per Story***	*Std Err*
1987	9	1.5%	26	3.1%	2.9	0.51
1988	9	1.5%	25	3.0%	2.8	0.49
1989	60	10%	57	6.8%	3.6	0.82
1990	34	5.5%	27	3.2%	2.7	0.54
1991	54	9%	57	6.8%	3.8	0.88
1992	60	10%	54	6.5%	3.9	0.48
1993	89	14%	128	15.3%	6.7	1.45
1994	128	21%	272	32.6%	7.2	0.8
1995	105	17%	113	13.5%	3.8	0.45
1996	68	11%	75	9.0%	5.4	1.3
Total	616	100%	834	100%	4.8	0.32

N = Population, all articles on Human Rights in China during 1987-1996.
n = Sample, 25% of articles on Human Rights in China during the time frame. With oversampling in 1987 and 1988, n equals 28% of the population. The total references of Human Rights in 1987 and 1988 are counted according to the oversampling, and are about 4 times inflated in the graph comparing to other years.
** One way ANOVA, F = 3.5, DF = 9, P < .01